Economic bulletin [July 2009] by Banco de España
ECONOMIC BULLETIN 0/20
ECONOMIC BULLETIN JULY 2009 
All of the Banco de España’s regular reports
and publications can be found on the Internet
at http://www.bde.es
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted
provided that the source is acknowledged.
© Banco de España, Madrid, 2009
ISSN: 1130 - 4987 (print)
ISSN: 1695 - 9086 (online)
Depósito legal: M. 31904 - 1990
Printed in Spain by Artes Gráficas Coyve, S. A.
ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using the 
alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EEK (Estonia kroon)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia LVL (Latvian lats)
LT Lithuania LTL (Lithuanian litas)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignifi cance
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the fi nal digit shown in the series.
ABCP Asset-backed commercial paper
AIAF Association of Securities Dealers
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Offi ce
CCR Central Credit Register
CEBS Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CEIPOS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors
CEMLA Center for Latin American Monetary Studies
CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CIIs Collective Investment Institutions
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer price index
DGSFP Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds
EAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Defi cit Procedure
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Offi cial Spanish Labour Force Survey
ERDF European Regional Development Fund
ESA 79 European System of Integrated Economic Accounts
ESA 95 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro Interbank Offered Rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Offi ce of the European Communities
FAFA Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fi xed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
ICO Offi cial Credit Institute
IGAE National Audit Offi ce
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
INEM National Public Employment Service
MBSs Mortgage-backed securities
MEW Mortgage equity withdrawal
MFIs Monetary fi nancial institutions
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
MROs Main refi nancing operations
NAIRU Non-accelerating-infl ation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NPISHs Non-profi t institutions serving households
NRPs National Reforms Programmes
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
RoW Rest of the World
SCLV Securities Clearing and Settlement Service
SDRs Special drawing rights
SEPA Single European Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SIVs Structured investment vehicles
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement
Express Transfer system
TFP Total factor productivity
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value added tax
XBRL Extensible Business Reporting Language
ECONOMIC BULLETIN JULY 2009 
CONTENTS
Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, to the  
Parliamentary Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs 11
Quarterly report on the Spanish economy
1  Overview 23
2  The external environment of the euro area 32
3  The euro area and the monetary policy of the European Central Bank 39
4  The Spanish economy 54
5  Financial developments 70
Results of non-financial corporations in 2009 Q1 85
The functioning of the labour market and unemployment growth in Spain  103
Pros and cons of various fiscal measures to stimulate the economy  123
Survey of non-financial corporations on conditions of access to credit 145
The economic and financial crisis, policy responses and their impact on public finances. A  
global perspective   159
Financial regulation: 2009 Q2  179
Economic indicators 1*
Articles in English and publications of the Banco de España 67*
TESTIMONY OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA,
MIGUEL FERNÁNDEZ ORDÓÑEZ, TO THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC 
AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 TESTIMONY OF THE GOVERNOR TO THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez,
to the Parliamentary Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs
The performance of the Spanish economy referred to in the annual report of the Banco de 
España forming the subject-matter of this appearance before Parliament is, as you know, set 
against a background of fi nancial and economic crisis which is worldwide and without prece-
dent for many decades.
The origin of the crisis – which dates back to the summer of 2007 – was eminently fi nancial 
and its propagation was hastened by the globalisation of fi nancial activity. The activity of the 
international fi nancial markets suffered severely, practically coming to a standstill in some of 
them. The fi nancial tension reached its peak in October 2008 and, although it has ebbed in 
recent months, still remains at relatively high levels.
The seriousness of the fi nancial shocks prompted a deep real crisis which affected the world 
economy with unheard-of intensity and simultaneity, pushing most developed countries into 
recession at the end of 2008. From 2008 Q4 contractions were seen in the activity of many 
countries and in world trade, which worsened in the fi rst quarter of this year. However, activity 
may have already bottomed in that period, since the most recent indicators suggest that, al-
though production will probably continue to decline, it will do so more moderately, which 
seems to indicate that the risk of a recessionary spiral in the world economy is more remote.
The dimensions of this crisis and the multiplicity of its ramifi cations mean that a response on 
various fronts is required to prevent it from recurring. It is evident that the fi nancial crisis has 
revealed numerous shortcomings in fi nancial regulation, which must be dealt with promptly. 
Moreover, it is necessary to analyse why the structural weaknesses of economies and of fi nan-
cial systems were not detected or corrected in time, thereby permitting a contagion of consid-
erable size to be triggered. With the benefi t of hindsight, it seems clear that the economic 
policies of past years were generally too permissive of the imbalances generated by the grow-
ing indebtedness during the high-growth stage.
It is therefore essential for the authorities to examine critically the institutional and regulatory 
frameworks of their economies and fi nancial systems and design mechanisms to reinforce 
them, so that mechanisms can be set in place to prevent a crisis like this one from being re-
peated.
That review should encompass various basic areas. I will leave for later those concerned with 
fi nancial regulation and supervision policies and will now focus on the need for examining the 
role of macroeconomic policies. This examination should assess the part played by them in the 
gestation of the crisis and analyse how their design can be optimised to make it more suitable 
for correcting imbalances such as those seen in recent years. In the fi scal policy sphere, the 
lack of a more powerful stabilising role in the high-growth years was noted with regret, since it 
would have balanced the momentum of private spending and helped to keep public fi nances 
on a more sustainable path in the medium and long term. In regard to monetary policy, more 
attention must be paid to the role of central banks in stability strategies.
Many of the measures adopted by economic and monetary authorities in recent months were 
based on common principles agreed jointly in the framework of different international fora. In 
the case of the European Central bank, unprecedented expansionary measures were set in 
train to alleviate the contractionary trends apparent both in the real economy and in the fi nan-
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cial sector. The provision of liquidity was made more fl exible from the very summer of 2007, 
although it was from October 2008 when the changes became more substantial, since institu-
tions’ requests for liquidity began to be met in full and the range of fi nancial assets eligible as 
collateral for those operations was widened. Since summer 2008, the policy interest rate has 
fallen by 325 basis points to stand, following the meeting last May, at a historical low of 1%. In 
the fi eld of exceptional measures, mention should be made, among others, of the lengthening 
of the periods for which liquidity is provided, which now extend up to 12 months, and the re-
cent decision to admit the outright acquisition of mortgage covered bonds.
Governments have also adopted numerous measures to combat the fi nancial crisis. They fall 
into two broad groups: those intended to support the fi nancial systems and those designed to 
boost spending. The fi rst group includes a wide variety of instruments ranging from the exten-
sion of bank deposit guarantees, through the granting of State guarantees for bank securities 
issues, to the injection of government capital in some institutions and the purchase of problem 
assets forming part of bank portfolios. Of the measures to stimulate demand, mention should 
be made of the operation of automatic fi scal stabilisers, which are very important in the Euro-
pean economies, and of the specifi c government spending or tax cutting measures to support 
the groups or sectors hardest hit by the crisis.
The measures by the Spanish authorities generally follow these same lines. Thus in Spain they 
are as follows: deposit guarantees were extended, a Fund for the Acquisition of Financial As-
sets was set up to purchase high-quality assets from Spanish institutions; guarantees are 
being granted for the issuance of bank bonds; the opening of diverse lines of special fi nancing 
through the ICO was approved; new personal income tax credits were introduced; and the 
so-called State Fund for Local Investment and the Special State Fund to Invigorate the Econ-
omy came into operation. More recently, new measures to spur demand (such as car pur-
chase assistance) have been announced, and the fi nishing touches are being put to a Bank 
Restructuring and Organisation Fund, which will serve as a tool for revamping the Spanish fi -
nancial system.
Let me now focus my attention on the situation of the Spanish economy. The international 
crisis came at a particularly delicate time for Spain, since the economy was already undergo-
ing the adjustment of certain imbalances which had accumulated during the long stage of high 
growth from the mid-1990s. The imbalances in Spain had some points in common with those 
detected at global level, but also some specifi c features.
As in other countries, the buoyancy of private sector spending in Spain was based on a rapid 
increase in household and corporate debt, spurred by low initial levels of debt and by favour-
able fi nancial conditions arising from a monetary policy stance which during that period was 
too lax for the conditions of the Spanish economy. The fi nancial laxity also led to an excessive 
concentration of economic and fi nancial resources in the real estate sector, and this subse-
quently added to the severity of the adjustment phase. For its part, fi scal policy undertook a 
signifi cant process of consolidation, but its contribution to the moderation of domestic de-
mand was not suffi cient to offset the effects of the monetary laxity.
As you are well aware, the Spanish economy underwent a very severe adjustment in the second 
half of 2008: GDP showed negative quarter-on-quarter growth rates from Q3 onwards, increas-
ingly so until 2009 Q1, in which activity decreased by 1.9% with respect to the previous quarter, 
this coming on top of the fall-off of 1% in the fourth quarter of last year. This contraction led to a 
year-on-year fall of 3% in GDP in 2009 Q1. The economic data for Q2 are not yet conclusive, but 
in any event suggest that activity is not contracting as quickly as in the previous quarter.
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In the Spanish recession, the strong impact of the international fi nancial crisis was superim-
posed on the real estate adjustment, which had begun to have an effect some time before. 
The size of the resulting shock was substantial and it deeply affected the confi dence of agents 
and depressed spending decisions and employment behaviour.
A notable development in 2008 was the sharp decrease in household spending, which hit both 
consumption and residential investment. But the worsening of the fi nancial crisis from summer 
onwards and the deterioration of the macroeconomic outlook meant that other items were 
also affected, for instance corporate investment. This sharp fall in domestic demand brought 
a substantial decrease in imports and, as a result, the contribution of net external demand to 
GDP improved, dampening the fall-off in activity.
The contraction of private spending meant that some of the imbalances accumulated in previ-
ous years began to be adjusted. Net lending by households increased, with a notable rise in 
the rate of saving, and net borrowing by fi rms decreased. All this was refl ected in a fall in the 
nation’s net borrowing, the rate of which has gradually quickened over the last few quarters.
The weakness in activity gradually spread to all productive sectors, with decreases in employ-
ment, initially in construction but subsequently in industry and, fi nally, services. There was thus 
widespread job destruction, which became extremely intense in late 2008 and early 2009, and 
a very substantial increase in the unemployment rate to 17.4% in 2009 Q1.
While the recession in Spain in terms of GDP growth is less serious than in other European 
countries, the sharp increase in the unemployment rate is a characteristic feature of Spain 
which is particularly harmful and reveals a basic weakness of its institutional structure which 
must be corrected.
One of the problems of the workings of the labour market relates to the insensitivity of labour 
costs to the particular conditions of each fi rm or to changes in the business cycle. Specifi cally, 
in 2008 labour costs increased markedly, a development which refl ected the deteriorating in-
fl ation owing to the sharp oil price rises in the fi rst half of the year. Although pressure from 
wage costs seems to have begun to ease in 2009, their rate of change is insuffi cient with re-
spect to the path of infl ation and to the recession currently besetting the economy, and, ac-
cordingly, the resulting real wage growth will not be conducive to job creation.
In recent months it has become apparent that the current recession, which is sharply affecting 
household consumption, is also causing downward revision of prices and margins. Thus in 
May the year-on-year rate of change of the CPI was -0.9%, the lowest level since the mid-
1900s, 0.9 pp below the euro area infl ation rate. Although by the end of the year these year-
on-year rates will foreseeably turn positive again once the statistical effect linked to the oil price 
rises in the early months of 2008 peters out, it was nonetheless notable that May saw year-on-
year decreases in food and industrial goods prices. Also, in services, which is traditionally the 
most infl ationary component of the Spanish economy, a gradual moderation is taking place. 
This price behaviour is in the appropriate vein for improving the competitiveness of the econ-
omy, reducing the costs of the recession and initiating a solid recovery.
The outlook for the Spanish economy is that GDP may continue contracting for the rest of the 
year. The resulting fall for 2009 as a whole will be very substantial, although probably less than 
in other European countries, more affected by the slump in world trade in recent months. Al-
though GDP may continue to fall in 2010 in annual average terms, it will do so at a less pro-
nounced rate, since the wide range of measures taken should gradually moderate the inten-
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sity of the shocks constraining activity. However, given the extent of the adjustments bearing 
on employment, the unemployment rate may yet remain on an upward path.
It is true that some imbalances accumulated during the expansion are being corrected. As just 
mentioned, the infl ation differential with respect to the euro area is now favourable to Spain, 
while the external defi cit is falling sharply in a trend which will foreseeably continue, such that, 
as a ratio of GDP, in 2010 it will fall to less than half its value in 2007. Although Spain should 
insist on reabsorbing these imbalances, it is undeniable that the improvements obtained are 
linked to an abrupt contraction in demand, with highly negative effects on the unemployment 
rate and the productive system. It is thus essential to change certain aspects of Spain’s insti-
tutional framework to prevent these losses of jobs and productive capacity from becoming 
entrenched and hindering recovery and to ensure that the imbalances of recent years do not 
reappear when demand starts to grow again.
In the recovery of the Spanish economy, as in the case of the world economy, a major contri-
bution will be made by the special measures adopted in demand-side (monetary and fi scal) 
policies and in fi nancial system support. However, in Spain, where domestic demand is very 
much affected by the need to strengthen the fi nancial position of the private sector and by the 
impact of the high unemployment rate, reliance will have to be placed on the recovery of ex-
ternal demand as the principal driver of spending. To capitalise on the improvement in external 
demand when it comes, fi rms will have to be able to offer competitive products, and to do this 
they will have to increase their productivity and adjust their costs, margins and prices fl exibly.
The substantial cuts in offi cial rates of central banks throughout the world in the past year have 
prompted a signifi cant drop in the cost of fi nancing. In Spain the resulting expansionary stimu-
lus is particularly powerful because of the predominance of variable-rate fi nancing. This boost 
will be particularly notable in certain sectors, such as residential construction, in which the 
combination of lower interest rates and price adjustments will make houses more affordable 
for households.
As in other countries, fi scal policy in Spain also contributed to cushioning the decrease in ac-
tivity, through both the action of automatic stabilisers and the adoption of diverse discretionary 
measures. This fi scal effort, of considerable size, generally exceeds that of other EU countries. 
Moreover, in Spain, the loss of revenue due to weaker spending came on top of the drying-up 
of the wind-fall revenues made possible by the housing boom of the past decade. All this 
meant that the general government balance worsened considerably, swinging from a surplus 
of more than 2% of GDP in 2007 to a defi cit which, according to the latest fi gures announced 
by the government, may stand at nearly 10% of GDP in the current year.
These developments have exhausted the possibilities of expansionary fi scal policy action. The 
fi scal imbalance has reached a level at which a corrective strategy is required, and this strat-
egy must be credible so that agents trust that budgetary stability will be maintained in the 
medium run. In this respect, the government has just announced the budgetary stability tar-
gets for the period 2010-2012 committing it to an enormous effort in fi scal consolidation. It 
aims to cut the defi cit from the nearly 10% of GDP that may be reached in 2009 to 3% in 2012, 
thereby complying with the guidelines set for Spain by the European Council in respect of 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. The size of the envisaged correction in such a 
short space of time calls for a strict budget outturn and the adoption of energetic measures. 
The recent increase in some indirect taxes is an initial step in this direction, although past ex-
perience shows that for fi scal consolidation processes to be successful, they must focus on 
cutting government spending, particularly that which is unproductive. In this respect, the re-
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gional governments, given their share of government spending, will have to contribute actively 
to getting the country back onto the path of fi scal consolidation and budgetary stability.
In any event, although monetary and fi scal policies have played an extremely important role in 
offsetting the huge contractionary forces bearing on economies, this policy support cannot 
continue to be relied on once the recovery commences. Governments and central banks have 
to design “exit strategies” for terminating the current extraordinary fi scal and monetary policy 
action, so as to prevent future processes of economic instability from taking root. For this 
purpose, the policy effort will have to concentrate on reforms aimed at improving the produc-
tivity and performance of the factor and product markets. Unlike in the fi eld of demand-side 
policies, here the room for action is ample and, in addition, its potential effects are signifi cant.
As noted above, one of the main problems of the Spanish economy lies in the labour market. 
The current crisis has caused the unemployment rate to surge once again, reminding us that 
adjustment in the Spanish economy basically takes place through job destruction. Action is 
needed to prevent the higher numbers of unemployed from becoming a permanent phenom-
enon and their level of employability from deteriorating rapidly. Action is also needed to enable 
the rapid reallocation of resources across sectors, so that the slack in real estate activity can 
be smoothly taken up by other productive sectors.
The labour reform is unavoidable and must address different areas. In the fi eld of collective 
bargaining, it seems that labour and remuneration conditions have to adjust more fl exibly to 
the economic situation, particularly that currently being faced by fi rms or specifi c productive 
sectors. It is also vital to make changes to the recruitment systems and to improve the labour 
market intermediation systems and the mobility and training of the unemployed, so that work-
ers who have lost their jobs can fi nd new opportunities promptly. These reforms would not only 
improve the medium-term growth outlook of the Spanish economy, but would also help to 
prevent deterioration of the productive system.
Obviously, although the labour market is important, it is not the only area calling for reform by 
the Spanish authorities. Closely linked to the labour market is the issue of human capital and 
education, where it bears repeating that, although the returns are primarily in the medium term, 
the need for reform is urgent. Finally, in Spain it is essential to establish a much more solid 
competitive environment, in which fi rms can operate more effi ciently and on an equal footing 
with those of other countries. Services play a key role in this environment since they account 
for a growing share of industrial activities. Furthermore, the lack of liberalisation of some seg-
ments may be limiting their expansion. This is particularly pernicious because the services 
sector encompasses some of the most dynamic activities with the greatest capacity to gener-
ate employment. In this respect, the government’s recently proposed initiative to implement 
the Services Directive through a draft law involving action in numerous areas must be applied 
resolutely, and, for this purpose, regional and local government will have to cooperate in their 
areas of competence. Also, fomenting competition in the network industries would enable in-
puts to be supplied to other productive activities under more competitive conditions.
To conclude, let me briefl y review the situation of the Spanish banking system.
The distinguishing feature of the situation in Spain is that this crisis found Spanish credit institu-
tions in a relatively strong position. Their business model was the traditional one, focused on 
the retail segment and evolving separately from those more sophisticated models which have 
seriously damaged the institutions – and even the entire fi nancial systems – of other countries. 
This explains why the weight of toxic assets in the balance sheets of Spanish institutions is 
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insignifi cant. Also, the Banco de España helped to strengthen the starting position of Spanish 
institutions vis-à-vis the crisis, since it required anticyclical provisions to be set up to lessen the 
pressure in tougher times and it defi ned suffi ciently wide scopes of consolidation for banking 
groups to enable accurate valuation of the risks assumed.
These strong starting conditions enabled the Spanish fi nancial system to withstand the fi rst 
wave of the fi nancial crisis and to continue channelling the necessary infl ow of foreign saving, 
although by different routes, since the paralysis of the securitised asset markets meant that 
alternative sources, such as short-term paper issuance and ECB loans, had to be tapped. 
Deposits gained in relative weight during the fi rst phase of the tensions.
However, the transformation of the fi nancial crisis in recession gave rise to a second wave of 
risks for fi nancial stability, this time of an eminently macroeconomic nature. Although the Span-
ish fi nancial system faces this second wave with the relative advantage of having been less 
damaged by the fi rst, the deterioration of the Spanish economy unquestionably puts pressure 
on bank income statements in a number of ways.
Specifi cally, job destruction is impairing some households’ ability to pay, while the decline in 
activity is being particularly noticed in the real estate sector, which required abundant fi nancing 
and had acquired a high relative weight in the balance sheets of some institutions. Hence, after 
a long period of economic expansion in which doubtful assets ratios fell to historical lows, 
since 2008 they have been rising signifi cantly and foreseeably the pressure has not yet run its 
course. In addition, lending activity has slowed substantially as a result of both demand-side 
and supply-side factors, and lending can be expected to grow more slowly than GDP in the 
coming months, as has occurred in other similar cycles.
These two factors – slower banking business growth and rising bad debts – put pressure 
on Spanish banks’ income statements in 2008. However, the traditional banking model, 
much less dependent on fi nancial market performance, along with the still-favourable rates 
at which spreads were holding, allowed earnings to remain positive despite the diffi cult 
economic situation.
However, this pressure on Spanish institutions’ income can be expected to continue in the future 
due to the foreseeable increase in bad debts and, in the more medium term, to the downward 
pressure that the competition for funding will put on operating margins, against a background of 
deleverage of the fi nancial sector and, in general, of the economy, which is taking place both in 
Spain and globally and which cannot be considered a temporary phenomenon.
I am convinced that the Spanish fi nancial system can overcome these challenges, although, 
as I have repeated on various occasions, banks will not be immune to the crisis and not all of 
them start from the same position when it comes to confronting this diffi cult stage, since they 
followed different credit policies in the past and managed their risks in different ways. In any 
event, banks necessarily have to adapt to the new circumstances, and so have to rationalise 
their operating cost structures and correct the excess capacity of the sector.
The fi nancial system plays a central role in any economy, since it is fundamental in the alloca-
tion of fi nancial resources. This role explains why the State, like other governments, has shown 
its readiness to provide capital to the viable credit institutions that need it. These contributions 
of capital must not, of course, be unconditional, but rather subject to the restructuring of the 
institutions that receive those public funds, so as to seek both the lowest cost for taxpayers 
and maximum effi ciency of the system. It should be noted that, moreover, this approach is 
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fully in line with the common principles agreed in international fora and expressly backed by 
this Parliament with a broad consensus. I trust that these principles and this spirit of coopera-
tion in matters of general interest related to the stability and strength of the Spanish fi nancial 
system can soon be manifested in a set of legal provisions which will strengthen the capacity 
to take action as and when problems arise, in line with the tradition of the Banco de España 
and in accordance with the specifi city of the serious tensions now being faced.
QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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1 Overview
During 2009 Q1, the pace of the contraction in the Spanish economy intensifi ed, in a highly 
unfavourable international environment and a fi nancial setting marked by substantial tension. 
GDP fell by 3% in year-on-year terms and its quarter-on-quarter rate stood at –1.9%. The fall-
off in economic activity was due to the collapse of national demand (by 5% year-on-year), 
since the contribution of net external demand to GDP continued to be positive at 2.3 pp, as a 
result of a slump in imports which exceeded the likewise marked weakening in exports. 
The indicators available for Q2 augur a prolongation of the contractionary trends, albeit at a 
more contained pace, in an environment marked by some normalisation of fi nancial markets 
and less severe external conditions. The estimates made drawing on the as yet incomplete 
conjunctural information available point to a quarter-on-quarter decline in GDP of 0.9% (less 
pronounced than in the two preceding quarters), although the year-on-year rate, subject by 
defi nition to greater inertia, is expected to have continued trending down, posting a decline of 
4%. On the expenditure side, there was a further reduction in national demand, with a year-on-
year rate of change of –6%, while net external demand showed a slight increase, contributing 
2.4 pp to GDP. On the supply side, the bulk of the adjustment fell once again on the manufac-
turing industry and construction branches, although in this latter case the rate of decline of 
activity moderated owing to the effects of the start-up of the civil engineering projects included 
in the State Fund for Local Investment. In the labour market, the rate of decline of employment 
slowed somewhat, in line with the information provided by the EPA for Q2, which shows a 
decline of 7.2% year-on-year and a fresh increase – albeit at a lesser pace than in previous 
quarters – in the unemployment rate to 17.9%, and the rate of increase of compensation per 
employee once again outpaced infl ation. Finally, the rate of change of the CPI fell substantially 
in the period from April to June, posting a fi gure of –1% in this latter month, meaning the dif-
ferential with the euro area was once again negative (–0.9 pp), for the seventh month run-
ning. 
On the international economic front, the tension on fi nancial markets furthered the correction 
initiated in March, although global funding conditions remained restrictive, and the sharp de-
clines in trade fl ows seen in previous months slackened. In these circumstances, GDP in the 
developed economies is estimated to have fallen once more in Q2, albeit on a somewhat 
lesser scale than in Q1, and the slowdown in the emerging economies is expected to have 
moderated in the face of the recovery in the Chinese economy, in response to the large-scale 
fi scal stimulus and liquidity expansion plans pursued. Global infl ation continued to fall, with 
negative fi gures being posted in the United States, Japan, the euro area and some emerging 
economies. Oil and, to a lesser extent, other commodities prices rose notably, though they 
have eased in recent weeks.
The diminished contraction in activity and the signs of stabilisation on international fi nancial 
markets have brought the trajectory of continuous downward revisions to growth projections 
for the world economy to a halt, although the diagnosis of the – foreseeably lengthy – duration 
of the recession and the – prospectively very gradual – exit therefrom has not substantially al-
tered.
In the period under study, governments and central banks extended the macroeconomic stim-
ulus and fi nancial support and restructuring measures set in train in the previous months. In 
the United States, the government unveiled a plan for the regulatory reform of the fi nancial 
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system; among other aspects, it will increase the supervisory powers of the Federal Reserve 
and will provide for tighter control of the risk in complex fi nancial assets. In Europe, the pursuit 
of bank guarantee and recapitalisation schemes continued, and certain proposals for the re-
structuring of banks’ assets began to take specifi c shape. On 27 June the Spanish govern-
ment approved the creation of the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB by its Spanish 
acronym) with the aim of extending and reinforcing the instruments with which to develop a 
bank restructuring strategy that will allow for an increase in the resilience and solvency of the 
Spanish fi nancial system in the face of the potential effects of the recession. 
Over the course of the quarter, public fi nances have deteriorated considerably and globally as 
a result of the operation of the automatic stabilisers, the discretionary measures to stimulate 
aggregate demand and the actions to support the fi nancial system. The scale of the change 
has shifted the economic policy debate towards the need to ensure the compatibility of the 
stimulus measures with credible fi scal consolidation strategies that will guarantee the sustain-
ability of public fi nances in the medium term. 
Meanwhile, central banks continued to provide an unlimited supply of liquidity and, in some 
cases, they made further cuts to intervention rates, from what were already very low starting 
levels, following the forceful cuts made in the preceding months. The US Federal Reserve held 
its offi cial interest rate in a range of 0% to 0.25% and continued to conduct extraordinary 
monetary policy operations (essentially through asset purchases), although it began to reduce 
the amount and frequency of some of them. The Bank of England did not alter the level of its 
offi cial rate, which has held at 0.5% since January, and continued to pursue its government 
bond purchase programme. Finally, the ECB Council cut its main refi nancing operations (MRO) 
rate by 25 bp in May, to 1%, while its deposit and marginal lending facility rates were set at 
0.25% and 1.75%, respectively. Accordingly, the current MRO rate stands 325 bp below its 
October 2008 level. In parallel, the ECB reinforced its policy of abundant liquidity provision, 
establishing a longer-term fi nancing operation maturing at 12 months (the fi rst of these was 
conducted on 24 June, with somewhat more than €440 billion being allotted). In addition, it 
began in July to apply extraordinary monetary policy measures that it had earlier announced in 
May. These involve a programme to purchase guaranteed bonds and covered bonds issued in 
the euro area. 
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This raft of measures has meant that, during Q2, the improvement in the fi nancial stress indica-
tors dating back to March has continued, in a climate of lessening uncertainty which, in prior 
months, had begun to stimulate the demand for higher-risk assets. Interbank market interest 
rates continued to fall, substantially narrowing the spread between these and rates on guaran-
teed bank transactions. Risk premia on credit derivatives markets also declined notably and, 
on equity markets, stock market prices continued on the upward trajectory on which they 
embarked in March, evidencing notably diminished volatility. Finally, on the government debt 
markets, there was a generalised rise in yields on sovereign bonds, chiefl y as a consequence 
of the return of fi nancial fl ows towards higher-risk assets and of the greater caution elicited by 
the increase in public debt. 
In the euro area, the conjunctural indicators available also point to some moderation in the rate 
of decline of activity as a result of a smaller fall in private consumption, a somewhat less nega-
tive contribution of external demand and lower destocking. The infl ation rate continued to fall 
in Q2, posting a negative fi gure in June (–0.1%) for the fi rst time in the history of EMU. The 
reduction in the infl ation rate was essentially in response to base effects in energy prices and, 
to a lesser extent, to the slowdown in services prices, linked partly to the slackness of de-
mand. The decline in core infl ation was much more moderate, standing at 1.3% in June.
Overall, then, the external environment of the Spanish economy has become less contraction-
ary and fi nancing conditions, though they remain restrictive, are showing signs of some im-
provement. On one hand, the decline in interbank yields continued feeding through to private-
sector bank fi nancing costs, unevenly across the different segments; on the other, fi nancial 
institutions further tightened their lending standards, albeit to a lesser extent than in previous 
quarters. Elsewhere, the positive trajectory of stock market prices helped to offset the declines 
recorded in the opening months of the year (the IBEX posted gains of close to 13% in this 
period) and to recuperate to some extent this component of fi nancial wealth. Conversely, the 
1.9% fall in property prices in Q2 (–8.3% in year-on-year terms) led to further declines in the 
value of private-sector wealth.  
Against this background, household spending fell off once more in Q2, although it is estimated 
that the rate of decline of fi nal consumption will slow, potentially to a year-on-year rate of 
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–4.6% (–4% in the previous three months). Consumption decisions continued to be highly in-
fl uenced by the generalised weakening of the attendant main determinants (disposable in-
come and wealth), although agents’ confi dence improved substantially during the quarter after 
having been very depressed since the start of the fi nancial crisis. Developments in disposable 
income were determined by the deterioration in earnings, as a result of the unfavourable labour 
market situation. The scale of this effect could not be countered by the impact of general gov-
ernment (through higher social benefi ts and lower taxes), the decline in interest payments 
(which, according to the quarterly non-fi nancial accounts, began to be observable already in 
the previous quarter) and the substantial cut in infl ation. The reduction in wealth also contin-
ued, above all as a result of developments in its real estate component, as earlier indicated. 
Consequently, a further increase in the household saving rate is expected, following its rise in 
Q1 to 14.1% of disposable income in four-quarter cumulated fl ows, a fi gure 4 pp up on the 
same period a year earlier. 
On the contrary, the weakness of residential investment intensifi ed, infl uenced by expectations 
of falling prices, uncertainty over income growth prospects and continuing restrictive fi nancing 
conditions globally. That said, some signs of improved access to fi nancing are becoming dis-
cernible. Overall, a year-on-year decline in residential investment of around 25% is expected 
for Q2. The downward revision of household spending plans, along with continuing restrictive 
fi nancing conditions, drove the slowdown in debt, the growth of which in year-on-year terms 
stood below 1%, affecting both loans for house purchases and consumer credit and other 
lending. This, in turn, provided for a slight reduction in the debt/GDI ratio. 
Turning to business investment, spending on capital goods contracted once more. That is 
consistent with the sluggishness of demand, in both its domestic and external components, 
with continuing restrictive fi nancing conditions (despite the cut in interest rates) and with un-
certain prospects concerning economic recovery and very negative earnings expectations. 
However, it is estimated that other private productive investment fell somewhat less markedly 
owing to the impulse that is being given to certain infrastructure development plans, as re-
fl ected in the National Accounts fi gures for Q1. The fall in business investment and the restric-
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tiveness of the supply of bank funds meant that borrowing by non-fi nancial corporations con-
tinued to slow, to a rate of 5%, compared with the same period in 2008. The sector’s 
borrowing needs diminished once again in Q1 to 6.4% of GDP, in terms of four-quarter cumu-
lated fl ows, 4.6 pp down on a year earlier. 
Set against the decline in the various components of private domestic demand, the general 
government sector contributed to sustaining expenditure by means of sizeable net transfers to 
households and through public investment, with the start-up of the projects included in the 
State Fund for Local Investment. The government announced new measures to support eco-
nomic activity, which will come into force in 2009 and 2010. These include most notably direct 
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assistance with car purchases (Plan 2000E), given their greater potential impact on the indus-
try in the short term. In this connection, and despite the fact a fresh cut in State spending was 
also approved, general government spending has increased notably in the year to date, while 
the declining course of tax revenue has steepened, with very negative rates of change. The 
interplay of all these factors led to a further deterioration in public fi nances, prompting the 
government to raise the projected defi cit in 2009 and to announce an adjustment path that 
might involve posting a budget defi cit of 3% in 2012, in line with the guidelines laid down for 
Spain by the European Council regarding compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (see 
Box 1).
As regards the external sector, net external demand once again alleviated the effect of the fall 
in domestic spending on economic activity, with a positive contribution to GDP growth of 2.4 pp, 
slightly up on that in Q1. With the phase of the maximum contraction in international trade 
fl ows behind, the positive contribution of net exports was mainly due to the reduction in im-
ports, which were more than 20% down, the decline being induced by the collapse in fi nal 
demand and by industrial production. In any event, exports fell again, albeit less than in Q1, 
despite the more favourable behaviour of the price-competitiveness indices vis-à-vis the de-
veloped countries. This situation spread to some extent to trade in services, with the decline 
in services revenue easing, particularly in the case of tourist services, although expenditure 
continued on a declining course. 
In step with these developments, the nation’s net borrowing once again fell signifi cantly in Q1 
to 8.4% of GDP, in terms of four-quarter cumulated fl ows, 1.6 pp down on a year earlier ac-
cording to data from the non-fi nancial accounts of the institutional sectors. The Balance of 
Payments fi gures to April confi rm this trend, as they show a decline in the defi cit of almost 40% 
year-on-year, the result of the intensifying adjustment of the trade defi cit, which fell over this 
period by 51% and, to a lesser extent, of the balances on current transfers and on services, 
while the incomes defi cit widened. 
On the supply side, following the substantial deterioration seen in Q1, value added in the mar-
ket economy contracted in Q2 but, as in the case of GDP, at a somewhat less pronounced 
rate. The decline in activity was across all the productive branches, except agriculture and 
fi sheries, which showed a recovery. In the construction sector, the slowdown in the rate of 
deterioration of value added was due to the effects of the start-up of the projects included in 
the State Fund for Local Investment, which are boosting the civil engineering component; 
conversely, there is no evidence of the contractionary trends in the residential sector easing. 
Industrial activity continued to fall, and services, which are generally posting more contained 
declines, showed no signs of stabilising, beyond what might be related to purely seasonal 
activities. Against this backdrop the employment adjustment continued in Q2, albeit with 
somewhat less intensity than in the two previous quarters, in particular in the construction sec-
tor, for the reasons stated earlier. Overall, the increases in apparent labour productivity are 
expected to have held at a relatively high level (3.2%), similar to that in the opening months of 
the year, chiefl y refl ecting the decline in employment.
The rate of increase of labour costs fell moderately, though less than might be expected in the 
face of the severe weakening in the labour market. Moreover, there are some signs that wage 
restraint might be coming to a halt. For one thing, the wage rates arising from collective bar-
gaining show increases that are practically unchanged since the start of the year (with rates of 
2.7% to June), stemming from the fact that, under bargaining, newly signed agreements are 
registering higher increases than those in revised agreements (2.9% and 2.7%, respectively). 
For another, the existence of positive wage drift this year, linked to the effects induced by job 
THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE IN SPAIN BOX 1
Maintaining sound public fi nances is a necessary condition for sus-
tainable economic growth and for the proper functioning of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU). Under these tenets, the Maas-
tricht Treaty laid down various provisions with the aim of ensuring the 
disciplined fi scal behaviour of the Member States. In particular, mem-
bers must avoid “excessive public defi cits”, which are assessed in 
relation to the reference values of 3% and 60% of GDP for the defi cit 
and for public debt, respectively. Further, the Treaty envisages a “pro-
cedure” geared to ensuring the prompt correction of excessive defi -
cits, should these arise. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), ap-
proved by the EU Member States in 1997 and reformed in 2005, 
establishes a set of “preventive measures” so that excessive defi cits 
should not arise, along with “corrective measures” aimed at ensuring 
the rapid and rigorous application of the excessive defi cit procedure, 
including the possible imposition of sanctions. 
During 2008, the euro area’s fi scal policy was infl uenced by the eco-
nomic crisis, which strongly impacted the member countries’ public 
fi nances and led to the adoption of fi scal stimulus measures by the 
economic authorities. In February 2009, the European Commission 
decided to initiate the excessive defi cit procedure for those coun-
tries whose defi cit exceeded the Treaty reference value of 3% of 
GDP in 2008: France, Spain, Ireland, Greece and Malta. In Spain’s 
case, this will be the fi rst time this procedure has been initiated since 
it joined EMU. This Box summarises how the procedure has un-
folded to date and its consequences for Spanish fi scal policy in the 
coming years.
In January 2009, the Spanish government submitted an update of 
the Stability Programme (SP). According to the estimate in this 
update, the general government deficit would have exceeded 3% 
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THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE IN SPAIN (cont’d) BOX 1
of GDP in 20081 (see accompanying table). Accordingly, the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) decided to initiate the excessive deficit 
procedure, drafting the mandatory report in February 2009. This 
report analysed the reasons behind the breach of the 3% thresh-
old and, in particular, it assessed whether this breach could be 
considered as close to the reference value of 3% of GDP, tempo-
rary and due to exceptional circumstances, factors which, should 
they arise in conjunction, prevent deficits above 3% being consid-
ered “excessive”. The EC argued that the breaching of the 3% 
reference value in Spain’s case could not be considered excep-
tional, given that it had not come about from a severe economic 
downturn that year. Indeed, on the EC estimates available at the 
time of the report being drafted, GDP had posted growth of 1.2% 
in 2008, compared with 3.7% the previous year, meaning that the 
estimated output gap remained positive and close to 1% of GDP. 
Nor is it considered that the breach could be temporary, given that 
the deficit will continue widening in 2009. On the basis of this re-
port and of the subsequent opinion of the Economic and Financial 
Committee and of the EC itself, the European Council came to a 
decision on 27 April 2009 on the existence of an excessive deficit 
in Spain.
In parallel, the Council adopted a recommendation2 with a view to 
bringing to an end the situation of an excessive public defi cit in 
Spain, setting a deadline for its correction. As a general rule, the 
SGP establishes that excessive defi cits should be corrected in the 
year following that of the Council’s decision as to its existence, un-
less exceptional circumstances prevail. In this case, the Council 
considered that there were exceptional circumstances in Spain 
and has extended the correction deadline to 2012.3 Moreover, the 
Council indicated that Spain should rigorously apply the budgetary 
targets specifi ed in the SPG to 2011 and make an additional budg-
etary effort in 2012 to reduce the defi cit to below 3% in that year.4 
Specifi cally, Spain should make an annual average fi scal effort 
equivalent to at least 1.25% of GDP, as submitted in the Stability 
Programme5, which should commence in 2010. The Council set a 
period of six months, to 27 October 2009, in which the Spanish au-
thorities should apply effective budgetary adjustment measures.6 Fi-
nally, it highlighted the importance of achieving the medium-term 
objectives (a balanced budget in structural terms) once the excessive 
defi cit has been corrected. At the same time it called for the consoli-
dation process to be compatible with an improvement in the quality 
of public fi nances, and that the sustainability of public fi nances be 
reinforced with the application of further pension system reforms. 
Compliance with the European Council’s recommendations will re-
quire a very great consolidation effort, especially if it is taken into ac-
count that a deterioration in the budgetary situation in 2009 greater 
than that projected in the SP has been forecast. Also, real GDP in the 
Spanish economy is expected to trend more adversely both in 2009 
and in 2010. In this connection, on 8 July 2009 the Spanish Parlia-
ment approved the Budgetary Stability Objectives for the three-year 
period 2010-2012 along with the State non-fi nancial spending ceiling 
for 2010. The Budgetary Stability Objectives foresee a rise in the pub-
lic defi cit to 7.9% of GDP in 2010 and a subsequent progressive re-
duction to 3% of GDP in 2012, in line with the guidelines laid down by 
the European Council. As to State non-fi nancial spending for 2010, 
the year in which the fi scal consolidation process should commence 
according to the recommendations of the European Council, the ceil-
ing has been set in cash-basis terms at €182,439 million, up 13.9% 
on the ceiling approved for 2009. Implicitly, however, the government 
considers there will be an upward deviation in budgetary spending in 
20097, meaning that the ceiling approved for 2010 would involve a 
4.5% reduction relative to the fi nal budget estimated for 2009.
Compliance with the adjustment path described is very important for 
retaining agents’ confi dence in the maintenance of budgetary stabil-
ity in the medium run. In this respect, the scale of the correction pro-
jected in such a short space of time requires a very strict budget 
outturn and the adoption of ambitious measures. Attention must also 
be given not only to the scale of the adjustment but also to its com-
position. Experience shows that for fi scal consolidation processes to 
be successful, they must include cuts in public spending and, in par-
ticular, in unproductive spending. Finally, it is important that all tiers of 
general government and, given their share in public spending, re-
gional governments in particular, should contribute actively to restor-
ing the path of fi scal consolidation and budgetary stability.
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1. At that time the public defi cit estimate for 2008 was 3.4% of GDP. Subse-
quently, at 3.8% of GDP, the defi cit exceeded this estimate by 0.4 pp. 2. On 
the basis of a prior recommendation by the EC. 3. These circumstances 
are, fi rst, the considerable deterioration expected in the economy for 2009 
and 2010 which, on Commission estimates, will be accompanied by a reduc-
tion in potential growth and a signifi cant decline in the output gap; and, sec-
ond, the size of the fi scal adjustment, in excess of 3% of GDP, which would 
require reducing the defi cit to below the reference value in 2010.  4. Moreo-
ver, given that in its assessment of the Stability Programme it had identifi ed 
risks to compliance with budgetary targets, in particular associated with the 
growth assumptions contained in this Programme’s macroeconomic scenario 
and with the absence of any description of specifi c defi cit-correcting meas-
ures, the Council indicated that fi scal efforts additional to those described in 
the Stability Programme might prove necessary if these risks were to materi-
alise.
5. The fi scal effort is measured drawing on the change in the structural budget 
balance.  6. Assessment of the effectiveness of the measures will take into ac-
count economic developments compared with those projected by the Commis-
sion in its January 2009 interim forecasting exercise. 7. The upward deviation in 
spending in 2009 compared with the initial forecast would, according to these 
estimates, be around €32 billion (3% of GDP), which could be explained by the 
approval of various measures during 2009 to combat the economic crisis.
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destruction in low-paid industries, cannot be ruled out. Bearing in mind all these factors, com-
pensation per employee in the market economy is expected to rise by 3.3% in Q2, and al-
though there might be some further slowdown in the second half of the year, this will involve a 
signifi cant rise in labour costs in real terms. Economy-wide the estimated increase is some-
what higher, owing to the upward effect exerted by public-sector wages in the current circum-
stances.
The correction initiated in infl ation in the closing months of 2008 proceeded more sharply, with 
increasingly negative fi gures in the January-June period. In this latter month the CPI posted a 
year-on-year rate of change of –1%. As was foreseeable, a very signifi cant portion of this ad-
justment was due to the marked decline in energy prices on a year earlier. But beyond these 
base effects, the weakening of infl ationary pressures spread to the other components, includ-
ing services, whereby core infl ation slowed to 1% on average during the quarter, 2 pp down 
on the same period a year earlier. Price adjustments in Spain are proving more acute than in 
the euro area, which is shaping an outlook free from infl ationary pressures and one of negative 
price differentials with the euro area that it is necessary to preserve in order to entrench a de-
gree of competitive advantage that may underpin the recovery.
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2 External environment of the euro area
During 2009 Q2, international fi nancial markets continued on the recovering trend begun in 
March, moving away from the extreme situation that had previously characterised them. The 
generalised improvement in confi dence made for some increase in the appetite for risk, for less 
restrictive fi nancial conditions and for a pick-up in international fi nancial fl ows, from which the 
emerging countries (especially those with higher credit ratings) also benefi ted. The sharp fall in 
the two previous quarters in the macroeconomic indicators eased off and tended to stabilise, 
although the improvement was more evident in the indicators of expectations than in the co-
incident indicators. In any event, there was a notable and rapid pick-up in the Chinese econo-
my (see Box 2). However, in general terms the transfer of risks from fi nancial institutions to the 
public sector has continued and the deterioration in the fi scal position has deepened, as a 
result of the implementation of stimulus plans and of the decline in economic activity.
The signs of activity stabilising were favourably interpreted by the fi nancial markets and there 
was a perceptible improvement in the situation of US fi nancial institutions. Signifi cant in this 
latter respect was the effect of the publication of the results of the stress tests conducted by 
supervisors on the main institutions in early May, and the favourable results posted by some of 
the leading banks. Indeed, several US banks managed to raise equity from the private sector 
and were even able to return some of the aid received from the public sector. Against this 
background, the Federal Reserve began to redeploy some of its liquidity-providing and fi nanc-
ing instruments, though these could be instantly reactivated. In addition, major regulatory re-
forms in the United States and in the United Kingdom were announced.
During Q2, interbank and credit market spreads narrowed considerably, while private-sector 
debt issuance increased. The stock markets were less volatile and there was an across-the-
board increase in prices, though this was checked in June as optimism over the onset and 
strength of economic recovery fell off in part. Long-term government debt yields generally 
rose, set against some recovery in the demand for higher-risk assets, concern over the stabil-
ity of public fi nances and, to a lesser extent, something of a rise in long-term infl ation expecta-
tions. On the foreign exchange markets the dollar depreciated against the main currencies, of 
developed and emerging countries alike. The performance of the emerging markets during the 
quarter was even more favourable than that of the developed countries in some segments, as 
illustrated by the substantial stock market gains and the narrowing of sovereign spreads. On 
the commodities markets, oil, whose price in March was around $50 per barrel of Brent, 
climbed in June to $70, although subsequently it resumed a level around $60. The same was 
the case for the prices of the main industrial metals, in a setting of improved expectations 
about economic recovery. Food prices held at similar levels to those at the end of the previous 
quarter.
In the United States, the fi nal GDP estimate for 2009 Q1 showed a decline of 5.5% in annual-
ised quarterly terms, owing essentially to the strong contraction in fi xed capital investment and 
rapid destocking, which was partially offset by the positive contributions of private consump-
tion and of the external sector. The higher-frequency indicators have offered signs of stabilisa-
tion in recent months, although the labour market remains immersed in a deep contraction. On 
the demand side, the consumer confi dence indices rose forcefully in Q2, though they eased 
off in July, while the consumer spending and retail sales indicators continue to suggest a de-
gree of stabilisation. In the real estate market, indicators of sales and housing starts appear to 
confi rm that the decline in the previous quarter has been checked and, at the same time, the 
BOX 2CHINA’S SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN THE FACE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
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The Chinese economy has proven most resilient in the face of the 
adverse International economic and fi nancial environment, and it has 
also been one of the fi rst to show generalised signs of recovery. This 
relatively favourable behaviour – despite its close trade links with the 
global economy – might initially be explained by its low degree of fi -
nancial development and its relative isolation from the international 
fi nancial system. Also, following the heightening of the international 
crisis, the Chinese authorities responded with speed and fi rmness, 
assisted by the sound cyclical position of China’s public fi nances (de-
spite their contingent liabilities) and its room for manoeuvre in mone-
tary policy. Even so, real GDP growth eased to 9% in 2008, against 
13% in 2007. Activity slowed abruptly in year-on-year terms in 2008 
Q4, and more sharply in 2009 Q1, down to 6.1%, marking the weak-
est year-on-year growth in a decade. However, it picked up markedly 
in Q2 (see Panel 1 and the main body of the text) to 7.9% year-on-
year, above all due to the effect induced by the economic policies 
applied.
The slowdown in activity was not only a refl ection of the collapse in 
international trade; it also stemmed from the notable adjustment in 
the domestic real estate sector – which accounts for around 10% of 
GDP and which had expanded markedly until early 2008 – and from 
the effects induced on agents’ confi dence. Indeed, the infl uence of 
the trade channel on Chinese growth is less than it is habitually con-
sidered to be: although exports account for around one-third of GDP, 
almost half is produced with imported goods. Accordingly, the contri-
bution of net external demand averaged 1.4 pp between 2002 and 
2008, i.e. only 12% of GDP growth in this period, which stood at 
10.5% per annum. Nonetheless, National Accounts fi gures underes-
timate the actual weight of foreign trade in the economy, as they do 
not consider either its indirect effect on investment, employment and 
consumer spending, or its role in the productive transformation of the 
Chinese economy.
In any event, the trade surplus has diminished considerably due to 
the strong contraction in exports, despite the most signifi cant fall in 
prices and import volumes (see Panel 2). The fi nancial transmission 
channel has so far been the least relevant; however, China has not 
been immune to the external turmoil, which has translated into high 
volatility in short-term capital fl ows and into a reduction in direct in-
vestment infl ows, which entailed a temporary slowdown in the build-
up of international reserves.
The economic policy stance turned expansive as early as the sum-
mer of 2008. The fi rst set of measures applied was geared to the 
export sector to mitigate the effect of the recession that was already 
SOURCES: CEIC, JP Morgan and Datastream.
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CHINA’S SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN THE FACE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS (cont’d) BOX 2
affecting many developed economies. From July 2008, the apprecia-
tion of the renminbi against the dollar was halted, coinciding with the 
appreciation of the US currency. Export VAT rebates also increased 
on low-value-added and labour-intensive products (which entails an 
implicit improvement in their competitiveness). These rebates were 
extended after September, when the contraction in trade spread 
sharply to consumer durables. The second pillar was the monetary 
impulse, which was activated on the same day as the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in mid-September, adopting a moderately loose 
stance to promote economic growth in an environment of gradually 
declining infl ation (see Panel 3), which has been in clearly negative 
territory since early 2009. This policy was implemented by means of 
an accelerated cycle of cuts in lending and deposit benchmark rates. 
Although real rates have not fallen, owing to the rapid correction in 
infl ation, the removal of credit controls to make for ready access to 
fi nancing – especially by households, the rural sector and SMEs – has 
translated into very marked growth in lending. This rise concerns the 
authorities given the excessive concentration on public-sector 
projects and the foreseeable increase in non-performing loans. The 
third pillar is fi scal policy, the last and most ambitious to be applied. 
In November a fi scal stimulus plan was announced, whose impulse is 
estimated to be of the order of 3.1% of GDP in 2009 and 2.7% in 
2010. The aim of the plan is to infuse domestic demand with dyna-
mism and restore confi dence. The range of measures announced is 
extensive, though they are essentially geared to infrastructure devel-
opment, support to the real estate sector and the subsidy of con-
sumer durables, although in March they were re-directed towards 
social spending. As regards fi nancing, around one-third will be de-
frayed through the central government budget, and the rest through 
local government bond issues and bank credit.
The recovery seen in recent months has been based almost exclu-
sively on the effect induced by government policies, since the dyna-
mism of actual private-sector demand has been limited and external 
demand has been lacklustre (see Panel 4 and the main body of the 
text). In any event, the main economic institutions foresee a rela-
tively softer landing than initially expected and have revised their 
growth projections upwards for 2009 and 2010 to 7.5% and 8.4%, 
respectively, on average. If the policies remain effective, domestic 
demand might grow vigorously in the second half of this year, against 
a background of weakness in the external sector. However, the key 
variable for sustaining the recovery will be private domestic demand 
in the medium term. As to external demand, it is extremely uncertain 
what its contribution to growth will be, given the parallel fall in ex-
ports and imports; that said, there is not likely to be an abrupt reduc-
tion in the trade surplus. Exports will foreseeably fall off less than 
international trade (for which international organisations project a 
decline of over 10%), since Chinese products have scope to con-
tinue gaining share in export markets, albeit at a diminishing rate. As 
to imports, there are at least two opposing effects: the substitution 
of domestic output for imports, and greater external demand for 
commodities and capital goods following the measures to boost in-
frastructure. In the fi nancial arena, and despite China’s inherent 
weakness, the impact will be limited owing to the low external expo-
sure of Chinese banks, the low dependence of households and fi rms 
on external fi nancing in the short and long run, and fi nancial under-
development (a most substantial portion of investment is fi nanced 
through companies’ retained earnings and the wealth effects are es-
timated to be less than in other emerging economies). It is possible, 
in any case, that fi nancial stability may be dented – through an in-
crease in non-performing loans – in a setting of weak economic 
growth, a phenomenon exacerbated by the high dependence on 
credit to fund the stimulus plan.
In sum, the global crisis has confi rmed China’s dependence on de-
mand from the developed economies, which goes beyond to the ex-
ternal sector’s contribution to growth. Against this background, it is 
uncertain whether private-sector demand can take up the baton 
once the public-sector impulse has been exhausted. Accordingly, in 
the medium term the Chinese economy will require a re-balancing of 
its growth model towards domestic demand, specifi cally towards pri-
vate consumption, given the high weight of investment (45% of GDP). 
In this process, structural policies in the agricultural, social and fi nan-
cial areas will be pivotal, but so too will foreign exchange policy, which 
has been a fundamental pillar in China’s development strategy in the 
past decade.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
rate of decline of prices has moderated, although the house/sales ratios suggest that part of 
the adjustment in this market has still to take place. As to economic activity, the ISM indices 
show lower rates of contraction and, in fact, some of their components have gone above the 
expansion threshold. Industrial production continued falling during Q2, although durable goods 
orders increased in April and May. In the labour market, net job destruction declined in Q2, 
although the pace of this variable remains very high since 1.3 million jobs were lost during the 
quarter and the rate of unemployment increased to 9.5% (7.2% at end-2008). Prices, mean-
while, continued to post negative year-on-year rates (–1.4% in June), although core infl ation 
remained in positive territory (1.7% in June). As regards the external sector, the correction of 
the trade defi cit continued, standing at $26 billion in May. Against this backdrop, the Federal 
Reserve kept its target federal funds rate in a range of 0-0 .25% and retained its asset pur-
chase objectives.
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In Japan, following a particularly marked collapse in economic activity in Q1 (GDP shrank by 
14.2% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms), the higher-frequency indicators showed im-
provements in the following months. Yet it is still exports and, stemming from these, industrial 
production which are posting the biggest recoveries; indeed, this latter variable has registered 
three consecutive months of improvement. The consumption indicators evidenced some 
weakness at the beginning of Q2, but there are signs that the fi scal stimulus programme has 
managed to boost household spending. Prices continued to move on a declining trend: year-
on-year infl ation in May was -1.1%, and, stripping out the contribution of food and energy, the 
rate was –0.5%. The current account surplus continued widening, given the dynamism of ex-
ports, especially to China. The Bank of Japan held its offi cial interest rate at 0.1% at its meet-
ing on 16 June, and extended the period in which it will retain a series of extraordinary meas-
ures such as the purchase of commercial paper and corporate bonds, and operations to 
facilitate fi nancing to companies.
In the United Kingdom, the fi nal GDP estimate for 2009 Q1 showed a strong contraction in 
activity (9.3% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms), essentially owing to the decline in do-
mestic demand. In Q2, and as suggested by the higher-frequency indicators, the fall in activity 
was less than in the previous quarter (3.1% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms according 
to the preliminary estimate), although the year-on-year rate stood at –5.6%. The PMI indices 
for June had already pointed to a mild recovery in economic activity, and this was confi rmed 
by other surveys in July. However, labour market conditions continued to worsen in Q2 and, 
although the fall in sales and consumer confi dence has been checked, a rapid recovery is not 
yet in sight. There were signs of some stabilisation in the real estate market, with lower year-
on-year falls in house prices and some recovery in demand, although there has been no im-
provement in mortgage credit. In general, credit activity remained weak, despite some im-
provement in credit availability, offset by still-restrictive access conditions. In this environment, 
infl ation stood at 1.8% in June compared with the same month a year earlier, below the Bank 
of England target. The central bank held its offi cial interest rate at 0.5% and made no changes 
to its asset purchase programme.
In the new EU Member States not belonging to the euro area, a sharp and abrupt slowdown 
across the board in GDP was confi rmed in 2009 Q1. On average, GDP fell by 3.6% year-on-
year, compared with growth of 0.9% in Q4, though there were marked differences between the 
13% year-on-year contraction in the Baltic States and the 0.8% growth in Poland. This nega-
tive performance was the result of the deep adjustment in domestic demand, particularly in the 
Baltic States, compounded by the deterioration in external demand, especially that from the 
euro area. The industrial production and retail sales indicators for Q2 continued to show a 
pronounced decline in activity, while current account balances for Q1 improved notably, due 
above all to the collapse in imports. Over the course of the quarter, the aggregate infl ation rate 
held on a declining path, and in June it stood at 3.6% a year-on-year, which prompted further 
cuts in offi cial interest rates in all countries. On the fi nancial front, the depreciation pressures 
on the Latvian lats eased following the Parliamentary approval of new fi scal containment 
measures. The IMF approved the new pre-emptive Flexible Credit Line (FCL) for Poland, for an 
amount of $20 billion.
In China, GDP accelerated most sharply in Q2 to a year-on-year rate of 7.9%, 1.8 pp up on 
the previous quarter. This was due essentially to the impulse provided by macroeconomic 
policies on domestic demand, as detailed in Box 2. Turning to the supply-side indicators, in-
dustrial production accelerated progressively during the quarter and business confi dence 
moved into clearly expansionary territory. The domestic demand indicators have trended fa-
vourably in the quarter: investment in fi xed assets rose sharply in light of the fi scal stimulus 
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plan and there are even signs of recovery in real estate investment; and retail sales held rela-
tively fi rm. As to external demand, the trade surplus narrowed substantially, although there are 
signs that the decline in exports and imports might have touched bottom. Despite this reduc-
tion in the trade surplus and in foreign direct investment infl ows, the build-up in international 
reserves – now in excess of $2 trillion – was very sharp, and might suggest an intensifi cation 
of short-term capital infl ows. Year-on-year infl ation was in even more negative territory in Q2 
(–1.7% in June), owing essentially to the base effect and despite the ongoing and marked rise 
in credit and in the money supply. Of note in the policy-making realm was the bias of the fi scal 
stimulus plan towards domestic products and services, and the new measures to lessen de-
pendence on the dollar in Chinese trade transactions.
In 2009 Q1, GDP in the rest of Asia grew at a year-on-year rate of 0.8%, notably down on the 
fi gure of 2.2% the previous quarter. There was notable growth in the less open economies – In-
dia and Indonesia posted growth rates of 5.8% and 4.4%, respectively – while the other coun-
tries saw a contraction in their GDP on a year earlier. In Q2, industrial production and exports 
continued to show year-on-year declines, although in monthly terms greater dynamism began 
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to be discernible in both variables. Infl ation continued falling appreciably in Q2, in a setting in 
which most central banks cut their offi cial interest rates, albeit by a lesser amount than in pre-
vious quarters.
Set against growth of 0.9% in 2008 Q4, GDP in Latin America contracted by 2.8% in 2009 Q1 
compared with the same period a year earlier, the worst fall since quarterly statistical records 
began. The contraction was due to the slowdown in domestic demand (which subtracted 3.5 
pp from growth), while the contribution of external demand turned positive, adding 0.7 pp, the 
consequence of the contraction in imports outpacing that in exports. The indicators of activity 
in 2009 Q2 point to weak growth in most countries in the area, although in Brazil activity is 
expected to have regained some dynamism. Infl ation continued to ease, standing at 6.5% in 
June, 0.9 pp down on March. In combination with extensive output gaps, this led central 
banks with infl ation targets to continue cutting interest rates at each of the meetings held dur-
ing Q2. Argentina and Venezuela also relaxed their monetary conditions. Against the back-
ground of reduced imports owing to the collapse in domestic demand and price increases in 
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certain commodities, there was an improvement in trade balances. Along with some recovery 
in fi nancial infl ows, the improved trade balances gave rise to currency appreciations (which 
were limited in some cases owing to central bank intervention), except in the cases of Argen-
tina and Venezuela. The IMF approved the granting of the new FCL facility to Colombia (after 
having previously done so with Mexico), for an amount of $10.5 billion. Finally, there was a 
notable change, in opposing directions, in the rating agencies’ outlook for Brazil (upwards) and 
Mexico (downwards).
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3 The euro area and the monetary policy of the European Central Bank
In 2009 Q2, economic activity in the euro area continued to worsen, although at a much more 
subdued rate than in the previous two quarters. This easing in the rate of decline, together with 
signs of stabilisation on the fi nancial markets (see Box 3) and the relative recovery – based 
particularly on the expectations component – in agents’ confi dence indicators (see Box 4) 
might indicate that a turning point has been reached in the deep economic recession which 
started in 2008 Q2. However, most of the forecasts available agree in showing a main sce-
nario in which, helped by a more positive international environment and the continued action 
of economic policies supporting aggregate demand, positive quarter-on-quarter growth rates 
may be expected to return only in the course of 2010.
This slow upturn scenario continues to be subject to uncertainty and contains signifi cant weak 
elements. First, the intensity and duration of the recession will put to the test the functioning of 
the labour market and developments in employment in the coming quarters that so far – sup-
ported by temporary measures – have shown themselves to be relatively resilient in the euro 
area as a whole. Second, public fi nances have considerably deteriorated as a result of the 
operation of the automatic stabilisers, discretionary measures to stimulate aggregate demand 
and action to support the fi nancial system. To underpin the effectiveness of this extraordinary 
fi scal impulse, it is essential that governments guarantee its compatibility with a strategy of 
medium-term fi scal consolidation that ensures the sustainability of public fi nances. And, third, 
the international fi nancial crisis and the economic recession have severely affected the banking 
system, which partly depends on support from the public sector and in which leveraging ten-
dencies persist. To make sure that this unfavourable situation does not translate into an epi-
sode of contraction of the credit supply beyond what cyclical circumstances would warrant is 
one of the main challenges facing economic policymakers. 
The rate of infl ation continued to decline throughout the quarter and turned negative in June 
(-0.1%) for the fi rst time in the history of EMU. This development responded mainly to the base 
effects in energy prices and, to a lesser extent, to the slowdown in services prices, resulting 
partly from very weak demand. According to most experts and analysts, infl ation will foresee-
ably return to positive though very moderate levels towards the end of the year, and would run 
over a prolonged period in a context in which the high level of slack in productive capacity will 
tend to limit possible infl ationary pressures. In these circumstances, the Governing Council of 
the ECB again eased its monetary policy stance with a further cut in offi cial interest rates in 
May, to 1%, i.e. 325 basis points below the October 2008 level. In addition, the ECB strength-
ened its generous liquidity supply policy to the banking system by establishing a longer-term 
fi nancing operation with one-year maturity, twice the six-month maximum time span in force 
until then, and has recently embarked on a programme of acquiring covered bonds and other 
guaranteed bonds issued in the euro area.
The second National Accounts estimate confi rmed the marked decline in economic activity in 
the euro area in 2009 Q1. Thus, after the quarter-on-quarter fall of 1.8% in 2008 Q4, the cur-
rent year started with a sharper-than-envisaged slowdown, (-2.5%, see Box 1). This new fall in 
activity largely refl ects the decline in gross fi xed capital formation and in exports, as in the 
previous quarter, as well as destocking (see Chart 8). Private consumption fell back to a lesser 
degree, despite the ongoing job destruction, while government consumption was the sole ag-
gregate to post a positive rate of increase. However, domestic demand, excluding stocks, cut 
1.1% from GDP growth. The external sector continued to contribute negatively to activity, 
3.1 Economic 
developments
SIGNS OF STABILISATION ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS BOX 3
The stabilisation of the fi nancial markets is essential to an effi cient 
allocation of resources in the economy and, in the current economic 
climate, to the recovery in economic activity. Moreover, markets need 
to function properly if the impulses from monetary policy are to be 
effectively transmitted. To assess the degree of easing of tension in 
the markets since the episode in September 2008 and to identify the 
fi nancial risks to the macroeconomic scenario, it is useful to construct 
a synthetic indicator which sums up the not always coincident trend 
of a set of relevant fi nancial variables.
To this end, a synthetic indicator of fi nancial tension in the euro area 
is shown in this box, following a similar approach to that proposed by 
the IMF1 (see Box 1). This indicator consists of three sub-indices, 
which respectively refer to the stock exchanges, the banking sector 
and foreign exchange market (Panels 2 – 4), with each being calcu-
lated as an average of a set of previously standardised relevant vari-
ables, and available for a suffi ciently long period. In the fi rst case, the 
level (sign reversed) is included and the implied volatility of a stock 
exchange index and, as a risk assessment measure, the yield spread 
between private bonds with a BBB credit rating and those with the 
highest rating, AAA. The banking indicator, shown in Panel 2, con-
sists of the (inverted) price of a sectoral stock exchange index, the 
slope of the yield curve (sign reversed) and a measure of the counter-
party risk in the sector that is calculated as the additional cost of in-
terbank fi nancing without collateral (EURIBOR) in respect of the pub-
lic government debt. Finally, the third sub-index relating to the foreign 
exchange market includes the volatility of the euro–dollar exchange 
rate.
The movement in this synthetic indicator confi rms a notable easing of 
tensions compared with the height of the crisis in September 2008, 
and has been supported by a broad deployment of measures, some 
unprecedented in nature and volume, by governments and monetary 
authorities worldwide, and also by signs that the economic slowdown 
was starting to abate. The breakdown into components shows that 
the signs of fi nancial stabilisation starting in March have been refl ect-
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BOX 3SIGNS OF STABILISATION ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (cont’d)
ed, above all, in a generalised fall in volatility, which had reached very 
high levels, and in a reduction in risk premia, both in the non-fi nancial 
sector and, notably, in the fi nancial sector. In addition, the decline in 
the banking stress indicator largely refl ects the increase in the yield 
curve, which tends to push up the net interest income of credit insti-
tutions2 – which traditionally take short-term liabilities (e.g. deposits) 
and convert them into long-term loans. Finally, the improvement was 
boosted by the rise in stock market indices, although, after the lows 
of the past decade reached in March, they were still at levels far from 
those prevailing before the crisis.
Despite the notable fall, the fi nancial tension indicator remains at his-
torically high levels which still point to a situation of relative fi nancial 
weakness with a high level of uncertainty. It is worth remembering in 
this context that corporate earnings worsened in Q1 and one-year 
profi t expectations continue to suggest falls, even though they have 
recovered over longer horizons. With regard to the banks, they have 
incurred substantial losses, mainly due to structured assets. And 
problems relating to liquidity, shortage of capital and medium-term 
fi nancing have been eased by the actions of the monetary authorities 
and governments. Nevertheless, the wholesale funding markets have 
not resumed their activities and the pronounced macroeconomic 
weakness poses additional risks for banks’ loan portfolios.
In conclusion, since the start of the year, and especially since March, 
there has been a reduction in fi nancial tensions, linked in all likelihood 
with the unprecedented measures taken by governments and central 
banks, and with evidence that the economic slowdown seems to be 
losing force. However, tension remains high and far from the pre-
crisis levels in mid-2007. Some confi rmation in the coming months of 
the current expectations of economic recovery will be critical in re-
storing the normal functioning of the fi nancial system.
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since exports contracted more strongly than imports. Finally, as regards the breakdown by 
sector, the adjustment was predominantly in industry and services, while construction was 
down less than in the previous quarter.
The contraction in activity was a common feature of the main economies of the euro area. 
However, the strength of the downturn varied greatly. Activity fell in Germany in 2009 Q1 by 
3.8%, while in France it was down 1.2%, 0.2 pp less than in 2008 Q4. Italy, for its part, posted 
negative growth of 2.6%, in line with the average for the whole of the euro area. Despite these 
differences, the items which most impacted economic activity in the three countries were the 
same: gross fi xed capital formation, specifi cally capital goods and exports. Government con-
sumption and private consumption expanded, except in the case of Italy, contributing posi-
tively to GDP. 
The decline in employment intensifi ed in 2009 Q1, falling by 0.8%. Given that GDP slowed to 
a greater extent, apparent labour productivity growth fell to -1.7%. Also, the adjustment ob-
served in employment in the euro area is the result of very different behaviour across the 
member countries. Thus, while the pace of job destruction in Germany and France stands at 
0.3% and 0.8%, respectively, in countries such as Spain and Ireland the slowdown is more 
acute and in 2009 Q1 posted rates of 3.1% and 3.8%, respectively. The marked fall in produc-
tivity resulted in a sharp increase in unit labour costs, even though the growth in compensation 
per employee moderated (see Chart 8). In addition, the increase in the GDP defl ator was more 
contained, and business margins contracted sharply.
The latest economic data indicate a further decline in activity in 2009 Q2, albeit one more 
moderate than in Q1. Thus, on the supply side, industrial production fell in April and May to a 
slower pace than in Q1, a pattern also evident in new industrial orders (see Chart 9). The con-
fi dence indicators produced by the European Commission and the PMI industry and services 
surveys have, after reaching lows in February and March, been recording steady advances, 
underpinned mainly by the expectations component (see Box 4), although they are still at lev-
2. Nevertheless, this effect will depend notably on the term structure of compa-
nies’ balance sheets and, for example, will be less signifi cant the greater the 
weight of fl oating-rate loans on the assets side.
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTUAL AND EXPECTED ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CONFIDENCE SURVEYS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA
BOX 4
The confi dence indicators cover the results of surveys of private 
agents on their perception of the economic situation. Their prompt 
availability and capacity to anticipate turning points in the business 
cycle make them very relevant as monitors of the economy.1 Lately, 
most indicators for the euro area have recorded considerable im-
provements which suggest that in recent months there has been a 
marked slowdown in the worsening of economic activity. 
The surveys include questions on the economic situation or on pro-
duction or demand trends at the time of the respective survey, while 
others focus on the expectations of respondents in respect of these 
variables. The components related to the current or recent situation 
usually show a coincident or even lagged correlation to economic 
activity, while the indicators of expectations usually show a weaker 
relationship with the real variables, but of a leading nature. The latter 
indicators, however, tend to change more frequently, so their short-
term movements have to be treated with caution since they can 
change back more easily. 
The panels depict developments during the current recession broken 
down into assessments of the current and expected economic situation 
taken from some of the main confi dence indicators in the euro area, 
together with the economic variable with which a stronger relationship 
in each case may be expected. Moreover, for comparative purposes, 
the same variables in the recession of the early 1990s2 are included. 
That recession spread in a generalised way to the euro area countries, 
although with less force than the current one, like in the period of low 
economic growth in the euro area between 2001 and 2003. 
As the panels illustrate, the expectation indicators have recorded gen-
eralised increases in the most recent period, while those referring to the 
current situation have either continued to deteriorate – in the case of the 
IFO surveys and the European Commission’s consumer surveys – or 
have shown more moderate improvements – like the EC’s business 
confi dence and the services PMI surveys. These developments are in 
line with the experience of the two previous phases, when initially there 
was a rise in expectations, whereas assessments of the present showed 
a smaller improvement or continued to worsen. Yet, while in the early 
1990s the rise in prospects was continuous and was followed, with a 
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SOURCES: European Commission, Eurostat and Markit Economics.
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1. See ECB (2004), “Opinion surveys on activity, prices and labour market de-
velopments in the euro area: features and uses”, Monthly Bulletin, January, and 
Cuenca and Millaruelo (2006), “Las encuestas de opinión y el análisis de coy-
untura de la actividad real de la UEM”, Boletín Económico, January, Banco de 
España.
2. With the exception of the confi dence indicators in the services sector, for 
which there are no data for this period.
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTUAL AND EXPECTED ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CONFIDENCE SURVEYS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
BOX 4
certain lag, by a strengthening of real variables and of the assessment 
of the economic situation, in the low-growth period at the start of this 
decade the improved expectations in early 2002 regarding the future 
went into reverse after a short time and were not accompanied by a 
pick-up in activity, which remained weak. Subsequently, in 2003, the 
improvement in expectations was followed by a more optimistic as-
sessment of the situation and by a higher growth rate. 
In conclusion, the most recent improvement in confi dence in the 
euro area so far has been based essentially on indicators that in-
clude the expectations of economic agents. On the limited evidence 
available, this behaviour, although reassuring, does not necessarily 
mean a quick pick-up in activity, as it is fairly common for rises in 
these indicators to be short-lived. If the favourable responses to the 
questions on future developments continue in the coming months 
and feed through to a more positive assessment of the economic 
situation, it could give greater weight to a recovery scenario. In any 
event, the comparison with previous situations must be made very 
carefully given the exceptionally strong nature of the current reces-
sion. 
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els signifi cantly below those associated with positive growth in activity. On the labour front, the 
unemployment rate has continued to worsen throughout the quarter, while the declining trend 
of the employment indicators turned round in many cases, although they remain at very low 
levels in historical terms.
On the demand side, household spending indicators show a lesser deterioration in private 
consumption. Retail sales were down on average to levels somewhat below those of Q1 this 
year, while car registrations – boosted by support schemes by various governments – and 
consumer confi dence indicators, after the low in March, continued to progress. As regards 
investment in capital goods, both the degree of capacity utilisation and the assessment of 
order books according to the Commission’s quarterly survey declined again in Q2. Data relat-
ing to external demand have, by contrast, been less negative than in recent months. Thus, the 
trade balance nominal data show on average a more moderate contraction in exports in April 
and May, and export expectations drawn from the EC’s quarterly industrial opinion survey 
progressed slightly in Q2. However, the average assessment of order books continued to de-
cline over that period. Finally, the European Commission’s stock valuation indicator suggests 
a slower pace of destocking.
In sum, the recent movements in the economic indicators, which despite the improvement 
remain at very low levels, point to a further contraction in activity in Q2, but a more limited one 
than in the opening months. Into the medium term, private analysts and international organisa-
tions place the decline in GDP at around 4.5%, with a gradual recovery to positive rates at the 
end of 2010 (see Box 2). Nevertheless, although uncertainty about the economic prospects 
has eased slightly, downside risks to this slow recovery scenario exist, mainly due to the de-
gree of normalisation of the fi nancial system and the worsening situation in the labour mar-
ket.
Euro area infl ation slowed gradually in Q2 to a negative year-on-year growth rate of -0.1% in 
June (see Chart 10). This slowdown was essentially in response to the energy base effects 
arising from last year’s high prices and, to a lesser extent, from the deceleration in services 
prices, stemming partly from sluggish demand. The growth rate of unprocessed food prices 
continued its downward trend, as did that of processed food prices, although the latter fell at 
a slower pace than in the previous quarters. Infl ation in non-energy industrial goods was, how-
ever, stable throughout the quarter. Thus, core infl ation, as measured by the overall index ex-
cluding unprocessed food and energy, was much more subdued, falling by only 0.2 pp be-
tween March and June to 1.3%. Industrial prices continued their sharp contraction, with a 
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year-on-year drop of 5.8% in May. This marked decline was essentially due to the fall in the 
prices of energy, non-energy intermediate goods and non-durable consumer goods, but also 
to the lower growth in the prices of capital goods and consumer durables.
In the coming months, mainly as a result of energy and food price base effects, infl ation is 
expected to hold at a negative rate. However, this base effect will foreseeably wane in the 
second half of 2009 and positive, albeit moderate, infl ation rates may be reached in the fi nal 
months of the year and should continue in 2010. That infl ation is expected to stabilise around 
1% next year refl ects the high degree of slack in production capacity building up in Europe’s 
economy in the face of weak aggregate demand. 
According to information published by the ECB, the euro area current account defi cit totalled 
€65 billion (1.7% of GDP) between January and May 2009, €19 billion more than over the 
same period last year. The other components, except for the income balance, whose defi cit 
fell slightly, performed less well. Thus, the trade surplus on goods became a defi cit, as exports 
declined more than imports, the services trade surplus narrowed and the defi cit on current 
transfers continued to widen. By contrast, in respect of the fi nancial account, net capital out-
fl ows in the form of direct investment rose to €37 billion between January and May, while 
portfolio investment amounted to net infl ows of €224 billion, three times higher than in the 
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same four-month period of the preceding year. Accordingly, in the opening months of the year, 
the basic balance, which aggregates the current account balance and these two kinds of in-
vestment, was positive to the tune of €123 billion, contrasting with the defi cit of €78 billion 
between January and May 2008 (see Chart 11).
In recent months several countries in the euro area have started to discuss both the budgets 
for next year, updating the estimates available for 2009, and the medium-term budgetary pro-
jections. In general, these new fi gures refl ect the impact of the crisis on public revenues and 
specifi cally on corporate income tax takings, given the severe cut in profi ts. Government 
spending grew at a strong pace, boosted by the dynamism of the automatic stabilisers, such 
as unemployment benefi ts, and by discretionary measures that seek to promote economic 
activity and limit job destruction. These measures included most notably the income transfers 
associated with schemes in some countries to shorten the working day.
Specifically, for the year 2009, the European Commission estimates that the general gov-
ernment budget deficit will amount to 5.3% of GDP, compared with 1.9% the previous year 
(see Table 3). Almost two-thirds of this fiscal impulse, approximated by the change in the 
deficit between the two years, would be explained by the activation of the automatic sta-
bilisers, while the remaining third, 1.1 pp, would be linked to the discretionary measures to 
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stimulate demand agreed under the framework of the European Economic Recovery 
Plan.
The European Council approved last April the excessive defi cit procedure for those Member 
States – France, Spain, Ireland and Greece – whose defi cits exceeded the reference value of 
3% of GDP in 2008, and, in June, the European Commission relaunched the procedure for 
Malta and other EU members. This group of countries could become considerably larger in the 
coming months since, according to the latest Commission forecasts shown in Table 3, virtu-
ally all the members of the euro area will have budget defi cits above the 3%-of-GDP ceiling laid 
down in the Stability and Growth Pact.
Public debt could approach 80% of GDP in 2009, as a result of the high budget defi cits and 
the fi nancial system support measures applied by governments. This increase in debt poses a 
major challenge for the euro area countries in the next few years, for it adds to the costs which 
an ageing population will generate. Thus, the latest estimates by the European Commission 
are for an increase in public spending resulting from the inversion of the age pyramid over the 
medium term. By 2060 it might amount to 5.2% of the euro area’s GDP, mainly due to spend-
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2006 2007 2008 2009
 M3
 M1
 PRIVATE-SECTOR CREDIT
MONETARY AND CREDIT AGGREGATES
Year-on-year growth
%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2006 2007 2008 2009
 FIXED-INCOME
 MFI LOANS
%
FINANCING OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Year-on-year growth
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2006 2007 2008 2009
 TOTAL MFI LOANS
 CONSUMER
 HOUSING
HOUSEHOLD FINANCING
Year-on-year growth
%
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2006 2007 2008 2009
 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (a)
 DIRECT INVESTMENT (b)
 PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT (b)
 OTHER INVESTMENT (b)
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (a)
Cumulative amounts for the last twelve months
€bn
DEFICIT
MONETARY AND CREDIT AGGREGATES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CHART 11
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a. A positive (negative) sign denotes a current account surplus (deficit).
b. Capital Inflows less capital outflows. A positive (negative) sign denotes a net capital inflow (outflow).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
ing on pensions, health care and long-term care. In this context, countries need to draw up a 
credible fi scal consolidation strategy without withdrawing fi scal stimulus measures that might 
contribute to the economic recovery at too early a stage. In view of the looming high debt 
levels, the members should set medium-term objectives that are more ambitious than in the 
past and commit themselves accordingly to achieving the compromises needed to achieve 
them as soon as possible. 
After the extreme tension of recent months, the international fi nancial markets showed signs 
of stabilising in Q2. As Box 3 illustrates, the improvements in the fi nancial tension indicators 
have been notable and fairly generalised across markets, although they have still not attained 
levels which could be described as normal. The greater degree of confi dence brought about 
an unwinding of fl ight-to-quality investments, in particular into government debt, and a strong-
er preference for higher-risk assets. These movements pushed up sovereign bond yields, 
while stock prices rose signifi cantly, and risk premia in bond markets and particularly in the 
interbank market narrowed. Although the cost of credit continued to fall, refl ecting the more 
accommodating monetary policy stance, fi nancing for the private sector continued its marked 
decline, only partly offset by some pick-up in bonds issued by non-fi nancial corporations. 
The fi nancial markets have been further stabilised by the actions taken by governments and the 
measures taken by the monetary authorities. The euro area governments continued to draw up 
3.2 Monetary and 
fi nancial developments
BUDGET BALANCES (a)
2007
SP (b) EDP (c) SP (b) EDP (c) EC (d) SP (b) EC (d)
Belgium -0.3 0.0 -1.2 0.3 -3.4 -4.5 0.7 -6.1
Germany -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -3.0 -2.9 -3.9 -4.0 -5.9
Greece -3.8 -3.7 -5.0 -3.7 -3.7 -5.1 -3.2 -5.7
Spain 2.2 -3.4 -3.8 -5.8 -5.8 -8.6 -4.8 -9.8
France -2.7 -2.9 -3.4 -3.9 -5.6 -6.6 -2.7 -7.0
Ireland 0.2 -6.3 -7.1 -9.5 -9.9 -12.0 -9.0 -15.6
Italy -1.5 -2.6 -2.7 -3.7 -3.7 -4.5 -3.3 -4.8
Luxembourg 3.2 2.0 2.6 -0.6 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 -2.8
Netherlands 0.3 1.2 1.0 -1.2 -3.3 -3.4 -2.4 -6.1
Austria -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2    NA -4.2 0.4 -5.3
Portugal -2.7 -2.2 -2.6 -3.9 -3.9 -6.5 -2.9 -6.7
Slovenia 0.5 -0.9 -0.9 -0.6 -3.7 -5.5 0.0 -6.5
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plans to support and restructure the fi nancial sector. Thus, according to the latest fi gures from 
the European Commission, the effective aid given between June 2008 and April 2009 would be 
equivalent to almost 12% of the euro area’s GDP, around one-half of the maximum package 
envisaged in the plans. In the last few months, in addition to the ongoing bank guarantee and 
recapitalisation schemes, various proposals to consolidate banks’ assets have started to take 
shape. The initiatives, some of which are still under parliamentary review, notably include the 
creation of a public agency in Ireland (the National Asset Management Agency, NAMA), which 
will buy loans to developers from Irish banks, and the legislative amendment which will permit 
German banks to create ‘bad banks’ for illiquid and non-strategic assets. 
The ECB maintained its ample liquidity supply policy, meeting all requests for funds for open 
market operations, and amended its operational framework. First, it established longer-term 
refi nancing operations with a maturity of 12 months, doubling the maximum period of six 
months in force until then. In the fi rst auction on 24 June, the ECB lent a record amount of 
more than €440 billion, which resulted in a sharp increase in the deposit facility, remunerated 
at a rate of 0.25%. Moreover, in July, the ECB embarked on a purchase programme for cov-
ered bonds issued in the euro area. This initiative was announced in May and aims to improve 
the funding of banks and, ultimately, to make access to credit easier for the rest of the econo-
my. It will last until June 2010 and involves outright purchases, both in the primary and second-
ary markets, of up to €60 billion. Finally, it should be emphasised that the ECB extended its 
currency arrangements with the Federal Reserve and other central banks until 30 October 
2009 as well as the validity of the broader list of eligible collateral until the end of 2010, and it 
also included the European Investment Bank as a counterparty for the Eurosystem’s monetary 
policy operations. 
In a similar vein, the Governing Council again eased the ECB monetary policy stance with a 
reduction in its offi cial rates of 25 bp in May, bringing the overall cut since October 2008 to 
325 bp. Thus, the rate for the main refi nancing operations stood at 1%, while those for the 
deposit and marginal credit facilities were at 0.25% and 1.75%, respectively (see Chart 12). 
Furthermore, the Governing Council reiterated throughout the quarter that medium and long-
term expectations remain anchored, in line with the infl ation rate objective of below, but close 
to, 2%, pointing out that the negative rates expected in the coming months largely refl ect 
temporary base effects. 
Against this background, the interbank interest rates continued to fall in Q2, mainly due to the 
reduction in the risk premia. The EURIBOR fell in July to below 1% and to 1.4% for maturities 
of between three months and one year, respectively, the lowest levels since the start of mon-
etary union (see Chart 13). Movements in short-term rates continued to fed through to the cost 
of bank funding. The strongest falls occurred in variable-rate loans, which are prevalent in 
corporate fi nancing, and also in home loans in some countries. However, the interest rate for 
consumer credit remained at relatively high levels. 
Despite the decline in the cost of fi nancing, the predominance of stricter lending standards, as 
indicated in the July Bank Lending Survey, and the contraction in demand continued to make 
for a sharp slowdown in euro area bank lending. The year-on-year growth rate of loans to 
companies stood at 4.4% in May, compared with 9% at end-2008, while in the case of house-
holds, slight falls were posted in year-on-year terms in fi nance for both housing and consump-
tion (fi gures which might be biased downwards by the sale of loans via securitisation). In the 
case of companies, the slower pace of bank loans was partly offset by a substantial increase 
in debt issuance, particularly long-term instruments, the year-on-year increase in which stood 
in May at over 16%. 
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In the government debt markets, long-term interest rates started to rise, essentially refl ecting 
the impact of the reversal of the shifts towards this safe-haven asset made at the height of the 
instability. The turnaround took place in mid-June, whereby long-term rates stood at 4.2% on 
average between April and June, a level very similar to that of the previous quarter. In the 
United States, despite the purchases of government debt by the Federal Reserve, the greater 
appetite for risk had an upward impact on benchmark rates. The yield on US sovereign bonds 
averaged 3.3% on average in Q2, which entailed a narrowing of the spread vis-à-vis that of 
the euro area. The decline in risk premia as from March, which exerted downward pressure 
on long rates in the euro area, was refl ected in a fall in the yield spreads of the sovereign debt 
of various euro area countries with respect to the German benchmark. Nevertheless, this 
decline ended in May and risk premia remained at high levels, evidencing wide cross-country 
disparity.
The improvement in confi dence was also apparent in a contraction in the risk premia in the 
private fi xed-income markets, both for fi nancial and non-fi nancial corporations, and in a more 
marked way for lower-graded securities. In the same way, risk spreads in the covered bond 
market fell considerably after the ECB’s purchase programme was announced.
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The signs of stabilisation became clearer in the international equity markets, where prices start-
ed to rise across the board, particularly bank stocks, and entailed in the case of the EURO 
STOXX 50 index a gain of almost 25%, offsetting the declines in the fi rst two months of the year. 
In addition, the reduced uncertainty contributed to the decline in volatility in Q1, steepening as 
from March, although it remains at high levels from a historical perspective (see Chart 13). 
In the foreign exchange markets, the euro rose by 7.2% against the dollar between the end of 
March and the date this Bulletin went to press, until it stabilised at around $1.40 (see Chart 13). 
However, in nominal effective terms, the euro remained relatively stable throughout Q2, since 
its appreciation vis-à-vis the dollar was offset by its depreciation against other currencies, such 
as sterling.
Finally, the growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3 continued to decline, to less than 
4% year-on-year in May. Lower rates of interest and the steeper slope of the yield curve led to 
investment switching out of M3 towards better rates of return, a move refl ected in the redemp-
tion of fi xed-term deposits and of marketable securities. At the same time, the fall in the op-
portunity cost also supported a shift in assets included in M3 towards M1 (currency and de-
posits). 
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4 The Spanish economy
On Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) estimates, the rate of contraction of Spanish economic 
activity intensifi ed in 2009 Q1, with real GDP posting a decline of 3%, compared with a fall of 
0.7% in 2008 Q4. The quarter-on-quarter rate was negative for the third consecutive quarter 
at –1.9%, down 0.9 pp on the previous quarter. The fall-off in economic activity refl ected the 
sharp contraction in national demand, which declined by 5% in year-on-year terms. By con-
trast, net external demand continued to make a positive contribution to GDP growth (2.3 pp), 
against a background in which both imports and exports of goods and services declined con-
siderably. On the supply side, value added fell across all branches of activity, including market 
services. In line with this deterioration in activity, the pace of job destruction quickened, 
posting a year-on-year rate of change of –6% on QNA fi gures, taking productivity growth to 
3.1%. 
According to the available information, the Spanish economy continued to shrink in 2009 Q2, 
although at a more moderate pace, against a background marked by a certain degree of nor-
malisation on the fi nancial markets and a slightly less adverse macroeconomic outlook at an 
international level. Specifi cally, the estimated year-on-year change in GDP in 2009 Q2 was 
–4%, down by more than 1 pp on that seen in 2009 Q1 (see Chart 14). In quarter-on-quarter 
terms, GDP is estimated to have declined by –0.9%, as opposed to –1.9% in Q1. This would 
refl ect the contraction in national demand, which is estimated to have fallen by 6% in com-
parison with the same quarter a year earlier. The contribution to GDP growth from the external 
sector is estimated to have risen slightly, to 2.4 pp, although the intense fl uctuations in world 
trade, with a sharp fall in the previous quarters and a better performance more recently, con-
tinue to severely hamper this estimate.
Also on the supply side, the most recent indicators point to a degree of slowdown in the rate 
of decline of GDP and in the rate of labour market adjustment. On these estimates, employ-
ment growth could drop by some 6.8% in year-on-year terms, while apparent labour produc-
tivity growth – due, fundamentally, to extensive job destruction – seems to have stabilised at a 
high level, following the sharp rebound seen since the start of 2008. Compensation per em-
ployee continued to rise at a much higher pace than infl ation, with only a minor decrease in the 
rate of change of unit labour costs. Lastly, turning to infl ation, the year-on-year rate of change 
in the CPI fell substantially in the period between April and June, standing at –1% at end-June. 
This prompted further narrowing of the infl ation differential with the euro area, which stood at 
–0.9 pp at the end of H1, the lowest value since the start of monetary union.
The slowdown in fi nal consumption spending of households and NPISHs seen in previous 
quarters continued in 2009 Q2 (see Chart 14). The various indicators continued to record 
sharp declines, although at a more moderate pace than in the opening months of the year 
(see Chart 15). Among the qualitative indicators, consumer confi dence made a partial recov-
ery in the last few months, after posting an all-time low in February; retail confi dence also 
improved in Q2. In the case of the quantitative indicators, the tax authorities’ data on large 
corporations for April and May recorded further sharp declines in year-on-year terms in do-
mestic sales of consumer goods and services, while the rate of contraction of the retail trade 
index moderated somewhat in April-May. Lastly, the positive impact of the government’s Plan 
2000E on car purchases by individuals in June is noteworthy, as although new car registra-
tions declined by 15.9% year-on-year in the month, this was the most moderate drop since 
May 2008. 
4.1 Demand
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Weak household consumption spending refl ects the signifi cant deterioration in the labour mar-
ket, the high economic uncertainty and the continued tight credit conditions, although the 
latter may have been offset to some extent by the cut in bank interest rates. Household wage 
income has decreased as a result of job losses, offsetting the positive impact that lower tax 
payments and higher welfare-related benefi ts have had on household disposable income. 
Financial wealth was boosted in 2009 Q2 by the recovery in the stock markets, recording gains 
on end-2008, although real estate wealth, which is the most important component of house-
hold wealth, continued to be adversely affected by falling house prices. According to the latest 
data of the non-fi nancial accounts of the institutional sectors, the household saving rate rose 
again in 2009 Q1 to 14.1% of disposable income in cumulative four-quarter data, an increase 
of 1.1 pp on end-2008 and of 4 pp on a year earlier.
General government fi nal consumption continued to grow substantially in 2009 Q2, albeit 
more slowly than in the previous quarter, according to available information on net purchases 
of goods and services drawn from the State budget outturn. 
On the available economic information, the decline in investment in capital goods quickened 
in 2009 Q2 (see Chart 16). In this respect, apparent investment in capital goods and new com-
mercial vehicle registrations continued to contract sharply. Business confi dence, in industry 
overall and, in particular, in the capital goods sector, remained very low, despite a minor re-
bound, especially in the component refl ecting future production expectations. The decline in 
both national and external demand, the uncertain economic recovery outlook and the persist-
ently tight bank credit conditions continued to deter non-fi nancial corporations from undertak-
ing new investment projects, despite the interest rate cuts. According to the non-fi nancial 
accounts of the institutional sectors, the decline in business investment prompted a decrease 
in the sector’s net borrowing in 2009 Q1, down to 6.4% of GDP in cumulative four-quarter data 
(1.1 pp less than in 2008 Q4). Firms’ higher saving, driven by lower net interest payments and 
lower tax disbursements, also contributed in this respect, although to a lesser extent.
The rate of decline of investment in construction moderated in 2009 Q2, although it remained 
very high (see Chart 16). Labour market indicators in this branch (Social Security registrations 
and registered unemployment) and input indicators (apparent consumption of cement and 
domestic production of construction materials) all fell in the quarter at a more moderate pace 
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than in previous months, while construction fi rms’ qualitative indicators showed some im-
provement in confi dence. 
This pattern of investment in construction overall in 2009 Q2 refl ected a disparate perform-
ance by component, as the rebound in investment in civil engineering projects offset the 
heightened slowdown in residential investment. In fact the adjustment in residential invest-
ment seems to have accentuated in 2009 Q2, as a result of the signifi cant decline in the 
number of housing starts in previous quarters and, possibly, of the increase in lead times of 
work already under way. This refl ects the behaviour of unsubsidised housing starts, as the 
number of subsidised housing starts has risen and these now account for almost half of the 
total. On the demand side, in recent months there has been a certain slowdown in the rate 
of decline of property transactions, in accordance with transactions fi gures and the number 
of mortgages granted. As in previous quarters, the continuing tight credit conditions, the 
expectations of price falls and the worsening outlook for household income growth are all 
acting as a deterrent to housing demand, although the drop both in prices and interest 
rates has meant that affordability indicators have improved. The data on new project ap-
provals refl ect further contraction in non-residential construction, while civil engineering 
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
2006 2007 2008 2009
 RETAIL TRADE
 CONSUMER
CONFIDENCE INDICATORS (b)
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2006 2007 2008 2009
 RETAIL TRADE SALES INDEX
%
SPENDING INDICATORS (a)
-48
-40
-32
-24
-16
-8
0
8
16
2006 2007 2008 2009
 NEW CAR REGISTRATIONS
 SYNTHETIC INDICATOR OF CONSUMER DURABLES
CONSUMER DURABLES INDICATORS (a)
%
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION INDICATORS CHART 15
SOURCES: INE, European Commission, ANFAC and Banco de España.
a. Year-on-year percentage change based on the seasonally-adjusted series.
b. Normalised indicators (deviation from the mean, divided by the standard deviation).
-12
-9
-6
-3
0
3
6
9
2006 2007 2008 2009
 GOODS AND SERVICES
 GOODS
SYNTHETIC INDICATOR OF PRIVATE 
CONSUMPTION (a)
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 57 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
works rebounded signifi cantly due to the increase in rail works – in light of the tenders is-
sued in 2008 – and of local government investments linked to the State Fund for Local In-
vestment.
In light of the latest information available for Q2, as yet incomplete, the contribution of net ex-
ternal demand to GDP growth could possibly be up slightly on the previous quarter, continuing 
in the positive tone seen since the start of 2008. This refl ects the marked declines in year-on-
year terms both in imports and exports, although both seem to have moderated somewhat 
when compared with Q1 (see Chart 17). The fall in imports was in step with the poor perform-
ance of consumption, investment in capital goods and exports and with the sharp adjustment 
in industrial production. For their part, exports continued to record high rates of decline in year-
on-year terms, against a backdrop of continued notable weakness in world trade, although 
most recently there appear to be some signs of recovery. In any case it should be noted that 
the decline in relative prices in 2009 H1 resulted in improvements in the price-competitiveness 
indices vis-à-vis the developed countries.
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On Customs data, real goods exports fell by almost 20% year-on-year in April and May, very 
much in line with the decline seen in 2009 Q1. By product group, exports fell across the board, 
but especially exports of intermediate products, consumer durables and capital goods. By 
geographical area, the decline was equally pronounced in real exports to the rest of the EU 
and to the rest of the world. As regards real services exports, the balance of payments fi gures 
to April point to a more moderate decline in the rate of fall of tourism services. This is backed 
up by real tourism indicators, which include numbers of tourists entering Spain and numbers 
of overnight hotel stays, whose rate of decline fell in 2009 Q2, as did that of nominal spending 
by foreign visitors. By contrast, also on balance of payments fi gures, non-tourism services 
exports may have deteriorated further in Q2.
In the case of imports, Customs data show that purchases of goods abroad fell by around 24% 
year-on-year in the period April-May, slightly less than in Q1. By product group, the biggest de-
creases, approaching 30%, were in capital goods and non-energy intermediate goods, while food 
imports – which are less sensitive to the cycle – continued to record more moderate declines. 
Lastly, real imports of services continued to fall in 2009 Q2, at a pace similar to that seen in Q1.
FOREIGN TRADE 
Year-on-year percentage change
CHART 17
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
a. QNA data at constant prices.
b. Deflated seasonally-adjusted series.
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The year-on-year rate of decline of the gross value added of the market economy as a whole 
quickened in 2009 Q2, although, as in the case of GDP, the quarter-on-quarter rate of contraction 
was less pronounced than in the opening months of 2009. This was seen in all branches of activ-
ity, with the exception of construction, which contracted at a lower year-on-year rate, and agricul-
ture, which posted positive year-on-year rates in the period April-June (see Chart 18).
The value added of industry as a whole is expected to fall signifi cantly year-on-year in Q2. The 
industrial production index (IPI) contracted in April-May, at a rate similar to that seen in Q1. By 
product type, decreases were seen across the board, but especially in the industries producing 
capital goods and non-energy intermediate goods. Labour market indicators, such as Social 
Security registrations, continued to decline year-on-year, although at a more moderate pace. At 
the same time, the main industry sentiment indicators, such as the manufacturing PMI and the 
business confi dence index, showed minor signs of improvement, despite remaining close to 
the lows recorded at the start of the year (which were, in turn, close to the all-time lows). 
Construction activity declined at a slightly more moderate pace in 2009 Q2, as refl ected by the 
information available from the main coincident indicators. As mentioned earlier, it is estimated 
that this minor slowdown in the rate of contraction in this branch is connected with the projects 
implemented under the State Fund for Local Investment.
In the case of the services sector, the latest conjunctural information available points to a sharp-
er year-on-year decline in 2009 Q2 than in the previous quarter, although the various indicators 
record different behaviour. Thus, among the quantitative indicators, the rate of decline of turn-
over moderated slightly in May, but sales of large corporations worsened somewhat, both in 
real and seasonally-adjusted terms, in comparison with the previous quarter, while employment 
indicators continued weak. In terms of sentiment indicators, services sector confi dence re-
mained at the low level seen in Q1, while the retail confi dence indicator and the PMI indicator 
both gave signs of a minor improvement. By branch of activity, the deterioration was across the 
board, but most especially in transport and business services, while retail fell at a similar rate to 
that seen in Q1 and IT and communications services showed less weakness.
The labour market indicators available point to a deceleration in the pace of job destruction in 
2009 Q2. Specifi cally, although the year-on-year rate of change in Social Security registrations 
declined by a further 0.8 pp, to –6.7%, this decrease was less pronounced than in the two 
previous quarters. The monthly changes, according to the seasonally-adjusted series, were 
also lower than in previous months. Moreover, the year-on-year decline in hires drawing on 
INEM (National Public Employment Service) fi gures was less pronounced in April-May than in 
Q1 (–19.9% and –25.4%, respectively). Lastly, the Spanish Labour Force Survey for Q2 indi-
cates a year-on-year fall in employment of –7.2%, down 0.8 pp on the previous period. The 
decrease in employment seems to have affected all branches of the market economy, espe-
cially industry (–13.7%) and construction (–24.6%), although in the case of the latter, the sharp 
year-on-year rate of decline moderated somewhat, most likely as a result of the activities con-
nected with the State Fund for Local Investment. 
On Spanish Labour Force Survey data, the decline in employment affected not only dependent 
employees (– 6.6%) but also the self-employed (–10.3%). As in Q1, job destruction was most 
pronounced among foreign workers (–9.2%), although employment among Spanish nationals 
also fell sharply (–6.9%). As regards contract duration, the year-on-year rate of decline among 
temporary employees moderated slightly (–19.8%), although this group continued to ac-
count for almost all the labour market adjustment, while the year-on-year rate of change 
among permanent workers turned negative (–1.1%). As a result, the temporary employment 
4.2 Output and 
employment
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ratio stood at 25.2%, some 4 pp less than a year earlier. Lastly, part-time hires increased 
slightly, in contrast to the sharp reduction in full-time hires, so that, as in the last few quarters, 
the part-time employment ratio rose, to 12.9% from 12% a year earlier.
The slowdown in the rate of growth of the labour force fi rst seen in 2009 Q1 quickened in Q2, 
to 1.2% year-on-year, almost 1 pp less than at the start of the year. This was due to the decel-
eration in the rate of growth of the population over 16 years of age, which rose by 0.7% (0.3 pp 
less than in the previous quarter) and to the sharp drop in the year-on-year rate of growth of the 
participation rate (0.3 pp less than in the last few quarters). This moderation was seen in both 
the male and female workforce, although the female segment continued to record strong mo-
mentum (3.4%), while the male segment recorded slightly negative fi gures (–0.4%). By national-
ity, the growth rate of foreign nationals in the workforce slowed to 5.3%, mainly as a result of 
smaller immigrant infl ows (4.2%, in comparison with 6.3% in Q1). The rate of growth of Spanish 
nationals in the workforce also moderated, rising by 0.5% year-on-year (against 1.3% in Q1).
Lastly, unemployment rose again in 2009 Q2, although at a slower pace than in previous quar-
ters. The ranks of the unemployed swelled by 126,000 people in Q2, bringing the year-on-year 
rate of growth down to 73.7% as a result of the lower momentum in job destruction and the 
slowdown in the rate of growth of the labour force. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate rose 
again, to 17.9%, up 0.5 pp on the previous quarter. The INEM registered unemployment fi g-
ures rose by 52.9% on average in Q2, above the increase recorded in Q1, although the rate of 
growth of the numbers of registered employed has moderated somewhat in recent months. 
The data available on collective bargaining agreements registered to June 2009 show an aver-
age increase in wage settlements of 2.7% in 2009 H1, as opposed to the 3.6% increase in 
wage settlements in 2008 (following compilation of the data received subsequent to the 2008 
close) (see Chart 19). These agreements affect some 7.5 million workers (almost 70% of the 
4.3 Costs and prices
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numbers affected in 2008). However, it is estimated that the indexation clauses will have no 
effect on wage costs in 2009, as infl ation stood at 1.4% at end-2008, below the 2% threshold 
above which these clauses generally come into effect.
Consequently, owing to the smaller wage settlements and to the absence of infl ation deviation 
payments, QNA fi gures for 2009 Q1 recorded a decrease in the rate of growth of compensation 
per employee: specifi cally, compensation rose by 4% year-on-year in Q1 in the economy as a 
whole, and by 3.9% in the market economy, down 1.2 pp and 0.8 pp, respectively, on 2008 
Q4. The rate of growth of compensation per employee is expected to decline slightly again in 
2009 Q2, albeit while continuing to rise considerably faster than prices. This slightly lower rate 
of growth estimated for nominal wages in Q2, together with stabilisation of the rate of growth 
of productivity, should lead to a minor deceleration in unit labour costs (see Chart 20).
The domestic component of infl ation (measured by the GDP defl ator) is expected to have 
grown at a slower pace in 2009 Q2, while import prices are expected to have fallen, affected, 
inter alia, by the fl uctuations in the oil price. Both factors would have made a major contribu-
tion to the signifi cant reduction in the year-on-year rate of change of the fi nal demand defl ator. 
By component, the decline in the goods exports defl ator is expected to have quickened, while 
the rate of growth of the various components of national demand is expected to have fallen. 
The residential investment defl ator is expected to have fallen sharply – in line with house prices 
– while the private consumption defl ator will foreseeably record a negative rate of change.
In effect, consumer prices continued to decelerate notably in Q2. Thus, the year-on-year rate 
of change of the CPI, which turned negative in March, declined further, recording a rate of 
–0.7% on average in the quarter and of –1% in June 2009 (see Chart 21). Infl ationary pressures 
weakened across the board. Especially signifi cant in June was the decline in the prices of 
energy goods, which fell by 14.2%, a decrease of almost 3 pp more than that recorded at 
end-March. This was a result of the lower oil prices on the international markets, although the 
depreciation in year-on-year terms of the euro against the dollar continued to moderate the 
impact on domestic prices. The prices of non-energy industrial goods and unprocessed food 
also recorded negative rates of change at the end of Q2 (–1.1% and –2.7%, respectively), 
while processed food prices continued to post positive rates of change (0.4% in June), albeit 
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signifi cantly lower than those seen at the start of the year. Lastly, services prices, which have 
traditionally shown little sensitivity to cyclical changes, decelerated signifi cantly, to 2.4% in 
June. As a result, the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy prices continued in the 
downward pattern fi rst seen at the end of 2008, closing the quarter at a year-on-year rate of 
0.8%, 0.5 pp below the end-March fi gure.
Price adjustments in Spain are proving more intense than in the euro area. Thus, since Decem-
ber 2008, the infl ation differential – as measured by the harmonised index of consumer prices 
(HICP) – has been negative for the fi rst time since the start of monetary union, and it has con-
tinued to widen, standing at –0.9 pp in June (see Chart 22). All the components showed rates 
of change below those of the euro area, with the exception of services, although this differential 
has also narrowed substantially since December (see Box 5 for comments on the latest regula-
tory changes in connection with the services sector). In light of these developments, Spanish 
core infl ation was lower than that of the euro area for the second consecutive quarter.
The rate of growth of the producer price index moderated further in 2009 Q2, standing at –5% 
in June (2.5 pp down on March), thus continuing in the defl ationary pattern fi rst seen in sum-
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mer 2008. The moderation in the index in Q2 affected its various components, although the 
slowdown in prices of energy goods was particularly notable. Prices also fell in all other prod-
uct groups, with the sole exception of capital goods. To May, the rate of growth of producer 
prices in the euro area as a whole decelerated more sharply than in Spain, widening the posi-
tive differential. The rate of decline of trade price indices intensifi ed for both imports and ex-
ports, chiefl y as a result of the behaviour of intermediate and energy goods.
The cash-basis fi gures for 2009 H1 show an amplifi ed State defi cit of €36,819 million, as op-
posed to a defi cit of €2,065 million in 2008 H1 (see Table 4). This deterioration is due: on the 
one hand, to the sharp fall (29.4%) in tax receipts, refl ecting not only the impact of the eco-
nomic slowdown on tax revenue but also the effect of the measures approved by the govern-
ment (relating primarily to withholdings on earned income and VAT); and on the other, to strong 
expenditure growth (22.9%) in comparison with the same period a year earlier, driven by the 
impact of the transfers to the State Fund for Local Investment. In light of the income and ex-
penditure patterns seen, and of the outlook for H2, signifi cant differences may be expected for 
4.4 The State budget
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LIBERALISATION OF THE SERVICES SECTOR IN SPAIN IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSPOSITION
OF THE SERVICES DIRECTIVE
BOX 5
On 12 December 2006, the European Parliament and Council ap-
proved Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, in 
response to the concern that over-regulation of markets for services 
could be creating barriers to entry in the different sectors and could, 
therefore, be reducing competition in the European economies. The 
Directive1 aims to liberalise market services in the EU, by reducing 
administrative burdens and removing conditions on entry for new 
fi rms, particularly conditions connected with restrictions on compa-
nies becoming established on grounds of nationality.
Correct transposition of the Services Directive is essential for en-
hanced competition and liberalisation of sectors that represent a very 
high proportion of value added (44%) and employment (42%) in the 
Spanish economy (albeit still below the fi gures seen in the more 
highly-developed economies) and that include particularly dynamic 
activities in terms of job creation. Moreover, this sector constitutes 
the core of infl ationary pressure in the Spanish economy.
The process of transposition of the Directive in Spain is particularly 
complex, as it involves reform of both State and regional legislation 
(see adjoining diagram).On 27 March 2009, the Council of Ministers 
approved the draft law on free access to and exercise of service ac-
tivities. This draft law, known as the “Umbrella Law”, refl ects the Di-
rective’s “generic” liberalisation mandate, laying the foundations for 
more specifi c reforms at sectoral level. The essential contents of the 
draft bill are threefold. First, it sets out the general principle of free-
dom of establishment, which may only be limited on grounds of “gen-
eral interest”, proposing a review of all the conditions and authorisa-
tions required in Spain for establishment of new competitors. Sec-
ond, it simplifi es the administrative procedures in general, for example, 
backing the introduction of online contact with the administration and 
of “points of single contact”. Third, it encourages cooperation be-
tween administrations, both at national and international level, to im-
prove their relationship with the services sector and achieve effective 
communication of information on the exceptions to the free establish-
ment of companies. 
In addition to this general liberalisation, transposition of the Direc-
tive will require reform of specifi c sectoral legislation. Some of 
these reforms will affect State legislation, while many others will 
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1. The Directive must be transposed into national law, by 28 De-
cember 2009 at the latest, before it can affect fi rms and consum-
ers.
LIBERALISATION OF THE SERVICES SECTOR IN SPAIN IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSPOSITION
OF THE SERVICES DIRECTIVE (cont’d)
BOX 5
affect regional legislation, in accordance with the distribution of 
powers. The main package of State legislation reforms is contained 
in the “Omnibus Law”, whose draft, approved by the Council of 
Ministers on 12 June, amends 47 existing laws on matters as 
wide-ranging as patent registrations and the sale of hydrocar-
bons. 
The draft “Omnibus Law” introduces a number of “horizontal mea-
sures” that affect fi rms in all sectors and are closely connected with 
the general objectives of the draft “Umbrella Law”. Thus, inter alia, 
the Law regulating the Bases of Local Government is amended, to 
introduce a (virtual) “point of single contact” for companies and 
permit online contact with local authorities. The Law on Online Ac-
cess to Public Services for the Public is amended likewise. For its 
part, Law 30/1992 on General Government and the Common Ad-
ministrative Procedure is amended to extend the scope of deemed 
authorisations owing to the absence of a negative decision (“af-
fi rmative administrative silence”). The Law on Professional Institu-
tions and the Law on Professional Associations are also amended, 
removing restrictions on advertising of professional services, to-
gether with some of the existing limitations on the joint exercise of 
several professions and the fee schedule guidelines. Furthermore, 
a ceiling is placed on professional association membership costs, 
which may not exceed the costs associated with processing of the 
inscription. For the time being, however, membership of the cor-
responding professional institution or association and obtaining of 
the corresponding licence remain obligatory. These two aspects 
will be dealt with at a later date in further legislation, once the “Om-
nibus Law” has been passed.
Also under the draft “Omnibus Law”, 16 authorisation processes are 
abolished and another 32 are replaced by less restrictive conditions, 
such as “prior notice” of start-up of an activity or “responsible state-
ments”. In these cases, administrative control over the activity con-
ducted becomes ex post rather than ex ante. 
It should be stressed that the “Omnibus Law” does not cover all the 
reforms of State legislation affected by the Directive, as some, owing 
to their complexity, require specifi c reform measures. For example, 
retail trade legislation; in this case, the Council of Ministers approved 
another draft law on 10 July2 which, in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Directive, establishes that the regional (autonomous) 
governments may no longer cite economic grounds as the basis for 
refusal to grant permission for new openings of certain retail formats. 
However, the draft law does not abolish the authorisation process, 
which has, in fact, become stricter in recent years,3 and includes the 
possibility of it being tightened on “grounds of general interest”, with 
no limitation on the scope of this concept.
In general, the above-mentioned draft laws contain elements that 
should facilitate access to service activities and reduce the adminis-
trative burdens borne by companies, in particular in connection with 
removal, not only of the need for authorisation for access to and ex-
ercise of a service activity, but also of the obstacles hindering the free 
movement of services by providers with no permanent establishment 
in Spain. However, the success of the reform, in terms of greater lib-
eralisation of services, will depend on its correct application in key 
sectors, such as professional services or retail trade, where the cur-
rent barriers to entry may be especially restrictive of competition, and 
on strict delimitation of the exceptions permitted, for which purpose 
the regional (autonomous) and local governments will have to work in 
their respective areas of responsibility. In the case of retail trade, the 
draft law amending the Retail Trade Law may prove insuffi cient to 
bring about a signifi cant change in the present systems of authorisa-
tion in the retail sector approved by the regional (autonomous) gov-
ernments and which restrict competition.
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2. Draft law amending Retail Trade Law 7/1996, of 15 January 
1996. 3. M. Ll. Matea and J. S. Mora (2009), “La evolución de la 
regulación del comercio minorista en España y sus implicaciones 
macroeconómicas”, Working Paper no.0908, Banco de España.
the whole of 2009 between projected and actual tax revenue. The Social Security budget out-
turn also worsened, as described in Box 6. 
For the description of revenue, information is available on total takings under the main taxes, 
for the portion assigned to the State and for that relating to the ordinary-regime regional gov-
ernments. On this information, revenue declined by 19.1% in Q2 compared with the same 
period a year earlier, due to the weakness of tax receipts. However, in the case of direct taxes, 
this weakness is infl uenced by the differential impact on personal income tax, in 2009 H1, of the 
rebate of up to €400 (without any equivalent in the corresponding period of the previous year) 
and which will be offset, in part, in H2, and by the impact of the reduction of 2 pp in the rate 
of withholding tax on mortgage expenses for persons earning less than €30,000 introduced in 
2009. Nevertheless, the impact of the economic crisis was refl ected in withholdings on earned 
income and, above all, in withholdings on gains from mutual funds, which fell by 45.1%. Nota-
ble among the indirect taxes is the fall in VAT (–35.8% in comparison with 2008 Q2); in this 
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case, the fi gures are affected not only by the decline in consumption and in real estate transac-
tions, but also by the increase in monthly refunds in light of the new rules. In turn, excise duties 
decreased by 4.9%, largely due to the decline in the tax on hydrocarbons, which would have 
continued to refl ect the impact of the low level of activity on transport and the collapse of the 
automobile market. The items aggregated under the “Other State revenue” heading recorded 
high growth, primarily due to “charges, public prices and other receipts”, especially those re-
lating to surcharges and default interest.
State cash-basis expenditure increased by 22.9%, well above the budget forecast for the year 
as a whole (6.6%). In fact, with the exception of personnel costs and interest payments, all the 
other items continued to record higher rates of change than envisaged in the budget. Particu-
larly notable was the strong growth in current transfers, mainly to other tiers of general govern-
ment, which accelerated considerably throughout Q2. Also worthy of mention is the large in-
crease in capital transfers, owing to those made to local government for the State Fund for 
Local Investment.
The overall balance on current and capital account in the first four months of 2009 was 
a deficit of €23,889 million, down 39% on the same period a year earlier (see Table 5). 
This is primarily due to the lower trade deficit and, to a much lesser extent, to the im-
4.5 Balance of payments
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STATE BUDGET OUTTURN TABLE 4
€m and %
SOURCE: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
a. Includes revenue from the tax on the income of non-residents.
b. Includes taxes on insurance premiums and tariffs.
c. Includes charges and other revenues, current transfers, profits and dividends, capital transfers and other unclassified transactions.
SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET OUTTURN BOX 6
The Social Security system posted a non-fi nancial surplus of €10,420 
million to May 2009, down 19.7% on the same period of 2008. Non-
fi nancial revenue fell by 1.1% to May in comparison with the fi gure a 
year earlier, while expenditure rose by 5.5% (see accompanying table).
Revenue from Social Security contributions declined by 2.4% to May, 
in sharp contrast to the increase of 7.8% budgeted for the year as a 
whole. This decrease is a direct refl ection of the adverse employment 
performance, which has resulted in a continued decline in Social Se-
curity registrations since June 2008; in 2009 Q2 as a whole, Social 
Security registrations fell, on average, by 6.7%.
Turning to expenditure, that earmarked for contributory pensions rose by 
6.8% to May, below the fi gure budgeted for 2009 as a whole. However, in 
the fi rst six months of the year, the number of contributory pensions rose 
faster than in the previous year (1.7%, as opposed to 1.4% for 2008 as a 
whole). Expenditure on sickness benefi ts fell by 27.9% to May, meaning that, 
to date, this item is also below the fi gure budgeted for the year as a whole.
As regards the National Public Employment Service (SPEE, by its 
Spanish abbreviation), the defi cit rose considerably, standing at 
€2,816 million at May 2009, as opposed to a defi cit of €41 million for 
the same period a year earlier. Revenue rose by 27.1% but expendi-
ture by 56.9%, due to the poor labour market performance. Accord-
ingly, the growth of expenditure earmarked for unemployment benefi ts 
accelerated sharply in 2009 H1, increasing by 68.5% year-on-year to 
June. Also at June, the coverage ratio stood at 73.6%, approximately 
1.5 pp above that recorded in June 2008. On data to April, the number 
of benefi ciaries rose by 66.7% on the same month a year earlier, while 
to June, registered unemployment grew by 55.4% year-on-year.
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SOURCES: Ministerio de Hacienda, Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración and Banco de España.
a. Only data relating to the system, not to the entire Social Security Funds sector are given. This is because the figures for other Social Security funds are 
not available until October 2008.
b. Transfers from the ISM to the regional governments to finance transferred health-care and social services have been distributed among the various 
expenditure captions on the basis of the percentages obtained from the general government accounts for 1997.
provement in the current transfers and services balances, while the income deficit wid-
ened.
In the period January-April 2009, the defi cit on the trade balance declined by 51% year-on-year, to 
€16,058 million, signifying considerable quickening of the rate of adjustment. Exports and, to a great-
er extent, imports decreased more rapidly, as the real terms of trade improved. The improvement in 
the trade defi cit refl ected both the lower energy bill, stemming from the drop in real net imports of 
energy goods and the sharp decline in oil prices, and the decrease in the non-energy trade defi cit.
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The surplus of €5,479 million on the services balance in the fi rst four months of 2009 was 7% 
more than in the same period of 2008, as a result of the sharp decrease in the defi cit on non-
tourism services (67%), offsetting the deterioration of the tourism surplus, which fell by 8% to 
€5,911 million. Nominal tourism receipts decreased by 11.7% in the fi rst four months of the 
year. In other services, both receipts (–5.7%) and, in particular, expenditure (–10%) decreased 
in the period.
The defi cit on the income balance grew by 21% in the fi rst four months of the year, while the 
defi cit on the current transfers balance decreased by 12.5%, in a setting in which remittance 
payments sent abroad fell more sharply than those received. Lastly, in the fi rst four months of 
the year the surplus on capital account declined by 25% in comparison with the same period 
of 2008, to €1,864 million, refl ecting the decline in general government receipts from Com-
munity funds.
JANUARY-APRIL
2008 2009
CREDITS Current account 120,325 99,649 -17.2
9.22-289,15424,76sdooG
0.8-528,52570,82secivreS
7.11-425,9587,01msiruoT—
— Other services 17,290 16,301 -5.7
4.31-992,71979,91emocnI
Current transfers 4,846 4,543 -6.3
Capital account 2,919 2,346 -19.6
Current + capital accounts 123,244 101,995 -17.2
DEBITS Current account 161,776 125,402 -22.5
0.23-040,86400,001sdooG
4.11-643,02759,22secivreS
3.71-316,3863,4msiruoT—
— Other services 18,589 16,733 -10.0
9.2-408,72236,82emocnI
Current transfers 10,184 9,211 -9.6
Capital account 421 482 14.4
Current + capital accounts 162,198 125,884 -22.4
BALANCES Current account -41,452 -25,753 15,699
225,61850,61-085,23-sdooG
063974,5911,5secivreS
705-119,5714,6msiruoT—
— Other services -1,299 -432 867
358,1-505,01-256,8-emocnI
Current transfers -5,338 -4,667 671
Capital account 2,498 1,864 -634
Current + capital accounts -38,954 -23,889 15,065
RATE OF 
CHANGE
2009/2008 (b)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Provisional data.
b. Absolute changes for balances.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: MAIN COMPONENTS (a) TABLE 5
€m
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5 Financial developments
There was a certain degree of normalisation on domestic and international fi nancial markets in 
2009 Q2. Stock market indices rose and market volatility continued to decline, returning to the 
levels seen before the collapse of Lehman Brothers exacerbated the crisis. At the date of this 
report going to press, the IBEX 35 was up 32.7% on end-March, while the EURO STOXX 50 
index of European companies was up 24.8% and the S&P 500 for US companies 22.4%. 
Thus, in 2009 to date, the Spanish index has gained 12.8%, ahead of both the S&P 500 
(8.1%) and the EURO STOXX 50 (5.5%) (see Chart 23). 
On the interbank market, risk premia continued to decline. Thus, the spread between 12-
month EURIBOR and the cost of secured fi nancing operations (repos) at the same maturity 
narrowed by 29 bp between end-March and the date of this report going to press, although, 
at 67 bp, it remains quite wide. During this period, 12-month interest rate expectations barely 
changed, meaning that 12-month interbank market yields declined by a similar amount. More-
over, long-term fi xed-income issuance by credit institutions showed some signs of recovery 
(see Box 7), refl ecting the more favourable credit conditions.
Public debt yields performed differently by maturity. Thus, the return on Spanish Treasury bills fell 
from 1.4% at end-March to 0.8% at the date of this report going to press, in line with the offi cial rate 
cuts in the Eurosystem’s main refi nancing operations. However, the return on ten-year bonds fell by 
barely 3 bp, remaining at around 4%. This pattern, which was also seen on the main sovereign debt 
markets worldwide, was basically due to the reversal of the fl ight to quality that occurred at the peak 
of the crisis. In line with the recovery in investor confi dence, long-term yield spreads between euro 
area sovereign bonds and the German bund narrowed; in the case of Spanish bonds, the spread 
stood at 56 bp, down 41 bp on the Q1 close. Credit risk premia for Spanish non-fi nancial corpora-
tions traded on the derivatives markets also fell (by 110 bp on average, standing at 91 bp).
On the real estate market, according to the latest data available from the Ministry of Housing cor-
responding to 2009 Q2, the price of unsubsidised housing fell by 1.9% in the quarter, bringing the 
year-on-year rate of growth to –8.3% in June, as opposed to –6.8% in March (see Chart 23). 
The drop in interbank yields continued to pass through to the cost of bank credit to the private 
sector, although unevenly in the different segments (see Chart 23). Thus, between March and 
May, spreads between bank and market rates widened on new loans to households for con-
sumption and other purposes (62 bp) and on new loans to corporations of less than €1 million 
(13 bp), which are those generally deemed to entail the most risk, while in the case of housing 
loans to households and new loans to corporations of more than €1 million, spreads narrowed 
by 19 bp and 5 bp, respectively. This seems to confi rm that the latest increase in spreads is 
not only due to the delay in pass-through of market rates to bank rates, but that there is also 
a permanent component connected with the higher risk perceived by the fi nancial institutions 
in their lending activities. The cost of fi nancing for corporations via issuance of fi xed-income 
securities also fell in 2009 Q2, while the cost of equity rose. In addition, according to the July 
Bank Lending Survey (BLS), the banks’ approval criteria tightened slightly (to a lesser extent 
than was expected in April) and are expected to remain relatively stable over the next three 
months, in contrast to the sharp tightening of credit standards seen throughout 2008.2 Other 
5.1 Overview
2. For more details, see the article entitled “Encuesta sobre Préstamos bancarios en España: julio de 2009”, by Jorge 
Martínez Pagés, in Boletín Económico, July-August 2009, Banco de España.
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lending conditions (term, security required) were seemingly somewhat less favourable than in 
the previous quarter. 
In line with the credit supply pattern and the lower demand for external funds, private sector 
debt continued to moderate in 2009 Q2. The year-on-year growth rate of household fi nancing 
dropped below 1% in May, 1.5 pp less than two months earlier. This lower momentum was 
seen both in housing loans and consumer and other credit. In turn, corporate borrowing grew 
by 5% relative to the same period of 2008, almost 1 pp down on March. The latest data on 
lending by purpose, corresponding to March, shows a widespread slowdown, but especially 
in construction (where credit fell by 8% in the previous 12 months), while bank loans in indus-
try and non-real estate services continued to grow by more than 10% year-on-year.
The moderation in household credit led to a minor decrease in the ratio of debt to gross dis-
posable income (GDI) in 2009 Q1, even though the debt burden in annual terms remained 
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FINANCING CONDITIONS AND ASSET PRICES CHART 23
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Credit Trade, Datastream, MSCI Blue Book, Ministerio de Vivienda and
Banco de España.
a. Five-day moving averages.
b. The cost of equity is based on the three-stage Gordon dividend discount model.
c. The cost of long-term debt is calculated as the sum of the weighted average 5-year
CDS spread for Spanish non-financial corporations and the 5-year euro swap rate.
d. Base 2001 until December 2004; base 2005 from that date.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ISSUES OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES BY SPANISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BOX 7
The onset of fi nancial turmoil in the summer of 2007, and its subse-
quent intensifi cation and globalisation, made it far more diffi cult for 
fi nancial institutions to access medium- and long-term fi nancing on 
the wholesale markets. Spanish credit institutions had had frequent 
recourse to these markets during the last cyclical upturn, to fi nance 
the notable expansion in lending. 
The international securitisation markets, which were at the heart of 
the fi nancial crisis, were those most severely affected. In Spain, both 
gross and net issues of asset-backed securities have remained high 
since mid-2007 (see the accompanying table), but the bulk of these 
securities have stayed in the banking sector, to be used as collateral 
in liquidity-providing operations with the ECB. In fact, the volume of 
asset-backed securities held outside bank portfolios has decreased 
continuously since 2007 Q3. 
Although to a somewhat lesser extent, the problems of confi dence 
that arose in the wake of the fi nancial crisis also hindered the func-
tioning of the other medium- and long-term fi nancing markets. 
Thus, as the accompanying table shows, issues of fi xed-income 
securities with maturities of more than one year, which were, to 
that date, the main alternative to deposits as a source of funds, 
decreased considerably as from mid-2007, both in gross and net 
terms. 
In light of the diffi culties in obtaining long-term funding on the whole-
sale markets, credit institutions turned instead to the short-term 
funding markets. Thus, from 2007 Q3 to mid-2008, the volume of net 
funding obtained via issues of fi xed-income securities with maturities 
of no more than one year exceeded that obtained from issues with 
longer maturities. During this period, subsidiaries, and specifi cally 
SHORT-TERM FIXED INCOME (a)
LONG-TERM FIXED INCOME 
(excluding ABS)
ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES
SUBORDINATED BONDS AND 
PREFERENCE AND LISTED 
SHARES
Gross issues Net issues Gross issues Net issues Gross issues Net issues Gross issues Net issues
Total
Non-resident
subsidiaries
Total
Non-resident
subsidiaries
latoTlatoTlatoT Total
2006 Q1 76.9 0.0 2.9 -0.5 55.0 47.7 18.6 7.6 2.2 1.9
2006 Q2 75.1 0.2 2.6 -0.1 37.9 28.9 30.8 20.0 1.8 1.5
2006 Q3 86.9 0.0 7.3 0.0 29.7 23.0 16.9 6.0 2.1 1.6
2006 Q4 89.9 2.5 3.8 1.9 30.1 16.2 45.1 36.3 3.7 3.5
2007 Q1 118.1 2.3 9.9 0.0 43.1 36.1 41.2 28.6 1.2 0.8
2007 Q2 104.0 1.4 3.3 -0.5 41.8 32.5 39.6 27.6 1.0 -0.7
2007 Q3 132.6 8.6 25.3 6.9 19.7 4.1 18.6 7.2 0.0 0.0
2007 Q4 113.9 11.1 7.8 3.1 22.3 4.5 55.4 43.8 0.4 0.2
2008 Q1 128.8 38.0 16.6 22.0 7.9 -12.4 23.9 15.6 0.2 0.0
2008 Q2 124.4 28.1 12.8 0.4 39.7 22.7 37.8 27.4 0.0 -0.1
2008 Q3 114.8 18.8 -8.3 -6.0 9.6 -6.0 14.2 4.5 0.6 -0.8
2008 Q4 128.9 50.6 -22.6 6.0 15.3 -6.9 62.9 46.9 8.4 7.6
2009 Q1 118.8 32.7 4.2 -2.0 30.9 5.4 27.9 14.8 3.0 2.8
FEB-MAY 08 160.2 45.7 17.8 15.7 28.9 6.2 46.8 34.5 0.2 -0.1
FEB-MAY 09 148.3 46.7 2.2 0.5 59.9 26.2 44.2 24.3 1.0 0.4
AUG 08 32.3 4.9 1.8 -3.1 2.5 -1.7 3.8 1.5 0.2 0.1
SEP 08 30.6 3.3 -12.3 -1.2 3.5 -3.9 2.5 -0.7 0.0 -0.7
OCT 08 41.8 15.7 -8.5 2.4 3.0 -5.6 7.1 1.8 0.1 0.0
NOV 08 49.6 22.1 1.6 8.9 1.6 -4.5 32.1 25.5 7.6 7.4
DEC 08 37.5 12.8 -15.7 -5.3 10.6 3.2 23.7 19.6 0.6 0.2
JAN 09 39.8 10.3 -1.6 -3.1 3.1 -2.8 2.4 -2.0 2.4 2.4
FEB 09 38.4 11.5 -3.8 -3.8 13.8 3.0 13.0 9.2 0.6 0.6
MAR 09 40.6 11.0 9.6 4.8 14.0 5.2 12.4 7.7 0.0 -0.1
APR 09 33.9 10.0 -4.1 -1.8 17.3 10.7 9.6 4.3 0.0 0.0
MAY 09 35.4 14.2 -4.2 1.3 14.8 7.2 9.2 3.1 0.4 0.0
€bn
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Only credit institutions. Includes issues by resident and non-resident subsidiaries.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ISSUES OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES BY SPANISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  (cont’d) BOX 7
non-resident subsidiaries, played an important part in raising this 
funding.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 signifi ed a 
qualitative change in the international fi nancial landscape and the 
perceived risk of a systemic collapse rose considerably (see left-
hand panel). In this setting, it became notably more diffi cult for fi -
nancial institutions to access funding, as the risk premia borne by 
them rose signifi cantly. As a result, from mid-2008 to January 
2009, net funding via both short-and long-term fi xed-income secu-
rities was negative; in the case of those with maturities of less than 
one year, this may also have been related to the changes made in 
spring 2008 in the Eurosystem’s framework for monetary policy 
implementation and, specifi cally, to the inclusion of 6-month liquid-
ity-providing operations, which broadened the range of fi nancing 
possibilities open to credit institutions. There was also an increase 
in subordinated bond and share issues in the last three months of 
2008 and January 2009, in response to the fi nancial institutions’ 
aim to bolster their capital adequacy ratios, in line with market de-
mand, against a backdrop of high uncertainty regarding the 
strength of fi nancial institutions’ balance sheets worldwide and 
high risk aversion. 
Since February 2009, the situation on the fi nancial markets has 
improved considerably, thanks to the brighter investor outlook, re-
fl ected in lower risk premia, and to the fi nancial system support 
measures introduced. Accordingly, long-term fi xed-income issues 
have regained momentum, becoming positive again in net terms 
after posting a negative balance throughout most of 2008. The 
granting of State guarantees for new bank debt issues, a measure 
adopted by various EU countries to alleviate the refi nancing diffi cul-
ties facing their banking systems, is one of the key factors behind 
the higher placement volume of these issues in recent months. 
Thus, as at 10 July 2009, 40 Spanish fi nancial institutions had 
launched issues backed by State guarantee, amounting to some 
€38 billion in total.1 
Funding via mortgage covered bonds, one of the main sources of fund-
ing used by Spanish fi nancial institutions in the years of strong credit 
expansion, has also recovered somewhat in recent months. Thus, be-
tween February and April, the number of mortgage covered bond is-
sues – mainly low-volume private placements – rose. Following the ECB 
announcement in May on the purchase of covered bonds issued by 
banks in the euro area, a number of issues have been launched in the 
market, as the spreads borne by these instruments have fallen sharply 
(see right-hand panel). By contrast, net issues of short-term fi xed-
 income securities have remained very limited, possibly as a result of the 
favourable conditions under which liquidity may be obtained within the 
Eurosystem. Lastly, the securitisation markets remain frozen, with all 
operations recorded being retained in full by the originators.
In short, the latest data show a certain degree of normalisation on the 
wholesale markets, with the exception of the securitisation markets. 
This is due not only to the more favourable outlook, refl ected in the 
easier conditions for access to funding by the fi nancial institutions, but 
also to the fi nancial system support measures – especially the grant-
ing of State guarantees for fi xed-income issues, which have been very 
well received by the market – and to the announcement by the ECB 
that it would purchase covered bonds issued by banks in the euro 
area, which seems to have encouraged activity in this market.
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the index and returns on swap curve rates, weighted by portfolio duration.
1. Between February and May, 52% of all gross issues of long-term fi xed-
 income securities made were backed by State guarantee.
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stable, as the average cost of on-balance-sheet liabilities was similar to that recorded in the 
same period a year earlier (see Chart 24). Moreover, the ability to save, after debt servicing, 
rose, largely due to the recovery in the sector’s gross saving ratio. It should be noted that all 
these ratios were also affected by the loss of momentum in GDI. In line with these develop-
ments, the Financial Accounts refl ect an increase of 0.6 pp, in cumulative four-quarter terms, 
in the sector’s net borrowing, to 0.9% of GDP. For its part, household net wealth continued to 
contract relative to GDI, as the prices of fi nancial and real estate assets headed down. The 
latest preliminary estimates indicate that debt, the debt burden and net wealth will all have 
declined in 2009 Q2. 
Turning to fi rms, in 2009 Q1 both the debt and the debt burden ratio continued at similar levels 
to those seen at end-2008 (see Chart 25). However, the latest preliminary estimates available 
point to a decline in the debt burden in Q2. According to the Financial Accounts data for Q1, 
the sector’s net borrowing was equivalent to 5.7% of GDP in cumulative 12-month terms, 
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SOURCES: Ministerio de Vivienda, INE and Banco de España.
a. Includes bank credit and off-balance-sheet securitised loans.
b. Assets 1 = total financial assets less "Other".
c. Assets 2 = assets 1 less shares less holdings in mutual funds.
d. Estimated interest payments plus debt repayments.
e. Balance of households' use of disposable income account.
f. Gross saving less estimated debt repayments.
g. Calculated on the basis of the estimated changes in the stock of housing, in the average area 
per house and in the price per square metre.
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1.5 pp below the end-2008 fi gure. According to the latest National Accounts estimates, also 
as at March 2009, profi ts recorded a further slowdown; thus, although the year-on-year rate 
of growth was still quite high, the quarter-on-quarter rate of growth of the seasonally-adjusted 
series was close to zero. Similarly, the information from the Central Balance Sheet Data Offi ce 
Quarterly Survey (CBQ), based on a sample in which large corporations predominate, shows 
that most fi rms reported a deterioration in profi ts in 2009 Q1, helping drive up debt ratios and 
interest payments. As a result of all these developments, the indicators of fi nancial pressure on 
investment and employment rose once again.
The deteriorating economic situation prompted a further increase in the fi nancial pressure 
borne by certain private-sector agents. This was refl ected in the widespread increase in doubt-
ful asset ratios, which for the other resident sectors as a whole (including, in addition to house-
holds and corporations, fi nancial intermediaries other than credit institutions) stood at 4.6% in 
May, 0.4 pp higher than in March and 1.3 pp higher than in December 2008. 
The most recent Financial Accounts data (see Table 6) show that the nation’s net borrowing 
declined again in 2009 Q1 (to 8.4% of GDP in cumulative annual terms, from 9.1% in De-
cember). This decrease was lower than that recorded by the non-fi nancial private sector, 
which was partly offset by the sharp increase in the general government defi cit (up 1.5 pp 
at 5.3% of GDP). The funds required to cover the external defi cit were raised, in part, by the 
general government (3.1% of GDP) and, to a lesser extent than in previous quarters, by 
credit institutions and institutional investors (1.2% and 1.5%, respectively, of GDP). How-
ever, these funds were insuffi cient to cover the nation’s overspending relative to revenue, 
with the result that, once again, the Banco de España’s net asset fl ows vis-à-vis non-resi-
dents were negative, in an amount equivalent, in cumulative 12-month terms, to slightly 
less than 3% of GDP.
In short, the cost of borrowing for households and fi rms continued to decline throughout the 
quarter, although other credit conditions continued to tighten, albeit less so than since the start 
of the crisis. The macroeconomic deterioration and the decline in value of real estate assets 
(the main component of household wealth) were again refl ected in a worsening of the aggre-
gate fi nancial position of the private sector; this will naturally have had most impact on the 
2009
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agents most exposed to these developments, raising the fi nancial pressure borne by some 
segments. 
According to the latest data (relating to May) on interest rates on new loans, interest rates on 
housing loans fell by 56 bp relative to March, while those on consumer and other loans, which 
are more volatile, rose by 28 bp. This is a drop of some 280 bp and 170 bp, respectively, from 
the highs recorded in the summer of 2008 and is, in both cases, short of the fall in market 
rates. Spreads between bank interest rates and the reference interbank rate widened, in par-
ticular, in consumer loans, which are, a priori, higher risk. 
The latest data available also show that lending conditions other than interest rates, such 
as security required (which has increased) or maturities (which have shortened), continued 
to tighten. Thus, the respondents to the latest BLS, compiled in July, confi rmed that spreads 
widened slightly in 2009 Q2 and that repayment periods and the ratio between the principal 
and the value of collateral decreased. However, lending standards were only marginally 
more demanding than in 2009 Q1, and less demanding than was anticipated in the previ-
ous BLS. 
In this setting, household debt continued to decelerate, growing by less than 1% year-on-year 
in May, almost 1.5 pp lower than in March. This slowdown was seen across the board: thus, 
housing loans rose by 1% in May relative to the same period a year earlier, while consumer and 
other loans were fl at in 12-month terms. In fact, in seasonally-adjusted quarter-on-quarter 
terms, growth rates were negative, both for household borrowing as a whole and for its two 
components, each of which was close to –2% in annualised terms. 
According to the latest Financial Accounts data (for 2009 Q1), investment in fi nancial assets con-
tinued to decline (see Table 7), amounting, in cumulative annual terms, to approximately 1% of 
GDP, almost 1.5 pp below the end-2008 level. This was mainly a result of the decline in invest-
ment in time deposits (from 6.6% to 3.9% of GDP), which was only partly offset by the lower net 
outfl ows from mutual funds (–3.1% of GDP, against –3.7% in December) and by the increase in 
holdings of cash and cash equivalents (0.3% in March, against –0.5% three months earlier).
In 2009 Q1, the household debt ratio dropped slightly, to around 125% of GDI. By contrast, 
the debt burden ratio seems to have remained close to 18% of GDI, as the average cost of 
on-balance-sheet liabilities was quite similar to that recorded a year earlier. The moderation in 
debt servicing payments, together with the slowdown in household consumption, is the rea-
son behind the increase in households’ saving, net of the expenses associated with their lia-
bilities. The sector’s net wealth decreased again as a percentage of GDI, as the prices of fi nan-
cial assets, and especially of real estate assets, fell. The latest preliminary estimates indicate 
that debt, the debt burden and net wealth will all have declined in 2009 Q2. It is important to 
note that these ratios have also been affected by the loss of momentum in their respective 
denominators.
Despite the moderation in the household debt burden, the worsening economic conditions – 
especially the surge in the unemployment rate – contributed to the increase in the proportion of 
households facing diffi culties in servicing their debts. Thus, in 2009 Q1, the percentage of per-
sons with past due loans rose by 1 pp to 5.7%. As a result, during the same period the doubt-
ful asset ratio for households rose by 0.6 pp to 3.6%. By type of loan, both the ratio and the 
rate of increase are higher in the case of consumer and other loans (6.6%, from 5.2% in De-
cember) than in the case of housing (purchase and refurbishment) loans (2.8%, up 0.4 pp on 
the 2008 close).
5.2 Households
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The latest available data on interest rates on new loans to corporations, corresponding to May, 
show a decline in comparison with March, both in loans under €1 million (21 bp) and over €1 
million (40 bp). Since the cost of credit began to fall in September 2008, the larger loans have 
seen the biggest cut in interest rates (312 bp, as opposed to a cut of 207 bp for the smaller 
loans that are generally more common among SMEs). The cost of borrowing via issuance of 
fi xed-income securities also declined, both in short-term securities (by 23 bp relative to March) 
and long-term securities (by 49 bp in the same period), while in contrast, return on equity de-
manded by the market rose by 133 bp.
5.3 Non-fi nancial 
corporations
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Not including unpaid accrued interest, which is included under "Other".
b. Excluding mutual funds.
c. Including off-balance-sheet securitised loans.
d. Including issues of resident financial subsidiaries.
e. Defined as the sum of bank credit extended by resident credit institutions, foreign loans, fixed-income securities and financing through 
securitisation special purpose entities.
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However, the July BLS shows that all other credit conditions applied by the banks were less 
favourable than in 2009 Q1, and that lending standards also tightened, albeit marginally and 
to a lesser extent than was envisaged in the April BLS. The decline in the rate of contraction 
was similar in lending to SMEs and to large corporations, being slightly more noticeable in 
short-term rather than long-term loans. Moreover, according to the BLS, credit institutions 
envisaged no changes in their credit standards in the following three months. 
According to the business confi dence index compiled by the Chambers of Commerce, the 
percentage of fi rms pointing to diffi culties obtaining credit as a factor limiting their activity rose 
again (to 30%) in 2009 Q1. Moreover, the survey on access to fi nancing for SMEs, also com-
piled by the Chambers of Commerce, showed an increase, in April and May, in the number of 
fi rms with fewer than 250 employees that had seen their credit supply squeezed (43% in May, 
up from 27% in March), while 88% of SMEs had faced higher demands in terms of collateral 
and guarantees. 
In this setting, corporate borrowing continued to lose momentum, growing by some 5% year-
on-year in May, down almost 1 pp on March. Credit from resident institutions, which is the 
main source of fi nancing for corporations, rose at a slower pace (around 3% year-on-year, and 
close to 0% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms). By contrast, other sources of fi nancing 
(credit from non-residents and fi xed-income securities), which are mainly used by the larger 
corporations, showed greater momentum. 
The latest data on credit breakdown by productive activity, relating to 2009 Q1, show wide-
spread deceleration save in industry, where bank liabilities grew by around 10% year-on-year, 
virtually the same as three months earlier. Construction and agriculture posted the sharpest fall 
year-on-year, with negative growth rates of –8% and –2%, respectively, while the rate of growth 
of credit to real estate sector fi rms (4% in March 2009, down from 5% at end-2008) and to 
other services (down from 14% to 12% in the same period) also moderated.
Against this backdrop, and according to the Financial Accounts for 2009 Q1, the sector’s net 
borrowing fell by more than 1.5 pp, to slightly less than 6% of GDP, while the fi nancing gap, 
the indicator that approximates the funds required to bridge the difference between gross 
corporate saving and gross capital formation plus permanent foreign investment, also fell (by 
2 pp), to slightly less than 9% of GDP.
Despite the moderation in the rate of growth of sector liabilities, the corporate debt-to-earn-
ings ratio was stable in 2009 Q1, due to the poor earnings performance. Interest payments 
relative to profi t were also virtually unchanged on end-2008 at around 29%. However, the lat-
est preliminary estimates available point to a decline in the debt burden in Q2, in line with the 
decline in the cost of lending. In turn, the latest National Accounts earnings estimates, corre-
sponding to March 2009, point to a further slowdown. Thus, although the year-on-year rate of 
growth was still relatively high, the quarter-on-quarter rate of the seasonally-adjusted series 
was practically fl at. 
In addition, analysts again downgraded their earnings growth expectations for listed non-
 fi nancial corporations for the next 12 months (see Chart 26), although they raised their pre-
liminary earnings forecasts for the longer term, for the fi rst time since end-2007.
The Central Balance Sheet Data Offi ce Quarterly Survey (CBQ) information for 2009 Q1, based 
on a sample in which large corporations predominate, shows a sharp contraction (of around 
30%) in ordinary profi ts in 2009 Q1 in comparison with the same period a year earlier; this is 
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the most negative change in this variable throughout the CBQ series. Analysis of the activities 
with most representation in the CBQ, which includes neither construction nor property devel-
opment, shows that, once again, the decline was particularly notable in industry (–68%) and, 
in line with this decline, industry was the sector that posted the sharpest drop in ordinary re-
turn on equity (ROE). This, together with the growth in liabilities, was refl ected in an increase 
both in the debt and the debt burden ratio. As a consequence of all these developments, the 
synthetic indicators of fi nancial pressure on investment and employment rose once again.
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Non-fi nancial corporations’ doubtful asset ratios rose in Q1, standing at 4.8% in March, up 
1.1 pp on end-2008, continuing to refl ect the adverse earnings performance. Real estate serv-
ices and construction fi rms, with an overall doubtful asset ratio of 7.3% at the end of 2009 Q1, 
in comparison with 5.7% at end-2008, experienced the greatest diffi culties in servicing their 
debts, while in all other branches of activity the ratio rose to a lesser extent (from 1.9% to 
2.6%) in the period.
General government net borrowing rose signifi cantly in 2009 Q1, to 5.3% of GDP in cumulative 
12-month terms, an increase of 1.5 pp on end-2008 (see Table 6 and Chart 27). The break-
down by instrument shows that the defi cit was covered by issuing short-term, and especially 
medium- and long-term, securities. In contrast to the previous year, the balance of deposits 
net of lending increased. Moreover, despite the higher debt, the drop in the average cost of 
funds held interest payments steady as a proportion of GDP at 1.6%.
The debit balance of the nation’s net fi nancial transactions fell, in cumulative 12-month terms, 
in 2009 Q1 to 8.4% of GDP, from 9.1% in December. This moderation was accompanied by a 
restructuring by institutional sector, as fi rms and households (the latter, posting a positive bal-
ance for the second consecutive quarter) recorded lower borrowing, while the general govern-
ment defi cit rose (see Table 6).
The breakdown of fi nancial transactions vis-à-vis the rest of the world by sector shows that net 
capital infl ows channelled through the general government rose substantially in 2009 Q1, rep-
resenting, in cumulative 12-month terms, 3.1% of GDP, against a backdrop of high public debt 
issues. By contrast, the funds raised by credit institutions, institutional investors and non-fi nan-
cial corporations decreased, although in all three cases they remained positive (equivalent to 
1.2%, 1.5% and 0.7%, respectively, of GDP). At the same time, the other non-fi nancial institu-
5.4 General government
5.5 The rest of the world
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tions, including securitisation SPEs, once again recorded negative fl ows. Despite the decrease 
in the nation’s net borrowing, funds raised abroad by sectors other than the Banco de España 
were insuffi cient to cover it, with the result that, once again, the Banco de España’s net asset 
fl ows vis-à-vis non-residents were negative, amounting to 2.8% of GDP in cumulative annual 
terms (see Chart 28).
Capital infl ows fell in 2009 Q1 to 8.8% of GDP, in cumulative 12-month terms, a decrease of 
3.5 pp on December (see Table 8). By instrument, there was a notable drop in purchases of 
shares and other equity by non-residents (1.9% of GDP, down 1.5 pp on three months earlier) 
and in deposits (particularly interbank deposits: 2% of GDP, down 4.2 pp on end-2008). Net 
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c. Includes, in addition to other items, the asset-side caption reflecting insurance technical reserves and the net flow of trade credit.
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fi nancing obtained through this channel recorded a more moderate decline (2.4 pp). This con-
trasted with the growth in net fi nancing obtained from securities other than shares, which had 
been negative in previous periods, due especially to the increase in funds obtained through 
securities issued by general government. Relative to GDP, foreign direct investment in Spain 
declined again, by 1.5 pp to 2.9%.
Capital outfl ows fell to 0.5% of GDP, in cumulative 12-month terms, in 2009 Q1, a decrease of 
2.7 pp on December 2008 (see Table 8). By instrument, investment in fi xed-income securities 
declined, while net acquisitions of shares and other equity showed greater momentum (2.5% 
of GDP, up 0.6 pp on three months earlier). However, Spanish direct investment abroad fell 
slightly, going below 5% of GDP.
As a result of cross-border fi nancial fl ows and of changes in asset prices and the exchange 
rate, the Spanish economy’s accumulated net debt vis-à-vis the rest of the world remained at 
around 80% of GDP (see Chart 28). By sector, this was essentially the result of the improve-
ment in the debit positions of the fi nancial institutions and the non-fi nancial private sector, 
which was offset by the increase in general government liabilities.
24.7.2009.
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Results of non-fi nancial corporations in 2009 Q1
Productive activity at the non-fi nancial corporations reporting their data to the Central Balance 
Sheet Data Offi ce Quarterly Survey (CBQ) contracted sharply in 2009 Q1, bringing gross value 
added (GVA) down 13%. This negative rate of growth contrasts with the increase of 2.3% re-
corded in 2008 Q1 (see Table 1 and Chart 1)2 and is higher than the decline seen in 2008 
overall (–2.6%). It is, however, consistent with the events of the closing months of the year. This 
negative performance affected all sectors of the sample, although the most negative rates 
were seen at corporations in the wholesale and retail trade and industrial sectors, against a 
backdrop of declining consumption and investment in capital goods. The contribution of the 
external sector to non-fi nancial corporations’ results improved in 2009 Q1 as opposed to a 
year earlier, due to the notable decrease in imports, which was more acute than the decline in 
exports, against the backdrop of a collapse in international trade. 
Personnel costs fell slightly (–0.2%) in 2009 Q1, in comparison with a 4.3% increase a year 
earlier, as headcount reductions intensifi ed (–2.8%) and growth in average compensation 
moderated (2.6% against 3.4% in 2008 Q1; see Table 2.A). The decline in the average number 
of employees affected only temporary contracts, which were down 16.2% at fi rms reporting to 
the CBQ. The number of employees with permanent contracts remained unchanged, although 
this also represents deterioration on a year earlier (+0.7%). Employment fell across all sectors, 
with the exception of energy. Among the fi rms reporting to the CBQ, employment fell most 
notably in industry and in the wholesale and retail trade (–5% and –8.6%, respectively), in line 
with their weak productive activity fi gures. The energy sector was the only one to see its aver-
age headcount rise (+1.7%), although to a lesser extent than in 2008 Q1 (+2.1%). The con-
tained growth in average compensation of 2.6%, almost 1 pp lower than a year earlier, is a 
result of the lower wage rises negotiated in the latest collective bargaining agreements, against 
the backdrop of the economic crisis and the falling rate of infl ation (1.4% at end-2008). In fact 
average compensation even declined in some sectors: in industry, for example, where wage 
costs recorded a negative rate of change (–0.2%). The rate of growth of personnel costs per 
employee also decelerated considerably in the wholesale and retail trade in 2009 Q1, standing 
at 0.2%; this fi gure may be connected with the sharp cut in performance-related variable com-
pensation at large corporations.
The decline in personnel costs offset only a minimum part of the negative rate of change of 
GVA; this thus passed through to gross operating profi t (GOP), which fell by 22% in 2009 Q1, 
in comparison with growth of 0.8% a year earlier, refl ecting the extent of the impact of the 
slowdown in activity on earnings at Spanish non-fi nancial corporations. By contrast, fi nancial 
costs declined at a rate of 5.3% in 2009 Q1, representing a turnaround in comparison with 
previous quarters. This improvement is a result of the lower interest rate scenario, as debt 
levels rose slightly, due to a number of corporate restructuring operations via purchase and 
sale of shares that entailed extra fi nancing. On the whole, however, investment activity was 
sluggish in the quarter. Financial revenue fell sharply in 2009 Q1 (–10.3%), as fi rms received 
fewer dividends in the period, in contrast to the exceptional growth seen in this heading in 
Overview1
1. The information which serves as a basis for this article is that sent by the 656 corporations that had reported their 
quarterly data to the Central Balance Sheet Data Offi ce as at 17 June. The GVA generated by this aggregate accounts 
for 11% of the total GVA of non-fi nancial corporations. 2. These rates, obtained from the fi gures supplied directly by the 
non-fi nancial corporations in their accounting statements, are affected by the fact that Easter fell in Q2 in 2007 and 2009 
but in Q1 in 2008.
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2008 Q1. As fi nancial revenue declined by more than fi nancial costs, ordinary net profi t (ONP) 
fell somewhat more sharply than GOP, recording a negative rate of change of –30.5% in 2009 
Q1. This is the highest decline seen in this fi gure throughout the CBQ’s data series.
As activity contracted sharply, and with it the main corporate surpluses, ordinary returns also 
headed down again in 2009 Q1. Thus, return on investment (ROI) stood at 5.1%, down slight-
ly more than 0.5 pp on 2008 Q1 (5.7%), and return on equity (ROE) at 6%, down 0.6 pp on a 
year earlier (6.6%). The decline in the ratio that measures the cost of debt borne by fi rms re-
fl ects the lower interest rates: the ratio stood at 4.1% in 2009 Q1, in comparison with 4.7% a 
year earlier, offsetting the decline in returns. Accordingly, the differential between ROI and the 
cost of debt remained positive (albeit marginally, at 1 pp) across the entire sample, unchanged 
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3.01-2.027.22.320.710.4euneverlaicnaniF.4
3.5-0.424.610.933.430.4stsoclaicnaniF.5
4.8-6.0-7.00.09.92.5snoisivorpgnitarepodnatnemriapmi,noitaicerpedteN.6
5.03-4.1-5.61-8.41.55.9]6–5–4+2.S[TIFORPTENYRANIDRO.3.S
)b()b()b()b(0.280.1-c)(tnemriapmidnaslasopsidmorf)sessol(sniaG.7
8.52.1-3.3-1.3-6.5)1.S/7(AVGfoegatnecrepasA.'7
)b(5.691.65)b(9.452.1)c()sessol(sniagrehtodnaeulavriafnisegnahC.8
0.3-2.0-9.3-0.49.2-)1.S/8(AVGfoegatnecrepasA.'8
3.03-2.316.86-9.41-9.639.1xatemocnietaroproC.9
5.12-2.4-5.82-6.83.828.7– 9]8+7+3.S[TIFORPTEN.4.S
0.524.729.521.523.42)1.S/4.S(AVGfoegatnecrepasA.'4.S
)d(salumroFSOITARTIFORP
R.1 Ordinary return on investment (before taxes) (S.3 + 5.1)/NA 9.1 8.9 7.7 5.7 5.1
R.2 Interest on borrowed funds/interest-bearing borrowing 5.1/IBB 4.1 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.1
R.3 Ordinary return on equity (before taxes) S.3/E 13.5 12.5 10.2 6.6 6.0
0.10.18.21.41.52.R–1.RR.4 ROI – cost of debt (R.1 – R.2)
08 Q1-Q4/
07 Q1-Q4 (a)
08 Q1/
07 Q1
09 Q1/
08 Q1
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT. YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES AND PROFIT RATIOS
Growth rates of the same corporations on the same period a year earlier
TABLE 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. All the data in these columns have been calculated as the weighted average of the quarterly data.
b. Rate not significant or not calculable because the relevant figures are of opposite sign.
c. New P&L headings resulting from application of the new general chart of accounts (PGC 2007). Box 2 reports on the scope of the changes made. 
Data assimilated for 2007 and previous.
d. NA = Net Assets (net of non-interest-bearing borrowing); E = Equity; IBB = Interest-Bearing Borrowing; NA = E + IBB. The financial costs in the 
numerators of ratios R.1 and R.2 only include the portion of financial costs that is interest on borrowed funds (5.1) and not other financial costs (5.2).
NB: In calculating rates, internal accounting movements have been edited out of items 4, 5 and 7.
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on a year earlier. Returns declined in all sectors, although most notably in industry, which 
posted a negative differential with the cost of debt (–2.3), evidencing the extent of deterioration 
of the fi nancial position at industrial fi rms.
Lastly, extraordinary transactions virtually offset each other in 2009 Q1 and thus had little im-
pact on profi t for the period, although they did mean that this surplus declined somewhat less 
than ONP. Accordingly, the fi rms in the sample saw their profi ts fall by 21.5% in 2009 Q1. 
However, as GVA also fell, when profi t is expressed as a percentage of GVA the decline in 
REPORTING NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of corporations CBA 9,065 9,137 9,280 8,947 — —
CBQ 830 811 829 847 782 656
CBA 32.3 32.5 33.6 33.0 — —
CBQ 15.0 14.6 14.5 14.3 12.2 11.0
% of GDP of the sector non-
financial corporations
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
Rates of change
 PERSONNEL COSTS PER EMPLOYEE
 AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
GROSS OPERATING PROFIT
Rates of change
GROSS VALUE ADDED AT FACTOR COST
Rates of change
PERSONNEL COSTS
Rates of change
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS REPORTING TO THE CENTRAL BALANCE 
SHEET DATA OFFICE
CHART 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 data drawn from corporations reporting to the annual survey (CBA), 
and average data of the four quarters of each year in relation to the previous year (CBQ).
b. Average of the four quarters of 2008 relative to the same period of 2007.
c. Data for 2009 Q1 relative to the same period of 2008.
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comparison with 2008 Q1 was little more than 2 pp (from 27.4% to 25%) and the ratio re-
mained relatively high.
To sum up, productive activity at non-fi nancial corporations contracted sharply in 2009 Q1, 
prompting major reductions in all ordinary surpluses and job losses, as the average number of 
workers with temporary contracts declined. This adverse performance affected all sectors of 
activity, but most especially industry and wholesale and retail trade which were directly infl u-
enced by consumption and investment, both of which showed strong signs of recession in the 
REPORTING NON-FINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of corporations CBA 9,065 9,137 9,280 8,947 — —
CBQ 830 811 829 847 782 656
CBA 32.3 32.5 33.6 33.0 — —
CBQ 15.0 14.6 14.5 14.3 12.2 11.0
% of GDP of the sector non-
financial corporations
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (R.1)
Ratios
COST OF DEBT (R.2) AND
ROI-COST OF DEBT (R.1 – R.2)
Ratios
 COST OF DEBT (R.2)
 ROI-COST OF DEBT (R.1 - R.2)
FINANCIAL COSTS
Rates of change
ORDINARY NET PROFIT
Rates of change
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS REPORTING TO THE CENTRAL BALANCE 
SHEET DATA OFFICE (cont'd)
CHART 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 data drawn from corporations reporting to the annual survey (CBA), 
and average data of the four quarters of each year in relation to the previous year (CBQ).
b. Average of the four quarters of 2008 relative to the same period of 2007.
c. Data for 2009 Q1 relative to the same period of 2008.
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CBA CBQ CBA CBQ CBA CBQ CBA CBQ
2007
08 Q1-
Q4 (a)
08 Q1 09 Q1 2007
08 Q1-
Q4 (a)
08 Q1 09 Q1 2007
08 Q1-
Q4 (a)
08 Q1 09 Q1 2007
08 Q1-
Q4 (a)
08 Q1 09 Q1
Total 6.4 -2.6 2.3 -13.0 3.1 0.4 0.9 -2.8 6.9 3.6 4.3 -0.2 3.7 3.2 3.4 2.6
SIZE
Small 3.4 — — — -0.4 — — — 4.8 — — — 5.2 — — —
Medium 5.6 -0.3 1.8 -14.0 1.7 -1.5 -0.2 -5.2 6.6 3.0 4.9 -4.7 4.8 4.6 5.1 0.5
Large 6.6 -2.7 2.3 -12.9 3.4 0.5 1.0 -2.6 7.0 3.6 4.3 0.0 3.4 3.1 3.3 2.7
BREAKDOWN OF ACTIVITIES BEST REPRESENTED IN THE SAMPLE
Energy 1.4 4.1 10.9 -13.8 0.2 2.0 2.1 1.7 5.0 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.8 2.5 2.3 1.7
Industry 8.4 -12.4 -2.5 -29.5 0.3 -1.1 -0.9 -5.0 4.2 1.7 2.7 -5.2 3.8 2.8 3.6 -0.2
Wholesale and retail trade 7.1 -6.4 -1.5 -14.5 3.5 1.3 2.0 -8.6 7.0 4.5 3.6 -8.5 3.4 3.2 1.6 0.2
Transport and communications 6.9 -1.8 1.2 -7.6 1.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.4 5.6 1.8 3.2 1.8 3.7 2.7 4.1 3.3
GROSS VALUE ADDED
AT FACTOR COST
EMPLOYEES
(AVERAGE FOR PERIOD)
PERSONNEL COSTS
COMPENSATION PER
EMPLOYEE
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. All the data in these columns have been calculated as the weighted average of the quarterly data.
VALUE ADDED, EMPLOYEES, PERSONNEL COSTS AND COMPENSATION PER EMPLOYEE.
BREAKDOWN BY SIZE AND MAIN ACTIVITY OF CORPORATIONS
Growth rates of the same corporations on the same period a year earlier
TABLE 2.A
TOTAL CBQ
CORPORATIONS
2009 Q1
CORPORATIONS
INCREASING (OR
NOT CHANGING)
STAFF LEVELS
CORPORATIONS
REDUCING
STAFF LEVELS
683072656snoitaroprocforebmuN
PERSONNEL COSTS
1.202,42.952,23.164,6)m€(1Q8002noitautislaitinI
3.4-4.72.0-1Q8002/1Q9002etaR
AVERAGE COMPENSATION
2.668,015.063,311.526,11)€(1Q8002noitautislaitinI
5.23.16.21Q8002/1Q9002etaR
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
783961655)s000(1Q8002noitautislaitinI
6.6-0.68.2-1Q8002/1Q9002etaR
Permanent Initial situation 2008 Q1 (000s) 462 132 330
Rate 2009 Q1 / 2008 Q1 0.0 5.3 -2.2
Non-permanent Initial situation 2008 Q1 (000s) 94 37 57
Rate 2009 Q1 / 2008 Q1 -16.2 8.5 -32.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
EMPLOYMENT AND PERSONNEL COSTS
Breakdown based on changes in staff levels
TABLE 2.B
ANALYSIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR BOX 1
Activity contracted sharply at the industrial fi rms in 2009 Q1, re-
fl ected in the decline of –29.5% in their GVA. This is the largest 
decline in this sector in the quarterly series that began in 1994, 
confi rming the signifi cant impact that the decline in exports and in 
investment in capital goods has had on industrial fi rms, and the 
impact the deterioration in construction activity has had on auxil-
iary industry. Thus, although all industrial aggregates saw their GVA 
decrease signifi cantly, the sharpest declines were in glass, ceramic 
and metal products (–54%), chemical industries (–32%) and other 
manufacturing industries (–25.8%). Net external demand (exports 
less imports) performed favourably, making a positive contribution 
as imports declined more than exports, against a backdrop of no-
table sluggishness in international trade. The deterioration in in-
dustrial activity led to a deterioration in employment: the average 
number of employees in the sector fell at a rate of –5% in 2009 Q1, 
which is, as in the case of activity, the largest decline in this ag-
gregate since the launch of the CBQ’s data series. Personnel costs 
per employee recorded a very moderate performance, practically 
fl at (–0.2%) in 2009 Q1, as opposed to growth of 3.6% a year ear-
lier. This moderation in average compensation is due to the lower 
wage increases set in collective bargaining agreements, against a 
backdrop of uncertainty and low infl ation rates, and to the sharp 
cuts seen in performance-related variable compensation. In fact, 
average personnel costs even declined in some sub-sectors: –2% 
in food, beverages and tobacco; –2.5% in glass, ceramic and met-
al products; and –3.5% in other manufacturing industries. As a 
result of the performance of employment and average compensa-
tion, personnel costs fell at a rate of –5.2% in 2009 Q1, but this 
was insuffi cient to prevent a major adjustment in gross operating 
profi t (–60.6%), refl ecting the sharp contraction in industrial activity 
in the period. In contrast to the rest of the sample, the industrial 
sector saw its fi nancial revenue and fi nancial expenses increase in 
2009 Q1. However this was due, in both cases, to one-offs (new 
borrowings, on the expenses side, and receipt of dividends, on the 
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EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
Rates of change
 PERSONNEL COSTS
 AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
GROSS VALUE ADDED AT FACTOR COST
Rates of change
FINANCIAL COSTS
Rates of change
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Ratios
PERFORMANCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS REPORTING TO THE CBSO
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REPORTING INDUSTRIAL 
CORPORATIONS
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of corporations CBA 2,538 2,476 2,471 2,345 — —
CBQ 353 343 336 334 325 313 306 298 321 305 292 283 316 305 290 286 291 276 254 234 207 — — —
CBA 29.4 28.8 31.5 33.0 — —
CBQ 20.0 20.3 18.3 19.7 19.5 20.2 17.2 17.7 18.9 18.0 16.5 17.6 19.8 19.9 16.4 17.2 17.3 16.5 12.1 8.2 8.4 — — —
% of GDP of the sub-sector industrial 
corporations
SOURCE: Banco de España.
BOX 1ANALYSIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR (cont’d)
revenue side), with no signifi cant impact on the declining profi t tra-
jectory. Accordingly, ordinary net profi t fell sharply (–68.2%), at a 
similar rate to gross operating profi t. Return on investment and 
return on equity also fell considerably: ROI declined by 4 pp to 
2.3% in 2009 Q1, while ROE dropped to 0.3%, well below the 
7.9% recorded a year earlier. As in the rest of the sample, the ratio 
that measures the cost of debt reversed, down to 4.6% in 2009 Q1 
(0.3 pp lower than in 2008 Q1), as a result of the lower interest 
rates. Nevertheless, this decrease was not suffi cient to prevent the 
differential between ROI and the cost of debt from turning negative 
(–2.3), for the fi rst time in this aggregate since 1996 when interest 
rates were considerably higher (around 10%). This confi rms and 
sums up the diffi cult situation faced by the industrial sector, which 
has been more directly affected than other aggregates by the ad-
verse international developments and the general climate of uncer-
tainty and which has seen contraction in its activity and its returns, 
along with a marked decrease in its capacity to generate profi t and 
create jobs.
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quarter. The resultant decline in ordinary returns was accompanied by a decline in the cost of 
debt, which offset the impact on the differential between the two (ROI – cost of debt), although 
this differential remains very narrow.
In 2009 Q1, productive activity at the non-fi nancial fi rms reporting to the CBQ declined sig-
nifi cantly, continuing in the adverse pattern seen in the closing months of 2008 and leading to 
a decline of 13% in gross value added (GVA) in the period, in comparison with growth of 2.3% 
a year earlier (see Table 1 and Chart 1). The sharp decline in intermediate consumption and 
production (–23.8% and –20.2%, respectively) is further evidence of how the contraction in 
activity heightened in 2009 Q1. The contribution of the external sector improved as net exter-
nal demand (exports net of imports) rose (see Table 3), as a result of the sharp deceleration in 
imports, which was more acute than that of exports, against the backdrop of a severe down-
turn in world trade. 
A more detailed breakdown by sector (see Table 2.A) shows, fi rst, that GVA contracted in all 
the aggregates, although with a varying degree of intensity. Thus, the wholesale and retail 
trade and industrial sectors posted the most negative rates of change in productive activity. 
Industrial fi rms’ GVA fell at a rate of –29.5% in 2009 Q1, primarily as a result of the decline in 
investment in capital goods and another poor performance from the sub-sectors most closely 
connected to the construction industry. Activity also declined considerably in the wholesale 
and retail trade sector, with GVA falling at a rate of –14.5%, as a result of weak consumption 
against a backdrop of great uncertainty. In the transport and communications sector, GVA fell 
at a rate of –7.6% in 2009 Q1, in comparison with growth of 1.2% a year earlier. Within this 
aggregate, telecoms and air traffi c, which are the sub-sectors most directly affected by the 
present downturn, recorded the most negative performance. Lastly the energy sector saw its 
GVA fall at a rate of –13.8% in 2009 Q1, in comparison with growth of 10.9% a year earlier. In 
this case, GVA declined sharply in the two main sub-sectors, that is, in electricity, gas and 
water utilities and, especially, in refi ning. Thus GVA fell at a rate of –30.8% in the oil refi ning 
companies, due largely to shrinking corporate margins as oil prices headed sharply down-
wards (see Chart 2). In the utilities sub-sector, GVA fell at a rate of –8.8%, in comparison with 
growth of 5.9% a year earlier, mainly as a result of the fall-off in demand (demand for electric-
ity declined by 6.5% in 2009 Q1, according to data from Red Eléctrica).
Finally Chart 3, which depicts the distribution of corporations by rate of change in GVA, irre-
spective of their size or economic sector, shows a very signifi cant increase in the percentage 
of corporations posting a decline in this variable in the period analysed, in comparison with a 
Activity
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CBA CBQ (a)
2007 08 Q1-Q4 (a) 08 Q1 09 Q1
656656287749,8snoitaroproclatoT
Corporations reporting source/destination 8,947 732 615 615
9.180.975.771.76niapS
Total abroad 32.9 22.5 21.0 18.1
EU countries 19.2 15.6 14.3 13.0
Third countries 13.8 6.9 6.7 5.2
8.095.192.098.48niapS
Total abroad 15.2 9.8 8.5 9.2
EU countries 10.5 6.9 6.5 6.5
Third countries 4.7 2.8 2.0 2.7
Industry -10.5 65.1 73.1 (b)
Other corporations -6.3 23.2 5.0 60.3
Percentage of net purchases 
according to source
Percentage of turnover
according to destination
Net external demand 
(exports less imports), 
rate of change
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. All the data in these columns have been calculated as the weighted average of the relevant 
quarterly data.
PURCHASES AND TURNOVER OF CORPORATIONS REPORTING DATA ON
PURCHASING SOURCES AND SALES DESTINATIONS
Structure and rates of change
TABLE 3
IMPACT OF OIL PRICES ON THE REFINING SECTOR CHART 2
SOURCES: Banco de España and Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio (Informe mensual de
precios).
a. 2009 data relate to the CBQ.
 REFINING GVA (Rates of change) (a)
 REFINING PRICE INDEX (Rates of change)
 EURO-DENOMINATED OIL PRICE INDEX
 DOLLAR-DENOMINATED OIL PRICE INDEX
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year earlier. This signifi es that the decline in activity has intensifi ed and spread to the majority 
of corporations in the sample. Thus, while 44.5% of corporations recorded contraction in GVA 
in 2008 Q1, this fi gure rose to 67.4% in 2009 Q1. Furthermore, there is a clear increase in the 
percentage of corporations recording a decline in GVA in excess of 20%: 39.1% in 2009 Q1 
as opposed to 21.1% in 2008 Q1.
In 2009 Q1 personnel costs fell at a rate of –0.2%, against an increase of 4.3% in 2008 Q1; 
this is due to the negative employment performance and to the greater moderation seen in 
average compensation growth in 2009 Q1.
In effect, average employment at CBQ sample fi rms fell at a rate of –2.8% in 2009 Q1, as op-
posed to growth of 0.9% in 2008. The deterioration in productive activity was seen in tempo-
rary employment, which bore the brunt of workforce restructuring, declining at a rate of –16.2% 
(see Table 2.B). Permanent employment was unchanged, although this represents deteriora-
tion on a year earlier when it grew by 0.7%. The sectoral breakdown (see Table 2.A) shows that 
employment fi gures worsened overall, although the industry and wholesale and retail trade 
aggregates refl ect the most job destruction, in line with their extremely weak productive activ-
ity fi gures. Thus, the average number of employees in the industrial fi rms in the CBQ sample 
fell at a rate of –5%, accentuating the pattern of job destruction seen in 2008 in this aggregate 
(–0.9% in 2008 Q1 and –1.1% in the full year). Workforce restructuring was more severe in the 
wholesale and retail trade sector, as the average number of employees fell at a rate of -8.6%, 
as opposed to an increase of 2% a year earlier (although the comparison is affected by the 
retail outlet openings seen in 2008). The transport and communications sector also destroyed 
employment in 2009 Q1 (–1.4%, marginally higher than the –0.9% recorded a year earlier). In 
fact the energy sector was the only one that created employment (+1.7%), although the rate 
of growth was short of that seen in 2008 Q1 (+2.1%). Lastly, Table 4 shows how job destruc-
tion has spread to most of the sample fi rms: the average number of employees fell in 61% of 
these fi rms in 2009 Q1, in comparison with 39.8% in 2008 Q1.
Average compensation grew at a contained pace in 2009 Q1, rising by 2.6% as opposed to 
3.4% a year earlier. A certain degree of wage cost moderation was seen in general across all 
the sample sectors, as the downturn and extremely low infl ation rates prompted lower in-
Employment and 
personnel costs
DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATONS BY RATE OF CHANGE
IN GVA AT FACTOR COST
CHART 3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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creases in wage bargaining agreements. Table 4 confi rms this development, showing that the 
percentage of corporations in which the rate of change of compensation per employee was 
below infl ation rose in 2009 Q1 to 50.9%, from 48.1% a year earlier. By sector, industry and 
the wholesale and retail trade saw the most intense slowdown in average compensation 
growth (in fact the industrial sector posted negative rates of change (–0.2%)), primarily as a 
result of the sharp reductions in performance-related variable compensation at some large 
corporations. Lastly Table 2.B, which distinguishes between corporations that have main-
tained or raised their average number of employees and those that have destroyed employ-
ment, shows that, as is customary, the fi rms that created employment were those with the 
most contained growth in average compensation (+1.3%). It also shows that the fi rms that 
destroyed employment recorded more contained wage cost growth (+2.5%) than in the past. 
Despite the decline in personnel costs, the sharp contraction in productive activity meant that 
gross operating profi t fell at a rate of –22% in 2009 Q1, in comparison with minor growth of 
0.8% a year earlier. Financial costs also declined in 2009 Q1, at a rate of –5.3%, in this case 
for the fi rst time since 2004. As shown in Chart 4, which depicts the ratio of interest to GOP 
plus fi nancial revenue, this enabled fi rms to ease their debt burden somewhat (down to 27%, 
a drop of 0.7 pp in comparison with 2008 Q1), even though the ratio’s denominator also de-
clined. The table below permits analysis of the reasons behind the decline in fi nancial costs in 
2009:
09/08 Q1
Change in fi nancial costs –5.3%
A. Interest on borrowed funds (1 + 2) –4.8%
1. Due to the cost (interest rate)  –16.6%
2. Due to the amount of interest-bearing debt 11.8%
B. Commissions and cash discounts –0.5%
The table shows that these costs declined as a result of the interest rate cuts that were gradually 
passed through to fi rms’ fi nancial costs. This decline was partially offset by the change due to the 
amount of debt, which rose moderately in 2009 Q1, although this aggregate change was due to 
Profi ts, rates of return
and debt
QBCABC
2006 2007 07 Q1-Q4 (a) 08 Q1-Q4 (a) 08 Q1 09 Q1
656258287748749,8082,9snoitaroprocforebmuN
001001001001001001STSOCLENNOSREP
3.453.628.238.821.624.52gnillaF
7.547.372.762.179.376.47gnisirrotnatsnoC
001001001001001001SEEYOLPMEFOREBMUNEGAREVA
0.168.938.547.834.139.03gnillaF
0.932.062.453.166.861.96gnisirrotnatsnoC
AVERAGE COMPENSATION PER EMPLOYEE RELATIVE TO INFLATION 100 100 100 100 100 100
9.051.847.848.441.835.83)b(htworgrewoL
1.949.153.152.559.165.16)b(htworgemasrorehgiH
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Weighted average of the relevant quarters for each column.
b. Year-on-year rate of change in the CPI in December of the previous year.
PERSONNEL COSTS, EMPLOYEES AND AVERAGE COMPENSATION PER EMPLOYEE
Percentage of corporations in specific situations
TABLE 4
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
CBA 188.6 202.3 243.4 261.2
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 CBQ 242.6 258.5 337.0 358.6 404.2 445.7
CBA 44.8 44.8 47.3 47.6
CBA excl. 
MGs
188.6 202.3 209.0 226.0
CBQ 46.2 46.4 49.0 48.8 48.7 49.8
CBQ excl. 
MGs
194.1 225.1 283.6 309.3 366.3 408.6
E1. INTEREST-BEARING BORROWING /
NET ASSETS (a)
Ratios
 TOTAL CBA
 TOTAL CBQ
 CBA excluding MGs (c)
 CBQ excluding MGs (c)
E2. INTEREST-BEARING BORROWING / GVA (b)
Ratios
DEBT RATIOS CHART 4
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% CBA / CBQ CBQ
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Ratio calculated from final balance sheet figures. Own funds include an adjustment to current prices.
b. Ratio calculated from final balance sheet figures. Interest-bearing borrowing includes an adjustment to eliminate 
intragroup debt (approximation of consolidated debt).
c. MGs: Sample corporations belonging to the main reporting multinational groups. These do not include the large 
construction sector companies.
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certain large share transactions made within the framework of a restructuring process in the energy 
sector that entailed additional borrowing by the fi rms involved. In any case, the rate of growth of debt 
moderated in general; this is consistent with the sluggish investment conditions in the sample fi rms 
and the uncertainty that prompted most fi rms to postpone their investment decisions. The data com-
piled by the CBQ to approximate business investment show a decline of –7.8% in 2009 Q1. The E1 
ratio (see Chart 4) refl ects a minor increase in debt levels in 2009 Q1, as net equity (which forms part 
of the denominator, together with borrowed funds) remained virtually unchanged and interest-bearing 
borrowing (the numerator) rose slightly. The E2 ratio, which approximately measures the debt burden 
relative to fi rms’ repayment capacity, continued to head upward, as in previous quarters, driven by the 
minor increase in interest-bearing debt and, above all, by the decline in ordinary revenue.
CBA CBQ CBA CBQ CBA CBQ CBA CBQ
2007
08 Q1
- Q4 (a)
08 Q1 09 Q1 2007
08 Q1
- Q4 (a)
08 Q1 09 Q1 2007
08 Q1
- Q4 (a)
08 Q1 09 Q1 2007
08 Q1
- Q4 (a)
08 Q1 09 Q1
0.10.18.21.41.57.57.79.85.03-4.1-5.61-8.40.22-8.03.7-9.5latoT
SIZE
———5.2———4.7———5.1-———1.1llamS
3.01.27.12.31.48.67.70.80.24-5.6-5.2-9.3-5.52-0.2-2.4-4.4muideM
0.10.18.21.41.57.57.70.92.03-2.1-9.61-8.59.12-9.04.7-1.6egraL
BREAKDOWN OF ACTIVITIES BEST REPRESENTED IN THE SAMPLE
7.10.35.36.44.55.72.89.82.91-9.67.0-1.17.71-5.210.44.0ygrenE
3.2-5.14.00.53.24.64.51.012.86-1.73-8.25-6.316.06-2.8-4.82-0.41yrtsudnI
Wholesale and retail trade 7.3 -23.1 -7.3 -22.8 4.0 -22.7 -1.5 -37.7 10.9 4.9 9.6 6.2 6.0 0.6 5.0 1.8
Transport and communications 7.8 -4.2 -0.2 -14.2 23.7 -4.3 1.4 -23.0 10.3 10.7 10.1 8.4 5.8 6.0 5.6 4.6
GROSS OPERATING
PROFIT
ORDINARY NET PROFIT RETURN ON INVESTMENT
(R.1)
ROI-COST OF DEBT
(R.1-R.2)
GROSS OPERATING PROFIT, ORDINARY NET PROFIT, RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI) AND
ROI-COST OF DEBT (R.1 - R.2).
BREAKDOWN BY SIZE AND MAIN ACTIVITY OF CORPORATIONS
Ratios and rates of change of the same corporations on the same period a year earlier
TABLE 5
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. All the data in these columns have been calculated as the weighted average of the quarterly data.
CBQ
RETURN ON
INVESTMENT (R.1)
ORDINARY RETURN
ON EQUITY (R.3)
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656258656258snoitaroprocforebmuN
R ≤ 0% 24.4 36.6 32.5 42.8
0% < R ≤ 5% 23.4 25.8 14.4 18.1
5% < R ≤ 10% 17.6 14.3 13.6 9.1
10% < R ≤ 15% 10.2 4.7 8.9 5.8
15% < R 24.4 18.6 30.5 24.1
MEMORANDUM ITEM: Average return 5.7 5.1 6.6 6.0
Percentage of corporations
by profitability bracket
SOURCE: Banco de España.
STRUCTURE OF REPORTING CORPORATIONS' RETURN ON INVESTMENT
AND ORDINARY RETURN ON EQUITY
TABLE 6
CHANGES IN THE PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT UNDER THE NEW CHART OF ACCOUNTS (PGC 2007) BOX 2
As a result of the entry into force of the new chart of accounts (PGC 
2007) in 2008 Q1, the non-fi nancial corporations have had to apply 
new valuation criteria including, in particular, “fair value” accounting 
for a number of fi nancial assets. The Central Balance Sheet Data Of-
fi ce (CBSO) has regularly informed of the potential impact of this 
change on the quarterly data reported by the CBQ sample fi rms,1 
although to date this impact has been limited. With a view to reducing 
the reporting burden, as from 2008 the CBSO has been collecting 
information from the CBQ reporting corporations via a questionnaire 
that is fully adapted to the new chart of accounts, entailing changes 
in the data breakdown. As a result of these changes, adjustments 
have had to be made to the profi t and loss account in Table 1 of this 
article and to the time data series published in Chapter XV of the 
Banco de España’s Boletín Estadístico. This is the fi rst time these 
adjustments are included, now that two consecutive observations 
(2008 Q1 and 2009 Q1) are available under the new format. 
As the accompanying table shows, the change in format only affects 
the extraordinary profi t and loss headings. The table also shows the 
highest level of detail available in the questionnaires that serve as a 
basis for the data, to refl ect the content and the analytical limitations 
of these new data, as noted below. The following aspects of these 
changes should be highlighted: 
— As indicated above, the changes only affect the extraordinary 
profit and loss headings; accordingly, ordinary net profit (ONP), 
the heading on which the CBSO’s profit analysis is fundamentally 
based, is not significantly different from the data obtained previ-
ously. Nevertheless, when the time series were reviewed, it was 
decided to include amortisation of capital grants in ONP, to en-
hance its calculation: hereafter, ONP includes fixed asset depre-
ciation net of capital grants, a change that does not represent a 
break in the series. The change means that returns increase by a 
few decimal points throughout the data series.
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Absolute values (€m)
Absolute values (€m)
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Rate impossible to calculate
1. This impact has been quantifi ed in successive quarterly articles on results of 
non-fi nancial corporations, the fi rst published in the Economic Bulletin of July 
2008 relating to 2008 Q1 (see Box 1: “Implementation of the new Spanish 
general chart of accounts. Effects on corporations’ accounting data”).
CHANGES IN THE PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT UNDER THE NEW CHART OF ACCOUNTS (PGC 2007) (cont’d) BOX 2
— Extraordinary revenue and expenses, which are not included un-
der this name in the new chart of accounts, are no longer booked 
separately (capital losses and extraordinary expenses, on the one 
hand, and capital gains and extraordinary revenue, on the other), 
but as a net amount (revenue less expenses). This presentation 
option, defined in the PGC 2007, affects the explanatory power of 
the rates of change and makes them more volatile, as it adds to-
gether positive and negative headings in the numerators and de-
nominators. In fact there will be many cases in which it will be im-
possible to calculate the rates of change (when the headings go 
from negative to positive or vice versa, as in the case of the 2009 
Q1 data), and others in which the rates of change go beyond 
double-digit, as they are calculated on the basis of very low (net) 
figures, and thus lose all their analytical value. For this reason, Ta-
ble 1 of this article will hereafter include not only the rates of 
change but also the structure of these headings relative to GVA.
— The accompanying table sets out the items contained in the sum-
mary headings included in Table 1, and their relative importance in 
2009 Q1:
a) Heading 7, “Gains (losses) from disposals and impairment“, is 
identical to the same heading in the profit and loss account 
under the new chart of accounts. It includes gains and losses 
from the sale of fixed assets and financial instruments and 
impairment, that is, the valuation adjustment made at the end 
of the period for reversible deterioration in these asset bal-
ances. This heading totalled 5.8% of GVA in 2009 Q1.
b) Heading 8, “Changes in fair value and other gains (losses)”, is 
a group of extraordinary items created by the CBSO for ana-
lytical purposes, including severance pay, exchange differ-
ences, overprovisioning income, other extraordinary gains 
(losses) and, lastly, changes in fair value.
c) The key new feature here is precisely the presence of 
“Changes in fair value of financial instruments”, which 
records changes in the value of financial assets that may be 
fair value accounted. For 2009 Q1, the combined impact of 
exchange differences and fair value adjustments was nega-
tive and limited (–1.3% and –0.9% of GVA, respectively). 
Nevertheless, this valuation should be reviewed when the 
data for full-year 2008 become available (in November 
2009) and, in future years, when the new valuation proce-
dure is more established and the doubts expressed by 
some firms regarding its application have been settled.
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Financial revenue fell sharply in 2009 Q1 (–10.3%), as fi rms received fewer dividends (these fell 
at a rate of –24.3% in the period analysed, although the comparison is based on exception-
ally high dividend revenue in 2008 Q1). Accordingly, the decline in ordinary net profi t (ONP) 
heightened, falling at a rate of –30.5%, an unprecedented fi gure in a fi rst quarter throughout 
the CBQ’s data series and the result of generalised deterioration across all areas of activity (see 
Table 5). The combined performance of ONP and fi nancial costs meant that ordinary returns 
were notably lower than in previous quarters. Thus, return on investment (ROI) stood at 5.1% 
in 2009 Q1, down slightly more than 0.5 pp on 2008 Q1, and return on equity (ROE) stood at 
6%, down 0.6 pp on a year earlier (6.6%). Financial costs borne by fi rms (the R.2 ratio) also 
declined in 2009, with average fi nancial costs down from 4.7% a year earlier to 4.1%, due to 
the impact of the interest rate cuts. Accordingly, the differential between ROI and fi nancial 
costs remained positive (albeit marginally, at 1 pp) and virtually unchanged on 2008. The dif-
ferential narrowed across all sectors of activity (from 5 to 1.8 in wholesale and retail trade), but 
most noticeably in industry where it turned negative (–2.3).
To conclude, analysis of the extraordinary or non-recurrent items3 shows that no changes in 
2009 Q1 had a signifi cant impact on profi t for the period. Capital gains obtained on asset sale 
transactions within the framework of reorganisation of some energy sector fi rms and the sub-
stantial drop in corporate income tax (–30.3%) both added to profi t for the period, but share 
portfolio impairment charges detracted from fi rms’ book profi t. The combined impact of these 
3. The profi t and loss account format has been adapted to the new general chart of accounts. This has affected presen-
tation of these extraordinary items, which include, as key new features since 2008 Q1, changes in fair value and net re-
cording of extraordinary revenue and expenses. This makes analysis of these rates of change more diffi cult, given their 
increased volatility. The impact of these changes is analysed in more detail in Box 2.
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impairment charges and capital gains (items which, under the new general chart of accounts, 
are reported together) was positive (5.8% in terms of GVA structure), while changes in equity 
due to fair value accounting and other extraordinary items were negative (representing –3% 
relative to GVA). In any case, as indicated above, the net effect of these changes on profi t was 
negligible, meaning that profi t for the period continued to decline sharply (–21.5%), in line with, 
although slightly less marked than, the decline in ONP. Lastly, the ratio between profi t for the 
period and GVA also fell, from 27.4% in 2008 to 25% in 2009 Q1, although it remained quite 
high since GVA, which is the denominator, also declined in the period.
17.6.2009.
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The functioning of the labour market and unemployment growth in Spain
The authors of this article are Ángel Estrada, Mario Izquierdo and Aitor Lacuesta, of the Directorate General Economics, 
Statistics and Research.
The unemployment rate is proving to be the key manifestation of the severity of the crisis af-
fecting the Spanish economy. According to EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) data, the un-
employment rate rose from 9.6% at the beginning of 2008 to 17.9% in 2009 Q2, topping the 
4 million mark.1 The rate of job destruction is higher than in other developed countries, even 
taking into account some of the singularities of the Spanish case. Thus, in countries facing a 
similar contraction in activity, but with a lower rate of growth in the labour force and with no 
comparable construction sector expansion, the unemployment rate has risen only slightly 
since the start of 2008 (for example, in France, by 1.3 pp according to Eurostat) or has even 
remained stable (for example, in Germany), although unemployment will foreseeably rise in 
these countries in coming quarters. However, when compared with countries that share similar 
characteristics in terms of property market developments and demographic trends, such as 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Ireland, Spain’s unemployment growth continues 
to stand out: the unemployment rate has risen by “just” 4 pp in the United States, slightly more 
than in the United Kingdom, and by 6.4 pp in Ireland, as opposed to more than 8 pp in 
Spain.
This suggests that the Spanish labour market’s mechanisms for adjustment in the face of ad-
verse shocks are not functioning correctly, as employment is bearing the brunt of the adjust-
ment and this entails a high cost, in terms of long-term economic growth and social well-being. 
Moreover, these distortions are not only seen in periods of recession, but also in economic 
expansion phases, in the form of highly temporary and precarious employment, low productiv-
ity and real wage growth and an unemployment rate that has failed to converge with that of the 
euro area countries. These shortcomings in the functioning of the labour market refl ect, inter 
alia, a lack of adaptation of the institutional framework. When it comes to determining how the 
labour market functions and its capacity to adjust in the face of serious macroeconomic shocks, 
there are four key labour market institutions: unemployment protection schemes, understood 
in the broadest sense (including unemployment benefi ts and severance payments); wage-setting 
mechanisms (the collective bargaining system); active labour market policies (designed to raise 
the employability of the labour force); and labour market intermediation mechanisms (the agen-
cies that help match persons looking for work with fi rms offering work).
The fact that employment is bearing the brunt of the adjustment is probably chiefl y due to the 
fi rst two of these institutions, i.e. the unemployment protection schemes and the wage-setting 
mechanisms.2 Moreover, several studies have demonstrated that the interaction between 
these two institutions is also key to understanding the labour market’s reaction to shocks:3 in 
fact it is clear that protection systems may affect the result of collective bargaining, and vice 
versa, that the degree of wage adjustment in light of a shock makes it essential for unemploy-
Introduction
1. To give an idea of the magnitude of the problem, it should be noted that, in like-for-like terms, the all-time high for 
Spanish unemployment was 18.2% in 1994 Q3, although as it was then calculated, the unemployment rate reached 
24.5%. 2. This does not mean that the role of the other two institutions is insignifi cant. In fact Denmark is the most 
paradigmatic example of the effectiveness of powerful active and well-designed labour market policies and of the im-
portant role public and private employment services can play to prevent the unemployed from becoming 
stigmatised. 3. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) analyse the importance of the interaction between labour market institu-
tions and different economic shocks for analysis of labour market behaviour. 
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ment protection schemes to come into play. In this respect, the reasons that warrant the exist-
ence of these labour market institutions should not be forgotten: they provide guaranteed in-
come for workers (who are thus able to maintain a more stable spending profi le over time), 
they transfer part of the risk from individuals to fi rms, they oblige fi rms to assume the social 
cost of worker dismissals, they enable the unemployed to fi nd work more suited to their skills 
and they balance the bargaining power of workers and fi rms, inter alia. All this explains why 
these institutions must be well designed, to ensure that labour market adjustments are effi cient 
and entail the lowest possible social and economic cost. However, it should also be borne in 
mind that for these design improvements to yield optimum results, fi rms will have to operate in 
a more competitive environment on the product markets, to ensure that the consequent de-
cline in corporate margins is passed through to fi nal consumers.
Accordingly, the next two sections of this article contain an overview of the existing unemploy-
ment protection and wage-setting institutions in Spain, placing them in an international context 
and aiming to identify their main shortcomings. There follows a review of some of the labour 
market reforms undertaken in other European countries that may serve as a reference frame-
work for Spain. In particular, Germany and Austria made extensive changes to the design of 
their unemployment protection schemes in the 1990s and are, for the time being, demonstrat-
ing considerable resilience to unemployment growth, while Sweden is a paradigmatic example 
of how a collective bargaining system mid-way between past excessive centralisation and 
wage bargaining at company level may have an adverse impact on unemployment. Finally, the 
last section summarises the main conclusions.
Most developed countries operate a combination of two basic mechanisms to ensure that 
workers receive income throughout their working lives and to enable them, if made redundant, 
to secure a new job that matches their skills, namely severance pay and unemployment ben-
efi ts. In Spain, the Workers’ Statute contains the regulations on severance pay following termi-
nation of a permanent employment contract. In simplifi ed terms, there are two channels that 
fi rms may use to dismiss individual employees: objective reasons (Articles 52 and 53 of the 
Statute) or disciplinary grounds (Articles 54 and 55). In either case, if an appeal is fi led, an em-
ployment tribunal may declare the dismissals to be fair, unfair or null and void. In the case of 
dismissals for objective reasons, fi rms must give employees one month’s notice and severance 
pay amounting to 20 days’ salary per year worked, up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay; if the 
dismissal is subsequently declared to be unfair, employees will be entitled to 45 days’ salary per 
year worked, up to a maximum of 42 months’ pay. In 1997 this was reduced to 33 days’ sal-
ary per year worked, up to a maximum of 24 months’ pay, for certain groups of workers via the 
creation of the permanent employment-promoting contract. Dismissals on disciplinary grounds 
are effective immediately and grant no entitlement to severance pay if they are considered fair; 
if they are deemed unfair by the tribunal, in this case also employees will be entitled to 45 days’ 
salary per year worked, up to a maximum of 42 months’ pay.4 Lastly, should the tribunal rule 
that the workers have been discriminated against and that the dismissals, whether for objective 
reasons or on disciplinary grounds, are null and void, the employees must be readmitted.
To place these fi gures in an international context, the data compiled by the World Bank for its 
Doing Business Index is used, given the uniformity between countries.5 In these statistics, the 
Employment protection
in Spain. The effects of 
excessive labour market 
segmentation
4. By contrast to the case of dismissals for objective reasons, the permanent employment-promoting contracts brought 
no changes in these conditions. 5. Specifi cally, one of the components of this Index refl ects the cost of termination for 
economic reasons (corresponding to termination for objective reasons in the Spanish system) of the contract of a 42-year 
old, full-time, non-management employee, with 20 years’ service, earning the national average wage, in a company with 
201 employees, in the manufacturing industry, which is subject to a collective bargaining agreement (even if it takes no 
direct part in the bargaining process). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 107 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LABOUR MARKET AND UNEMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN SPAIN
cost of dismissal in Spain in 2008 was 56 weeks’ pay, based on fair dismissal, for objective 
reasons, of an employee with 20 years’ service. As Table 1 shows, this sum is more than dou-
ble the average for the countries of the OECD (25.8 weeks). In fact, only four developed coun-
tries top this fi gure: Germany, Portugal, Korea and Turkey. Nevertheless, these fi gures may 
possibly not be an adequate refl ection of effective severance payments in Spain, as most 
terminations of contracts are made, not for objective reasons that are considered fair, but on 
disciplinary grounds that are subsequently considered unfair. In this case, for the employee 
considered in the World Bank’s Index, the cost of dismissal would be 128 weeks’ pay, far 
higher than that of any of the other countries analysed.
Unfortunately in Spain there is no accurate information available on fi nal rulings on terminations 
of contracts. However, from a number of approximations it is possible to affi rm that the great 
majority of permanent contracts terminated in Spain grant entitlement to maximum severance 
(45 days’ pay per year worked). In fact, combining the information on individuals accessing 
unemployment benefi ts by source of entitlement with the judicial statistics on worker dismis-
sals, it may be seen that fi rms acknowledge from the outset that dismissals are unfair6 in slight-
ly more than 70% of cases, and that of the cases that go to employment tribunals (the remain-
ing 30%), approximately 30% result in agreed settlements and more than 20% in rulings 
favourable to the workers. Accordingly, the proportion of permanent contracts terminated in 
Spain that grant entitlement to the maximum severance pay established in the Workers’ Stat-
ute may be close to 90%.7
In any case, it is important to note that this legislation only affects employees with permanent 
contracts, who represent approximately 70% of Spanish dependent employees. By contrast, 
Severance pay Severance pay
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19aeroK31dnalreztiwS
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SEVERANCE PAYMENTS IN OECD COUNTRIES TABLE 1
SOURCE: Doing Business (World Bank).
6. Under Law 45/2002, fi rms are no longer obliged to pay wages between the date of dismissal and the date of the 
conciliation hearing, in cases in which they acknowledge that dismissal on disciplinary grounds, as of the date thereof, is 
unfair and they grant the workers the corresponding severance pay. 7. There is no detailed information on severance 
payments made in the case of redundancy programmes; however, even in the present circumstances, these programmes 
affect only a very small percentage of workers. 
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employees with casual contracts or with contracts for specifi c tasks or services that are not 
renewed are entitled to just eight days’ pay per year worked, or 22 weeks’ pay in the terms of 
the World Bank’s Index (were it possible for a temporary employee to have 20 years’ service 
in one company). Employees with other types of temporary contracts (around 20% of the total 
or 1.2 million people) have no entitlement to severance pay when their contracts end. This 
would place all employees without permanent contracts below the OECD average, in a com-
parable position to all dependent employees in the Czech Republic or the United Kingdom, 
where workers without permanent contracts account for just 9% and 6%, respectively, of the 
total.
In most countries, unemployment benefi ts, the second institution providing income for work-
ers who lose their jobs, are managed by the public sector and fi nanced by fi rms’ and workers’ 
contributions. They are generally defi ned by two parameters: their maximum duration and the 
percentage of salary they represent. However, the system is generally somewhat more com-
plex, as there are fl oors and ceilings on the benefi ts effectively received, the benefi ts may de-
cline over time and certain groups of workers may be entitled to unemployment assistance 
when their unemployment insurance is exhausted. Given these complexities, to place Spain 
among the developed countries, Table 2 shows the average percentage of salary that unem-
ployment benefi ts represent for persons who were earning 67%, 100% and 150% of the aver-
age wage in the economy before becoming unemployed and who have been unemployed for 
less than a year.
From the table, Spain looks to be one of the OECD countries with the most generous unem-
ployment benefi ts in relative terms, almost 5 pp above the OECD average. However, as in the 
case of severance payments, these fi gures may be misleading as a result of labour market 
segmentation. In effect, as temporary workers become unemployed more often, they accumu-
late fewer rights, and this drives down the effective replacement ratio. Taking this into account, 
Spanish temporary workers rank below the OECD average, with a level of protection slightly 
below that of the United States.
Rep eRoitartnemecal placement ratio
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Thus, combining the data contained in Tables 1 and 2 and adding in the disaggregation between 
permanent and temporary workers in the case of Spain, the developed countries may be plotted 
in the four quadrants shown in Chart 1, according to the different combinations of these two in-
stitutions for worker protection. The chart clearly illustrates the duality in the Spanish labour mar-
ket, as Spain appears in two opposing quadrants: on the one hand, Spanish workers with tem-
porary contracts appear among the countries with severance pay and unemployment benefi ts 
below the OECD average, along with all the Anglo-Saxon countries, while Spanish workers with 
permanent contracts appear among the countries with severance pay and unemployment ben-
efi ts above the OECD average, along with Portugal and Germany, inter alia. In the other two 
quadrants, the Nordic countries (specifi cally, Denmark and Norway) stand out, as unemployment 
benefi ts are above average but severance pay has virtually been eliminated, as do Turkey and 
Korea, for the opposite reason, as severance pay is high but unemployment benefi ts are low.
This excessive segmentation of the labour market is a result of the introduction, in 1984, of the 
temporary contract allowing unrestricted dismissal. Very likely this was the only way, without 
modifying the terms of stable contracts, to encourage job creation by reducing severance pay-
ments – in fact they were almost eliminated completely – for new hires, at a time when the 
unemployment rate was rising sharply and the majority of those who had lost their jobs were 
facing long-term unemployment. This reform helped reduce the numbers of long-term unem-
ployed and helped new groups of workers enter the labour market. It also increased labour 
mobility, permitting reallocation of workers, from sectors in decline to up-and-coming sectors, 
at a time of large-scale restructuring of numerous industrial sectors. However, the continued 
coexistence of two forms of employment contracts with such big differences in terms of em-
ployment protection has resulted in excessive labour market segmentation and this is having 
an adverse effect on the functioning of the labour market, especially because, in the face of 
any kind of economic shock, it passes the burden of adjustment by fi rms on to employment, 
and particularly temporary employment.8
Thus, as Chart 2 shows, labour mobility is concentrated, almost exclusively, on workers with 
temporary contracts. Accordingly, even at times of economic expansion, these workers are 
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8. In fact, the aim of almost all the labour reforms introduced in recent years (most notably in 1997, 2001 and 2006) has 
been precisely to reduce the duality in the labour market, endeavouring to encourage permanent hires. 
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much more likely to become unemployed than permanent workers (in fact approximately 8% 
of temporary workers in one quarter become unemployed in the next). In turn, the unemployed 
who fi nd work are most likely to be offered temporary contracts. In addition, it is very rare for 
workers with permanent contracts to change jobs, thus limiting the potential productivity gains 
stemming from labour mobility. This concentration of fl exibility on a specifi c group of workers 
also leads to excessive turnover, as temporary workers combine very short periods of work 
with repeat episodes of unemployment, thus further detracting from productivity.9 Finally, in 
the face of a crisis such as the present one, and as the chart also shows, the intense employ-
ment adjustment experienced in the Spanish economy is restricted almost exclusively to tem-
porary workers, whose employment exit rates have doubled in recent quarters, while those of 
permanent workers have barely changed. Although it is highly probable that more permanent 
employees will eventually be dismissed, the workers with the most precarious employment 
conditions and who, in addition, are less well protected against this eventuality, are bearing the 
bulk of the adjustment.
Overall, therefore, as it stands, the labour market presents serious operating ineffi ciencies that 
amplify the effect of economic shocks – however short-lived – as too much of the impact is 
passed through to employment levels. As Table 3 shows, this results in higher employment 
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9. See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002) for theoretical models of these effects. 
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volatility relative to GDP in Spain in comparison with other developed countries. This tends to 
amplify economic fl uctuations and is a consequence, in part, of the scant sensitivity of real 
wages to cyclical economic conditions. In fact, as the table shows, Spain is the only country 
in which, on average, real wages per capita tend to rise in recessions and fall in growth phases, 
exacerbating the employment adjustment in the event of a demand shock. Moreover, Spain is 
also the only country in which the correlation between hours worked and the cyclical compo-
nent of activity is lower than the correlation between employment and said cyclical com ponent, 
suggesting that fewer hours are worked per capita in growth phases and more hours per 
capita in recessions, which goes against the aim of achieving stable employment.
This recourse to external fl exibility, rather than internal fl exibility in the form of adjustments in 
the number of hours worked or in wages, has a major impact on the pattern of economic 
adjustment in the face of a shock of any kind, as it immediately results in changes in numbers 
employed and, therefore, in unemployment. This has an evident social cost for those who lose 
their jobs and for society as a whole, but it also has a signifi cant impact on agents’ confi dence, 
as unemployment is the key determinant of household expectations.
Moreover, from a long-term view, this segmentation of the labour market has a negative impact 
on incentives for workers to accumulate human capital and for fi rms to provide training. This is 
vital, as workers’ human capital, that is, their training and skills, are clearly their best protection 
in the event of economic slowdown. It is common knowledge that the most highly-trained seg-
ments of the population enjoy not only higher wages but also lower unemployment, even 
though they represent a higher proportion of the participation rate. The link between labour 
market segmentation and investment in human capital stems from the fact that temporary 
workers currently lack the necessary incentives to acquire company-specifi c knowledge in the 
fi rms in which they work, considering the high probability that in a few months’ time they may 
have changed or lost their jobs. Firms are likewise reluctant to invest in effective training for 
temporary workers, in light of the risk that this training may benefi t their competitors.10 More-
over, in some cases this may also have an adverse impact on permanent workers, for whom the 
US Germany France UK Italy Spain Sweden
Volatility relative to GDP
Total hours worked 0.96 0.75 1.25 1.46 0.82 1.67 1.01
10.114.168.060.107.087.017.0tnemyolpmE
Correlations with GDP
Total hours worked 0.88 0.81 0.39 0.72 0.32 0.70 0.84
87.098.023.027.018.007.058.0tnemyolpmE
41.011.0-30.0-05.070.0-91.007.0atipacrepsruoH
10.072.0-72.011.012.024.025.0atipacrepegaW
50.0-41.0-42.091.0-12.093.091.0egawylruoH
VOLATILITY RATIOS RELATIVE TO GDP AND CORRELATIONS (a) TABLE 3
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a. Correlations and volatilities are calculated on the cyclical component of each series.
10. Albert et al (2005) show that temporary workers are less likely to obtain employment in fi rms that offer training to their 
employees, and that those who do so are less likely to receive this training. Also in this respect, Dolado and Stuchi (2008) 
fi nd that temporary employment has an adverse effect on productivity growth, especially in fi rms that employ a high 
proportion of temporary workers. 
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fact of being seemingly protected from fl uctuations in activity may reduce the incentives for 
them to undertake on-the-job training. 
Lastly, the duality in the Spanish labour market is particularly damaging for certain groups of work-
ers, fundamentally new market entrants such as young people, women and immigrants. This 
causes signifi cant problems of equity, as these workers bear the brunt of market adjustments. 
This would be less of a problem if temporary workers soon became permanent workers, that is, 
if temporary employment was a gateway into the labour market, ahead of transition to improved 
employment conditions. However, the evidence shows that this transition is very slow, and that a 
considerable percentage of temporary workers remain trapped. In effect, as Chart 311 shows, 
more than 80% of workers start their working lives with a temporary contract. This percentage 
declines over time, but very slowly. Thus, after ten years in the labour market, 40% of workers still 
have temporary contracts. This appears to be the consequence of the huge difference between 
severance pay in temporary and permanent contracts, which becomes a decisive factor in fi rms’ 
decisions to offer permanent contracts to temporary workers.
Clearly this does not affect all workers alike; in effect, it is the less-privileged and less-skilled 
workers who endure precarious employment conditions for longer. As the right-hand side of 
Chart 3 shows, the higher the level of educational attainment, the lower the probability of start-
ing out with a temporary contract. Furthermore, the transition period is much longer for work-
ers with a lower level of educational attainment, although in no case is the move to permanent 
employment particularly quick. And it is a considerable problem, as even in the case of engi-
neers and graduates, 20% still have temporary contracts ten years after starting work.12
The economic literature generally uses three indicators to assess the economic impact of col-
lective bargaining on the labour market: coverage, degree of coordination and level of cen-
tralisation. Union density, that is, the proportion of workers with trade union affi liation, is the 
most straightforward approximation to coverage, as workers are formally represented by trade 
unions in the collective bargaining process. However, there are reasons to believe that this 
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11. Compiled using data on the working lives of men who started work in 1986. 12. Toharia and Cebrián (2008) con-
duct a highly detailed analysis of the problem of the temporary employment trap for different groups of workers. Their 
results show that a high percentage of the population (approximately one third) remain in this trap for some time, with 
disastrous consequences, for example, for Social Security contribution levels, as temporary employment goes hand in 
hand with frequent episodes of unemployment. 
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approximation underestimates coverage, due to the existence (as in Spain) of legal mecha-
nisms that extend these agreements to workers or their representatives who have not neces-
sarily taken part in the bargaining process. Accordingly, collective bargaining coverage, which 
measures the proportion of workers whose wages are set by the process, is generally used as 
an additional yardstick.
As Chart 4 illustrates, Spain, together with France, is one of the economies with the lowest 
union density and the highest collective bargaining coverage (between 80% and 90% of Social 
Security registrations since 1990), and thus with the biggest difference between the number of 
active participants in the bargaining process and the number of workers fi nally affected by it. 
By contrast, there are no such differences in the Nordic countries (where both indicators lie 
between 80% and 90%) or in the Anglo-Saxon countries (in the United Kingdom the indicators 
barely rise above 30%). The situation in Spain is a consequence of two fundamental principles 
of the collective bargaining process: the automatic general effectiveness of the agreements 
reached, meaning that all agreements that are not company-specifi c must be applied in all 
fi rms and to all workers in the corresponding geographical area and industry, irrespective of 
whether or not they have taken part in the bargaining process; and the legitimacy for bargain-
ing, based on electoral majorities to determine the worker representatives forming part of the 
bargaining committees (companies, for their part, are represented by the majority employer 
associations). The problem here is that there are groups of workers (temporary workers, the 
unemployed, etc.) and fi rms (the smallest ones) that are under-represented in the bargaining 
process, which thus tends to be less “sensitive” to their special needs. In addition, another 
singular feature of the Spanish system is that the opt-out clauses, which defi ne the circum-
stances in which fi rms in diffi culties may choose not to apply the terms of a sectoral collective 
agreement, are generally highly restrictive, preventing their application even in extremely diffi -
cult circumstances for fi rms.
Just as important as content and coverage, in terms of economic impact, is the level of cen-
tralisation and coordination of the collective bargaining process, although these concepts are 
diffi cult to specify and even more diffi cult to quantify. According to OECD indicators, the level 
of centralisation and coordination of the collective bargaining process in Spain has declined 
since the mid-1980s and is currently at an intermediate level (see Chart 5), similarly to most 
other European economies (Germany, Denmark, France, Italy and Sweden, inter alia). The re-
maining Nordic economies (Finland and Norway), Ireland, Portugal and Belgium have the high-
est levels of coordination and centralisation, while the eastern European economies (the Czech 
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Republic, Hungary and Poland) and the Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, the United States, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom) are the most decentralised.
Spain’s position in these two indicators is fi rstly a result of the principle of the automatic general 
effectiveness of collective bargaining agreements, together with the fact that the regulations on 
confl icts between different agreements signifi cantly restrict the possibility of lower-level agree-
ments amending the terms of higher-level ones. This means that company-specifi c agreements 
are the minority, even though collective agreements may be negotiated at this level. As Table 4 
shows, most collective agreements signed in Spain are sectoral agreements at a provincial level; 
nationwide sectoral agreements represent a quarter of the total, while regional and company-
level agreements each account for some 10%. Moreover, this structure has remained relatively 
stable since the beginning of the decade. This suggests an intermediate level of centralisation of 
collective bargaining, which, in accordance with economic theory, is more prejudicial to the level 
of structural unemployment and wage growth than if the system was fully centralised (as in the 
Nordic countries) or decentralised (as in the Anglo-Saxon countries), as demonstrated by Calm-
fors and Drifi ll (1988) at a theoretical level, and by Izquierdo et al (2003) empirically for Spain.
This institutional framework for collective bargaining means that wages are highly infl exible in 
Spain, hindering adjustment to different kinds of economic shocks. Thus, from an aggregate 
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Sector
Firm Total Provincial Regional National
2000 15.2 84.8 58.1 11.3 15.5
2001 12.8 87.2 53.8 7.6 25.8
2002 11.5 88.5 54.8 9.5 24.2
2003 11.5 88.5 54.4 10.4 23.6
2004 10.8 89.2 54.7 10.2 24.4
2005 11.8 88.2 52.7 10.2 25.3
2006 12.1 87.9 52.3 10.0 25.6
2007 12.8 87.2 52.8 7.9 26.5
2008 10.6 89.4 54.6 6.8 28.0
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE TABLE 4
Percentage of workers affected
SOURCE: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración.
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standpoint, wages in Spain have a low level of sensitivity to economic conditions and a high 
level of indexation to past infl ation. In this respect, the results of a fairly uniform survey con-
ducted in most European countries on the wage-setting process corroborate, in general, the 
high level of indexation in the Spanish collective bargaining system and the lower level of sen-
sitivity to the prevailing economic conditions. These results, presented in Table 5, show that 
some 70% of Spanish fi rms apply wage policies that take direct or indirect account of infl ation. 
This fi gure is much higher than in most other European countries.13 In fact, for 54% of the 
Spanish fi rms there is a direct and automatic link to either past or expected infl ation, as op-
posed to the euro area average of approximately 20%. This high wage indexation clearly has 
an impact on wage adjustment mechanisms in the face of different shocks; for example, it 
makes it more diffi cult for external shocks, such as an oil price rise, to be absorbed. In addi-
tion, the process is asymmetrical, as it comes into effect only when actual infl ation is higher 
than forecast infl ation, but not when it is lower.
Regarding rigidities in labour cost adjustment, the Banco de España (2008) showed the low 
level of sensitivity displayed by wages set via the collective bargaining process to the eco-
nomic situation, measured in terms of the unemployment rate. In addition, a very high percent-
age of collective bargaining agreements span several years and are, therefore, even less infl u-
enced by economic conditions. From an international perspective, the results of the survey 
mentioned above show, for example, that Spanish fi rms have much less room for manoeuvre 
than their peers in other countries when it comes to adjusting costs; for example, in the face 
of an increase in the cost of an input, only 45% of Spanish fi rms say that they adjust their la-
bour costs, in comparison with more than 70% for the European aggregate.
However, the Spanish collective bargaining system not only causes aggregate rigidity in the time 
dimension of real and nominal wages, but also a lack of transverse fl exibility, that is, insuffi cient 
connection between wages and other matters subject to collective bargaining agreements and 
the specifi c circumstances of fi rms and sectors. In effect, wage growth is highly uniform between 
sectors, meaning, for example, that the correlation between real wage growth and total factor 
productivity (TFP) for the different branches of activity is one of the lowest of the developed coun-
tries. As Chart 6 shows, Spain is one of the countries with the lowest correlation between wage 
growth at sector level and TFP growth, typical of countries with more centralised collective bar-
gaining systems, and far removed from the Anglo-Saxon countries with decentralised systems. 
This signifi es that relative wages across sectors are a poor indicator of the reallocation of re-
sources that is required of an economy in the event of shocks, providing further backing to the 
view that, in the case of Spain, the adjustment may be a more painful and a lengthier process.
13. See Druant et al (2008), although comparison of the fi rms’ responses between countries may be affected, to some 
extent, by their different institutional frameworks. 
Spain Euro area France Italy Belgium
2.892.19.83.614.83noitalfnitsapotknilcitamotuA
0.05.00.21.44.61noitalfnidetcepxeotknilcitamotuA
0.06.22.127.99.01noitalfnitsaphtiwnoitcennoctceridnI
0.05.10.85.50.5noitalfnidetcepxehtiwnoitcennoctceridnI
8.12.499.954.463.92knilnoitalfnioN
WAGE SETTING AND INFLATION TABLE 5
Percentage of workers affected
SOURCES: Banco de España and Druant et al (2008).
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This section presents a brief overview of some of the most notable labour market reforms in-
troduced in Europe in recent years. It should be noted, however, that as a consequence of the 
crisis, most countries have implemented measures connected with the labour market, de-
signed to support employment through temporary programmes, subsidised, in full or in part, 
by the public sector, and to sustain the income levels of groups affected by job losses. In this 
respect, Spain too has introduced a number of measures, primarily aimed at raising the pro-
tection for certain groups of workers (those affected by redundancy programmes) and at get-
ting people back into work.
Over the past decade, various European countries have introduced important labour market 
reforms, aiming to achieve greater economic competitiveness and dynamism within the frame-
work of the Lisbon Agenda.14 In this respect, numerous policies have been implemented to 
provide markets with more fl exibility and to raise the degree of utilisation of the labour factor, 
in line with the recommendations contained in the Agenda. Below, three very specifi c cases 
are highlighted by virtue of their signifi cance, although it should be noted that, in general, many 
reforms have been introduced in Europe, tending, by various means, to provide fi rms with 
greater room for manoeuvre for adjustment in adverse circumstances, without having to resort 
to dismissing workers or to not renewing their contracts. This is the case, for example, of 
countries such as the Netherlands or France, which have made their labour legislation more 
fl exible, encouraging fi rms to use part-time contracts and to adjust their working hours.
Germany is the country that has undertaken the most radical and extensive transformation of 
its labour market institutions and social protection system in recent years, through the Hartz 
reforms, implemented successively between 2003 and 2005.15 The three main objectives be-
hind these reforms were: to improve the public employment services, modernising their or-
ganisation and functioning; to encourage active job-seeking by the unemployed, reforming the 
social protection system, based on a new balance between rights and duties; and to increase 
labour demand, removing restrictions from the labour market via a reduction in the level of 
protection in the temporary employment segment.16
Recent labour market 
reforms in Europe
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14. For a more in-depth analysis of labour market reforms in Europe between 2000 and 2006, see Moral and Vacas 
(2009). 15. Hartz I and II, on 1 January 2003, Hartz III, on 1 January 2004, and Hartz IV, on 1 January 2005. 16. For 
a more in-depth analysis of the Hartz reforms and of their effects in Germany, see Jacobi and Kluve (2006) and Ward-
Warmedinger et al (2008). 
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The placement system for the unemployed was improved by introducing market-based com-
petition elements into the public employment services. The placement agencies were set 
quantitative targets and were given greater discretion regarding the choice of appropriate ac-
tive policies for the unemployed, made on the basis of personal interviews between the unem-
ployed and the placement counsellors assigned to them. The active policies for the unem-
ployed now depend on the likelihood of their fi nding work. The active programmes were also 
redesigned and are now subject to rigorous and continuous assessment. Moreover, if the 
public employment service fails to offer an unemployed person a job within a period of six 
weeks, this person may decide to go to a private employment service, which will receive pub-
lic subsidies based on its placement rate. Training courses may also be given by private agen-
cies via subsidies.
Regarding the incentives for active job-seeking, the German system is now based on the prin-
ciple of “rights and duties”. In this respect, access to benefi ts largely depends on willingness 
to work. The unemployed are entitled to unemployment benefi t for a period of between 6 and 
12 months; the benefi t received depends on the contributions made. Thereafter they receive 
only means-tested benefi t, which is subject to penalisation in the event that they fail to dem-
onstrate willingness to look for work. To encourage private-sector hiring, two new types of 
employment contracts were created – “Minijobs” and “Midijobs” – targeting lower-paid work-
ers17 and entailing lower Social Security contributions (the lower the wage, the lower the con-
tribution).  Moreover, to encourage fi rms to hire workers over 50, the State subsidises half the 
difference between their new and former pay packets throughout the period during which they 
would have been entitled to unemployment benefi t.
Lastly, restrictions were removed from the labour market, liberalising temporary hires, which 
had been tightly regulated since 1972, and obliging temporary employment agencies to en-
sure that collective bargaining agreements were applicable to temporary agency workers, to 
prevent them being discriminated against in comparison with permanent workers. A public 
agency was also created to help provide temporary employment for groups of workers that 
were particularly diffi cult to place, and fi rms with fewer than ten employees were made exempt 
from statutory severance payments.18 The different reviews of this reform seem to show that it 
has been instrumental in cutting the unemployment rate and raising the employment rate 
[Jacobi and Kluve (2006)].
In addition to this new regulatory framework, other measures were introduced to reduce the 
impact of the present crisis on employment. This has meant that, to date, a great many fi rms 
have been able to adjust to declining demand without having to resort to more redundancies, 
helped by wage moderation and by the enhanced incentives for short-time working arrange-
ments (kurzarbeit). Thus, instead of laying off workers, fi rms may decide to cut working hours, 
partially or completely, for up to a maximum of six months, during which time the State pays 
workers 67% of their former wage. In general, fi rms may implement kurzarbeit, provided that 
their works councils accept the decision and that it involves a reduction of at least 10% in 
working hours for at least one-third of the employees. The German government’s second anti-
crisis package, implemented as from February of this year, extended these measures, which 
no longer need apply to at least one-third of employees and which may now last for up to a 
maximum of two years. In addition, fi rms receive a 50% allowance in workers’ Social Security 
contributions, rising to 100% in the event that training programmes are conducted. Although 
17. The fi rst, for jobs paying less than €400 per month; the second, for jobs paying between €400 and €800 per 
month. 18. This exemption was previously for fi rms with fewer than fi ve employees. It should be noted that the data 
contained in Table 1 refer to a fi rm with 201 employees. 
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this instrument is similar, in formal terms, to the Spanish temporary redundancy programmes, 
it has traditionally been much less used in Spain.19 This may be due to a variety of factors, in 
particular the easier it is in Spain for fi rms to adjust worker numbers by cutting temporary 
contracts. This relieves fi rms from the need to pay severance and shields permanent workers 
from the prospect of job losses; however, it is these workers who are chiefl y represented in the 
bargaining process with employers for introduction of temporary redundancy programmes, 
which will, in any case, entail a drop in earnings.
Austria has also introduced a signifi cant labour market reform, in this case of the unemploy-
ment protection system. In June 2002, the Austrian parliament approved a legislative change 
in severance pay applicable to all contracts terminated as from January 2003, with the excep-
tion of all contracts in force as at that date which would continue to be governed by the previ-
ous system. Under that system, only workers with more than three years’ service who were 
unfairly dismissed were entitled to receive severance pay,20 which rose in line with the number 
of years’ service, up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay after 25 years in the same fi rm.21 This 
was, therefore, considerably less than the severance currently payable in Spain to permanent 
workers, as an employee with 25 years’ service would receive total severance of 37.5 months’ 
pay. The reform was considered necessary because, as the system stood, many workers who 
lost their jobs had no entitlement to any benefi ts whatsoever and it discouraged labour mobil-
ity and investment in human capital, reducing the rate of growth of productivity of the produc-
tive system overall.
Under the new rules, fi rms must contribute 1.53% of employees’ gross monthly wages, as 
from the second month of employment and up to termination of the corresponding contract. 
These contributions are held in a fund in the employee’s name and may be withdrawn, at no 
fi scal cost, when a fi rm decides to terminate the contractual relationship, provided in all cases 
that the worker has been employed for more than three years. Workers who are never made 
redundant throughout their working lives may withdraw the funds upon retirement. Workers 
who decide to leave their present employer will not be entitled to withdraw the funds in cash, 
but they will maintain full rights over them and may continue to accumulate cash from contri-
butions from a future employer. This system, which is still pending evaluation, has, in any case, 
been instrumental in ensuring that all workers have rights in the event of dismissal as from the 
day on which they are hired. The system also enables them to preserve these rights even if 
they change jobs voluntarily, and this should encourage worker mobility between fi rms.
Although there have been no far-reaching reforms of collective bargaining systems in Europe over 
the past decade, there has been a tendency towards greater decentralisation (especially at com-
pany level). This has been evident in the eastern European countries, where bargaining was pre-
dominantly centralised, and in Germany, where the use of opt-out clauses, enabling fi rms in dif-
fi culties to opt out of sectoral agreements, has become more widespread. There have also been 
some changes in wage indexation systems, to reduce their high inertia; for example, in Slovenia, 
where the system now takes into account expected, rather than past, infl ation, and in Greece, 
where the indexation clauses have been abolished [Du Caju et al (2008)].
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
SYSTEMS: SWEDEN
19. Clearly, there are other differences between the two institutions that may encourage this reduced level of use. In 
Spain, temporary redundancy programmes must be approved by the corresponding regional government, or by the 
national government in the case of fi rms that operate in more than one region, after consultation with the union repre-
sentatives. During the period of inactivity, workers receive unemployment benefi ts (70% or 60% of their former salary). 
Firms may apply for these programmes provided they affect at least 10 workers (fi rms with fewer than 100 workers), 10% 
of the workforce (fi rms with between 100 and 300 workers) or 30% of the workforce (fi rms with more than 300 
workers). 20. Save in the event of unfair dismissal, workers were only entitled to severance pay when they retired (and 
then only if they had more than ten years’ service). 21. Each year fi rms were obliged to make annual provision for at 
least 50% of potential severance pay for all their employees. Severance pay was taxed at 6%. 
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All these changes aim to help fi rms survive in adverse macroeconomic conditions, without 
having to sacrifi ce the long-term allocation of productive resources in a free market environ-
ment. Sweden is a paradigmatic example: the problems caused by centralised bargaining 
prompted increased decentralisation at sector level, but the crisis of the early 1990s showed 
that an intermediate level of centralisation was not the answer, revealing the need for nation-
wide agreements on earnings in the face of diffi cult circumstances.
With union density verging on 80% in Sweden, wages were traditionally set via centralised 
collective bargaining without active government participation, even though government mea-
sures affected union strategy.22 All in all, this system resulted in extremely high wage compres-
sion, together with wage moderation that prevented unemployment from rising signifi cantly.23 
Nevertheless, low wage dispersion began to have an adverse impact on Swedish fi rms’ ca-
pacity to attract highly-skilled workers, and on investment in human capital by Swedish workers. 
The system became slightly more decentralised as from 1983:24 this had positive effects in the 
shape of high productivity and real wage growth, it raised the incentives for reallocation of 
productive resources towards higher-quality sectors and it enhanced the educational returns 
[Edin and Topel (1997)].
However, the crisis of the 1990s revealed the problems caused by this intermediate level of 
decentralisation, as wage demands achieved in some industries took no account of the as-
sociated costs in others, meaning that, on aggregate, wage increases were excessive in light 
of the crisis. This prompted the government to demand a return to centralisation and, despite 
its history of non-intervention, a commission (the Rehnberg Group) was created to track the 
bargaining process. The government also proposed a ceiling on wage growth resulting from 
collective bargaining, which proved quite credible as the government enjoyed suffi cient parlia-
mentary support. This strategy was successful in achieving wage moderation during the early 
1990s, leading to a signifi cant reduction in the unemployment rate, but the collateral cost was 
enormous. Public fi nances were severely damaged and the government was forced to cut a 
number of public programmes, at the same time as it raised taxes. In this setting, it was clear 
that workers would not be prepared to accept further cuts in real wages, and accordingly, as 
from 1995, high sector-wide wage rises again became the norm, moderating the rate of de-
cline of unemployment.
Accordingly, the Swedish experience shows that decentralisation of the collective bargaining 
process was positive in the long term, thanks to the incentives it generated in terms of reallo-
cation of resources to higher quality industries and enhanced incentives for human capital 
formation. However, from a short-term view, as the bargaining process remained mid-way 
between total centralisation and negotiations at company level, it proved insuffi cient, at a time 
of crisis, to halt the deterioration in the labour market, making it essential to resort to an in-
come agreement to moderate growth in margins and wages, to make a signifi cant contribution 
to economic recovery.
Comparison of the main characteristics of the Spanish employment protection and wage-
setting systems with those of other countries demonstrates the excessive degree of segmen-
Conclusions
22. Traditionally in Sweden the unions defended wage moderation, supported by tax cuts or higher welfare-related 
benefi ts that ensured that net earnings were not adversely affected [Mares (2006)]. 23. The main aim of wage concen-
tration, in what was known as the Rehn-Meidner model, was to increase the costs of less productive fi rms until they were 
forced out of the market, forcing their employees into more productive employment. The model worked, in part, although 
it also prompted extensive internal migration from the north of Sweden, where the productive system was more tradi-
tional, to the south of the country. 24. When the industrial union Metall and the engineering industry employer associa-
tion Verkstads Förening, which represented large corporations such as Volvo, Saab and ABB, signed an agreement 
separate from the centralised bargaining process.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 120 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LABOUR MARKET AND UNEMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN SPAIN
tation of the Spanish labour market, which combines very high protection for permanent 
workers with very limited severance terms for workers with a wide range of temporary con-
tracts, resulting in a labour market with an extremely high temporary employment ratio (in fact 
the highest in Europe). This imbalance in labour market fl exibility has adverse consequences 
for the functioning of the labour market, and for the Spanish economy in general, in terms of 
both effi ciency and equity. Possibly the clearest refl ection of this is the intensity of the employ-
ment adjustment in the face of the present crisis, as this adjustment is proving signifi cantly 
more far-reaching than in other countries and is concentrated on temporary workers, whose 
numbers fell by more than 20% in 2009 Q1. This adjustment also entails higher unemploy-
ment: the jobless fi gures have risen by more than 1.8 million in one year and the unemploy-
ment rate by 9 pp, recording the highest level of all the OECD countries. As indicated above, 
this labour market segmentation also has adverse effects on both training decisions and 
productivity.
Moreover, the present collective bargaining system tends to exacerbate some of the implica-
tions of this labour market segmentation, resulting, as has been seen above, in a labour mar-
ket marked by a high level of indexation to infl ation and scant wage sensitivity to cyclical 
conditions. Furthermore, it is an intermediate level bargaining system, which encourages high-
ly uniform wage rises that take little or no account of company-specifi c economic conditions, 
and which makes it impossible for relative wages to act as a mechanism for reallocation of 
resources to sectors with greater future potential.
Overall, therefore, a more appropriate design of the labour market institutions could en-
hance the capacity for reallocation of resources between sectors, firms or regions, permit-
ting a more rapid exit from the ranks of the unemployed for the large numbers currently in 
this position. Improvements in this respect would be vital to establish the bases for sound 
economic recovery, to ensure that when demand recovers it does not lead solely to an 
increase in inflation and limited and precarious employment growth. Moreover, the design 
of the labour market is possibly the key factor in bringing about a change in the productive 
model that was prevalent throughout the last economic cycle. If the labour market institu-
tions are designed so that they encourage firms and workers to take the appropriate train-
ing decisions, so that they represent a correct pointer for allocation of resources, so that 
they facilitate labour mobility between firms and sectors and so that they enhance the 
capacity for adjustment in the face of different economic shocks, then a new more sus-
tainable economic specialisation profile may be achieved, more quickly and at lower 
cost.
In this context, reference to the experience of other countries that have undertaken labour 
market reforms, aimed at achieving more effi cient adjustment to aggregate shocks and en-
couraging human capital formation, becomes even more relevant. The design of the labour 
market institutions must be oriented towards attainment of these two objectives. For this pur-
pose, hiring mechanisms should permit an appropriate combination of employment protection 
for workers and fl exibility for fi rms, to ensure that the labour market can adjust, more effi -
ciently and more equitably, to different economic shocks. This would also result in greater in-
centives for investment in human capital, and consequently in productivity growth. The collec-
tive bargaining system should also be designed to ensure that wage growth and all aspects 
connected with work organisation and worker training are better adapted to the specifi c cir-
cumstances of individual fi rms and sectors, and to ensure greater fl exibility in terms of timing 
of the agreements reached.
15.7.2009.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 121 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LABOUR MARKET AND UNEMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN SPAIN
ALBERT, C., C. GARCÍA SERRANO and V. HERNANZ (2005). “Firm-provided training and temporary contracts”, Spanish 
Economic Review, 7, pp. 67-88.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA (2008). Annual Report.
BLANCHARD, O. and A. LANDIER (2002). “The perverse effects of partial labour market reform: Fixed-term contracts in 
France”, Economic Journal, 112 (June).
BLANCHARD, O. and J. WOLFERS (2000). “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: 
The Aggregate Evidence”, Economic Journal, vol. 110, no. 462, Conference Papers (March), pp. C1-C33.
CALMFORS, L. and J. DRIFFILL (1988). “Centralization of wage bargaining”, Economic Policy, no. 6 (April), pp.13-61.
DOLADO, J. J. and S. STUCHI (2008). “Do temporary contracts affect TFP? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing 
fi rms”, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 7055.
DU CAJU, P., E. GAUTIER, D. MOMFERATOU and M. WARD-WARMEDINGER (2008). “Institutional features of wage 
bargaining in 23 European countries, the US and Japan”, Working Paper Series no. 974.
DRUANT, M., S. FABIÁN, G. KEZDI, A. LAMO, F. MARTINS and R. SABBATINI (2008). “How are fi rms’ wages and prices 
linked: survey evidence in Europe», mimeo.
EDIN, R.-A. and R. TOPEL (1997). “Wage Policy and Restructuring: The Swedish Labor Market since 1960”, in R. Free-
man, R. Topel and B. Swedenborg, The Welfare State in Transition: Reforming the Swedish Model, Chicago Univer-
sity Press, pp. 155-201.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009). “Labour market prospects and policies to soften the impact of the fi nancial crisis”, 
ECFIN Economic Brief, Issue 1, May.
IZQUIERDO, M., E. MORAL and A. URTASUN (2003). “El sistema de negociación colectiva en España: un análisis con 
datos individuales de convenios”, Banco de España Occasional Paper no. 0302.
JACOBI, L. and J. KLUVE (2006). “Before and After the Hartz Reforms: The Performance of Active Labour Market Policy 
in Germany”, IZA Working Paper Series, vol. 2100.
MARES, I. (2006). Taxation, Wage Bargaining, and Unemployment, Cambridge University Press.
MORAL, E. and C. VACAS (2009). “European labour market reforms in the period 2000-2006”, Economic Bulletin, Janu-
ary, Banco de España, pp. 101-112.
TOHARIA, L and I. CEBRIÁN (2008). “La temporalidad en el empleo: Atrapamiento y trayectorias”, Colección Informes y 
Estudios, Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración.
WARD-WARMEDINGER, M., K. MASUCH, R. GÓMEZ-SALVADOR, N. LEINER-KILLINGER, R. STRAUCH, J. TURUNEN, 
J. DE MULDER, H. STAHL, D. NICOLITSAS, A. LACUESTA, P. CIPOLLONE, A. STIGLBAUER, K. STOVICEK, A. 
BALLEER, K. MCQUINN, P. MONTANARO, A. ROSOLIA, E. VIVIANO and C. DUARTE (2008). Labour supply and 
employment in the euro area countries: developments and challenges, ECB Occasional Paper no. 87.
REFERENCES
PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS FISCAL MEASURES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 125 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS FISCAL MEASURES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY
Pros and cons of various fi scal measures to stimulate the economy
Carine Bouthevillain (Banque de France), John Caruana (Central Bank of Malta), Cristina Checherita (European Central 
Bank), Jorge Cunha (Banco de Portugal), Esther Gordo (Banco de España), Stephan Haroutunian (Central Bank of 
Cyprus), Geert Langenus (Bank of Belgium), Amela Hubic (Banque Centrale du Luxembourg), Bernhard Manzke 
(Deutsche Bundesbank), Javier J. Pérez (Banco de España), Pietro Tommasino (Banca D’italia).
Policy makers in the euro area and worldwide have intervened substantially to mitigate the 
economic and social disruptions of the present crisis and to stimulate recovery through various 
(conventional or unconventional) tools of monetary and fi scal policy. 
As regards fi scal policy, there is certainly a strong consensus that government rescue plans for the 
banking sector were needed to avoid a systemic crisis and restore confi dence. A wealth of studies 
by the EC, IMF, OECD and also national bodies have supported this line of action, also in view of the 
experience of past banking crises , most notably in Japan, Korea and the Nordic countries. 
At the same time, fi scal measures to stimulate the economy in the short-run have been advo-
cated by several voices within the economic profession, including international organizations 
and certain governments, and implemented in many countries of the euro area and worldwide. 
On this front, though, the whatever-it-takes approach that might be valid for fi nancial rescue 
plans is usually not fully applicable for demand-oriented discretionary fi scal policy actions.2
First, the need for discretionary fi scal policy measures has to be assessed in conjunction with the 
counter-cyclical stimulus of fi scal policy built into tax and spending systems, i.e. automatic stabi-
lization. Automatic stabilizers are those elements of fi scal policy that operate without any explicit 
government action, and thus are not affected by the implementation lags of discretionary policy. 
In this regard, a direct comparison of the “appropriate” discretionary stimulus in the EU and the 
US would be diffi cult, given the larger size of public sectors in the EU, with more progressive tax 
systems and more responsive social expenditure (in particular unemployment benefi ts).
Second, the affordability of a fi scal stimulus plan depends primarily on an economy’s existing 
fi scal conditions or the degree of fi scal stress, either proxied by a high existing level of govern-
ment debt, a rapid debt increase, or the extent of other long-term risks (such as aging costs). 
It is also likely to depend on the size of its external imbalances, particularly in the case of 
emerging economies. Hence, a country with a high level of foreign debt and/or confronting 
balance of payments problems is likely to have less room for fi scal expansion.
Third, even in the event that indeed discretionary packages were to be implemented, some 
questions remain open to debate: How should they be designed to maximize the impact on 
the economy (fi scal multipliers)? How should measures be tailored, communicated and imple-
mented in order to bolster consumers’ and fi rms’ confi dence and help reduce aggregate un-
certainty in the economy? In the event of the crisis lasting longer than envisaged, some addi-
tional questions could be posed: Would fi scal measures increase the probability of ending a 
recession in addition to mitigating the slump? Would they instead delay the recovery?
Introduction1
1. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the ECB or 
the NCBs involved. The authors would like to thank the participants at the ESCB Working Group on Public Finance meet-
ing of 3-4 March 2009, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. In particular, we would like to thank Karsten Wendorff, Ad van Riet 
and Richard Morris for their comments on previous drafts of this paper.  2. See European Central Bank (2009), Freed-
man et al. (2009), Barrell et al. (2009), OECD (2009), Elmendorf and Furman (2008), or Spilimbergo et al. (2008). 
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This paper reviews the main pros and cons of discretionary fi scal packages trying to unveil what 
we can learn from the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of discretionary 
fi scal policies, while at the same time drawing lessons for the actual packages recently put forward 
in some EU countries. The paper shows that it is extremely diffi cult to elaborate an unambiguous 
catalogue of measures defi ning an “optimal” fi scal package, though much attention has been paid 
in the policy debate to the requirement that measures taken should be “timely, targeted and tem-
porary” (TTT). As regards the duration of measures, both temporary and more persistent measures 
may be defended depending on the proportion of liquidity-constrained agents in the economy, the 
reaction of long-term interest rates, and the expected duration of the adverse shocks hitting the 
economy. Targeting measures to some specifi c agents may be diffi cult in practice, given the un-
certainty surrounding fi scal multipliers and the diffi culties of designing well-targeted fi scal stimulus 
packages. Timeliness is the least controversial criterion in the current situation.
Beyond the discussion on TTT, the literature suggests that the structure of a fi scal stimulus 
plan should take into account several factors, such as: (i) a proper balance between the ex-
pected short-term positive effects (mainly demand-side) with the costs that might be expected 
from the measures (mainly linked to the longer-term, and the supply side, but also to the short-
term via fi nancial markets); (ii) the expected size of fi scal multipliers of various tools available; 
(iii) the degree of openness of the economy; (iv) the need to minimise distortions in market 
mechanisms and, in the case of EU countries, the compliance with single market rules. 
Discretionary fi scal policy measures are usually advocated based on the claim that there are 
short-run benefi ts in the event of a crisis/recession situation. Indeed, several recent studies 
seem to provide evidence that additional government spending and/or tax cuts have a positive 
effect on aggregate output in the short-term in such a situation. What remains to be deter-
mined is the size of the fi scal multipliers, and the sign and size of the disaggregated impact on 
private consumption and private investment.
Private consumption, the biggest component of aggregate demand, has received most of the at-
tention. The current consensus holds that private consumption will increase after a positive govern-
ment spending shock or after temporary tax cuts due to the increase in disposable income.3
The most popular argument usually advocated is that the consumption of liquidity-constrained or 
myopic agents reacts strongly to tax reductions or government spending increases. For example, 
Gali et al. (2007) fi nd that, conditional on having a large enough fraction of rule-of-thumb consum-
ers4 (in their benchmark solutions 50% of the population), and a high degree of price stickiness 
(average duration of about four quarters), a government spending shock in the US generates an 
increase in aggregate consumption even if the latter is not very persistent. Otherwise, the negative 
wealth effect of the expected higher taxation would offset the expansionary impact, a standard 
result in models without liquidity constraints or price and wage stickiness.5 Inverting the previous 
The effectiveness of fi scal 
packages: short-run 
benefi ts and potential 
costs
SHORT-RUN BENEFITS ON 
AGGREGATE OUTPUT
3. See, for example, Gali et al. (2007), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001), Perotti (2005, 2007), 
Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Caldara and Kamps (2008) or Afonso and Sousa (2009). At the same time, some papers 
suggest the consumption response to temporary tax cuts may be modest. In this respect, see Shapiro and Slemrod 
(1995, 2001), Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999, 2002). Finally, the fi ndings that government spending shocks cause 
private consumption to rise is not unchallenged, e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al. 
(2004), or Ramey (2008). See Perotti (2007) for a critical discussion of this latter strand of the literature. Most of the pa-
pers referred to in this footnote analyze the US case. 4. By rule-of-thumb (or liquidity constrained or hand-to-mouth) 
consumers the literature refers to individuals that do not have access to fi nancial markets, and thus consume all of their 
current disposable income each period. 5. Standard “neoclassical” models predict that an exogenous increase in gov-
ernment spending will decrease private lifetime wealth (given that agents anticipate that increases in spending today will 
have to be fi nanced in the future), hence normal goods consumption and leisure declines (hours worked will increase to 
compensate for the negative wealth effect caused). The seminal paper most quoted in this respect is Barro (1974). See 
also Baxter and King (1993). For recent examples of simulation models that incorporate this theoretical structure in an 
otherwise standard “neo-Keynesian” framework see Coenen and Straub (2005) or Coenen et al. (2007). 
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argument on the fraction of constrained/unconstrained agents in the economy, several studies 
that analyse the non-Keynesian effects of fi scal policies claim that fi scal consolidations might have 
expansionary effects on the economy if the fraction of unconstrained agents is high enough.6, 7
Tagkalakis (2008) analyses the link between the fraction of constrained/unconstrained agents 
and the state of the economy. He develops a model to illustrate that the fraction of credit-con-
strained consumers is likely to increase in bad times, and hence a fi scal expansion is more 
likely to have a positive and stronger effect on consumption in economic downturns. This hy-
pothesis is validated in a panel data set of OECD countries for the period 1970-2002.8 
An alternative argument in the literature that rationalizes why private consumption might react 
positively to an increase in government consumption is based on the assumption that public 
and private consumption are complements or, similarly, that they are imperfect substitutes with 
suffi ciently low elasticity of substitution. In both cases the rise in government consumption 
increases the marginal utility of private consumption so that the negative wealth effect on con-
sumption is counteracted.9 Examples of public spending which substitutes private spending 
include defence, public order and justice, while public spending in education or health might 
be perceived as complements for private sector provided services.
Private investment, a much more cyclically volatile component of output, may also be infl u-
enced by tax and government spending. The incentive to invest is responsive to tax policy and 
is likely to be more responsive when tax measures are perceived to be temporary (in this re-
spect see for example Auerbach and Hassett, 2002). The rationale is the following. Firms and 
investors are sensitive to changes over the coming period in the tax-adjusted price of new 
capital goods, and may be motivated to accelerate purchases into this year if a favourable tax 
environment is expected to become less favourable. This might be particularly the case in the 
presence of capital stock adjustment costs, as expectations of future changes in the incentive 
to use capital in production lead to immediate changes in investment so as to minimize the 
adjustment costs incurred in closing the gap between the current and future desired capital 
stocks. Thus, temporary tax credits may have more than proportional impact on the user cost 
of capital. 
Most empirical studies on temporary investment incentives fi nd that they tend to be only mod-
erately effective (see, for example, CBO, 2008, and the literature cited there). This may be due 
to the fact that investment projects often require long planning phases and, consequently, only 
projects that have already been planned can be implemented in the short term. 
Standard models without liquidity constraints or price and wage stickiness would predict a 
boost in investment after a government spending shock given that, to compensate for the 
negative wealth effect caused, agents might decide to work more, which in turn will raise the 
return to capital. Nevertheless, other arguments would signal that a positive government 
6. On the assumption of credit market imperfections and the link to constrained and unconstrained individuals, see At-
tanasio (1999), Perotti (1999), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) or Giavazzi, Jappeli and Pagano (2000). Also on the 
issue of the “non-Keynesian” effects of fi scal policies see Schclarek (2007) and the references quoted therein. 7. Mona-
celli and Perotti (2008) exploit an alternative channel. They set up a standard business cycle model, except for the pres-
ence of price rigidity, and fi nd a positive response of private consumption to a government spending shock for prefer-
ences consistent with an arbitrarily small positive wealth effect on labour supply, that counterbalances the standard 
wealth effect. This effect is linked to the degree of complementarity between consumption and hours. See also Ravn, 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uríbe (2006). 8. This adds to the usual argument that expansionary fi scal policy is more effi cient 
when the output gap is negative because otherwise it could only boost infl ation (see Henry et al., 2004). 9. See for 
example Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) and Ganelli and Tervala (2009) for theoretical justifi cations and empirical evidence 
on the complementarities argument, and Linneman and Schabert (2004) for the imperfect substitution one. At the end of 
the day, the issue of whether private and public consumption are complements or substitutes is an empirical one.  
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spending shock might lead to a situation in which private investment is crowded out by higher 
public debt issuance, if the latter raises the interest rate (this will depend on current and future 
monetary policy).10 In addition, if the government spending shock is implemented through the 
public sector wage bill, upward wage pressures may appear in the economy, leading to a re-
duction in profi ts and thus private investment (see Alesina et al. 2002, Lane and Perotti, 2003, 
and Ardagna, 2007, for theory and empirics supporting this claim).
The implementation of discretionary fi scal packages is not without risks. The main costs usu-
ally spelled out in the literature as regards short-term policies are long-run costs. These are 
usually framed against the dangers that strong discretionary actions may generate for the 
sustainability of public fi nances.11
In addition, if long-run costs are perceived by private agents to be relevant in a given historical 
episode, then precautionary savings may increase and investment may decrease or remain 
muted, provided that agents perceive that a fi scal consolidation might be needed once the 
economic crisis is over (or even before, if the slump turns out to be enduring). This perception 
is likely to depend on the existing degree of “fi scal stress”, either proxied by high existing levels 
of government debt, a rapid debt increase, or the extent of the long-term risks perceived (such 
as aging costs or implicit liabilities related to government guarantees e.g. for fi nancial institu-
tions). These factors might severely limit the short-term impact of fi scal measures.
Discretionary fi scal actions can also have short-run costs. Bearing in mind default risk, increas-
ing or perceived-as-unsustainable government debt can lead to a risk premium being charged 
on the interest on government debt, leading to a crowding-out of private investment. A credi-
ble one-off increase in government spending could – given a suffi cient number of rule-of-
thumb consumers in the economy – bring about positive fi scal multipliers. However, if eco-
nomic agents do not believe that the fi scal stimulus is a one-off (or if it truly is a permanent 
stimulus), the risk premiums could increase accordingly because unconstrained Ricardian 
households want compensation for potential future income losses. This would generate a 
negative fi scal multiplier (see for example Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, or Alesina and Perotti, 
1997). 
An additional short-run consideration pertains to the link between fi scal policy and uncertainty. 
Automatic stabilizers, to the extent that they operate properly, can lower volatility and uncer-
tainty in the economy, without introducing new policy uncertainties (Auerbach and and Has-
sett, 2002, Andrés et al., 2008). This is not necessarily the case as regards discretionary fi scal 
policy actions. In this respect, random fi scal policies could increase the overall economic un-
certainty, and thus damage economic activity.12 As the impact of different measures might 
depend on expectations about the future, fi scal stimulus packages announced clearly and 
credibly are likely to be more effective.13 Without a credible strategy, the government may only 
increase the uncertainty in the system and induce fi rms and households to postpone their 
spending decisions (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). A related issue is the anticipation of fi scal 
measures by private agents. Hoon and Phelps (2008) show that under imperfect competition 
an unanticipated temporary labor tax cut to be effective on a given future date fi nanced by 
future cuts in spending is neutral for output in a Ricardian world but contractionary in a non-
Ricardian world. They also show that a sudden expectation of future labour tax cuts without a 
LONG-RUN COSTS, SHORT-RUN 
COSTS AND OTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS
10. From an empirical point of view, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) fi nd in a SVAR framework for the US a negative impact 
on private investment of a government spending shock. 11. See for example Afonso et al. (2009). For the trade-off 
between automatic stabilisation and the long-run fi scal positions of governments see Hiebert et al. (2009). 12. See 
Furceri (2008). 13. For example, if agents face a signal extraction problem as regards the prevailing and the expected 
fi scal regime. See Keen (2008), Eusepi and Preston (2008) or Davig (2004) in this respect.  
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sunset provision, with spending gradually adjusting to ensure fi scal sustainability, is expansion-
ary in a Ricardian world but (for small tax changes) contractionary in the time period before 
implementation in a non-Ricardian world.14 Thus, even if ex-post multipliers were positive, the 
fi nal impact of the labour tax cuts would have to be weighted against the ex-ante losses.
The effectiveness of fi scal packages is also likely to depend on the openness of the economy 
and external linkages. In a small and open economy, the share of additional consumption de-
mand resulting from a short-term increase in transfers that is going into imports is conceivably 
high. Therefore, unless fi scal stimulus packages are perfectly coordinated internationally (eve-
ryone spends), more open economies may be inclined to prefer public investment programs, 
in which they are better able to direct the demand impact towards domestic goods and serv-
ices and thus raise employment. IMF (2008) simulations show that, in general, fi scal multipliers 
tend to be lower in smaller and more open economies. However, in terms of the different fi scal 
tools, the multipliers for labour taxes fall by less (maybe not always be the case if also large 
openness of the labour market, see case of Luxembourg), followed by government invest-
ment, while the highest relative decline is found for transfers.
In addition, the impact of income tax changes on labour supply and output depends on insti-
tutional factors of the labour market, such as the degree of unionisation and other features of 
the wage-setting process. Other factors, such as corruption and preparedness of the govern-
ment institutions (effi ciency of spending line-ministries versus tax collection agencies; availabil-
ity of resources for public institutions and capacity to implement large scale investment pro-
grams), could conceivably infl uence the effectiveness of spending versus tax measures, most 
notably in developing countries.
An argument that is sometimes absent from theoretical studies, and certainly from empirical 
ones, is that the effectiveness of fi scal packages depends crucially on the way they are fi -
nanced. The literature signals that fi scal packages are not generally self-fi nancing. For exam-
ple, the impact of an increase in government spending depends on whether it is fi nanced by a 
future tax rise (or a future spending cut) or by a more persistent increase in government debt 
(the latter being the case of most packages currently announced in the EU), as private agents 
respond differently. As an example, Leeper and Yang (2008) fi nd that the expansionary effects 
of a tax cut (in the long-run, but also in the transition to a new steady-state) depend crucially 
on the choice of which fi scal instrument adjusts and on the magnitude of the adjustment in 
response to a deteriorating budget. The stronger is the response to the deteriorating budget, 
the less debt accumulates, and the more favourable are the expansionary effects of a tax 
cut.15 Thus, especially in countries with high levels of public debt, this strand of the literature 
tends to suggest that a given package should be accompanied by a related set of reverting 
measures, also in view of sustainability issues. 
Another consideration is the consistency of fi scal packages with monetary policy. Monetary 
policy reaction plays a key role in the effectiveness of a fi scal stimulus,16 the output re-
14. On different grounds, and from a purely empirical point of view, Ramey (2008) incorporates the timing of the news 
about future increases in government war spending, while Blanchard and Perotti (2002) incorporate future values of the 
fi scal shocks. Both empirical studies fi nd a larger and longer positive response of output to the fi scal stimulus than found 
in studies using actual spending. Such controls can capture the behavioural change from the moment the fi scal stimulus 
has been credibly announced or approved to the moment of the actual implementation. The response of private con-
sumption to fi scal shocks once the anticipation effects are taken into account is still controversial in the literature. 15. For 
additional illustrations, in a different modelling framework, see Ardagna (2007). 16. It is also a crucial assumption in 
simulation models and, if omitted, it may be an important source of bias in estimating the size of fi scal multipliers in re-
gression analyses. By type of fi scal tools, recent IMF simulation work (IMF, 2008) shows that the output response to la-
bour tax cuts is less affected by monetary accommodation in comparison with other tools (e.g. government investment, 
consumption taxes or transfers), due to the impact on labour supply. 
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sponse being considerably higher and more persistent in the case of monetary accommo-
dation. Ideally, monetary and fi scal policies are consistent in the short run so that their im-
pact on aggregate demand is cumulative and not offsetting. In the current situation of 
expansionary monetary and fi scal policies, risks may arise that the impact of one policy 
forces the other to adjust in the medium term, thus limiting its margin of manoeuvre and 
desirable design. For instance, if private debt remains high and public debt keeps on in-
creasing due to stimulus and rescue plans, interest rates might be pushed up in the me-
dium term.
Finally, expansionary policies might be diffi cult to reverse. An inadequate timing in the re-
versal of the policy mix could endanger growth and infl ation developments in the medium 
term. For example, if expansionary policies are reversed too late European economies may 
have to face excess liquidity (maybe implying new bubbles in other asset prices), unsustain-
able public fi nances, and lack of confi dence among private agents, which could endanger 
the recovery of consumption, investment and output in the medium term. The opposite might 
be also true: if expansionary policies are reversed too early, this could choke off an incipient 
recovery. 
The above review of the literature indicates that the design of fi scal measures may have a 
signifi cant infl uence on their effectiveness. Taking this into account, policy institutions have 
called for stimulus measures to be timely (enacted rapidly), temporary and targeted (directed 
where the multipliers are larger). Example is the “European Economic Recovery Plan” (EERP). 
Meanwhile, in the United States, government offi cials have argued that a “speedy, substantial 
and sustained” fi scal stimulus should fi t better, given the intensity and expected duration of the 
current crisis.
As regards timeliness, important lags can result between the diagnosis of the economic situa-
tion and the decision and implementation of fi scal policies (inside lags). Given these “inside 
lags” and the time needed for the measure to infl uence aggregate demand (“outside lags”), the 
impact of stimulus measures could come too late, when the cyclical position of the economy 
has already begun to improve17. This implies favouring simple measures instead of radical 
departures from current tax and expenditure structures, which may incur large lags associated 
with the process of political discussion and approval of new measures. In the particular case 
of public investment, the pressure to introduce timely measures may result in ineffi cient projects 
with little impact on short- and long-term output growth.
The effects of discretionary fi scal measures depend also on their expected duration (temporary 
vs permanent/sustained measures). As discussed above, the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture is controversial. Rule-of-thumb consumers would react to temporary measures, given that 
they spend all their current income. However, if the fraction of unconstrained agents is high 
enough then temporary increases in income will not lead to signifi cant increases in consump-
tion, as they only affect permanent income marginally. In this latter case, on the contrary, per-
sistency measures may result in higher multipliers if agents optimize over a fi nite number of 
periods.18
The preference for temporary measures is designed to allay concerns about fi scal sustainabil-
ity in the long term. A permanent or persistent stimulus could raise doubts about the long-run 
The effectiveness of fi scal 
packages and their design
TARGETED, TIMELY AND 
TEMPORARY?
17. Although, the diagnosis might be easier in the current crisis and therefore the inside lag shorter. 18. But even in this 
case, private agents may adopt some consumption smoothing when there are fi scal rules that limit the government debt 
and defi cit ratios. For example, if the fi scal defi cit is close to the threshold established by the rule, private agents may 
adjust their saving behaviour anticipating the fi scal adjustment. 
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fi scal position, resulting in the crowding out of private investment through higher interest rates. 
Moreover, the literature on the quality of public fi nances, by stressing the negative relationship 
between government size and economic growth, at least beyond a certain minimal size, adds 
weight to the argument that spending increases should be temporary (EC, 2008). Finally, tran-
sitory measures can also work by affecting the relative prices of present and future consump-
tion and investment. For example, a temporary reduction in VAT rates reduces the price of 
present consumption relative to future spending, boosting demand in the current period (but 
depressing it afterwards). 
Focusing the stimulus on sectors with higher multipliers and towards agents with a higher 
propensity to spend current income, would raise its impact (targeted).19 However, deciding 
which agents are eligible is controversial, especially when diverse sectors of the economy are 
affected, as in the current crisis. There is a risk that measures would be directed towards 
prominent sectors of the economy, on the basis of their visibility and political clout, rather than 
on the effective stimulus to demand. Moreover, national assistance to some specifi c sectors 
could distort competition rules and the functioning of the European single market. In addition, 
in a situation where fi scal multipliers are uncertain, it could be more prudent to rely on a diver-
sifi ed set of measures20. For example, against a background of uncertainty and tight credit 
conditions, fi rms might not undertake risky investments, even if corporate tax cuts reduce 
capital costs.
Given that the current fi scal packages aim at counteracting an aggregate shock that affects 
most economies, a majority of institutions has also stressed that coordinated actions would be 
desirable to reinforce individual national actions by reducing concerns about leakages through 
imports that are not compensated by the induced demand of fi scal packages in trade part-
ners. Trade spillovers and trade multipliers could potentially amplify the impact of fi scal stimu-
lus. At the same time, large scale actions by a broad set of governments, especially in the euro 
area, might lead to competition in the bond market, and increased borrowing costs, espe-
cially for non-core EU countries.
Apart from theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence supporting alternative theories, 
it is important to be able to quantify the multipliers associated with alternative fi scal measures 
to assess the degree of effectiveness of fi scal activism21. The literature (mainly focused on the 
US case) suggests that fi scal multipliers are on average positive, but many studies fi nd that 
they are quite low, and are typically estimated with a high uncertainty. This pertains to both 
expenditure and revenue stimulus measures.22 In this respect, the size of the (short- and 
medium-term) multipliers attached to different types of measures remains an open empirical 
question.
Nevertheless, some general conclusions could be drawn from the literature, presented in Ta-
bles 1, 2 and 3, and are summarized below.
COORDINATION VS. COUNTRY 
ACTIONS 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL 
PACKAGES: WHAT DO WE KNOW 
ABOUT TAX AND SPENDING 
MULTIPLIERS?
19. Notice that throughout this note we are ignoring measures aimed specifi cally at the fi nancial system, which, in the 
current situation, could be a prominent example of well-targeted discretionary measures. Another usually quoted exam-
ple is transfers to low-income households, that despite an expected short-term impact if they are well targeted (and if the 
target group is large enough), may have a negative impact on longer term growth by creating distortions in the allocation 
of resources (Obstfeld and Peri, 1998, Checherita, Nickel and Rother, 2009). 20. Targeting might still be more appropri-
ate in very specifi c cases (i.e. lower income households). 21. It is important to mention at this stage that the authors 
have developed a much more detailed version of this paper with country specifi c fi les that describe impact of the largest 
recently adopted fi scal stimulus measures on different economic variables. Unfortunately, due to the confi dentiality rea-
sons these results cannot be presented in this paper. However, feel free to contact the country specifi c author for the 
country specifi c data. 22. In some cases multipliers could turn out to be negative. Take the example of a small open 
economy with fi scal sustainability problems. In this case, fi scal activism could be damaging for short-term aggregate 
output, and hurt fi scal sustainability. 
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reilpitluMPDG
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSht02ht21ht4ts1sretrauQ
Expenditure shock
United States
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 1947-1997 +* + +* +* 0.84-0.9 0.66-0.97
0.14.0*+*++*+0002-1691)2002(ittoreP
3.1-1.0*––++0002-0891)2002(ittoreP
––*+*+6991-5691)1002(ireN
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) 1955-2000 + + + + 0.4 -0.1
Fatás and Mihov (2001) 1960-1996 +* +* +* +*
*+*+*+6991-8491)8991(.lategrebledE
–+*+*+3002-7491)8002(yemaR
Romer and Bernstein (2009) 2009-2014 1.05/1.44 1.6
Germany
3.1*+–*+*+0002-1691)2002(ittoreP 0.9
7.0-8.0––*–+0002-0891)2002(ittoreP
*+*+1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
France
––1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
Italy
++1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
Spain
––1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
de Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) +* +* + –*
United Kingdom
60.003.0++–*+0002-0691)2002(ittoreP
Japan
5.350.1/48.0+*+*+)2002(nesoPdnarenttuK
Pool of countries
WEO (2008) 1970-2007b 0.1 -0.1
Advanced economies 0.2 0.5
Emerging economies 0.1 -0.2
Revenue shock
United States
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 1947-1997 +* +* +* + 0.69-0.70 0.22-1.29
5.074.0-62.0*+*+*+*+0002-0691)2002(ittoreP
1.094.0-71.0+*–*–*+0002-0891)2002(ittoreP
*+*+*+*+6991-5691)1002(ireN
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) 1995-2000 +* +* +* + 0.2 1.3
0.32.0*+*++5002-7491)7002(remoRdnaremoR
Romer and Bernstein (2009) 2009-2014 0.00/0.66 1.0
Germany
2.02.0+*+*+*+0002-1691)2002(ittoreP
4.00.0*++*+–0002-0891)2002(ittoreP
*+*+1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
France
––1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
Italy
*–*–1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
Spain
––1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
de Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) – – – +*
United Kingdom
2.0-1.0-*–*––*–0002-0691)2002(ittoreP
Japan
8.485.1/61.0*+*++)2002(nesoPdnarenttuK
Pool of countries
WEO (2008) 1947-2007b 0.10 0.1
Advanced economies 0.0 0.4
Emerging economies 0.1 0.2
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors, with input from Henry et al (2004) and De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008). 
* Significance at the 95% level.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM VAR STUDIES TABLE 1
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Multiplier
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSnoitalumiS
Expenditure shock
United States
1.01.1.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
8.07.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.9 1.1
Increase in transfers to household 0.5 0.8
Euro Area
1.02.1.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.05.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)c()3002(notxaLdnatnuH
6.13.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
0.11.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)e()7002(vorakahcTdnabuartS
Increase in Gov. Invest. 1.2 1.1
Germany
2.0-1.1.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.09.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)f()4002(dleVt'nidnaregeoR
0.03.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)c()3002(notxaLdnatnuH
1.05.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
7.02.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
2.18.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)h()4002(ittoreP
Increase in Gov. Invest. 3.7 3.7
5.04.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.3 0.5
France
2.06.0.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.09.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)f()4002(dleVt'nidnaregeoR
0.03.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)c()3002(notxaLdnatnuH
1.02.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
8.01.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
7.06.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.7
Italy
0.09.0.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.09.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)f()4002(dleVt'nidnaregeoR
0.03.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)c()3002(notxaLdnatnuH
1.01.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
2.12.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
7.06.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.7
Spain
1.01.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
9.02.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
6.05.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.6
United Kingdom
1.0-2.0.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.00.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)f()4002(dleVt'nidnaregeoR
2.01.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
7.07.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)h()4002(ittoreP
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.0 -0.4
6.05.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.6
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors.
a. OECD INTERLINK model. Nominal exchange rates and real interest rates are assumed fixed. 
b. DSGE Model. Luxembourgish figures provided by the OECD INTERLINK model are not presented in 
a very transparent way and therefore one should be very cautious when interpreting these. According to 
the latest available information, Luxembourg and Belgium were modelled as a single country.
c. MULTIMOD model.
d. National Central Banks' models.
e. NAWM (New Area-Wide model). 
f. QUEST model.
g. NIGEM model.
h. VAR model.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM SIMULATION MODELS. EXPENDITURE SHOCKS TABLE 2
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Multiplier
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSnoitalumiS
Expenditure shock
Japan
5.07.1.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
8.07.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.9 1.1
Increase in transfers to household 0.5 0.8
Belgium
9.00.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
Luxembourg
3.06.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
Austria
3.13.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
Portugal
0.12.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
5.04.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.3 0.5
Finland
0.02.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
5.04.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.3 0.5
Netherlands
8.01.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
Greece
4.17.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
6.05.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.6
Ireland
9.01.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors.
a. OECD INTERLINK model. Nominal exchange rates and real interest rates are assumed fixed. 
b. DSGE Model. Luxembourgish figures provided by the OECD INTERLINK model are not presented in a 
very transparent way and therefore one should be very cautious when interpreting these. According to 
the latest available information, Luxembourg and Belgium were modelled as a single country.
c. MULTIMOD model.
d. National Central Banks' models. 
e. NAWM (New Area-Wide model).
f. QUEST model.
g. NIGEM model.
h. VAR model.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM SIMULATION MODELS. EXPENDITURE
SHOCKS (cont'd)
TABLE 2
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Multiplier
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSnoitalumiS
Revenue shock
United States
Dalsgaard et al. (2001) (a) Sustained cut in PIT (Personal Income Tax) 0.6 0.3
5.03.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
3.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Euro Area
2.05.0TIPnitucdeniatsuSDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Germany
3.05.0TIPnitucdeniatsuSDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
2.05.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
3.13.0xatetaroproC
2.07.0sexatlanosreptceriD
3.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
France
2.03.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
5.02.0xatetaroproC
2.03.0sexatlanosreptceriD
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Italy
2.02.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
6.02.0xatetaroproC
2.01.0sexatlanosreptceriD
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Spain
1.02.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
3.02.0xatetaroproC
1.02.0sexatlanosreptceriD
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
United Kingdom
2.03.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
6.01.0xatetaroproC
2.02.0sexatlanosreptceriD
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Japan
4.04.0TIPnitucdeniatsuSDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
5.03.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
3.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Belgium
2.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
1.01.0xaTtceridnInituC)b()9002(DCEO
Luxembourg
2.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
1.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Austria
3.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Portugal
3.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors.
a. OECD INTERLINK model. Nominal exchange rates and real interest rates are assumed fixed. 
b. DSGE Model. Luxembourgish figures provided by the OECD INTERLINK model are not presented in a 
very transparent way and therefore one should be very cautious when interpreting these. According to 
the latest available information, Luxembourg and Belgium were modelled as a single country.
c. NIGEM model.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM SIMULATION MODELS. REVENUE SHOCKS TABLE 3
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Multiplier
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSnoitalumiS
Revenue shock
Finland
3.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Netherlands
2.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
1.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Greece
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Ireland
2.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
1.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors.
a. OECD INTERLINK model. Nominal exchange rates and real interest rates are assumed fixed. 
b. DSGE Model. Luxembourgish figures provided by the OECD INTERLINK model are not presented in a 
very transparent way and therefore one should be very cautious when interpreting these. According to 
the latest available information, Luxembourg and Belgium were modelled as a single country.
c. NIGEM model.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM SIMULATION MODELS. REVENUE 
SHOCKS (cont'd)
TABLE 3
Many empirical studies fi nd that spending multipliers are higher than tax multipliers in the short 
term. This result could be rationalized as being consistent with the theoretical prediction that 
part of the higher disposable income from a tax cut is saved, while government purchases of 
goods and services affect aggregate demand directly.23
The cumulative effect of tax measures usually grows with time, but the evidence that tax cuts 
are more effective than spending increases is mixed, especially when tax changes are tempo-
rary. Nevertheless, IMF (2008) shows evidence from a wide panel of fi scal policy responses to 
economic downturns suggesting that revenue-based policies, including temporary ones, were 
associated with higher subsequent growth and even faster recoveries, the latter particularly in 
emerging economies. On balance, it seems that there is more evidence, especially from recent 
narrative studies and simulation exercises that tax multipliers may be high – and higher than 
spending multipliers – in the longer run.
Increases in government purchases of goods and services are found to work faster than other 
spending components, particularly in times of recession and low capacity utilisation, as they 
induce an immediate positive impact on aggregate demand. However, in the longer term, the 
distortions induced in the economy are likely to result in a negative or, at best, insignifi cant 
impact (as shown by most simulation exercises).
Government capital spending is generally considered to have a smaller short-term impact due 
to the long lags associated with the approval and implementation of new projects, but a larger 
long-term impact by raising the capital stock and potential output (Roeger and in‘t Veld, 
2004). Capital spending on maintenance works has the potential for a fast impact on demand 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
MULTIPLIERS VS. TAX 
MULTIPLIERS
BEYOND AGGREGATE 
“GOVERNMENT SPENDING OR 
TAX SHOCKS” 
23. See, among others, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the US, Perotti (2002) who found this was the case during 1961-
2000, but not for 1980-2000, Kuttner and Posen (2002) for Japan, IMF (2008) for advanced economies. Burriel et al. 
(2009) for the euro area aggregate, Dalsgaard, André and Richardson (2001) for the US, euro area, Germany and Japan, 
de Castro and Hernandez de Cos (2008) for Spain, Giordano et al. (2007) for Italy, and Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen and Wolf 
(2007) for Germany. 
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and a positive medium-term impact on the supply side. Despite the variety of results across 
countries, regions, sectors, or periods of time, the predominant view in the empirical literature 
is that public capital has a positive impact on long-term growth. However, this impact may be 
nonlinear (with lower returns after a certain threshold is reached), and thus it may have re-
ceded in recent years compared to earlier decades (Romp and DeHaan, 2005).
Coming to the impact of different measures aiming at affecting private sector income, income 
tax cuts are generally found to be more effi cient in the long term by eliminating distortions in 
the labour market and raising labour supply. In simulations, Coenen, McAdam and Straub 
(2007) fi nd that the short-term output impact is larger for a government spending shock than 
for a transfer shock, while the positive long-term impact of cuts in the tax wedge is sizably 
larger than the impact of both government consumption and transfers. Al-Eyd and Barrell 
(2005) conclude that personal income taxes have a larger impact than transfers in both the 
short and the medium term.
On the spending side, investment tax credits show high multipliers, as shown in, for example 
Roeger and in ‘t Veld (2004) and Auerbach and Hassett (2002). 
As regards the fi scal multipliers associated with other tax instruments, the comparable em-
pirical literature is scarcer. Al-Eyd and Barrell (2005) fi nd that personal income taxes have the 
largest short-term multiplier in Germany and France, corporate taxes in Italy, while indirect 
(consumption) taxes have a very large short-term multiplier in the UK. Corporate taxes have 
the largest medium-term multiplier across all countries under study. Similarly, in the long term, 
Arnold (2008) fi nds that corporate taxes have the largest impact on output per capita, followed 
by personal income tax and consumption tax.
Two fi nal issues are worth mentioning. First, as signalled in IMF (2008), fi scal multipliers tend 
to be lower in countries with high public debt burdens and high indebtedness vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world, along the lines of the theoretical considerations discussed above.
Second, almost all empirical studies implicitly impose symmetry, in the sense that they are 
performed for complete samples that encompass both upturns (with fi scal tightening) and 
downturns (with fi scal stimulus) together. This implies that estimated multipliers are averages 
over episodes that could potentially be dramatically different (as the literature on “non-Keyne-
sian” effects of fi scal policies shows). In addition, standard linear techniques might not capture 
accurately potential non-linearities arising for these reasons. Two remarkable exceptions point 
in different directions. On the one hand, the above-mentioned work by Tagkalakis (2008) mod-
els good and bad times explicitly, fi nding that a fi scal expansion is more likely to have a positive 
and stronger effect on consumption in economic downturns, with average “OECD spending 
multipliers” signifi cantly above 1. On the other hand, IMF (2008) only look at downturns, and 
fi nd that fi scal activism always makes them worse (and all the more so if public debt is high).
In the light of the discussion of previous sections, this section focuses on the evaluation of 
concrete fi scal measures that have been implemented or are under discussion in the context 
of the current recession in EU member states. As a yardstick against which these measures 
are assessed some of the criteria developed in previous sections (and widely acknowledged in 
the literature) are used. As mentioned before: (i) timely: Is the measure effective by the time a 
stimulus to the economy is needed most? In this respect the time lags involved in decision-
making, implementation and impact on the economy are important; (ii) temporary: Does the 
measure create an expansive fi scal impulse only for as long as the production potential is un-
derutilized?; (iii) targeted: Does the measure have a relatively strong multiplier effect?
OTHER ISSUES: FISCAL 
MULTIPLIERS IN HIGH DEBT 
COUNTRIES, AND IN GOOD AND 
BAD TIMES
Evaluation of specifi c 
fi scal measures to 
stimulate the economy
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING 
DIFFERENT FISCAL POLICY 
MEASURES
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In addition to these “TTT-criteria” it is also important that the respective measure does not 
confl ict with other economic policy objectives (e.g. fi scal sustainability, long-term economic 
growth, functioning of the market mechanism, desired income and wealth redistribution). This 
should also be taken into account when assessing the stimulus measures.
As discussed above, the suitability of a specifi c fi scal measure to stimulate economic activity 
in a severe recession depends on its precise form and on a number of other specifi c factors. 
For example, a measure that usually has a high multiplier effect can have a low or even nega-
tive impact on economic activity if fi scal sustainability is already severely impaired to begin 
with. Other country-specifi c circumstances like institutional factors and the capacity utilisation 
in different sectors of the economy also play an important role. Here instead the focus is only 
on general characteristics of some more important fi scal measures. 
Since not all specifi c measures taken by EU countries can be covered here – the EU identifi ed 
more than 350 government actions by the end of January 2009 – only those measures that 
have a large size and/or have been adopted by a number of member states are considered. 
On the revenue side, this is mainly the case for permanent reductions of personal income tax 
and frontloading of VAT refunds, while the main expenditure measures include increases in 
government investment, subsidies for purchases of consumer durables, per-capita transfers/
tax rebates and higher benefi ts connected to temporary working time reductions.
1 Permanent reductions of personal income tax24 have been taken or announced 
by a number of countries recently, namely Germany, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland or Malta. They may be implemented in a timely manner although adjust-
ing withholding tax payments might take some time on the side of employers 
and some time might elapse before private households increase consumption 
(outside lag). However, this measure is not temporary and thus the expansionary 
effect would not be limited to the period of the downturn. A permanent reduc-
tion is especially costly from a fi scal perspective and implies a large deterioration 
of the long-term sustainability of public fi nances. The multiplier effect of this 
measure is low in general, because a large part of personal income tax is paid 
by households with a relatively low marginal propensity to consume. It could, 
however, be increased somewhat by targeting the cut to households with lower 
incomes (e.g. by increasing individual tax allowances or cutting rates only for 
lower tax brackets). 
2 Frontloading of VAT refunds: The effectiveness of this measure depends crucially 
on the capability of tax authorities to advance the payment of VAT returns. If pay-
ment lags can indeed be shortened, additional liquidity would be provided to 
fi rms. The multiplier effect therefore hinges on the share of credit-constrained 
fi rms in the economy, likely to be high in the current circumstances. If this share 
is small the expansionary impact on the economy may be rather limited as the 
gains from interest savings will be marginal in most cases. In countries facing a 
severe credit crunch, however, some expansionary impact seems likely. Public 
fi nances will deteriorate only temporarily. In fact, the defi cit would not be affected 
at all in case of a strict accrual recording. However, a permanent detrimental ef-
fect on the government balance could arise if there is an increase in the number 
of fi rms that receive refunds but become insolvent before fi nal tax settlements are 
EVALUATION OF MAIN FISCAL 
MEASURES IMPLEMENTED IN THE 
CURRENT CONTEXT
24. Note that permanent reduction of personal income tax is not necessarily a crisis measure but has been used by some 
countries as it was already planned before the crisis. 
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paid. Measures of this type have been adopted in a number of countries, in par-
ticular France, Italy and Spain.
3 Many governments have decided to increase government capital spending, among 
them Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, Luxembourg and Italy. Government in-
vestment spending, particularly on maintenance works, has the potential for a rela-
tively high short-term multiplier as the state directly creates demand and there are 
therefore no leakages in the form of saving, at least initially. Moreover, the import 
ratio for construction projects is likely to be comparatively low. In addition, this in-
strument is appealing because there appears to be no confl ict with long-run growth 
objectives as potential growth might even be increased.25 However, a major draw-
back is that such measures involve long lags associated with deciding, planning 
and implementing additional investment projects (especially infrastructure), so that 
the multiplier is usually higher in the medium to longer term jeopardising the timeli-
ness of the effects. Even for projects that have already been planned and approved, 
the construction phase often lasts several quarters. Therefore, there is a danger of 
partially procyclical effects unless the additional investment is restricted to moveable 
capital goods and small construction projects (maintenance investment) which can 
be completed in the short run and the downturn is expected to be protracted. In 
addition, there is a risk of price increases if sizeable government demand leads to 
capacity constraints in the respective sector. Finally, an effi cient public administra-
tion is needed to avoid investment in projects that are wasteful from a welfare per-
spective. In federal countries in particular, an effective coordination between differ-
ent layers of government is necessary. 
4 Temporary subsidies for consumer durables might bring forward private demand 
during a recession and therefore can have a particularly high multiplier. The time 
limit on the subsidy strengthens the effect as it lowers the price of current as op-
posed to future consumption. While free-rider effects – payments to consumers 
who would have purchased the product at the time anyway – are inevitable, they still 
have some effect as disposable income is increased in these cases as well.26 How-
ever, consumer durables (e.g. cars) tend to have a relatively high import ratio. More-
over, unwanted price reactions instead of the desired volume effects become more 
likely with narrower subsidised product groups, higher subsidy and higher capacity 
utilisation in the industry concerned. While the measure is timely and temporary it 
leads to relative price distortions and associated welfare losses. Moreover, subsi-
dies for a specifi c industry might prevent necessary structural adjustments, and 
lead to increased pressures from lobbying groups to introduce additional distortions 
affecting the playing fi eld for international competition. Measures to support certain 
industries, like the car industry, have been adopted in a number of countries, among 
which are Germany, France, Spain, Luxembourg and Italy.
5 Per-capita transfers/tax rebates: Depending on the specifi c form that this instru-
ment takes it can have quite different effects. For example, whereas in Spain all 
25. However, it can be argued that in the absence of distortions introduced by the political decision-making process the 
optimal amount of public investment was already planned before the downturn and that therefore any additional invest-
ment is likely to be welfare decreasing. According to this reasoning in the long run the level of public investment should 
not be increased and only the timing of this investment should be adapted to cyclical conditions (advance expenditure to 
period of recession). 26. While we are not aware of any studies on how car subsidies (eg scrapping subsidies) affect 
the savings ratio and GDP growth with regard to the automobile sector there is some evidence that the sector is stimu-
lated in the short run but then experiences a downturn (Licandro and Sampayo, 2005, and Adla and Cooper 1997).
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labour income recipients will receive a transfer for an unspecifi ed number of 
years, in Germany the transfer is of a one-off nature and limited to households 
with children. In Italy it is limited to low-income families with children. In general, 
the effectiveness of the transfers increases with the degree of concentration on 
credit-constrained households with a low savings ratio. Evidence for the US 
(Agarwal, Liu, Souleles 2007 and Johnson, Parker and Souleles 2006) suggests 
a limited size of the multiplier of tax rebates. The timeliness of the implementation 
of the transfer depends on administrative issues. In the US in 2001 it took around 
ten weeks for tax rebates to be distributed. In case of a one-off transfer the im-
pact of the measure is strictly temporary.
6 Higher benefi ts connected to temporary working time reductions, like the ones 
made in Germany or the Netherlands, can be implemented in a timely manner but 
outside lags – as with all measures aiming to support purchasing power of house-
holds – can delay the impact on the economy. Given that temporary working time 
reductions are highly cyclical, the impact is likely to be concentrated on the pe-
riod of the economic downturn. Moreover, the multiplier could be rather high as 
employees eligible for this transfer could have a high marginal propensity to con-
sume. However, if the benefi ts accrue mainly to fi rms then any short-term impact 
on economic activity is likely to be smaller. The measure might reduce fi ring and 
(re-)hiring costs of fi rms and prevent a loss of fi rm-specifi c human capital but also 
help to avoid or alleviate the hysteresis phenomenon (structural unemployment). 
However, in the absence of market failure it remains unclear why an additional 
incentive by the government is needed since a profi t-maximising fi rm can be ex-
pected to take these costs into account anyhow. Moreover, subsidised tempo-
rary working-time reductions imply the risk that necessary structural adjustments 
are postponed as employees are locked into industries with structural overca-
pacity. 
This paper has reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of discretionary 
fi scal policies in order to distinguish pros and cons of fi scal policy in stimulating the economy. 
It shows that it is extremely diffi cult to elaborate an unambiguous catalogue of measures defi n-
ing an “optimal” fi scal package.
Discretionary fi scal policy measures are usually advocated based on the claim that they have 
short-run benefi ts in the event of a crisis. Indeed, several recent studies seem to provide evi-
dence that additional government spending and/or tax cuts have a positive effect on aggre-
gate output in the short term. The most popular argument relies on the presence of liquidity-
constrained agents, whose consumption reacts strongly to tax reductions or government 
spending increases and whose share in total households may rise in times of fi nancial turmoil. 
Another explanation relates to the complementarity between public and private goods. 
Short-term costs of discretionary fi scal measures stem, fi rst and foremost, from increasing 
sovereign risk premia: bearing in mind default risk, increasing or perceived-as-unsustainable 
government debt can lead to a risk premium being charged on the interest on government 
debt to compensate for higher default risk crowding out private investment. An additional 
short-run consideration pertains to the link between fi scal policy and uncertainty. Automatic 
stabilizers, to the extent that they operate properly, can lower volatility and uncertainty in the 
economy, without introducing new policy uncertainties. This may not be the case for discre-
tionary fi scal policy. In this respect, random fi scal policies could increase economic uncer-
tainty, and thus damage economic activity. As the impact of different measures might depend 
Conclusions
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on expectations about the future, fi scal stimulus packages announced clearly and credibly are 
likely to be more effective. 
Among the requirements that fi scal measures should be “timely, targeted and temporary” 
(TTT), the implementation of the fi rst one—timeliness— is the least controversial criterion in the 
current situation. As regards the duration of measures, both temporary and more persistent 
measures may be defended depending on the proportion of liquidity-constrained agents in the 
economy, the reaction of long-term interest rates, and the expected duration of the adverse 
shocks hitting the economy. Targeting measures to some specifi c agents may be diffi cult in 
practice, given the uncertainty surrounding fi scal multipliers and the challenge of designing 
well-targeted fi scal stimulus packages. 
The structure of a fi scal stimulus plan should take into account several factors, such as: (i) a 
proper balance between the expected short-term positive effects (mainly demand-side) with 
anticipated costs (mainly longer-term supply side); (ii) the expected size of fi scal multipliers of 
various tools available; (iii) the degree of openness of the economy; (iv) the need to minimise 
distortions in the market mechanisms and, in the case of EU countries, the compliance with 
the EU single market rules. 
On balance, empirical studies fi nd that spending multipliers are higher than tax multipliers in the 
short term. This result could be rationalized as being consistent with the theoretical prediction 
that part of the higher disposable income from a tax cut is saved, while government purchases 
of goods and services affect aggregate demand directly in the longer term. The cumulative ef-
fect of tax measures usually grows with time, but the evidence that tax cuts are more effective 
than spending increases is mixed, especially when tax changes are temporary. Increases in 
government purchases of goods and services are found to work faster than other spending 
components, particularly in times of recession and low capacity utilisation, as they induce an 
immediate positive impact on aggregate demand. However, in the longer term, the distortions 
induced by these measures may result in a negative or, at best, insignifi cant impact. 
In addition to general factors, country specifi c features are also of major importance in assess-
ing the suitability of fi scal packages. While a given fi scal package may be deemed appropriate 
for a country with a low debt ratio and a structural budget surplus, the same package could 
easily lead to rising risk premia on interest rates and other detrimental effects in a country with 
an unfavourable starting fi scal position. The openness of the economy should be considered 
as well. A crucial aspect in this regard is the exit strategy of the adopted fi scal policy line. A 
strategy that preserves long-term fi scal sustainability by embedding expansionary fi scal meas-
ures in a credible medium-term consolidation framework is less likely to invoke adverse expec-
tation effects than a strategy based on permanent and uncompensated defi cit increasing 
measures which violates fi scal rules.
From a European perspective, the neglect of the European fi scal framework could even lead 
to negative spill-over effects on other EU member states if the credibility of the framework is 
damaged by individual member states’ actions. 
3.9.2009.
ADLA, J., and R. COOPER (1997). Balladurette and Juppette: a discrete analysis of scrapping subsidies, NBER Working 
Paper 6048.
AFONSO, A., L. AGNELLO, D. FURCERI and R. M. SOUSA (2009). Assessing long-term fi scal developments, a new 
approach, ECB Working Paper 1032, March.
AFONSO, A., and R. SOUSA (2009). The macroeconomic effects of fi scal policy, ECB Working Paper 991, January.
REFERENCES
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 142 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS FISCAL MEASURES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY
AGARWAL, S., C. LIU and N. SOULELES (2007). The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to Tax Rebates: Evi-
dence from Consumer Credit Data, NBER Working Paper 13694.
ALESINA, A., and R. PEROTTI (1997). Fiscal adjustments in OECD countries: composition and macroeconomic effects, 
IMF Working Paper 96/70. 
ALESINA, A., R. PEROTTI and F. SCHIANTARELLI (2002). “Fiscal policy, profi ts and investment”, American Economic 
Review 92, pp. 571-589.
AL-EYD, A., and R. BARRELL (2005). “Estimating tax and benefi t multipliers in Europe”, Economic Modelling 22, pp. 759-
776.
ANDRÉS, J., R. DOMENECH and A. FATAS (2008). “The stabilizing role of government size”, Journal of Economic Dy-
namics and Control 32, pp. 571-593.
ARDAGNA, S. (2007). “Fiscal policy in unionized labor markets”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, pp. 
1498-1534.
ARNOLD, J. (2008). Do tax structures affect aggregate economic growth? Empirical evidence from a panel of OECD 
countries, OECD Economics department working paper no. 643.
ATTANASIO, O. (1999). “Humps and Bumps in Lifetime Consumption”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 17, 
pp. 22-35.
AUERBACH, A. J., and K. A. HASSETT (2002). “Fiscal policy and uncertainty”, International Finance 5, pp. 229-249.
BARRELL, R., T. FIC and D. HOLLAND (2009). “Evaluating policy reactions to the fi nancial crisis”, National Institute Eco-
nomic Review 207, pp. 39-42.
BARRO, R. (1974). “Are government bonds net wealth?”, Journal of Political Economy 82, pp. 1095-1117.
BAXTER, M., and R. KING (1993). “Fiscal policy and general equilibrium”, American Economic Review 83, pp. 315-334.
BIAU, O., and E. GIRARD (2005). “Politique budgétaire et dynamique économique en France: l’approche VAR structurel”, 
Économie et Prévision 169-171, pp. 1-24.
BLANCHARD, O., and R. PEROTTI (2002). “An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of changes in govern-
ment spending and taxes on output”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, pp. 1329-1368.
BURNSIDE, C., M. EICHENBAUM and J. FISHER (2004). “Fiscal shocks and their consequences”, Journal of Economic 
Theory 115, pp. 89-117. 
CALDARA, D., and C. KAMPS (2008). What are the effects of fi scal policy shocks? A VAR-based comparative analysis, 
ECB Working Paper Series 877.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2008). “Options for Responding to Short-Term Economic Weakness”, Washington.
CHECHERITA, C., C. NICKEL and P. ROTHER (2009). The role of fi scal transfers for regional economic convergence in 
Europe, ECB Working Paper, forthcoming.
CHRISTOFFEL, K., G. COENEN and A. WARNE (2008). The New Area-Wide Model of the Euro Area: a Micro-Founded 
Open-Economy Model for Forecasting and Policy Analysis, ECB Working Paper 944.
COENEN, G., P. MCADAM and R. STRAUB (2007). Tax reform and labour-market performance in the euro area. A simu-
lation-based analysis using the New Area-Wide Model, ECB Working paper 747.
COENEN, G., and R. STRAUB (2005). Does government spending crowd in private consumption? Theory and empirical 
evidence for the euro area, ECB Working Paper 513.
DALSGAARD, T., C. ANDRE and P. RICHARDSON (2001). Standard Shocks in the OECD Interlink Model, OECD Working 
paper 306.
DAVIG, T. (2004). “Regime-switching debt and taxation”, Journal of Monetary Economics 51, pp. 837-859.
DE CASTRO, F., and P. HERNÁNDEZ DE COS (2008). “The economic effects of fi scal policy: the case of Spain”, Journal 
of Macroeconomics 30, pp. 1005-1028.
DIXIT, A., and R. PINDYCK (1994). Investment under uncertainty, Princeton University Press.
EDELBERG, W., M. EICHENBAUM and J. FISCHER (1999). “Understanding the effects of a shock to government pur-
chases”, Review of Economic Dynamics 1, pp. 166-206.
ELMENDORF, D. W., and J. FURMAN (2008). “If, when, how: a primer on fi scal stimulus”, Brookings Institution, Janu-
ary.
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2009). “The effectiveness of various fi scal measures to stimulate the economy”, Box 7 in 
Monthly Bulletin, March.
EUSEPI, S., and B. PRESTON (2008). Stabilizing expectations under monetary and fi scal policy coordination, NBER 
Working Paper 14391.
FAGAN, G., and J. MORGAN (2005). “Econometric Models of the Euro-area Central Banks”, Edward Elgar Publishing – 
Northampton.
FATAS, A., and I. MIHOV (2001). The effects of fi scal policy on consumption and employment: theory and evidence, 
CEPR Discussion Paper 2760.
— (2009). The Euro and Fiscal Policy, NBER Working Paper 14722.
FIORITO, R., and T. KOLLINTZAS (2004). “Public goods, merit goods, and the relation between private and government 
consumption”, European Economic Review 48, pp. 1367-1398.
FREEDMAN, CH., M. KUMHOF, D. LAXTON and J. LEE (2009). The case for global fi scal stimulus, IMF Staff Position 
Note SPN/09/03.
FURCERI, D. (2007). “Is Government Expenditure Volatility Harmful for Growth? A Cross-Country Analysis”, Fiscal Studies 
28, pp. 103-120.
GALI, J., D. LÓPEZ SALIDO, and J. VALLÉS (2007). “Understanding the effects of government spending on consump-
tion”, Journal of the European Economic Association 5(1), pp. 227-270.
GANELLI, G., and J. TERVALA (2009). “Can government spending increase private consumption?”, Economics Letters, 
forthcoming.
GIAVAZZI, F., T. JAPPELI and M. PAGANO (2000). “Searching for non-linear effects of fi scal policy: evidence from indus-
trial and developing countries”, European Economic Review 44, pp. 1259-1289.
GIAVAZZI, F., and M. PAGANO (1990). “Can severe fi scal contractions be expansionary? Tales of two small European 
countries”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 5, pp. 75-110.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 143 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS FISCAL MEASURES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY
GIAVAZZI, F., and M. PAGANO (1996). “Non-Keynesian effects of fi scal policy changes: international evidence and the 
Swedish experience”, Swedish Economic Policy Review 3, pp. 67-103.
GIORDANO, R., S. MOMIGLIANO, S. NERI and R. PEROTTI (2007). “The effects of fi scal policy in Italy: evidence from a 
VAR model”, European Journal of Political Economy 23, pp. 707-733.
HEMMING, R., M. KELL and S. MAHFOUZ (2002). The effectiveness of fi scal policy in stimulating the economic activity 
– A review of the literature, IMF Working Paper WP/02/2008.
HEMMING, R., S. MAHFOUZ and A. SCHIMMELPFENNIG (2002). Fiscal policy and economic activity during recessions 
in advanced economies, IMF Working Paper WP/02/87.
HENRY, J., P. HERNÁNDEZ DE COS and S. MOMIGLIANO (2008). “The impact of government budgets on prices: Evi-
dence from macroeconometric models,” Journal of Policy Modeling 30, pp. 123-143.
HEPPKE-FALK, K. H., J. TENHOFEN and G. B. WOLFF (2006). The macroeconomic effects of exogenous fi scal policy 
shocks in Germany: a disaggregated SVAR analysis, Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies No 41/2006.
HIEBERT, P., J. J. PÉREZ and M. ROSTAGNO (2009). “The trade-off between public debt reduction and automatic sta-
bilisation”, Economic Modeling 26, pp. 464-472.
HOON, T. H., and E. S. PHELPS (2008). “Future fi scal and budgetary shocks”, Journal of Economic Theory 143, pp. 499-518.
HUNT, B., and D. LAXTON (2003). Some Simulation Properties of the Major Euro Area Economies in MULTIMOD, IMF 
Working Papers 03/31.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2008). World Economic Outlook, Chapter 5 “Fiscal policy as a countercyclical tool”, 
October.
JOHANSSON, A., et al. (2008). Tax and economic growth, OECD Economics Department Working Paper number 620.
JOHNSON, D., J. PARKER, and N. SOULELES (2006). “Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001”, 
American Economic Review 96 (5), S. 1589-1610.
KEEN, B. D. (2008). “The signal extraction problem revisited: its impact on a model of monetary policy”, mimeo Univer-
sity of Oklahoma, August.
KUTTNER, K., and A. POSEN (2002). “Passive savers and fi scal policy effectiveness in Japan”, paper presented at the 
CEPR-CIRJE-NBER conference Issues in fi scal adjustments, Tokyo. 
— (2004). “Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in Japan”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 16, pp. 536-
558.
LANE, P., and R. PEROTTI (2003). “The importance of composition of fi scal policy: evidence from different exchange rate 
regimes”, Journal of Public Economics 87, pp. 2253-2279.
LEEPER, E., and S. S. YANG (2008). “Dynamic scoring: alternative fi nancing schemes”, Journal of Public Economics 92, 
pp. 159-182.
LICANDRO, O., and A. SAMPAYO (2005). The Effects of Replacement Schemes on Car Sales: The Spanish Case, EUI 
Working Paper ECO No. 2005/20. 
LINNEMAN, L., and A. SCHABERT (2004). “Can fi scal spending stimulate private consumption?”, Economics Letters 82, 
pp. 173-179.
MARCELLINO, M. (2006). Some Stylized Facts on Non-Systematic Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area, Journal of Macroeco-
nomics 28(3), pp. 461-479.
MONACELLI, T., and R. PEROTTI (2008). Fiscal policy, wealth effects, and mark-ups, NBER Working Paper 14518.
MOUNTFORD, A., and H. UHLIG (2009). “What are the effects of fi scal policy shocks?”, forthcoming Journal of Applied 
Econometrics.
NERI, S. (2001). Assessing the effects of monetary and fi scal policy, Banca d’Italia Discussion Papers No. 425.
OBSTFELD, M., and G. PERI (1998). Regional Non-Adjustment and Fiscal Policy, Economic Policy 13, pp. 207-259.
OECD (2009). “The effectiveness and scope of fi scal stimulus”, Chapter 3 in OECD Economic Outlook Interim Report, 
March.
PARKER, J. (1999). “The response of household consumption to predictable changes in social security taxes”, American 
Economic Review 89, pp. 959-973.
PEROTTI, R. (1999). “Fiscal Policy when things are going badly”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, pp. 1399-1436.
— (2002). Estimating the effects of fi scal policy in OECD countries, ECB Working Paper no. 168.
— (2004). Public Investment: Another (Different) Look, IGIER Working Paper no. 277.
— (2005). “Estimating the effects of fi scal policy in OECD countries”, Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco.
— (2007). In search of the transmission mechanism of fi scal policy, NBER Working Papers 13143.
RAMEY, V. (2008). “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing”, mimeo, University of California, San 
Diego.
RAMEY, V., and M. D. SHAPIRO (1998). “Costly Capital Reallocation and the Effects of Government Spending”, Carne-
gie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 (June), pp. 145-194.
RAVN, M., S. SCHMITT-GROHÉ and M. URIBE (2006). “Deep habits“, Review of Economic Studies 73, pp. 195-218. 
ROEGER, W., and IN’T VELD (2004). “Some selected simulation experiments with the European Commission’s QUEST 
model”, Economic Modelling 21(5), pp. 785-832.
ROMER, C., and J. BERNSTEIN (2009). “The job impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan”.
ROMER, C., and D. ROMER (2007). “The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: estimates based on a new measure of 
fi scal shocks”, mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.
ROMP, W., and J. DEHAAN (2005). Public Capital and Economic Growth: a Critical Survey, EIB Papers 10(1).
SCHCLAREK, A. (2007). “Fiscal policy and private consumption in industrial and developing countries”, Journal of Mac-
roeconomics 29, pp. 912-939.
SHAPIRO, M., and J. SLEMROD (1995). “Consumer response to the timing of income: evidence from a change in tax 
withholding”, American Economic Review pp. 274-283.
— (2001). Consumer response to tax rebates, NBER Working paper 8672.
SOULELES, N. S. (1999). “The response of household consumption to income tax refunds”, American Economic Review 
89, pp. 947-958.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 144 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS FISCAL MEASURES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY
SOULELES, N. S. (2002). “Consumer response to the Reagan tax cuts”, Journal of Public Economics 89, pp. 99-120.
SPILIMBERGO, A., S. SYMANSKY, O. BLANCHARD and C. COTTARELLI (2008). Fiscal Policy for the Crisis, IMF Staff 
Position Note, SPN/08/01.
STRAUB, R., and I. TCHAKAROV (2007). Assessing the Impact of a Change in the Composition of Public Spending: A 
DSGE Approach, IMF Working Paper WT/07/168.
TAGKALAKIS, A. (2008). “The effects of fi scal policy on consumption in recessions and expansions”, Journal of Public 
Economics 92, pp. 1486-1508.
WALLIS, K. F. (2004). “Comparing empirical models of the euro economy”, Economic Modelling 1(5), pp. 735-758.
SURVEY OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ON CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO CREDIT
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 147 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 SURVEY OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ON CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO CREDIT
Survey of non-fi nancial corporations on conditions of access to credit
After a long phase of strong expansion, the rate of growth of bank lending to the private sector 
began to moderate in 2006. Since 2007 H2 this trend has intensifi ed, as a result of the inter-
national fi nancial crisis and its impact on economic activity. The year-on-year rate of growth of 
credit to non-fi nancial corporations stood at slightly less than 5% in March 2009, against 30% 
in December 2006.
There are various factors behind this development, on the supply and the demand side, and de-
termination of these factors would be extremely useful for an accurate diagnosis of the situation 
of the credit markets. Unfortunately, there are only a limited number of tools that enable a distinc-
tion to be drawn between the supply and the demand side. In this respect, the Bank Lending 
Survey (BLS), conducted quarterly in Spain in coordination with the other euro area Member 
States,1 is a highly valuable tool, as it provides a qualitative approximation of credit institutions’ 
opinions on credit developments, both for households and fi rms. On the demand side, a number 
of regular surveys include questions on the extent to which the fi nancial situation represents a 
barrier to corporate growth (for example, those conducted by the Chambers of Commerce and 
the Ministry of Industry). However, in these surveys, the “fi nancial situation” generally includes not 
only the ease with which external fi nancing may be obtained, but also other matters such as the 
internal liquidity position, making it impossible to isolate the factors that are directly related to ac-
cess to credit. Recently, the Chambers of Commerce began to conduct a regular survey (num-
bering six to date) which, although directed exclusively at SMEs, includes a wide range of ques-
tions that permit analysis of various aspects relating to access to bank credit.2
In this setting, the Banco de España has commissioned a survey of a representative sample of 
non-fi nancial corporations, to obtain signifi cant qualitative data on conditions of access to 
credit. The fi eldwork was conducted between 18 March and 3 April and the fi nal selection 
comprises 1,384 fi rms, broken down by size and sector as shown in Table 1.3 The survey in-
cluded questions on the situation in the last six months and on the outlook for the next six 
months. The survey’s main added value, relative to the BLS, is that it provides the view from 
the demand side. In comparison with the Chambers of Commerce survey on access to credit, 
which is also directed at fi rms but only SMEs, it has the advantage of a broader scope, and it 
also permits analysis of how the replies differ according to a wider range of characteristics. 
Thus, in addition to size and sector of activity, it includes variables relating to fi nancial position 
(profi t performance and level of indebtedness).
The following section analyses the extent to which the sample fi rms had to resort to credit lines 
and other bank lending, broken down by fi rm type and fi nancial position. The next section 
presents the results of the credit applications made, and the following section, the implications 
for the fi rms and the outlook for conditions of access to new lending. This is followed by a 
series of conclusions. The full text of the survey questions, together with the aggregate replies, 
is presented at Annex 1.
Introduction
1. For detailed comments on the results of the latest Bank Lending Survey in Spain, relating to July, see Boletín Económi-
co, July-August, Banco de España. For a description of the BLS, see J. Martínez and L. A. Maza (2003), “Resultados de 
la Encuesta sobre Préstamos Bancarios en España”, Boletín Económico, May, Banco de España. 2. Results available 
at: https://www.camaras.org/publicado/estudios/publicaciones_SE.jsp. 3. The sectoral breakdown was made consid-
ering the weight of each sector in the total GVA of the economy, excluding the Education and the Healthcare, veterinary 
care and social services sectors in which most activity is linked to general government. As there are no data on GVA 
breakdown by fi rm size, the fi rms were distributed, within each sector, on the basis of the relative weight of each of the 
fi ve size groups in total sector employment (source: DIRCE). 
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As Chart 1 shows, 62% of the fi rms surveyed indicated that they had needed bank lending 
(whether credit renewals or new lending) in the past six months. This fi gure includes not only 
fi rms that actually submitted a credit application, but also fi rms that did not do so, despite 
needing credit, because they did not expect it to be granted. Accordingly, a high percentage 
of the respondents (38%) signalled that they had had no need of bank lending in the previous 
six months. The largest fi rms, and especially those with higher debt levels (measured in terms 
of debt-to-equity), were those that had had most need of bank credit. The economic position 
of the fi rms surveyed also helps explain the reply to this question, as although there are no 
signifi cant differences between the fi rms that reported a loss (or virtually zero profi t) in 2008 
and the remainder, the proportion of respondents that needed external fi nancing was higher 
among fi rms that reported a drop in profi ts in comparison with the previous year, than among 
those that reported higher or virtually fl at profi t. Lastly, by sector, real estate and construction 
companies had most need of bank credit, irrespective of size and fi nancial position.
In addition to approaching banks for new lending or credit renewals, fi rms may also raise their 
borrowings by making more use of the balance available on credit lines already open with fi -
nancial institutions, an area that was also covered by the survey. Thus, the results show that, 
during the previous six months, 62% of the respondents had access to fi nancing via credit 
lines; this percentage increased as company size increased; it was also higher among con-
struction fi rms (73%). Of the fi rms with access to this type of fi nancing, 43% (i.e. 27% of the 
total sample) signalled that they had made more use than normal of the credit lines available in 
the previous six months, indicating a variety of reasons for this. Thus, 14% of all the respond-
ents made more use of credit lines due to higher borrowing requirements (see Chart 1). In this 
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case, there is no clear link between this percentage and company size, but the fi gure is higher 
among fi rms with most debt, among those that reported greatest earnings deterioration in 
2008 and among construction and real estate services sector fi rms.
In turn, 13% of the respondents made more use than normal of the credit lines available as a re-
sult of diffi culties in obtaining funding from other sources or of the higher cost of this alternative 
funding (see Chart 2). The percentage of fi rms signalling these reasons was higher in the real 
estate sector, understood in the broadest sense of the term, and among fi rms reporting a loss.4
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4. Greater use of credit lines by fi rms, for whatever reason, follows a cyclical path, as is evident from the fact that there 
is now less and less undrawn credit on bank balance sheets (see Box 6 in “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, 
Economic Bulletin, January 2009). 
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These diffi culties in obtaining funding also explain why not all corporations that needed funds 
turned to banks. Thus, as Chart 2 also shows, around 4% of the sample fi rms did not apply 
for funding because they did not expect to receive any. Once again, the fi gure is higher in the 
real estate and construction sector and among fi rms reporting a loss; it is also higher in fi rms 
with fewer than 50 employees and in those with most debt.
Approximately half the fi rms that applied for bank credit in the previous six months declared 
that they had received all the funds requested from the usual credit institutions (see Chart 3). 
Around 30% obtained only part of the funding requested, or had to apply to other credit insti-
tutions to obtain it in full, while the remainder (slightly less than 20%) declared that they were 
unable to obtain funding, either because their requests were refused or because the credit 
terms offered were too onerous for them.
As to be expected, these fi gures are more negative (i.e. there is a higher proportion of rejected 
applications and of fi rms that failed to obtain all the funding desired) among those companies 
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whose earnings fell in 2008, relative to a year earlier, and among those whose fi nancial position 
had become more compromised (lower profi t and/or higher debt levels) at year-end. 
In any case, even controlling for their fi nancial position, the proportion of fi rms that were unable 
to obtain the funding requested was, in general, higher among smaller fi rms and construction 
and real estate services sector fi rms (see bottom panel of Chart 3). In the case of the smaller 
fi rms, this is a structural characteristic, seen in various studies and linked to the lower level of 
collateral that is normally available to these fi rms. However, although it is impossible to be 
certain due to the lack of an appropriate time comparison, the possibility that there may also 
be a conjunctural component in this higher degree of contraction in credit supply to SMEs, 
connected with the present fi nancial tension, should not be ruled out. This would be consistent 
with the evidence supplied by the BLS and with the lower rate of growth, in recent months, in 
smaller loans in comparison with loans of more than €1 million.5
The difference between construction and real estate sector fi rms and the rest of the sample 
may be explained by the fact that credit institutions view the future prospects of these two 
branches of activity less positively. Thus, respondents to the BLS indicate that specifi c com-
pany or sector risks are an important factor behind the contraction in credit supply to non- 
 fi nancial corporations. Accordingly, comparing fi rms in a similar fi nancial position, credit institu-
tions would tend to be more cautious about granting funds to those connected, in some way, 
to the real estate sector. The results of the questionnaire (see Chart 3) show that, even consid-
ering only fi rms reporting profi t and with a debt-to-equity ratio below 20%, the percentage of 
credit rejections is 2.4 times higher (26% against 11%) among construction and real estate 
sector fi rms. However, this difference disappears when comparing the sample fi rms whose 
fi nancial position is more compromised (35% in both cases).
Most fi rms that were unable to obtain all the funding requested from their usual credit institu-
tions (65%) indicated that the main reason for this was a change in criteria by the banks (see 
Chart 4). However, a signifi cant percentage declared that the funding diffi culties were con-
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION HIGHER RISK AT FIRM CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF CREDIT
INSTITUTIONS
 ALL SAMPLE  < 50 EMPLOYEES  50 TO 200 EMPLOYEES
 200 OR MORE EMPLOYEES  CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE  OTHER SECTORS
 ZERO PROFIT OR LOSS  HIGH INDEBTEDNESS
%
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS THAT FAILED TO OBTAIN ALL THE FUNDING REQUESTED FROM THEIR 
USUAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
MAIN REASON FOR NOT OBTAINING ALL FUNDING CHART 4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
5. According to Eurosystem harmonised interest rate and new customer loan statistics. It seems reasonable to assume 
that the bulk of loans to SMEs will be for less than €1 million.
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nected with the general economic situation (22%) and with greater corporate risk (9%). In 
general, no key differences were detected in the replies to this question according to fi rm size 
or sector, although real estate and construction fi rms with more than 200 employees were 
those that most cited a change in institutions’ credit standards as the reason for this (85%). 
Lastly, among fi rms with higher debt and lower profi t levels, there was a greater tendency to 
attribute funding diffi culties to their higher risk.
Most fi rms that failed to obtain all the funding requested from their usual credit institutions 
declared that, as a result, they had had to take alternative steps (with more than one alterna-
tive step possible by fi rm). The most common measure adopted was to cut projected invest-
ment: thus, around half the sample fi rms in this position (see Chart 5), equivalent to some 15% 
of the total sample, did just that, while 40% resorted to alternative sources of fi nancing or avail-
able credit lines, 21% resorted to raising new funds from shareholders and 13% made asset 
disposals.
The more diffi cult a fi rm’s fi nancial position, the lower the degree of recourse to alternative 
sources of fi nancing and the higher the degree of recourse to contributions from shareholders, 
asset disposals and investment cuts. By way of example, 64% of corporations that reported a 
loss in 2008 and that were unable to obtain all the funding requested from their usual credit 
institutions made investment cuts; this fi gure is signifi cantly above the average, refl ecting the 
fact that these corporations have fewer internal funds with which to offset the lack of external 
fi nancing. This fi gure was also higher among smaller fi rms and construction and real estate 
fi rms, irrespective of their fi nancial position. Asset disposals were most common among real 
estate services fi rms (31%), irrespective of whether they reported a profi t (21%) or not (38%) in 
2008.
The survey also included questions on fi rms’ expectations regarding access to credit as at the 
date of the survey and over the next six months. Slightly less than half the sample fi rms indi-
cated that they would not expect to have any diffi culty in obtaining funding were they to need 
it as at the date of the survey, while 10% declared that it would be impossible to obtain funding 
(see Chart 6). The remainder expected that they would only be able to obtain funding on very 
onerous terms, that it would only be short-term funding and/or secured credit, or that it would 
only be possible via renewal of existing credit lines. Once again, smaller fi rms, real estate and 
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construction fi rms and those whose fi nancial position was more compromised expected to 
encounter the most diffi culties.
Lastly, as Chart 7 shows, 37% of fi rms expected their access to credit to worsen over the next 
six months, while just 13% expected it to improve. The difference between these two views 
was slightly smaller among corporations with more than 200 employees and in branches of 
activity not connected with the real estate sector. By contrast, the percentage of fi rms expect-
ing their access to credit to improve was higher among fi rms reporting a loss or zero profi t 
(18%) and among fi rms with higher debt levels (15%), probably because they were already 
encountering greater diffi culties in this respect.
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In short, the results of the survey commissioned by the Banco de España show that fi rms 
whose fi nancial position is more compromised, smaller fi rms and real estate and construction 
fi rms are encountering the most diffi culties in accessing credit. As the questionnaire refl ects 
recent credit standards, rather than how these standards have changed, it does not permit 
analysis of the extent to which these differences stem from structural or conjunctural factors. 
As regards the differences according to fi rm size, it seems reasonable to assume that these 
are, in part, due to structural factors, in line with the pattern identifi ed in numerous empirical 
studies. In any case, the evidence provided by fi nancial institutions through the BLS seems to 
suggest that an important part are also due to the current fi nancial tension. The greater diffi cul-
ties in accessing bank lending encountered by construction and real estate fi rms exceed those 
that may be warranted by their more compromised present fi nancial position, meaning that 
they must be connected with a less positive view, on the part of credit institutions, of the future 
outlook for these branches of activity. A high proportion of fi rms that have faced diffi culties in 
accessing credit have had to cut their spending plans; however, considering that a signifi cant 
proportion of fi rms had no need to turn to the credit market for funding in the previous six 
months, this fi gure is lower as a percentage of the total sample.
13.5.2009.
Q.1 Did your fi rm report a net profi t or loss in 2008? (If the 2008 accounts have not yet been 
closed, please indicate whether you expect to report a net profi t or loss at end-2008.)
— Profi t 902
— Virtually zero profi t 147
— Loss  318
— Don’t know/No answer 17
Q.2 In comparison with the previous year, did your fi rm’s profi ts improve, remain virtually 
unchanged or worsen in 2008?
— Improve  329
— Remain virtually unchanged  325
— Worsen  719
— Don’t know/No answer 11
Q.3 What was the ratio of interest-bearing debt to equity at your fi rm at end-2008? Please 
include the interest-bearing debt owed to group companies, if any.
— Up to 20% 519
— Over 20% and up to 50% 390
— Over 50% and up to 100% 135
— Over 100% and up to 200% 48
— Over 200% and up to 400%    21
— Over 400%    14
— No debt  141
— Don’t know/No answer 116
Conclusions
ANNEX 1
Survey of Spanish non-
fi nancial corporations on 
conditions of access to 
credit
(18.3.2009-3.4.2009)
SECTION 1: FIRM’S ECONOMIC 
POSITION
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Q.4 Do you have a credit line available with a credit institution, or have you had one available 
in the last six months?
— Yes  862
— No          → Go to Q.7   519
— Don’t know/No answer 3
Only if the answer to Q.4 was “Yes”:
Q.5 In the last six months, did your fi rm make more than usual use of your credit line(s)? 
— Yes  373
— No          → Go to Q.7  492
— Don’t know/No answer     5
Only if the answer to Q.5 was “Yes”:
Q.6 What was the main reason for your fi rm making more than usual use of your credit 
line(s)?
— Impossible to obtain funding through other channels  140
— Lower funding cost than through alternative channels     45
— Past-dues    64
— Growth/Investment     27
— Lower sales/Adverse situation     37
— Need for cash    39
— Other    23
— Don’t know/No answer      0
Q.7.a Over the last six months, did you renew any existing funding that matured?
— Yes 576
— No, it wasn’t necessary  678
— No, it wasn’t possible  124
— Don’t know/No answer 6
Q.7.b Over the last six months, did you apply to a credit institution for any new funding?
— Yes 563
— No, we didn’t need any 723
— No, we weren’t able to or we didn’t expect to obtain any  91
— Don’t know/No answer 7
Only if the answer to Q.7.a or Q.7.b was “Yes”:
SECTION 2: RELATIONS WITH 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
2.1 Credit lines available
2.2 New lending
To all
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Q.8 What was the result of applications made for new lending or credit renewals over the last 
six months?
— Impossible with any credit institution at any cost  107
— Impossible with any credit institution on terms that were not too
onerous for the fi rm    41
— Obtained in part, i.e. not in the full amount or for a shorter term than
requested, but not from the usual credit institutions    33
— Obtained in part, i.e. not in the full amount or for a shorter term than
requested, from the usual credit institutions  139
— Obtained in full, but not from the usual credit institutions    55
— Obtained in full from the usual credit institutions   → Go to Q.11  384
— Don’t know/No answer 37
Q.9 What do you think was the main reason for your not obtaining all the funding from your 
usual credit institution(s)?
— General economic situation    84
— Firm’s higher economic risk   33
— Change in credit institutions’ attitude 255
— Less competition between credit institutions 1
— Other    20
— Don’t know/No answer   25
Q.10 What kind of unexpected measures have you had to take as a result of your not obtain-
ing all the funding from your usual credit institution(s)? (Where appropriate, please mark sev-
eral options.)
— Greater recourse to undrawn balances in existing credit lines 43
— Recourse to other sources of borrowing (eg. trade credit,
intercompany loans) 110
— Recourse to funds from shareholders 78
— Asset disposals 48
— Cuts in projected investment 207
— Other     69
— None     54
— Don’t know/No answer       9
Q.11 If you were to need new funding now, or if you had to renew existing funding that had 
matured, which of the following statements would be most appropriate to your fi rm’s posi-
tion?
— It would be totally impossible  136
— It would only be possible on highly onerous terms for the fi rm  205
— It would only be possible in the short term and/or via secured lending  185
— It would be impossible to obtain new funding, but it would be possible
to renew existing funding upon maturity 149
— No diffi culties in obtaining funding are envisaged, although the terms 
could be less favourable than in previous years 670
— Don’t know/No answer   39
To all
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D.1 Sector of activity
A.1 Agriculture, hunting and forestry   44
A.2 Fishing  6
A.3 Mining and quarrying  7
A.4
A.4.1 Food, beverages and tobacco industries   43
A.4.2 Oil refi ning   12
A.4.3 Chemical industry   30 
A.4.4 Glass, ceramics and building materials   24
A.4.5 Metallurgy and manufacture of metal products;
manufacture of machinery and equipment; electrical,
electronic and optical materials and equipment  101
A.4.6 Manufacture of transport equipment    32
A.4.7 Other manufacturing industries    86
A.5 Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water    34
A.6 Construction  211
A.7 Wholesale and retail trade and repair services  190
A.8 Hotels and restaurants  135
A.9 Transport, storage and communication  117
A.11
A.11.1 Real estate activities  118
A.11.2 Other business services  127
A.12 Other services    67
D.2 Size of fi rm
— Fewer than 10 workers  275
— Between 10 and 49 workers  461
— Between 50 and 199 workers  214
— Between 200 and 499 workers  153
— 500 or more workers  281
Classifi cation data
THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS, POLICY RESPONSES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
PUBLIC FINANCES. A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 161 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 CRISIS, POLICY RESPONSES AND PUBLIC FINANCES
The economic and fi nancial crisis, policy responses and their impact on public 
fi nances. A global perspective.
The authors of this article are Enrique Alberola and Fernando Gutiérrez del Arroyo, of the Associate Directorate General 
International Affairs.1
The worsening of the economic and fi nancial situation since summer 2007 and, especially, its 
drastic intensifi cation from September last year are having far-reaching consequences on the 
public fi nances of the main developed economies and, to a lesser degree, on those of devel-
oping countries.
The deterioration of public fi nances refl ects the strong economic policy response through fi s-
cal stimulus plans and measures to support the fi nancial system, though it also increasingly 
mirrors the severe decline in economic and fi nancial activity. The economic policy response 
has involved not only the tax authorities but also central banks and other public entities – such 
as deposit guarantee funds and public and semi-public fi nancial institutions. Chart 1 provides 
a simplifi ed representation of the quickening and growing involvement of US authorities by 
quantifying the support provided by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to the fi nancial sys-
tem as well as the fi scal stimulus measures. Between summer 2007 and March 2008, the ef-
fects of the fi nancial turmoil on activity were still relatively moderate and their scope was lim-
ited to the United States and a growing number of developed economies. In that period, 
fi nancial support was based, essentially, on increasing the liquidity provided by central banks 
and on occasional bail-outs of specifi c entities. Furthermore, an initial fi scal stimulus package 
was implemented in the United States in February 2008. From March 2008 (with the Bear 
Stearns bail-out), the deepening of the fi nancial problems led to a stepping-up of support 
which remained centred on providing liquidity. In mid-September, however, there was a quan-
titative and qualitative leap in the economic policy response in all advanced economies and, to 
a lesser extent and slightly later, in emerging economies. On the one hand, the spectrum of 
fi nancial support measures was extended signifi cantly (to include, in addition to practically 
unlimited liquidity, direct fi nancing of fi nancial institutions and other sectors, capital injections, 
asset purchases and guarantees for bank assets and liabilities); and on the other, fi scal stimu-
lus plans were introduced in an increasing number of countries. The amounts committed in the 
fi nancial and economic sphere have multiplied since last summer. For example, in the United 
States – excluding guarantees – they have increased sixfold and already account for half of its 
gross domestic product (see Chart 1).
All these measures are resulting in a sharp increase in government defi cits and in public debt 
ratios and a strong deterioration in the long-term fi scal outlook. However, it is diffi cult a priori 
to assess the fi scal cost of the crisis. First, a substantial amount of committed government fi -
nancial support has not yet been used or does not represent an actual upfront outlay (as in the 
case of guarantees) or, even if it does, it may be partially recovered a posteriori (as in the case 
of asset purchases or lending). Second, a large share of government support, undertaken by 
central banks or other fi nancially independent bodies, falls, in principle, outside the scope of 
the budget; however, a portion of these amounts could ultimately have a potentially large 
budgetary impact. Third, the crisis is still ongoing, which makes it diffi cult not only to evaluate 
its fi scal impact but even to make an up-to-date calculation of the amounts invested.
Introduction
1. This article has benefi ted from the collaboration of other members of the Directorates General International Affairs, 
Economics, Statistics and Research, and Operations, and, in particular, of Lucía Cuadro and Ana del Río, in order to 
make the data from various sources uniform and consistent.
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In this context, the purpose of this article is to assess from a quantitative, qualitative and com-
parative standpoint the channels through which the fi nancial and economic crisis and the 
economic policy response to it are affecting public fi nances, adopting a global and, insofar as 
is possible, homogenous perspective, covering both advanced and emerging economies. To 
this end, it is necessary to establish a framework of analysis which makes it possible to dif-
ferentiate, on the one hand, between the impact related to the fi nancial crisis and that linked 
to the economic recession; and, on the other, between the direct impact of the crisis con-
nected with the adjustment of economic and fi nancial activity, and that arising from economic 
policy measures. In this framework, fi rst, the fi nancial sector support measures adopted by 
various economic authorities will be analysed in some detail, drawing a distinction between the 
various consequences that they may have on public fi nances at different time horizons. Sec-
ond, the fi scal stimulus plans and the direct impact of the crisis on government revenue and 
expenditure, fi scal balances and government debt will be studied. Similarly, the medium-term 
impact on public fi nances and, especially, on the expected debt dynamic is examined. From 
the whole analysis, it is concluded that public fi nances will be in a delicate situation over the 
next few years. This deterioration poses notable challenges for economic authorities, includ-
ing, inter alia, those of taking steps so that the fragile situation in itself does not limit the ef-
fectiveness of the measures adopted and reaffi rming the long-term commitment to fi scal dis-
cipline.
Two different strands underpin the conceptual framework for analysing the effect of the crisis 
on public fi nances. The fi rst refers to scope, either fi nancial or more strictly economic; the 
second makes it possible to distinguish between the direct impact, arising from developments 
in economic and fi nancial activity, and the indirect impact, resulting from the reaction of eco-
nomic policies, i.e. the discretionary support measures for the fi nancial system and the fi scal 
stimulus plans. The implications for public fi nances differ depending on the authority imple-
menting the measures: ministries of economic affairs and fi nance, central banks or other pub-
lic or semi-public entities such as deposit guarantee funds or public fi nancial institutions.
On the basis of these two strands, Table 1 summarises the various channels and their potential 
effect on the defi cit and public debt, differentiating in the case of the latter between the short-
term impact and the potential medium- and long-term impact. The direct impact of the real 
Framework of the analysis
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a. Excluding pre-crisis liquidity facilities, guarantees and swap lines.
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contraction accompanying the crisis – the fi rst row of the table – represents the loss of revenue 
– direct and indirect tax receipts – and increased expenditure through automatic stabilisers. 
Another direct and negative effect on public fi nances stems from the sharp adjustment of the 
fi nancial sector – included in the last row of Table 1 – which may represent a sizeable reduction 
of tax revenue and, therefore, an increase in the defi cit and debt. It is estimated that this loss 
would mainly be triggered by the decrease in fi nancial institutions’ profi ts and dividends, and 
lower receipts arising from adjustments in the value of fi nancial and real estate assets (fi nancial 
losses).
As for the impact of economic policy measures, a distinction should be drawn between fi scal 
measures to support demand or productive activity – the second block in the table – and the 
fi nancial sector support measures, the following block. There are certain measures which fall 
within a grey area (in particular, fi nancing for productive sectors), which in many cases are 
channelled through the fi nancial system and, although they often tend to be announced as 
part of fi scal stimulus packages, should be considered as fi nancial support measures.
The purely fi scal measures are confi ned to those affecting government spending and revenue, 
such as investment, tax cuts and fi scal incentives for households and fi rms. All these meas-
ures entail, in principle, a reduction in the fi scal balance resulting in higher debt in the short 
term. The fi nancial support measures are more varied and increasingly diverse as new support 
strategies are created. In this article they have been grouped into four categories, based on 
their immediate or actual impact on public fi nances which, in turn, depends on the institution 
implementing the measure. Table 2 links the type of measure to the institution which imple-
ments it:
1) Capital injections for banks and other fi nancial institutions through preference, 
ordinary or other shares, such as subordinated debt, undertaken in general by 
the Treasury. These are included in individual bail-outs and general plans.
CURRENT FUTURE (b)
FINANCIAL
SPHERE
Capital injections
Asset purchases and 
financing by Treasury
Central bank financial support
— Of which: with
Treasury backing
seetnarauG
Financial
crisis
Profits, dividends and revenue
ECONOMIC
SPHERE
DEBTBUDGET
DEFICIT
Financial
support
Fiscal stimulus packages
Automatic stabilisers
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS (a) TABLE 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. = Unfavourable impact; + = Actual or possible favourable impact; ? = Depends on 
implementation and accounting criteria.
b. Indicates a future contingent (new or additional) impact on debt. A plus sign indicates a (partial or
total) reversion of the future impact with respect to the immediate one.
?/+ +
?/+ +
? +
+
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2) Asset purchases and fi nancing by the Treasury. Asset purchases cover bonds 
and other fi nancial instruments – which are illiquid and, in certain cases, troubled 
– and include transactions with a repurchase option. Treasury fi nancing is tar-
geted at the fi nancial sector and other ailing productive sectors (automobiles, 
housing, exports, etc.).
3) Central bank fi nancial support. This category includes, fi rst, the provision of 
liquidity (including the facilities or windows created or extended after the tur-
moil began). As more and more measures were rolled out and the maturities 
of the operations and the collateral were extended, the boundary between the 
provision of liquidity and fi nancing – which in current circumstances is some-
what arbitrary – has become blurred, especially insofar as certain central 
banks have acted with the explicit objective of restoring the fl ow of credit on 
various markets. Similarly, a growing number of central banks have embarked 
on operations to purchase assets and on providing guarantees. In certain 
countries, a portion of these measures was backed with Treasury fi nancing – 
which we shall consider as a sub-category – although the recent trend is to-
wards central banks and other agencies increasingly taking responsibility for 
implementing fi nancial measures, to the detriment of the Treasuries, due large-
ly to the fact that the fi nancial position of the latter is increasingly compro-
mised.
4) Guarantees which back fi nancial institutions’ liabilities and, more recently, their 
assets. The liabilities guaranteed mainly comprise new debt, in order to make it 
easier to issue and to cut its cost in a period in which it is diffi cult to tap the mar-
kets. Although guarantees for bank deposits are widespread, they have not been 
included because it is diffi cult to calculate and compare them across countries.2 
Guaranteeing assets is a trend which began in 2009 and affects the troubled as-
sets of ailing entities. In fact, it is worth underlining the interplay between the 
guarantee system and other types of support, such as asset purchases or capital 
injections.
The fi nancial impact of these measures is included in the third block of Table 1. In general, they 
do not necessarily have an immediate impact on fi scal balances, although a broad range of 
situations may arise, and there are exceptions depending on each country’s accounting crite-
Capital
injections
Asset
purchases
Financing Liquidity Guarantees
X)a(XXXyrusaerT
XX)a(XXknablartneC
XXXsnoitutitsnicilbuprehtO
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Treasury financing for central bank measures is attributed to the latter but is broken down separately 
in Chart 2.
INSTITUTIONS PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MEASURES IMPLEMENTED TABLE 2
2. In the European Union guarantees are provided for deposits of up to €100,000, but in certain countries this fi gure is 
higher and in others there is no limit.
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ria.3 Capital injections and debt guarantees can even generate revenue in the short term – as 
shown by the plus sign – arising from the dividends committed, in the case of the capital injec-
tions or the fees required to gain access to the guarantees. Capital injections, asset purchases 
and Treasury fi nancing involve upfront loading as the funds committed are used and, therefore, 
result in an increase in government debt in the short term. Lastly, central bank fi nancial support 
and guarantees do not involve a parallel increase in government debt, although there are ex-
ceptions such as the provisions for guarantees set up in some countries or the above-men-
tioned Treasury backing of central banks.
Short-term effects on debt may differ from the long-term effects. In the case of asset pur-
chases and capital injections, the outcome will depend on how the value of the asset and of 
the capital performs (in addition to the cumulative fl ow of returns). In particular, it cannot be 
ruled out that part of the outlay may be recovered (as indicated by the plus sign in the last 
column of Table 2) once the fi nancial stress has been overcome, partly reversing the previous 
increase in debt, so that the outcome (when the positions are unwound) is less negative for 
public fi nances than its initial impact. The opposite might also occur, posing an additional 
burden. In the case of guarantees, the cost would only be incurred if the guarantees had to be 
called. As for central bank support measures and Treasury fi nancing, these institutions would 
incur a fi nancial loss if the lending were not repaid or, in the case of facilities with collateral, if 
the value of the collateral were lower than the amount of the loan.
In short, in the case of fi nancial support measures there are three important aspects for as-
sessing their impact on public fi nances: the initial outlay, the proportion recovered ex post and 
the possible contingent losses of other types of measures which do not involve an initial out-
lay.
Using this framework it is possible to describe the fi scal and fi nancial support measures, ex-
amine how they are recorded and make cross-country and cross-regional comparisons. This 
exercise is subject to numerous caveats, since it is diffi cult to address and compare on a con-
sistent basis the broad spectrum of measures with varying characteristics and particular fea-
tures inherent to each country. There are three important considerations when assessing this 
exercise:
i) Certain important measures to stabilise the system, such as the above-men-
tioned deposit guarantees, are not included in the calculation. Nor does it con-
sider monetary and exchange rate policy measures (interest rate reductions, the 
use of reserves or recent purchases of government assets by certain central 
banks),4 which, to a certain extent, have also served to bolster the fi nancial sec-
tor, nor other types of measures which have been important for maintaining inter-
national fi nancing fl ows, such as currency swaps and the external support pack-
ages of multilateral and regional fi nancial bodies.
ii) The fi gures presented are obtained by adding together measures of a very varied 
nature and with different fi scal implications, as described above. Therefore, their 
extrapolation to fi scal aggregates and the cross-country comparison must be 
undertaken with the utmost caution.
3. In the United States and the United Kingdom a large amount of the fi nancial support is included in the defi cit. 4. Pub-
lic asset purchases have been announced as part of some countries’ fi nancial support plans. However, insofar are they 
are aimed at affecting long-term interest rates, they fi t better in the monetary policy sphere. Also, in terms of accounting, 
their consolidated net effect on the public sector is nil. For these reasons, unlike the IMF’s analysis, they are excluded 
from our calculations unless otherwise indicated.
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iii) The amount committed is adopted as the criterion for recording the measures, 
which generally represents an intermediate point between the actual outlay 
and that announced. This generates certain diffi culties, due to the lack of pre-
cise data or the reformulation of certain measures (as occurred with TARP, the 
fi rst US fi nancial programme), the classifi cation diffi culties in other cases (the 
above-mentioned distinction between liquidity and fi nancing) and, in general, 
comparability problems arising from the different strategies for responding to 
the crisis.
The time span of the analysis is from the beginning of 2008 (which includes practically all the 
measures adopted) until April 2009. The main reference document is the recent IMF paper 
(2009), which is supplemented by contributions from the OECD (2009), the ECLAC (2009) and 
the European Commission (2009). The aim is to achieve the greatest possible consistency 
across countries and regions, based on up-to-date information. The sample covers the princi-
pal developed and emerging economies in the G20+ (which includes Spain), which represent 
approximately 75% of world GDP. The G20+ group of advanced economies will be considered 
and, unless stated otherwise, the four main emerging economies (the BRICs: Brazil, Russia, 
India and China), to represent the emerging countries. For each country the fi gures are in rela-
tion to the GDP in 2008 and, if successive years are analysed, to the GDP of each year; the 
data updating limit is mid-May.
The upper panel of Chart 2 refl ects the amount committed in the fi nancial system support 
measures, according to the categorisation described in the previous section, for the principal 
countries and areas analysed. The funds committed amount, in aggregate, to almost one-third 
of their GDP (a fi gure equivalent to the GDP of the United States in the G20). The largest por-
tions relate to guarantees for bank assets and liabilities (46% of the total, 15% of the GDP of 
the G20+) and to central bank fi nancial support (two-fi fths of the total, i.e. 13% of GDP), a 
small part of which is fi nanced in turn by the Treasury. Accounting for a smaller fraction are 
asset purchases and direct Treasury fi nancing, on the one hand, and capital injections, on the 
other: 7.4% and 6.9% of the total, equivalent to 2.5% and 2.3% of the GDP of the G20+, re-
spectively.
Although all the countries analysed have adopted measures of some type, there are pro-
nounced differences between regions and countries. The most striking difference is that ob-
served between the developed and the emerging economies. Thus, committed fi nancial sup-
port amounts to 50% of GDP in the advanced economies, where guarantees play a relatively 
larger role, but it only represents around 5% of GDP in the BRICs, where central bank support 
is dominant.
There are important differences in the scale of fi nancial support in the advanced economies. 
The United States and the United Kingdom stand out from the rest because of the amount 
committed – 83% and 82% of their respective GDP – and because they are the countries 
which have taken the initiative and set the pace in this sphere.
In the United States approximately half of the amount of the measures adopted relates to the 
fi nancial backing of the Federal Reserve, which has acted on numerous and diverse fronts (see 
the bottom panel of Chart 2). Only a small portion of the Fed’s support (slightly more than 14%) 
stems from its more traditional activity (providing liquidity) since it is considered that the facilities 
which have been set up since last September constitute credit facilities. These facilities, in ex-
change for collateral, in particular, have been designed to prop up various segments: the com-
mercial paper market (CPFF), the money markets (MMIFF) and other securitisation markets 
Financial support 
measures
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paralysed by the crisis, through the term asset-backed securities loan facility (TALF).5 The 
credit facilities made available amount to 24% of GDP and represent more than half of the 
Fed’s total support. The Federal Reserve has also embarked on purchases of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) to prop up this market, for a maximum amount of nearly 10% of GDP, 
and has furnished guarantees for some banks’ assets, amounting to 2.1% of GDP. Lastly, there 
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5. Only liquidity facilities arranged between summer 2007 and September 2008 are included. In order to distinguish be-
tween liquidity and fi nancing the timing criterion is used, because since October the authorities’ explicit concern was to 
restore the funding of troubled markets and this was the context in which new facilities were designed. Thus, the CPFF 
was aimed at unclogging the commercial paper market, which is essential for short-term lending in the United States, 
and the MMIFF was set up to overcome problems on the money markets stemming from very low interest rates. The 
TALF is more general and, although it has not been used much to date, is an important element in the strategy of market 
normalisation. The amount of these funding facilities is very high: $1,800 bn (CPFF), $900 bn (TALF) and $540 bn 
(MMIFF), which is nearly 20% of US GDP. However, until the beginning of May, only a small portion had been used: 
$245 bn. The Fed has also provided funding to support and bail out specifi c entities, such as the investment bank Bear 
Stearns ($23 bn) and the insurance company AIG ($90 bn). 
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are two measures adopted by the Federal Reserve which, as mentioned above, are not in-
cluded in our calculation: the purchase of Treasury bonds ($300 bn committed, 2.1% of GDP) 
and currency swap lines with a number of countries, $250 bn of which had been utilised.
The remaining US fi nancial support is made up of action by the Treasury and guarantees. Di-
rect action by the Treasury has centred on injecting capital into numerous banks through the 
TARP (approved amount: $700 bn), into the insurance company AIG and into the government-
sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which account for half of the capital in-
jections. The plan to purchase troubled assets also includes a contribution of up to $100 bn of 
public capital. Overall, the total amount committed for capital injections is more than $800 bn 
(5.6% of GDP). Asset purchases by the Treasury, which constituted the initial strategy for ac-
tion after September (the TARP was going to be used for this purpose), have so far been re-
stricted to the acquisition of MBS ($50 bn, less than half a percentage point of GDP). Lastly, 
the funding provided has also been marginal ($30 bn for automobile companies), although, it 
is necessary to consider, as mentioned above, the support fi nancing to the Fed. Finally, the 
guarantees – excluding those backed by the Fed – represent 43% of the total amount com-
mitted (36 pp of GDP). Noteworthy among the guarantees is that for new bank debt, amount-
ing to $1,450 bn (10% of GDP), backed by the US Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC); 
the temporary guarantee for money market funds created by the Treasury ($3,000 bn), and the 
new private-public investment programme for purchase of troubled assets and loans which 
will be implemented over the coming months and will also be guaranteed (by the FDIC) for an 
undetermined amount which may exceed $500 bn.6
Although the range of fi nancial support measures adopted in the United Kingdom is similar to 
that of the United States, the breakdown is different, with guarantees clearly predominating 
(more than 60% of the total, 50% of GDP). These guarantees are subdivided into those for 
new debts and securitised assets and those for the assets of fi nancial institutions through the 
Asset Protection Scheme (APS). The Bank of England’s participation is channelled through 
one main facility (the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)), fi nanced by the Treasury, as seen in 
Chart 2, and through purchases of up to £50 bn of fi nancial assets in the form of commercial 
paper and other private assets.7 In addition, capital injections have been made into banks (4% 
of GDP) and some have been bailed out, involving substantial fi nancing (10% of GDP).
In other advanced economies, less support has been provided, although it has gradually been 
increased. In Japan it now exceeds 20% of GDP and is provided mainly through government 
agencies authorised to purchase assets, particularly commercial paper and shares. Support in 
euro area countries amounts to nearly 30% of euro area GDP. Here guarantees are the pre-
dominant type of measure, representing around two-thirds of the total. Support from the cen-
tral bank8 consists of long-term liquidity operations [and will include the recently approved 
purchase of €60 billion of covered bonds (0.7% of GDP)]. There are notable differences in fi -
nancial support between the countries of the euro area. The Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, 
small economies where bank capital injections have been relatively large, are considerably 
6. The plan to buy troubled assets and loans (legacy assets and loans) was announced in March and consists of a joint 
initiative between the public and private sector (hence the Private Public Investment Program) to help clean up banks’ 
balance sheets. This programme combines several of the categories considered: FDIC guarantees, Treasury fi nancing 
and even indirect Federal Reserve support through the use of loans acquired as collateral under the TALF. 7. Asset 
purchases by the Bank of England (Asset Purchase Facility) are for up to 150 billion pounds sterling, although they in-
clude the acquisition of up to 100 billion pounds sterling (7% of GDP) of government bonds which have not been in-
cluded in our calculations for the reasons given in footnote 5. 8. Unlike the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, the 
ECB has not set up new facilities, but has made the existing ones more fl exible. For this reason, the increase in the ECB 
balance sheet is included under this heading. Moreover, in the euro area countries analysed in Chart 2, the category 
“Support from the central bank” is not included because it is centralised in the ECB.
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above the average, as is Ireland, which, moreover, opted to guarantee in full its bank assets, 
the committed support being more than twice its GDP. The support committed in France and 
Germany is around 20% of GDP. The fi nancial support committed in Spain is about 13% of 
GDP (€150 billion); moreover, Spain is one of the few countries among the advanced econo-
mies that has not carried out capital injections.
The emerging economies have devoted ten times fewer resources than the advanced econo-
mies, in terms of their respective GDP, to supporting the fi nancial sector. This notable contrast 
with the advanced countries may be attributed partly to the differing nature, intensity and 
transmission channels of the fi nancial crisis in the two areas, which has required different re-
sponses. Having said that, it should be noted that the capacity of these economies to respond 
to the crisis is, with some exceptions, more limited in an environment of diffi cult access to in-
ternational fi nancing.
Specifi cally, the main response in the emerging economies has been to supply foreign cur-
rency fi nancing to the fi nancial system and to the corporate sector and, in many cases, to re-
duce exchange rate volatility through the use of international reserves, particularly in 2008 Q4. 
Against this background, the support of other central banks – particularly the Federal Reserve, 
but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the central banks of Switzerland 
and China, under foreign currency swap agreements – has been a key factor in mitigating the 
uncertainty in numerous countries, making for smoother provision of foreign currencies to 
domestic fi nancial agents and companies. These agreements, which have been utilised only 
partially, are set out in Chart 3, which also includes those of the Federal Reserve with other 
developed economies and, in the last column, reciprocal agreements of the main central banks 
with the United States.9
Lastly, a growing number of emerging economies have turned to international fi nancial or-
ganisations for fi nancing and guarantees. In the case of the new EU member countries, sup-
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9. The ECB, apart from the swaps with members of the ERM II and with other developed countries, has offered repo-type 
loans to other EU members, such as Hungary and Poland. Notably the Federal Reserve itself also has a swap facility with 
major economies (blue bars), refl ecting the distortions persisting in the foreign exchange markets.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 170 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 CRISIS, POLICY RESPONSES AND PUBLIC FINANCES
port has been offered jointly by the international fi nancial organisations, the EU itself and some 
European development banks. Table 3 shows that the support packages – through traditional 
stand-by or preventive agreements, through new facilities (such as the fl exible credit line (FCL)) 
– have multiplied in the last six months. In this period the agreements approved have totalled 
more than $150 billion and the outstanding loans have returned to the levels of early 2006. The 
increase in fi nancing to the IMF, approved at the April G20 summit, for an amount of $500 bil-
lion, thus represents a key source of fi nancial support to the emerging economies, which are 
less able to mobilise domestic funds.
As regards the expected fi scal impact of all these fi nancial support measures, it should fi rst be 
pointed out that the calculations mentioned above do not refl ect the impact of fi nancial sup-
port on public fi nances in either the short or the long term. The high fi gures for support com-
mitments (expressed as a percentage of GDP) should be qualifi ed, since to a large extent no 
fi nancial cost is involved, for three main reasons:
— First, the support committed has only been partially utilised. Moreover, this proc-
ess is gradual and, in some cases, such as the guarantees, it is very likely that the 
maximum limit will not be reached. The level of utilisation also varies widely across 
the different categories, tending to be higher in capital injections and asset pur-
chases than in guarantees. For the United States, it is estimated that around 30% 
of the total commitments have been used; however, in the United Kingdom the 
level of utilisation amply exceeds 60%, while in the euro area the level of utilisation 
is around 25%. In Spain, the percentage utilised was about 40% in mid-May.
— The second reason derives from the distinction between the amount committed 
and the amounts to be disbursed (upfront loading), and therefore having a budg-
etary impact, when the facilities are utilised. The relationship between these two 
variables is shown in Chart 4. As mentioned when the analysis framework was 
Agreements
approved
Type
(a)
Amount
($m)
Amount
(% of GDP)
Date of
approval
Ukraine SBA 16,500 11.65 5.11.2008
Hungary SBA 15,700 11.35 6.11.2008
Iceland SBA 2,100 10.38 19.11.2008
Pakistan SBA 7,600 5.29 24.11.2008
Latvia SBA 2,350 8.65 23.12.2008
Belarus SBA 2,500 5.58 12.1.2009
Serbia SBA 3,968 9.96 16.1.2009
El Salvador SBA (P) 791 3.88 16.1.2009
Mongolia SBA 225 5.79 1.4.2009
Costa Rica SBA (P) 724 2.76 10.4.2009
Mexico FCL (P) 48,505 4.74 17.4.2009
Guatemala SBA P(P) 951 2.82 22.4.2009
Romania SBA 17,100 10.00 4.5.2009
Colombia FCL (P) 10,397 5.00 11.5.2009
Poland FCL (P) 21,062 4.99 Pending
375,051LATOT
SOURCE: IMF.
a. SBA = Stand-by agreement; FCL = Flexible credit line; (P) = Preventive agreement.
IMF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND PROGRAMS SINCE SEPTEMBER 2008 TABLE 3
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explained, generally only capital injections, loans and asset purchases by the 
Treasury, which are a small part of the total support, involve an immediate effective 
cost with a budgetary impact. It is possible that some of the other measures may 
have an immediate cost (depending on how they are carried out and on their ac-
counting treatment), but, in any event, according to these criteria and taking cer-
tain specifi c adjustments into account, it may be estimated that for the G20+ as 
a whole only 12% of the amounts committed involve actual ex ante outlay, i.e. 
nearly 4% of the GDP of the G20. The proportion is similar in the advanced econ-
omies, although for these it represents around 6% of GDP: among the latter, in the 
United States it amounts to 7.5% of GDP (although it is only 9% of the total com-
mitment) and in the United Kingdom to 20% of GDP.10 In Spain it is estimated that 
this fi gure will exceed 4% of GDP (slightly above one-third of the total, due to the 
relative importance of asset purchases), somewhat more than in the euro area as 
a whole. By contrast, the proportion in the BRICs is even lower (6%) and, there-
fore, the amounts to be disbursed are very small, around 0.3% of GDP.
— Finally, some of the amounts invested will foreseeably be recovered. It should not 
be overlooked that most of the measures have been taken to stabilise the fi nancial 
system and smooth the way to normalisation and subsequent recovery. In this 
respect, all measures are intended to be temporary and it is assumed that a sub-
stantial portion of the amounts committed and disbursed will eventually be recov-
ered. It is, however, very diffi cult to determine in advance the amount that will be 
recovered, given the depth of the crisis, its early stage of development and the 
uncertainty as to its duration and fi nal impact. In any event, the empirical evidence 
[see Laeven and Valencia (2008)] shows that the fi scal costs of fi nancial crises can 
be very high, depending on the circumstances, although there are also cases, 
such as that of Sweden, in which the amount of bank bailouts exceeded 4% of 
GDP and the fi nal cost was very small, while in some developed economies, such 
as Japan, they exceeded 13% of GDP and the rate of recovery was very low 
[Laeven and Valencia (2008)].
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10. In the United Kingdom the percentage of upfront loading is higher than elsewhere (one-quarter of the total), due to 
the fi nancing of the SLS by the Treasury.
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These considerations drastically reduce the expected cost of fi nancial support. However, it 
should be borne in mind that a portion of the committed amounts not entailing an immediate 
cost (mainly guarantees and central bank fi nancing) may end up generating an effective cost; 
although this fi nancing is backed by assets, the widening of eligible collateral to less secure 
assets entails a greater risk. Nor is it possible, in this case, to make estimates in this respect. 
Even the indicators which might serve as a guide – credit default swaps (CDSs) of institutions 
whose liabilities are backed by guarantees, which theoretically refl ect the probability of non-
payment assigned by the markets – show high volatility in the current circumstances and their 
information value is arguable.11
In any event, the depth and persistence of the crisis and the growing range of measures being 
taken by central banks and Treasuries unquestionably expose public fi nances to additional 
costs which may turn out to be potentially very high.
The second way in which economic policy responds to the crisis is in the form of fi scal stimu-
lus packages aimed at sustaining aggregate demand. Apart from exceptions such as the 
United States or Spain, these plans were announced as from October and have been progres-
sively implemented – and extended – in the ensuing months. Also in this case the accounting 
treatment is complicated by the different items contained in some announcements (particu-
larly fi nancing, which, as noted above, is considered to form part of fi nancial support) and by 
the inter-period allocation, since some measures are annual, some are multi-year and some 
have no specifi c time horizon.
The top panel of Chart 5 sets out the amount of the packages announced by countries for 
2008 to 2010.12 The aggregate annual average of the G20+ is 1.4% of GDP and, in this case, 
the commitments are slightly higher in the emerging economies (1.4%) than in the advanced 
economies (1.25%), since in recent months the former have made an additional effort, against 
a backdrop in which market conditions have tended to stabilise. In any event, the available 
data indicate that the announced fi scal effort is more sustained in the developed economies, 
where the peak (1.6% of GDP) will be reached next year, whereas in the emerging economies 
it will be reached this year, at 2.4% of GDP, after which it will fall off.
There are, in any event, notable differences between countries. Again, the United States 
stands out in regard to the funds provided, particularly in the plan approved at the beginning 
of this year for $787 billion, 5.5% of GDP, of which some $200 billion (1.3% of GDP) will be 
utilised as from 2011. When added to the plan approved in February 2008, this amounts to 
nearly 1.7% of the average annual GDP of the three years in question, and next year will ex-
ceed 2.7% of GDP. Also notable is the recent Japanese tax stimulus, expanded by the ex-
traordinary April budget, which this year will reach 2.4% of GDP (1.5% of the average total 
stimulus in the three years). In the United Kingdom, the budget envisages a signifi cant expan-
sion this year (1.6% of GDP), but a negative stimulus next year, which will leave the annual 
average for the three years at just 0.6% of its GDP. The euro area is also among the lower 
rankings, with an average stimulus of barely half-a-percentage-point of its GDP. Within the 
euro area, Spain’s fi scal stimulus is fairly signifi cant: 1.25% of GDP on average and concen-
trated in 2009 (1.9% of GDP). Lastly, two emerging economies have the highest fi scal stimu-
li: Russia (1.8% of GDP on average for the three years), making use of its fi nancial reserves 
Fiscal stimulus plans, 
business cycle and other 
factors
11. For example, fi ve-year CDSs of the major US banks exceeded 500 basis points (bp) in October and then fl uctuated 
between 200 bp and 400 bp. These fl uctuations refl ect relatively high probabilities of default, but these numbers are not 
very reliable due to the distortion of this market and the fact that the volumes are notional. 12. Most of the fi gures are 
IMF projections and are consistent with its World Economic Outlook (2009b), but some have been updated using the 
latest-known plans. For Spain the Banco de España projections (2009) have been used.
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derived from oil, and China (2.1% of GDP), whose response capability does not depend on 
external fi nancing.
Fiscal plans are generally biased towards measures based on public expenditure, particularly 
on infrastructure. On the revenue side, the tax cut focused on direct taxes and rebates, while 
the indirect tax cuts were merely symbolic. The higher proportion of public spending measures 
(around 60% of the total) may be explained by the private sector’s lower marginal propensity 
to consume and invest, against a backdrop of economic and fi nancial fragility and of negative 
outlook, thus making tax cuts less effective. However, the lag in implementing the expenditure, 
at a time when urgent action is needed to stimulate demand, may constrain its effectiveness 
in the short term.
To assess the impact of the crisis on public fi nances, in addition to the discretionary measures 
to boost demand, account must be taken of the automatic stabilisers operating through gov-
ernment revenue and expenditure. Given the expected contraction of activity, the impact of 
 AUTOMATIC STABILISERS
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these automatic stabilisers on fi scal balances may be notable, to the point of affecting the 
amount of the fi scal stimulus plans. In general, it is considered that the fi scal balance of conti-
nental European countries exhibits a greater elasticity with respect to the business cycle than 
that of the United Kingdom or the United States, while in the emerging countries, where the 
social protection networks are less developed and the fi scal structures are less solid, the sta-
bilisers are less powerful. However, in some developing economies that are commodity ex-
porters, the slowdown in global activity is having a strong impact on fi scal accounts through 
the fall in prices and export volumes of these products, which provide a signifi cant portion of 
fi scal revenue. Lastly, as explained in Section 2, the loss of revenue derived from the fi nancial 
adjustment (lower profi ts, dividends and asset values), which is not normally considered when 
making cyclical adjustments to fi scal balances, must be taken into account. This impact will 
depend on the taxation of these tax bases and will be more marked in those economies in 
which the fi nancial sector has a greater weight, such as the United States, Switzerland or the 
United Kingdom.
The bottom panel of Chart 5 provides estimates of the relative impact on the defi cit in 2009 of 
the non-discretionary factors related to the fall in activity.13 Automatic stabilisers are estimated 
to be responsible for approximately half of the non-discretionary increase in the defi cit in the 
G20+ as a whole, for three-quarters in the advanced economies and for barely 20%-25% in 
the emerging countries. In the latter, the main contribution derives from the loss of revenue 
associated with the adjustment of commodities (more than half the total, as compared with 
zero in the developed countries). The adjustment of fi nancial asset and real estate prices con-
tributes to a similar extent in all the groups considered, accounting for around one-quarter of 
the total.
Now that the various channels through which the crisis and the economic policy response af-
fect fi scal balances and government debt have been assessed, their overall impact on public 
fi nances may be analysed. The top panels of Chart 6 show the projected increases in the 
defi cit for 2009 and 2010 with respect to 2007, which resulted in all cases in the drastic widen-
ing of budget defi cits. Numerous countries may reach double-digit defi cits in terms of GDP, 
thereby dissipating the gradual recovery of fi scal balances which had been under way in most 
countries in the last 15 years. Some countries, such as the United States, will record defi cits 
not seen since the end of the Second World War.
Thus, with respect to the year before the crisis (2007), the projections indicate that the 
defi cit will increase by 7.6 percentage points (pp) of GDP in 2009, from 1% to 8%, and will 
fall only to 6.9% in 2010 in the G20+ as a whole. In the advanced economies the increase 
is even larger, from 2% to 10% in 2009, falling to 7.7% of GDP in 2010. In the four major 
emerging economies (BRICs), the deterioration is somewhat less, since an aggregate bal-
anced budget in 2007 gives way to a defi cit of 4.5% of GDP in 2010. By country, the defi -
cits as a proportion of GDP are higher in the United States (13.6% in 2009, down to 9.7% 
in 2010), Japan, the United Kingdom (near to 10% and 9%, respectively, in the coming 
years), India (above 10% in 2009) and Spain (8.3% in 2009 and 8.7% in 2010). In fact 
Spain, along with Russia, is the economy in the sample recording the largest increase in 
defi cit since 2007, exceeding 10 pp of GDP, having started out from an ample surplus 
(2.2% in 2007). At the opposite extreme is Brazil, where the projected defi cit is lower by 2% 
of GDP.
Fiscal balances, 
government debt and debt 
dynamics in the medium 
term
13. See IMF (2009b). It should be borne in mind that the initial calculations took into account the projections made in 
2009 Q1. The worsening of these projections since then and the possible change in behaviour of commodity and fi nan-
cial asset prices have modifi ed slightly the calculations, which should be regarded with caution.
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To approximate the weight with which each factor analysed in the above sections contributes 
to the increase in the defi cit, the left-hand panel of Chart 6 sets out a (necessarily approximate) 
breakdown of that contribution in the advanced economies for the current year (8 pp of GDP, 
as stated above), distinguishing between discretionary measures (fi scal and fi nancial support) 
and the impact derived from the fall in economic and fi nancial activity.14 First, the impact of fi -
nancial support measures on the defi cit is relatively small (1.7 pp of GDP, i.e. barely 20% of the 
total), although the estimate depends on the accounting criteria adopted, since a large part of 
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14. The breakdown is carried out by taking the defi cit and structural balance projections of the IMF World Economic 
Outlook. The difference between them gives the impact of the automatic stabilisers. The fi scal impulse is derived from the 
fi gures in Chart 7 and the fi nancial support from the country fi gures and the estimate published by the IMF in March [IMF 
(2009b)]. This estimate is the one used to derive the impact of fi nancial and real estate adjustments, which is presented 
in terms of contribution in Chart 8.
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the actual outlay affects debt rather than the defi cit. Second, the fi scal stimulus packages 
amount to 1.5 pp of GDP, contributing 18% of the increase in the defi cit. The fall in fi nancial 
activity adds at least 0.6 pp of GDP, which leaves the automatic stabilisers as the main factor 
determining the increase in the defi cit (3.3 pp, or 41% of the total). Accordingly, it is estimated 
that the direct impact of the crisis contributes half (4 pp of GDP) of the increase in the defi cit, 
while the contribution of the policy response is somewhat smaller (3 pp). One percentage point 
of the increase in the defi cit could not be assigned to any category.
Debt shows similar behaviour (Chart 6, bottom right panel) to that of the defi cit, since the net 
borrowing associated with the fi scal and fi nancial support plans is producing a substantial in-
crease in government debt issuance and in the ratios with respect to GDP in practically all the 
advanced economies. According to the uniform criterion used by the IMF, the debt of the 
United States will approach 100% of GDP in 2010, while that of Japan – where the ratio was 
already very high – will amply exceed 200% of GDP. The increases in Europe are also substan-
tial. British government debt will approach 80% of GDP and that of the euro area as a whole 
will exceed this level. Spain, with a lower initial debt ratio, will approach 60%, after falling below 
40% in 2007. In many cases these fi gures represent increases in government debt equal to or 
higher than 50% of GDP. In Japan and the United States these debt ratios represent a return 
to post-war levels, while in Europe they signify a reversal of the progress made in the last few 
decades and a fresh departure from the reference limit of 60% of GDP in nearly all countries. 
By contrast, the IMF projections for the major emerging countries are that in 2009 the debt 
ratio will stabilise at around 35% of GDP, although this projection is somewhat diffi cult to rec-
oncile with the economic and fi nancial projections.
The sharp rise in debt ratios poses questions as to the sustainability of public fi nances in many 
countries and as to how to put them on a sounder basis. Although this lies outside the scope 
of this article, a basic idea may be obtained by examining the foreseeable dynamics of public 
debt, described by the following equation, where the fi scal variables are expressed in terms of 
GDP:
Increase in debt = [Real cost of debt – GDP growth] × 
× Debt at start of period – Primary balance
This expression indicates that the debt dynamics have worsened generally, in various ways: 
fi rst, there has been a jump in initial debt, derived from the fi nancial support measures and 
from the increase in defi cits; second, the increase in budget defi cits is also refl ected in a sharp 
deterioration of primary balances (i.e. net of interest payments), as shown in Chart 7, which will 
be long-lasting. Lastly, it is to be expected that debt dynamics will exert a negative infl uence, 
after a long period in which they behaved very favourably. First, because projected GDP growth 
is negative for this year and very low for next year and there is a likelihood that growth will not 
return on a sustained basis to the rates seen before the crisis; and second, because the real 
cost of fi nancing the debt in the medium term may tend to rise as the fi nancial and economic 
situation normalises and the factors responsible for the current downward pressure on gov-
ernment debt yields cease to operate or do so less strongly.
Based on the equation set out, it is possible to derive a relatively simple indicator to assess to 
what extent the debt dynamics have worsened. This indicator, shown in Chart 7, compares 
the primary balance that would be needed to stabilise the debt ratio at a certain sustainable 
level (see the footnote to Chart 7), in the long term, with the expected primary balance. Both 
the debt-stabilising balance and the primary defi cit projections have increased markedly in all 
countries, meaning that the gap that has opened between the two variables is very wide (more 
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than 5 pp of GDP in the United States and the United Kingdom, and 13 pp in Japan).15 The 
size of the gap in the euro area economies is also notable, albeit smaller (around 3 pp), while 
in Spain it scarcely exceeds 2 pp, although this is because it starts out from a ratio below 60%. 
By way of comparison with the previous situation, the chart also shows the primary balance 
projected for 2012 before the crisis (October 2007), which was close to zero in all the coun-
tries.16
In sum, government debt has entered into a negative dynamic and the debt ratio will tend to 
move on a rising trend in the coming years which, given the inertia inherent to this dynamic and 
the expectations about its determinants, will be diffi cult to reverse. 
The economic and financial crisis is requiring a strong economic policy response which, 
combined with the very gravity of the situation, has placed public finances in a delicate 
situation, especially in some developed economies. The improvement in fiscal positions 
attained in recent decades, by virtue of perseverance and fiscal discipline, has allowed 
for greater leeway in the current conjuncture. But this progress has been eroded in just 
a few short months: fiscal deficits have risen rapidly and government debt is projected 
to reach ratios relative to GDP unprecedented in recent decades. This deterioration, 
moreover, will be persistent, since debt has entered into an unfavourable dynamic that 
will be difficult to reverse. The increases in debt and in primary deficits will foreseeably 
combine with less favourable developments than in the past in long-term interest rates 
and in the pace of growth, even after this acute phase of economic recession and finan-
cial crisis.
Outlook and conclusions
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a. The outcome of the exercise depends on the initial debt ratio. If the ratio falls below 60% (as in 
Spain and, among the BRICs, in China and Russia), it would be the balance that stabilises debt in 
2027. If the ratio is above 60% (as in the US, the UK and the three main European economies), the 
estimates refer to the balance required to return the debt level to that ratio. In the case of Japan, it 
would be the balance required to halve the current debt level.
b. IMF, October 2008.
c. IMF, March 2009.
d. The euro area aggregate comprises Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
15. The exercise (see IMF (2009b)) also imposes that the difference between the cost of fi nancing and GDP growth (the 
term in brackets in the debt dynamics equation) is equal to 1 for the long-term projection period. 16. This comparison 
is partial, since the other component of the gap would also have to be considered, i.e. the primary balance that was 
stabilising the debt in October 2007 and that has also grown since, owing to the increase in debt and to the deterioration 
in its determinants.
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Other risks may be added to this negative outlook, such as the potential actual outlay of the 
funds committed which have not yet been used (and which, therefore, do not appear in the 
defi cit or debt fi gures) and the possibility that more fi scal or fi nancial support will be needed to 
overcome the crisis, putting further pressure on public fi nances. Conversely, it is also possible 
that a relatively rapid reversal of the economic and fi nancial situation may allow some of the 
amounts invested or committed to be recovered, partly alleviating the public fi nances position. 
In addition to these risks, there are structural factors that were already weighing on public fi -
nances in the long run, such as population ageing in many developed countries, which may 
further complicate the future management of countries’ fi scal and fi nancial policies.
All these considerations frame what is a diffi cult outlook for public fi nances in most developed 
countries in the coming years. This will feed through to the emerging countries, not only be-
cause of the direct effect of the crisis on their fi scal balances, but also because greater com-
petition among sovereign issuers may make it more diffi cult and more costly for them to ac-
cess fi nancing for their debt.
Turning to the private sector, the persistent increase in public sector net borrowing poses two 
signifi cant risks which, in the current conjuncture, are only latent. The fi rst is the crowding-out 
effect, through upward pressure on long-term interest rates and fi nancial costs. This effect 
might be partly mitigated in the short and medium term by the expected increase in global 
private saving, as agents rebuild their fi nancial positions. The second is that agents may an-
ticipate the need for higher taxes in the future to redress the fi scal situation, and may adapt 
their current behaviour accordingly, reducing the marginal propensity to consume. This reac-
tion would offset the effects of the fi scal stimuli, adversely affecting the outlook for recovery of 
private demand. 
All these considerations point to major challenges for the economic authorities in the coming 
years and to some economic policy conclusions. The fi rst is that, given the delicate current 
position, the fi scal room for manoeuvre is very limited and, should further stimuli or support 
prove necessary, these should be designed with the utmost care, to optimise their effi ciency 
and minimise their cost and duration. Second, the prospect of public fi nances deteriorating 
should be countered as far as possible by a credible commitment to fi scal discipline in the 
medium term. This should be made effective through countercyclical policies, once the situa-
tion of economic emergency has passed, and suffi ciently ambitious structural policies. How-
ever, this commitment should be reconciled with the sustaining of private demand in the short 
term and the restructuring of the fi nancial sector. In particular, the premature withdrawal of the 
fi scal stimulus or insuffi cient bank restructuring measures might lead to a false exit from the 
crisis, as has occurred in some cases (in Japan in particular). 
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The author of this article is Juan Carlos Casado Cubillas, of the Directorate General Economics, Statistics and 
Research.
2009 Q2 saw new legal provisions of some importance in different areas of the fi nancial sys-
tem.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has revised the general selection criteria for eligible coun-
terparties in monetary policy operations and, as a result of that update, has amended the 
general clauses relating to harmonised conditions for participation in the trans-European auto-
mated real-time gross settlement express transfer system (TARGET2). Also, the statistics on 
interest rates applied by monetary fi nancial institutions to deposits and loans vis-à-vis house-
holds and non-fi nancial corporations have been reformed. 
Within the EU, the directives on settlement fi nality in payment and securities settlement sys-
tems and on fi nancial collateral arrangements have been amended.
In the fi eld of fi nancial institutions, the legal regime governing signifi cant holdings was reformed 
so as to adapt it to EU legislation, a model for bank restructuring and the strengthening of 
credit institutions’ capital was approved, and the regulations on the preparation and presenta-
tion of mutual guarantee companies’ accounting information were updated to adapt them to 
the principles and criteria in the current accounting framework.
In the terrain of the securities market, certain matters relating to notifi cation of signifi cant infor-
mation were addressed, and the content and format of the half-yearly reports to be submitted 
by the depositaries of collective investment institutions to the Spanish National Securities Mar-
ket Commission (CNMV) were defi ned.
Further, mortgage market regulations and other mortgage and fi nancial system rules were 
amended and the provision of mortgage loans and other fi nancial intermediation services by 
non-fi nancial corporations to consumers was regulated.
Guideline ECB/2009/10 of 7 May 2009 (OJ L of 19 May 2009) amended Guideline ECB/2000/7 
of 31 August 2000 on monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem, and 
the Resolution of 21 May 2009 (BOE of 3 June 2009) of the Banco de España Executive 
Commission, amending that of 11 December 1998, laid down the general clauses applicable 
to Banco de España monetary operations in order to adapt them to Guideline 
ECB/2009/10.
The purpose of these provisions is to update the general selection criteria for counterparties to 
allow access to monetary policy operations (Eurosystem open market operations and stand-
ing facilities) by certain entities1 in view of their specifi c institutional nature under Community 
law. These entities, while not strictly credit institutions under Community law,2 are subject to 
scrutiny of a standard comparable to supervision by competent national authorities.
Introduction
European Central Bank: 
amendment of provisions 
on monetary policy 
instruments and 
procedures of the 
Eurosystem
1. The fi rst institution to start operating as a counterparty under these provisions will be the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) from 8 July 2009. See ECB press release of 7 May 2009. 2. Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) 
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Both provisions came into force on 11 May 2009.
Guideline ECB/2009/9 of 7 May 2009 (OJ L of 19 May 2009) amended Guideline ECB/2007/2 
of 26 April 2007 on TARGET2. Also, the Resolution of 21 May 2009 (BOE of 3 June 2009) of 
the Banco de España Executive Commission, amending that of 20 July 2007, approved the 
general clauses on the harmonised conditions for participation in TARGET2 in order to adapt 
them to Guideline ECB/2009/10.
First, access to TARGET2 is allowed to certain credit institutions which, while not strictly cred-
it institutions, are subject to scrutiny of a standard comparable to supervision by competent 
national authorities, within the meaning of Guideline ECB/2009/10 of 7 May 2009 referred to 
in the preceding section.
Second, the defi nition of “cross-system settlement”3 is included in Annex IV “Settlement pro-
cedures for ancillary systems” and certain sections of this annex are updated, including those 
relating to relations between central banks, ancillary systems (AS), settlement banks, settle-
ment procedures and payment instructions fl owing between AS.
Both legal provisions came into force on 11 May 2009.
Regulation 290/2009 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2009/7) of 31 March 2009 (OJ L of 
8 April 2009) amended Regulation 63/2002 (ECB/2001/18) concerning statistics on interest 
rates applied by monetary fi nancial institutions to deposits and loans vis-à-vis households and 
non-fi nancial corporations.
The new developments in this Regulation are as follows:
1. General breakdown of new loans, identifying separately the interest rates applied 
to and the volumes of those that are secured with collateral and/or guarantees. 
2. Breakdown by size of new loans to non-fi nancial corporations in order to provide 
further information on the fi nancing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
3. Breakdown by initial period of interest rate fi xation for new loans with an in-
creased number of period of fi xation categories. 
4. Separate reporting of interest rates charged on credit card debt.
5. Additional category of new loans to sole proprietors to provide further information 
on the fi nancing of unincorporated businesses. 
6. Additional reporting of new loans to non-fi nancial corporations according to maturity. 
7. Clarifi cation and redefi nition of revolving loans and overdrafts. 
Lastly, the Regulation adopts clearer rules in respect of stratifi cation and selection of reporting 
agents by the national central banks (NCBs) and specifi es the right of the Governing Council 
to check such procedures, 
Update of the legal 
provisions governing the 
TARGET2 system
Monetary fi nancial 
institutions: interest rate 
statistics
3. “Cross-system settlement” means the real-time settlement of debit instructions under which payments are executed 
from a settlement bank of one AS to a settlement bank of another AS using the same settlement procedure.
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The Regulation came into force on 29 April 2009.
Directive 2009/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 (OJ L of 
10 June 2009) amending Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 May 1998 on settlement fi nality in payment and securities settlement systems and Directive 
2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on fi nancial col-
lateral arrangements as regards linked systems and credit claims.
The main change with respect to Directive 98/26/EC derives from the growing number of link-
ages between systems, which, at the time when Directive 98/26/EC was drafted, used to 
operate almost exclusively on a national and independent basis. The new directive defi nes the 
concept of an interoperable system and the responsibility of system operators. Thus, “interop-
erable systems” are defi ned as two or more systems whose system operators have entered 
into an arrangement with one another that involves cross-system execution of transfer or-
ders.
The moment of entry into the interoperable systems shall be determined in the rules on each 
system. In order to limit systemic risk, national competent authorities or supervisors should 
ensure that the rules on the moment of entry into an interoperable system are coordinated 
insofar as possible and necessary in order to avoid legal uncertainty in the event of default of 
a participating system.
Member States may provide that the opening of insolvency proceedings against a participant 
or a system operator of an interoperable system shall not prevent funds or securities available 
on the settlement account of that participant from being used to fulfi l that participant’s obliga-
tions in the system or in an interoperable system on the business day of the opening of the 
insolvency proceedings. Member States may also provide that such a participant’s credit facil-
ity connected to the system be used against available, existing collateral security to fulfi l that 
participant’s obligations in the system or in an interoperable system.
The new directive broadens the scope of Directive 2002/47/EC to include credit claims as an 
eligible type of fi nancial collateral.4 Member States may provide that the inclusion in a list of 
claims submitted in writing, or in a legally equivalent manner, to the collateral taker is suffi cient 
to identify the credit claim and to evidence the provision of the claim provided as fi nancial col-
lateral against the debtor or third parties.5
To facilitate the use of credit claims, when they are provided as fi nancial collateral, Member 
States shall not require that they be dependent on the performance of any formal act such 
as the registration or the notifi cation of the debtor of the credit claim in question. Also, 
Member States shall ensure that debtors of the credit claims may validly waive, in writing or 
in a legally equivalent manner: 1) their rights of set-off vis-à-vis the creditors of the credit 
claim and vis-à-vis persons to whom the creditor assigned, pledged or otherwise mobilised 
the credit claim as collateral, and 2) their rights arising from banking secrecy rules that 
would otherwise prevent or restrict the ability of the creditor of the credit claim to provide 
information on the credit claim or the debtor for the purposes of using the credit claim as 
collateral.
Amendment of the 
directive on settlement 
fi nality in payment and 
securities settlement 
systems and of the 
directive on fi nancial 
collateral arrangements
4. The directive defi nes credit claims as “pecuniary claims arising out of an agreement whereby a credit institution grants 
credit in the form of a loan”. 5. Member States may exclude from the scope of this Directive credit claims where the 
debtor is a consumer or a micro or small enterprise, save where the collateral taker or the collateral provider of such 
credit claims is a national central bank, the ECB, the Bank for International Settlements or a multilateral development 
bank.
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Member States shall adopt and publish the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with the directive by 30 December 2010 at the latest and shall apply 
those measures from 30 June 2011.
Amendment of the regime governing signifi cant holdings in fi nancial institutions
Law 5/2009 of 29 June 2009 (BOE of 30 June 2009) amended certain fi nancial legislation6 so 
as to reform the legal regime governing signifi cant holdings in fi nancial institutions (credit insti-
tutions, investment fi rms and insurance companies). It was enacted to transpose partially to 
Spanish law Directive 2007/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 Sep-
tember 2007 amending certain EU directives7 as regards procedural rules and evaluation cri-
teria for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of holdings in the fi nancial 
sector. The implementing regulations of this law will be enacted later on.
The main new features of this Law are as follows: the design of a new, clearer assessment 
procedure with more appropriate time periods; the establishment of the criteria the analysis of 
which may be used by the fi nancial supervisors’ as the basis for opposing the proposed ac-
quisitions; and the strengthening of cooperation between the supervisor of the acquirer and 
that of the acquiree during the assessment procedure.
Table 1 below summarises the main new developments in the Law.
From a quantitative standpoint, a holding is deemed to be signifi cant when it reaches 10% or 
more of the institution’s capital or voting rights (previously this percentage was 5%), although 
the qualitative criterion, whereby there is deemed to be a signifi cant holding if a notable infl u-
ence can be exercised in the acquired entity, remains in place.
A new obligation is established to notify the supervisor of holdings which, albeit not signifi cant, 
mean that the threshold of 5% of capital or voting rights is reached or exceeded (this new 
obligation does not trigger the assessment procedure until the threshold of 10% is reached, 
but it enables supervisors to obtain information on holdings of this type.
The Law simplifi es the various thresholds triggering the obligation to notify of increases or 
decreases in signifi cant holdings: 20%, 30% or 50%, as compared with the previous ones of 
10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 33%, 40%, 50%, 66% and 75%.
A series of new features is introduced in the assessment process of the potential acquirer of 
the signifi cant holding. A specifi c list has been drawn up of the strictly prudential criteria that 
supervisors8 must take into account when appraising the potential acquirer’s suitability either 
for acquiring a signifi cant holding, or for exceeding the above-mentioned thresholds with its 
Amendment of the legal 
regime governing 
signifi cant holdings in 
fi nancial institutions
6. Law 26/1988 of 29 July 1988 on the discipline and intervention of credit institutions, Law 24/1988 on the securities 
market and the consolidated text of the Private Insurance Law enacted in Legislative Royal Decree 6/2004 of 29 October 
2004. 7. Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance; Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in fi nancial instruments, amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC 
and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC; 
Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance, amending 
Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 92/49/EEC and Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council; and Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to 
the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast). 8. The supervisors are the Banco de España, the 
National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) and the Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds, according 
to the nature of the acquiree.
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new holding. The most important criteria are, inter alia, the following: the acquirer’s reputation 
and fi nancial soundness; the reputation of the persons who will direct the entity’s business in 
the future; the entity’s ability and fi nancial soundness to fulfi l applicable legal obligations, and 
that there are no reasonable grounds to suggest money laundering or terrorist fi nancing.9
The supervisors may only oppose an acquisition or an increase of a signifi cant holding on the 
basis of these criteria or if the information provided is incomplete.
Clearer and more transparent periods are established in the assessment process. Thus, the 
supervisors shall have a maximum of 60 working days in total (previously three months) to 
complete their assessment and to provide notifi cation of such opposition, the system of posi-
tive administrative silence prevailing. This maximum period may only be interrupted once, if the 
)b(emigertnerruC)a(emigersuoiverP
Quantitative limit: A significant holding is deemed to be one in which
at least 5% of the capital or voting rights of an institution is held either
directly or indirectly.
Quantitative limit: When at least 10% of the capital or of the voting rights of the
institution is reached.
Quantitative limit: A significant holding is deemed to be one which,
although not reaching the specified percentage, makes it possible to
exercise a notable influence in the institution.
No change.
No provision for notification of non-significant holdings. When the threshold of 5% of the capital or voting rights (non-significant holding)
is reached or exceeded. This new obligation does not trigger the assessment
procedure until the holding reaches 10%.
When 5% (significant holding) is reached or exceeded and when there
are the following increases or decreases in significant holdings: 10%,
15%, 20%, 25%, 33%, 40%, 50%, 66% and 75%.
When 10% (significant holding) is reached or exceeded and when there are the
following increases or decreases in significant holdings: 20%, 30% or 50%. 
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into account when appraising the suitability of the acquirer.
The supervisors have a maximum of three months to carry out their
assessment. The assessment period may be interrupted without
specifying how long the interruption will last.
The supervisors have a maximum of sixty working days to carry out their
assessment. The running of the aforementioned assessment period may be
interrupted only once for a maximum of 20 working days in the event that the
supervisor requests additional information. 
To be consulted with the supervisor of the acquirer. Cooperation is strengthened between the supervisor of the acquirer and that of
the acquiree, both within Spain and between supervisors in the various EU
Member States.
Procedure for assessment of the acquirer of a significant holding
Definition
Notification of supervisor of increases or decreases in holdings
REFORM OF THE LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TABLE 1
SOURCES: BOE and Banco de España.
a. Law 26/1988 of 29 July 1988 (credit institutions), Law 24/1988 of 28 July 1988 (investment firms) and Legislative Royal Decree
6/2004 of 29 October 2004 (insurance companies).
b. Law 5/2009 of 29 June 2009. 
9. In order to obtain an appropriate assessment of this last criterion, the mandatory request for a report from the Execu-
tive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offences is introduced.
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supervisor requests additional information to appropriately assess the proposed acquisition. 
The process may be interrupted for this reason during the period between the date on which 
additional information is requested and the date it is received, with a maximum duration of 
twenty working days.10 Upon completion of the procedure, the possibility has been introduced 
of the supervisor, at the request of the potential acquirer or ex offi cio, making public the rea-
sons justifying its decision (whether or not it opposes the acquisition), provided that the infor-
mation disclosed does not affect those who are not parties to the transaction.
Cooperation between the supervisor of the acquirer entity and that of the entity acquired 
within Spain and between supervisors of different Member States of the European Union is 
strengthened substantially. The main aim is for competent authorities to work in close collabo-
ration when attempting to verify the suitability of a potential acquirer, be it an authorised entity 
in another Member State or a regulated entity in another sector of activity in Spain.
Lastly, Collective Investment Institutions Law 35/2003 of 4 November 2003 was amended to 
include the new regime for signifi cant holdings in management companies.
The Law came into force on 1 July 2009.
Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 of 26 June 2009 (BOE of 27 June 2009), on bank restructuring and 
the strengthening of credit institutions’ capital (“the Royal Decree-Law”) was published with 
the aim of strengthening solvency and the functioning of credit institutions which are in diffi -
culty or whose medium-term viability is compromised.
The structure of the bank restructuring model included in the Royal Decree-Law is based on 
credit institutions’ Deposit Guarantee Funds (DGFs) and the use of a new institution created 
for this purpose: the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks (FROB).
The FROB’s legal regime is similar to that of the DGFs,11 and it basically has two functions: the 
management of credit institutions’ restructuring processes and the strengthening of capital in 
certain merger processes. The Fund has been endowed with €9 bn, €2.25 bn will be contrib-
uted by the DGFs12 and the remaining €6.75 bn will be charged to the State Budget. It may 
raise borrowed funds on securities and credit markets, with a guarantee of the State, for not 
more than €27 bn (three times the initial amount assigned). However, the Ministry of the Econ-
omy and Finance may authorise this limit to be exceeded after 1 January 2010, although under 
no circumstances may the FROB’s borrowed funds represent more than €90 bn (10 times the 
initial amount assigned).
The FROB is governed and administered by a steering committee comprising eight members: 
fi ve are proposed by the Banco de España (one of them, the Bank’s Deputy-Governor, is 
Chair) and three correspond to each of the DGFs. All of them are appointed by the Ministry of 
the Economy and Finance and have a four-year renewable mandate. The grounds for their 
termination are the same as those for the members of the DGFs. Likewise, a representative of 
the National Audit Offi ce, appointed by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance upon pro-
posal by the Auditor General, will attend the meetings of the steering committee with the right 
to speak but not to vote. This committee will submit a four-monthly report about management 
Bank restructuring and the 
strengthening of credit 
institutions’ capital
THE FUND FOR THE ORDERLY 
RESTRUCTURING OF BANKS 
(FROB)
10. It may be prolonged for up to 30 days in the cases determined by the Law. 11. See Royal Decree 2606/1996 of 20 
December 1996 on the Credit Institutions’ Deposit Guarantee Fund. 12. This amount will be distributed between the 
DGF for Banking Establishments, the DGF for Savings Banks and the DGF for Credit Co-operatives based on the depos-
its existing at the entities covered by each DGF at 2008 year-end as a percentage of the total deposits at credit institu-
tions as of that date.
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of the FROB to the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. As for parliamentary control, every 
three months, the State Secretary for Economic Affairs will appear before the Parliamentary 
Committee on Financial Affairs, to report on overall credit developments, the situation of the 
banking sector and the FROB’s activities.
A credit institution (or a consolidable group or subgroup of credit institutions) must undertake 
a restructuring process if it shows weaknesses in its economic and fi nancial situation which 
might jeopardise its functioning. The process is basically designed in two phases: 1) fi nding a 
solution (an action plan) at the institution’s initiative or ex offi cio by Banco de España and, if it 
were not viable, 2) commencing a restructuring process of the institution with the intervention 
of the FROB.
In the initial phase the institution must submit to the Banco de España, within one month, an 
action plan specifying the steps envisaged for overcoming the fi nancial weakness which must 
ensure the institution’s viability. The plan may envisage three steps: strengthening the institu-
tion’s equity and solvency, its merger or takeover and the full or partial transfer of the business 
or of business units. If, one month after the action plan has been submitted, there has been no 
specifi c opinion given thereon, it will be deemed to have been approved, although the Banco 
de España may modify it as considered necessary.
The corresponding DGF13 will support the plan submitted by the institution in question and 
adopt the preventive and reorganisation methods it deems suitable. Similarly, the FROB may 
grant fi nancing, on an arm’s-length basis, to the DGF so that it may provide fi nancial support 
to the credit institution’s action plans.
The second phase of the restructuring process involves the FROB and begins if the institu-
tion’s situation of weaknesses continues and, specifi cally, if any of the following occurs: a) the 
credit institution affected did not submit the above-mentioned action plan or had not notifi ed 
the Banco de España that it was impossible to fi nd a viable solution to its situation; b) the plan 
submitted was not viable in the Banco de España’s opinion, or it was subject to the involve-
ment of a DGF in terms not accepted by the latter; c) the credit institution failed to meet the 
deadline or to fulfi l the specifi c measures envisaged in the plan thus jeopardising the achieve-
ment of its objectives, and d) the credit institutions failed to fulfi l any of the specifi c measures 
envisaged in one of the programmes referred to in Article 75 of Royal Decree 216/2008 of 15 
February 2008 on the own funds of fi nancial institutions, thus jeopardising the achievement of 
its objectives. In this phase, the institution’s directors will be replaced by the Banco de España, 
which will appoint the FROB as provisional administrator. The latter must prepare a status re-
port and submit a restructuring plan for approval by the Banco de España within a period of 
one month, which may be extended up a maximum of six months.
The aim of the restructuring plan is either to merge the institution or to fully or partially transfer 
the business through the global or partial assignment of assets and liabilities through proce-
dures ensuring competition (among others, the auction system). While the restructuring plan is 
being prepared, the FROB could temporarily provide the fi nancial support required in accord-
ance with the principle of the most effi cient use of public funds.
The restructuring plan will provide details of the FROB’s support measures, which may include 
the following, among others:
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS’ 
RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES
13. The DGF for banks, savings banks or credit co-operatives, according to the type of institution.
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a) Financial support measures, which may comprise, among others, the granting of 
guarantees, loans under favourable conditions, subordinated debt, acquisition of 
any type of assets on the institution’s balance sheet, subscription or acquisition 
of equity securities and any other fi nancial support to facilitate mergers with or 
takeovers by other sound institutions or the full or partial transfer of the business 
to another institution by procedures ensuring competition.
b) Management measures which improve the institution’s organisation, procedures 
and internal control systems.
Investments made by the FROB as a result of the implementation of a restructuring plan will 
not be subject to established legal restrictions or obligations that are also applicable to aid for 
which the DGFs are responsible.14
The acquisition of savings banks’ shares or non-voting equity units by the FROB will require the 
elimination of the preferential subscription right of shareholders or holders of non-voting equity 
units when the decision to increase capital or to issue non-voting equity units is adopted. The 
FROB will also be entitled to representation at the General Assembly which is equivalent to its hold-
ing as a percentage of the issuing savings bank’s equity and which will continue solely for the dura-
tion of its ownership of these securities but cannot be transferred to subsequent purchasers.
If the FROB subscribes capital contributions of credit co-operatives, its voting right at the co-
operative’s Assembly will be proportional to the amount of these contributions as a percentage 
of the credit co-operative’s capital.
As for specifi c mergers of credit institutions due to takeovers, through the creation of a new 
credit institution or the full or partial spin-off of assets and liabilities, no administrative authori-
sation will be required in respect of credit, apart from the authorisations required by competi-
tion law.
Prior to approval of the plan, the Banco de España will request a report from the Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance (for banks) or from the competent bodies of the regions (Autonomous 
Communities) where the savings banks and the credit co-operatives involved are domiciled.
In addition to its function regarding restructuring processes, the Royal Decree-Law envisages 
the possibility of the FROB supporting merger processes between credit institutions which are 
aimed at improving their medium-term effi ciency. Accordingly, the FROB may acquire securi-
ties issued by credit institutions resident in Spain15 which, although they are not in a situation 
requiring a restructuring process, need to strengthen their capital solely for the purpose of 
merger processes. The institutions involved in such processes must draw up a merger plan 
including, among other items, effi ciency improvements, rationalisation of their administration 
and management and the restructuring of their production capacity to improve their future 
outlook. This plan must be approved by the Banco de España according to the principle of the 
most effi cient use of public funds.
Strengthening of capital
14. Specifi cally, the FROB will not be subject to the following restrictions: by-law restrictions arising form the right to at-
tend Shareholders’ Meetings or the voting rights in respect of the shares acquired or subscribed by the FROB; the limita-
tions arising from the holding of non-voting equity units established in Law 13/1985 of 25 May 1985; the limitations on 
the acquisitions of credit co-operatives’ capital contributions by legal persons; those which the Law establishes in the 
eligibility of equity in respect of the securities acquired or subscribed by the FROB and those arising from the obligation 
to present a takeover bid pursuant to securities market regulations. 15. They may be preference shares which can be 
converted into shares (banks); non-voting equity units (savings banks) or capital contributions (credit co-operatives).
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The issuance of securities is considered exceptional and must be undertaken in conditions in 
which, in any event, the following are taken into consideration: the duration and the risk of the 
operation, the need to avoid the risk of distorting competition and to ensure that such an ac-
quisition facilitates and encourages the implementation and fulfi lment of the merger plan.
The issuers must undertake to repurchase them as soon as they can in the terms of the 
merger plan. If fi ve years elapse from when the disbursement was made and the preferential 
holdings have not been repurchased by the institution, the FROB could request that they be 
converted into shares (banks), non-voting equity units (savings banks) or capital contributions 
(credit co-operatives). Nevertheless, convertibility at the initiative of the FROB will be envisaged 
in the issuance agreement if, before fi ve years pass, the Banco de España were to consider 
that it was unlikely for them to be repurchased during that period.
The FROB will divest the securities subscribed through their repurchase by the issuer or sale 
to third parties. In the latter case, the transaction must be performed through procedures en-
suring competition and within a period of no more than fi ve years from the date the integration 
plan was fulfi lled.
The Royal Decree-Law envisages specifi c mechanisms for following-up and monitoring the 
implementation of the integration plans. Thus, every three months, the entity designated by the 
institutions involved in the integration process or, if appropriate, the institution resulting from 
such process, will send a report to the Banco de España on the level of compliance with the 
measures envisaged in the integration plan that has been approved. If the integration plan 
could not be complied with initially, the institution may ask the FROB for a modifi cation of the 
terms of the process which would include, among other aspects, an extension of the repur-
chase period by up to another two years. Ultimately, if it were not viable, the restructuring 
process described in the previous section would apply.
The Royal Decree-Law includes a provision on insolvency law whereby the competent court will 
not render judgement on petitions for an insolvency order referring to a credit institution with 
fi nancial diffi culties if it has submitted an action plan aimed at ensuring its viability to the Banco 
de España. Only the FROB will have the legal standing to petition for an insolvency order.
The Royal Decree-Law contains several fi nal provisions, most notably the amendment to Law 
13/1985 of 25 May 1985 on investment ratios, own funds and reporting requirements for fi -
nancial intermediaries which includes two important aspects: fi rstly, the FROB is added (as 
occurred with the DGF) to the institutions which may exceed the 5% limit on non-voting eq-
uity units issued by a savings bank in exceptionally serious situations. Furthermore, in these 
cases the limit on the volume of non-voting equity units in circulation, such that they may not 
exceed 50% of the savings bank’s assets, will not be applicable either. Secondly, the power to 
agree to the issuance of non-voting equity units is extended to the provisional administrators 
appointed by the Banco de España in the cases of restructuring envisaged in this Royal De-
cree-Law.16
Finally, Law 26/1988 of 29 July 1988 on the discipline and intervention of credit institutions 
was amended to include, as a very serious infringement, the failure by a credit institution’s di-
rectors to send the action plan, envisaged in this Royal Decree-Law to guarantee the institu-
tion’s viability, to the Banco de España.
OTHER PROVISIONS
16. The General Assembly was specifi ed as the competent body for agreeing to each issuance of non-voting equity units 
and it could delegate this power to the savings bank’s Board of Directors.
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The Royal Decree-Law came into force on 28 June 2009.
According to the prerogatives established in Royal Decree 2345/1996 of 8 November 199617 
on administrative authorisation rules and solvency requirements for mutual guarantee compa-
nies (MGCs),18 Ministerial Order EHA/1327/2009 of 26 May 2009 (BOE of 28 May 2009), on 
special rules for the preparation, documentation and presentation of MGCs’ accounting infor-
mation was published to adapt them to the principles and criteria in the current accounting 
framework.19 Similarly, the Order of 12 February 1998, which included the previous rules, was 
repealed.
Like its predecessor, the Order contains two sections: on the one hand, valuation rules, the 
presentation of public fi nancial statements and confi dential returns and the content of the 
notes to the fi nancial statements, and, on the other, the accounting statements which must be 
prepared by the MGCs and sent to the Banco de España.
The criteria are established for recording guarantees, technical provisions, coverage of spe-
cifi c credit risk exposures, assets acquired or awarded in payment of debts, capital and repay-
able funds received to cover credit risk.
Granting guarantees is the basic activity of these companies, and the recognition and meas-
urement criteria are similar to those envisaged in accounting rules for credit institutions.20 The 
fi nancial guarantee contracts21 will be measured initially at their fair value, which will be the 
commission or premium received plus the present value of the commissions or premiums 
which will be received, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The value of the premiums 
not yet received will be recognised as a credit under assets. Subsequently, the value of these 
contracts not classifi ed as doubtful, will be the amount initially recorded under liabilities less 
the amount taken to the income statement. The other guarantees will be treated in the same 
way for the purposes of measurement and presentation as the fi nancial guarantees, although 
with certain specifi c features.
The technical provisions will comprise the amount set aside by the company and the non-
refundable and similar contributions received to cover specifi c credit risk exposures and all 
its operations, the measurement criteria and accounting basis of which are detailed in the 
Order.
As for the coverage of specifi c risk exposures, the same criteria will be applied as those estab-
lished in the accounting regulations of credit institutions for insolvency risk, with the specifi c 
refi nements therein.
Assets acquired or awarded in payment of debts (foreclosed assets) are those which the MGC 
receives from its debtors for the full or partial settlement of their debts, irrespective of the way 
The accounting 
information of mutual 
guarantee companies
MEASUREMENT BASES AND 
CONTENT OF THE NOTES TO THE 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
17. See “Regulación fi nanciera: cuarto trimestre de 1996”, Boletín Económico, January 1997, Banco de España, pp. 109 
and 110. 18. Under Article 4 of Royal Decree 2345/1996 MGCs will bring their accounting information into line with the 
principles of the Spanish General Chart of Accounts, with the adaptations established by the Order of the Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance. 19. Law 16/2007 of 4 July 2007 on reform and adaptation of accounting-related corporate law 
for international harmonisation according to European Union law and Royal Decree 1514/2007 of 16 November 2007 
approving the Spanish General Chart of Accounts. 20. See Banco de España Circular CBE 6/2008, of 26 November 
2008, amending CBE 4/2004, of 22 December 2004, on public and confi dential fi nancial reporting rules and 
formats. 21. Financial guarantee contracts are contracts under which the issuer is required to make specifi c payments 
to reimburse the holder for the loss it incurs because a specifi ed debtor fails to make payment when due in accordance 
with the original or modifi ed terms of a debt instrument. This concept includes guarantees directly or indirectly guarantee-
ing debts such as credits, loans, fi nancial lease transactions and payment deferral of all manner of debts.
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in which ownership is acquired. Foreclosed assets will be classifi ed and presented on the bal-
ance sheet taking into consideration the purpose for which they are used.
Capital will solely comprise the contributions made by members when the MGC has an uncon-
ditional right to reject its repayment due to legal or bylaw prohibitions. The amount of the 
contributions which cannot be recorded as capital will be recorded as a fi nancial liability.
The funds received to guarantee all operations, which are repayable to the individuals and in-
stitutions that have contributed them, if they are not necessary to cover such operations, will 
be recorded as bonds and deposits. These bonds and deposits will not be derecognised until 
they are returned to the parties that contributed them, such parties relinquish collection there-
of from the guarantee company or they are used to remove the asset corresponding to the risk 
that they covered because it has been written off.
Lastly, in addition to the measurement bases which are detailed in the format created in the 
Spanish general chart of accounts, those specifi c to the operations of these companies should 
be indicated in the notes to fi nancial statements.
The MGCs will present their accounting information through their annual accounts, confi dential 
returns and year-end fi nancial statements.
The annual accounts will comprise the fi ve fi nancial statements included in the Spanish na-
tional chart of accounts: the balance sheet, income statement, statement of changes in eq-
uity (which comprises two parts: the statement of comprehensive income and the statement 
of changes in equity), the cash-fl ow statement and the notes to annual accounts. They will be 
sent to the Banco de España within 15 business days of their approval by the General As-
sembly and will be accompanied by the related audit report and other supplementary docu-
ments that are fi led at the Mercantile Registry.
The confi dential returns will comprise the confi dential balance sheet, the confi dential income 
statement, the coverage of credit risk exposures and the classifi cation of the guarantees. 
Similarly, the year-end fi nancial statements are the statement of comprehensive income, the 
statement of changes in equity and the cash-fl ow statement as of 31 December which are 
included in the annual accounts.
The Banco de España may also require MGCs in general, or particular ones, to provide all such 
information it may need to clarify and expand upon the data in the documents sent.
The Order came into force on 29 May 2009, although its criteria will be applied retroactively to the 
annual accounts for 2008 and to the statements that must be submitted at 2008 year-end. However, 
the deadline for sending the confi dential returns and the statements for the year ending 31 December 
2008 to the Banco de España has been extended from 31 March 2009 to 30 June 2009.
Royal Decree 716/2009 of 24 April 2009 (BOE of 2 May 2009), implements several aspects of 
Law 2/1981, of 25 March 1981, on mortgage market regulation and other mortgage and fi nan-
cial system rules, reformed by Law 41/2007 of 7 December 200722 (“the Royal Decree”). It 
PRESENTATION OF THE PUBLIC 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND 
CONFIDENTIAL RETURNS
Mortgage market: 
amendment of rules
22. See the comments on Law 41/2007, of 7 December 2007, which amended Law 2/1981, of 25 March 1981, on 
mortgage market regulation and other mortgage and fi nancial system rules, regulating reverse mortgages and depend-
ency insurance, and establishing a specifi c tax regulation, in “Financial regulation: 2007 Q4”, Economic Bulletin, January 
2008, Banco de España, pp. 177-182.
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replaces Royal Decree 685/1982 of 17 March 1982 which also implemented several aspects 
of Law 2/1981 and which is thus repealed.
The following sections detail the reforms introduced by the Royal Decree in the mortgage 
market. Table 2 compares, in summary form, the main elements envisaged in the Royal Decree 
with their treatment under Royal Decree 685/1982.
Participant institutions in the Spanish mortgage market include, not only Spanish credit institu-
tions, but also branches in Spain of credit institutions authorised in other EU Member States, 
whose capacity to issue collateralised mortgage bonds linked to loans and credits granted by 
them, secured by mortgages on property in Spain, is recognised de facto.
Regarding the conditions that mortgage loans and credits must meet to serve as a basis for 
the issue of mortgage market securities (covered bonds, bonds and collateralised mortgage 
bonds), the following new features are introduced:
The requirement relating to the purpose of mortgage loans and credits that may be used to 
secure issues of bonds and covered bonds is eliminated (see Table 2).
The conditions that mortgage loans and credits granted by credit institutions must meet to be 
eligible to serve as coverage for issues of mortgage securities are determined. These condi-
tions include, in particular, a tighter ratio (reduced from 70% to 60%) between the loan and the 
appraisal value of the mortgaged asset (loan-to value ratio), save in the case of mortgage loans 
and credits for construction, refurbishment or purchase of housing, in which case the maxi-
mum LTV ratio remains at 80% as previously.
This fi gure may be raised to 95% if the mortgage loan is backed by a bank guarantee issued 
by a credit institution other than the creditor institution, or if it is covered by credit insurance. 
The credit institution will be solely responsible for payment of said guarantee or insurance; this 
payment may not, in any case, correspond, directly or indirectly, to the mortgagor.
The conditions that must be met by loans and credits secured by property in other countries 
of the European Union in order to be considered equivalent to the Spanish mortgage guaran-
tee regime, and thus form part of the pool of collateral for mortgage securities issued in the 
Spanish market, are specifi ed. 
A number of adjustments are also made, to include in these regulations the latest new features 
contained in Ministerial Order ECO/805/2003 of 27 March 2003 on rules for the valuation of 
real estate and specifi c entitlements for certain fi nancial purposes. Specifi cally, mortgaged 
properties must be valued by the appraisal services of the lending institution, or by institutions 
authorised therefor, before mortgage securities are issued. Furthermore, technical appraisal 
reports must be signed by specifi c professional experts, in accordance with the nature of the 
property appraised. Lastly, the Ministry of Economy and Finance is authorised to establish, 
inter alia, the appraisal criteria and the minimum content of the appraisal reports and corre-
sponding certifi cates.
The mortgagor’s obligation to provide additional collateral, in the event that the mortgaged 
asset depreciates in value by more than 20% relative to the initial appraisal, is maintained, but 
a new condition is added, namely that in the case of a mortgagor who is a natural person, the 
depreciation in value must have continued for one year before said person may be obliged to 
increase said collateral.
PARTICIPANT INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE MORTGAGE MARKET
CONDITIONS OF MORTGAGE 
LOANS AND CREDITS
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authorised in other EU Member States.
Purpose of mortgage loans: to finance construction, refurbishment and
purchase of housing, urban development work and institutional building,
construction of agricultural, tourism, industrial and commercial buildings, and
any other work or activity.
Disappears.
The ratio between the mortgage loan and the appraisal value of the mortgaged
asset (the LTV ratio) is 70%, save in the case of financing for construction,
refurbishment or purchase of housing, when it may reach 80%.
No significant changes, save that the ratio between the mortgage loan
and the appraisal value of the mortgaged asset (the LTV ratio) goes
from 70% to 60%.
knabaybdekcabsinaolegagtromehtfi%59ot%08morfesiryamtI.degasivnetoN
guarantee issued by a credit institution other than the creditor
institution, or if it is covered by credit insurance.
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countries of the European Union must meet in order to form part of
the pool of collateral for mortgage securities issued in the Spanish
market are specified.
Provision of additional collateral in the event that the mortgaged asset
depreciates in value by more than 20% relative to the initial appraisal.
Provision of additional collateral in the event that the mortgaged asset
depreciates in value by more than 20% relative to the initial appraisal.
However, if the mortgagor is a natural person, the depreciation in value
must have continued for one year before said person may be obliged
to increase the collateral provided.
Guarantees for holders of mortgage securities: earmarking of mortgage loans
and credits specified in a public deed, without prejudice to the issuer’s
unlimited liability.
Guarantees for holders of mortgage securities: in addition to those
cited, substitute assets, similarly earmarked in a public deed, and the
economic flows generated by financial derivatives linked to each issue,
are added.
Requirement that issues of securities be published in the BOE and that a
marginal note be made in the Property Register to earmark mortgage loans or
credits to bond issues.
Disappears.
dnasnaolegagtromforetsigergnitnuoccalaicepsehtfonoitalugeR.degasivnetoN
credits, of the substitute assets backing covered and mortgage
bonds, and of the financial derivatives linked to them.
Limits on issuance of mortgage bonds: ceiling of 90% of the outstanding
capital of the earmarked credits.
Limits on issuance of mortgage bonds: the updated value of the
mortgage bonds must be at least 2% lower than the updated value of
the mortgage loans and credits earmarked to the issue.
Limits on issuance of covered bonds: ceiling of 90% of the sum of the
outstanding capital of all the mortgage credits of the institution's pool that are
eligible to act as coverage.
Limits on issuance of covered bonds: ceiling of 80% of the sum of the
outstanding capital of all the eligible mortgage loans and credits of the
institution's pool.
Fiscal and financial regime: mortgage market securities are exempt from
transfer tax and stamp tax and are deemed appropriate for investment by
certain regulated investment regime institutions.
No significant changes.
Secondary market: mortgage market securities may be transferred by any
means permitted by law, and with no need for intervention by a public
authenticating official or for notification to the mortgagor.
Secondary market: no change from previous regime. A new added
feature is that they may be admitted to listing on regulated markets or
in multilateral trading facilities.
Issuing institutions' transactions with own securities. Institutions may trade their
own securities. The securities may be early redeemed, provided that at least a
year has elapsed from the issuance date. The volume of own mortgage
securities that may be held in portfolio, for an unlimited period, may not exceed
5% of the total issued.
Issuing institutions' transactions with own securities, similar to the
previous regime. The securities may be early redeemed, even if less
than a year has elapsed from the issuance date. The institutions may
hold own mortgage securities in portfolio; in the case of issues
distributed among the public, up to a maximum of 50% of each issue.
Participant institutions in the mortgage market
Conditions of mortgage securities
Conditions of mortgage loans and credits
MODIFICATION OF MORTGAGE MARKET REGULATIONS TABLE 2
SOURCES: BOE and Banco de España.
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The regulations introduce a series of improvements, described below, enhancing investor pro-
tection and granting greater fl exibility to institutions when it comes to designing the conditions 
of issue of mortgage securities.
The guarantees previously enjoyed by holders of these securities, owing to their being ear-
marked to mortgage loans and credits, are maintained. Moreover, substitute assets, similarly 
earmarked, are added, along with the economic fl ows generated by fi nancial derivatives linked 
to each issue,23 without prejudice to the issuer’s unlimited liability, explicitly determined in the 
regulations.
The requirement that issues of securities be published in the BOE, and that a marginal note be 
made in the Property Register earmarking mortgage loans or credits to bond issues, are dis-
pensed with.
The regulations on the special accounting register24 to be kept by institutions granting mort-
gage loans and credits are implemented, along with those on the substitute assets backing 
covered and mortgage bonds and on the fi nancial derivatives linked thereto. The main objec-
tives of this register are to enhance legal protection in the event of insolvency proceedings, to 
provide greater transparency regarding the quality of the securities and to increase supervi-
sory effi ciency in this market.
The limits on the issuance of covered and mortgage bonds are tightened up (see Table 2) and 
several obligations are imposed on the issuing institutions to ensure that they take the neces-
sary steps to prevent any imbalances between the fl ows from the pool of collateral and those 
necessary to meet the payments to the holders of covered and mortgage bonds.
Several clarifi cations are made in the collateralised mortgage bond regime. Thus, credit institu-
tions issuing these bonds transfer all the risk of the part of the credit ceded, and each such 
bond represents a holding in a specifi c credit, rather than in a group of credits.
Regarding the fi scal and fi nancial regime, as under the previous regulations, mortgage market 
securities are exempt from transfer tax and stamp tax and are deemed appropriate for invest-
ment by certain regulated investment regime institutions.
As for the secondary market, the securities may be transferred by any means permitted by law, and 
with no need for intervention by a public authenticating offi cial or for notifi cation to the mortgagor. 
A new feature is added, namely that they may be admitted to listing on regulated markets or in 
multilateral trading facilities, in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Market Law.25
Under the new regulations, issuing institutions may still operate with own mortgage securities, 
although the transparency requisites have been raised. The securities may be early redeemed, 
without a year having to have elapsed from the issuance date as envisaged in the previous 
regime. They may also be held in portfolio, the new feature being that, in the case of issues 
distributed among the public, the ceiling is raised from 5% to 50% of each issue.26 Advance 
CONDITIONS OF MORTGAGE 
SECURITIES
OTHER MATTERS
23. Envisaged in Law 2/1981 of 25 March 1981 amended by Law 41/2007 of 7 December 2007. The substitute assets 
backing issues of covered or mortgage bonds will do so up to the established limit (maximum of 5% or 10%, respec-
tively, of the principal of each issue); they must be linked to a specifi c issue when each issue is made and identifi ed in the 
special accounting register. 24. Envisaged in Law 2/1981 of 25 March 1981  amended by Law 41/2007 of 7 December 
2007. 25. Securities Market Law 24/1988 of 28 July 1988, amended by Law 47/2007 of 19 December 2007. 26. Un-
der the previous regulations, the ceiling on the volume of own mortgage securities that these institutions could hold in 
portfolio, for an unlimited period, was 5% of the total issued.
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notice must be given to the market of any acquisitions to be made for this purpose; moreover, 
this shall be considered signifi cant information.
The supervisory regime of the mortgage securities market is updated, specifying the respec-
tive areas of competence of the Banco de España and the CNMV, to prevent any overlap in 
this respect. The Banco de España is responsible, inter alia, for control and inspection of the 
conditions required of mortgage loans and credits, and of the related collateral, and of all 
other assets that may be used as coverage for issues of mortgage securities, including control 
and inspection of the accounting register in which they must be recorded and of compliance 
with the rules on appraisal. In turn, the CNMV is responsible for supervision of the conditions 
required of public offerings of mortgage securities, and for aspects relating to the secondary 
market in the case of mortgage securities traded in offi cial markets.
The additional provisions contain two key clarifi cations. First, they clarify the regime applicable 
to mortgage transfer certifi cates,27 which are considered a transfer of credit, similarly to col-
lateralised mortgage bonds, but which are not strictly defi ned as mortgage market securities, 
since there is no guarantee of minimum quality. They may be issued purely for placement 
among professional investors, or to be grouped in securitisation special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs); under no circumstances may they be prejudicial to the interests of the mortgagor.
Second, they make a number of adjustments to the mortgage loan subrogation regime envis-
aged in Law 2/1994 of 30 March 199428 on subrogation and novation of mortgage loans. 
Specifi cally, fi nancial institutions that are willing to become subrogated must include the bind-
ing offer accepted by the mortgagor in the notice given to the creditor institution. In turn, the 
creditor institution exercising its right to render the subrogation null and void must appear, duly 
represented, before the Notary Public who gave the notice, indicating its binding decision to 
amend the conditions of the mortgage loan or credit with the mortgagor, to equal or better 
those of the binding offer. In addition, said institution must also, and to this effect, submit to 
the mortgagor, within ten business days, a binding offer, in writing, that effectively equals or 
betters the fi nancial conditions of the other institution.
The Royal Decree came into force on 3 May 2009.
Ministerial Order EHA/1421/2009 of 1 June 2009 (BOE of 2 June 2009), implements Article 82 
of Securities Market Law 24/1988 of 28 July 198829 on signifi cant information.30
The Ministerial Order specifi es certain aspects relating to notice of signifi cant information that 
were pending implementation in Law 24/1988. Thus, the criteria are established for identifying 
facts, decisions or circumstances that warrant the description of signifi cant information. In this 
respect, the CNMV is authorised to draw up an illustrative, but by no means exhaustive, list of 
the events that may be deemed to constitute signifi cant information; this may be done by type 
Securities market: notice 
of signifi cant information
27. Mortgage transfer certifi cates were regulated by Law 3/1994 of 14 April 1994 which adapts Spanish law on credit 
institutions to the Second Banking Coordination Directive. 28. See “Financial regulation: 1994 Q2”, Boletín Económico, 
July-August 1994, Banco de España, pp. 96-97. 29. See “Financial regulation: 1988 Q3”, Boletín Económico, October 
1988, Banco de España, pp. 61-62. 30. EU regulations on insider dealing and market abuse are contained in Directive 
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipula-
tion, and in Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 on the defi nition and public disclosure of insider 
information and the defi nition of market manipulation, which were transposed into Spanish law by Financial System Re-
form Law 44/2002, of 22 November 2002; Royal Decree 1333/2005 of 11 November 2005 implementing Securities 
Market Law 24/1988 of 28 July 1988 on market abuse (amended by Royal Decree 364/2007 of 16 March 2007), and 
Ministerial Order ECO/3722/2003 of 26 December 2003 on the annual corporate governance report and other informa-
tive instruments of listed public limited companies and other entities.
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of fi nancial instrument. This list may include, inter alia, events connected with strategic agree-
ments and mergers and acquisitions, information relating to the reporting entity’s fi nancial 
statements or those of its consolidated group, information on notices of call and offi cial mat-
ters, and information on signifi cant changes in factors connected with the activities of the re-
porting entity and its group.
The principles to be followed and conditions to be met by entities when they publish and re-
port signifi cant information are laid down, along with the requisites as regards the content of 
the notice issued and the conditions applicable in cases in which the signifi cant information is 
connected with accounting, fi nancial or operational projections, forecasts or estimates. The 
reporting entity must designate at least one interlocutor whom the CNMV may consult or from 
whom it may request information relating to dissemination of the signifi cant information.
Lastly, some of the circumstances in which it is considered that an entity is failing to comply 
with the duty to publish and report signifi cant information are described. These include, inter 
alia, cases in which signifi cant information is disseminated at meetings with investors or share-
holders or at presentations to analysts or to media professionals, but is not communicated, at 
the same time, to the CNMV. 
The Ministerial Order came into force on 3 June 2009.
CNMV Circular 3/2009 of 25 March 2009 (BOE of 20 April 2009) on the content of the half-
yearly reports on performance of the monitoring and supervisory function of CII depositar-
ies.31
CII depositaries shall prepare half-yearly reports on the results of their monitoring and supervi-
sory functions.32 These reports are divided into four sections, plus a further section for any 
additional information, set out as annexes to the Circular. In the fi rst four sections, depositaries 
shall report any incidents in the valuation of assets, any conciliation differences between secu-
rities and balances, any other incidents regarding net asset value and any non-compliance 
with legal limits and ratios, ether settled or pending settlement as at the last day of the corre-
sponding half-year period. These reports shall be completed for each CII, save in the case of 
CIIs that are divided into investment compartments, in which case the information shall be 
provided for each such compartment.
The section on additional information shall include the depositaries’ contact details, so that the 
CNMV has up-to-date information to facilitate its supervisory tasks. The half-yearly reports 
must be submitted online, using the CIFRADOC/CNMV service, prior to the last calendar day 
of the second month following the period to which the reports relate.
The Circular also includes two clarifi cations relating to the depositaries’ monitoring and super-
visory functions described in Ministerial Order EHA/596/2008 of 5 March 2008 which regu-
lates certain aspects of the legal regime of CII depositaries. First, regarding verifi cation of the 
accuracy, quality and suffi cient nature of the periodic public information, this function shall only 
be understood to have been performed when depositaries have checked that the cash and 
Collective investment 
institutions: half-yearly 
depositary reports
31. Pursuant to the provisions of Royal Decree 1309/2005 of 4 November 2005 approving the implementing regulations 
of Collective Investment Institutions Law 35/2003 of 4 November 2003 authorising the CNMV to determine the content 
and format of the half-yearly reports that must be submitted by CII depositaries, along with details on the time and man-
ner in which they must be sent. 32. Without prejudice to their obligation to inform the CNMV, in writing and as prompt-
ly as possible, of any signifi cant anomaly detected, in the performance of their monitoring and supervisory functions, in 
the management or administration of any CIIs (whether fi nancial or real estate CIIs).
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investment portfolios coincide with their internal records, and when they have checked the 
content of the signifi cant events, the fees and commissions established and the information on 
transactions between the management company and the depositary.
Second, the scope of the concept of signifi cant anomalies is adjusted. Thus, these shall in-
clude, among others, anomalies that might have a considerable impact on the net asset value 
of units of mutual funds and of shares of investment companies, along with certain specifi c 
acts or omissions described in detail in the Circular, provided they correspond to the deposi-
taries’ monitoring and supervisory functions.
The Circular came into force on 1 July 2009; the fi rst information to be sent will be that relating 
to 2009 H2.
Law 2/2009 of 31 March 2009 (BOE of 1 April 2009) regulating mortgage loans and credits 
and other fi nancial intermediation services provided by non-fi nancial corporations to consum-
ers, to enhance consumer protection.
The Law extends to natural and legal persons (hereinafter fi rms) that offer mortgage credit or 
loan agreements, other than credit institutions, obligations that were to date exclusive to the 
latter. In particular, it establishes a series of transparency rules and a specifi c legal regime ap-
plicable to all fi rms that conduct fi nancial intermediation services, including credit or loan con-
solidation.
The Law shall apply to all fi rms other than credit institutions (as the latter are already subject to 
organisational and disciplinary rules on credit and are supervised by the Banco de España) 
that conduct the following professional activities with consumers:33
a) Granting of mortgage loans or credits under the deferred payment formula, of cred-
it facilities or of any other equivalent means of credit, without prejudice to the spe-
cifi c regulations on certain products such as consumer credit or hire purchase.
b) Provision of fi nancial intermediation services for loan or credit agreements for any 
purpose, including, where appropriate, making said agreements available to con-
sumers for signing.
Before being inscribed in the offi cial registers created for this purpose, fi rms must take on 
civil liability insurance or obtain a bank guarantee to cover any liabilities that may be incurred 
vis-à-vis consumers relating to any damages deriving from the provision of fi nancial interme-
diation services or the granting of mortgage loans or credits.
Furthermore, prior to start-up of their activity, they must be inscribed in the register held in the 
Spanish region in which they have their registered offi ce. Firms conducting these activities in 
Spain that have no registered offi ce in the country shall be inscribed in the State Register to be 
created at the National Consumer Institute (INC).34
The State Register, which shall include the information supplied by the regional (autonomous) 
governments and the inscriptions of foreign fi rms, shall be accessible online, free of charge, 
Mortgage loans and 
credits and other fi nancial 
intermediation services 
provided by non-fi nancial 
corporations
SCOPE OF APPLICATION
CONDITIONS TO BE MET BY 
FIRMS FOR EXERCISE OF THIS 
ACTIVITY
33. Consumers are understood to be natural and legal persons acting, in the agreements to which the Law refers, inde-
pendently of any business or professional capacity. 34. The Law envisages creation of this Register, within the six 
months following its entry into force.
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and shall contain, inter alia, data identifying the fi rms, information on the activity conducted 
and the geographical area covered, data identifying the insurance company with which the 
necessary civil liability policy is held or the credit institution supplying the necessary bank guar-
antee, along with all other details set out in the respective regulations.
The Law envisages a number of transparency obligations relating to the agreements signed 
and prices charged. In the case of the agreements, fi rms shall make the general contractual 
conditions used by them available to consumers, free of charge. This pre-contractual informa-
tion shall also appear on their websites, if such websites exist, and shall be available in the 
premises open to the public or offi ces in which the fi rms provide their services. As regards 
prices, fi rms shall be free to set their fees and commission charges, conditions and expenses 
chargeable to consumers, within certain legal limits; these prices shall be set out in a prospec-
tus to be sent by the fi rms to the registers in which they are inscribed prior to application 
thereof. Firms may not charge any amounts over and above those deriving from the corre-
sponding rates. Moreover, the fees and commission charges and chargeable expenses shall 
correspond to services effectively rendered or expenses incurred. Fees and commission 
charges and expenses may only be charged for services fi rmly and expressly accepted or re-
quested by consumers.
All premises open to the public shall have a permanent notice board, set in a clearly visible 
place, with all the information that must be made available to consumers, as envisaged in the 
Law.
In addition, the burden of proof of compliance with the obligations established in the Law shall 
lie with the fi rms providing the services. The Law also regulates access to procedures for set-
tling disputes out of court and for injunctions, in the event of any unlawful conduct that might 
harm general or collective consumer interests.
Regarding the penalty regime, any failure to comply with their obligations constitutes a con-
sumer offence, penalised by the corresponding authorities in accordance with the provisions 
of the respective regional legislation.
In any marketing material and advertising that refer to the amount of loans or credit offered, to 
the interest rate or to any fi gures connected with the related cost, fi rms must include mention 
of the typical APR (annual percentage rate) and of all other aspects determined in the respec-
tive regional legislation.
In the case of marketing material that refers to loan or credit consolidation, clear, concise and 
visible information must be given on expenses of any kind that may be incurred. Moreover, any 
reference to cutting monthly repayments is prohibited if not accompanied by express mention 
of the increase in the amount of the capital outstanding and of the repayment period of the 
new loan or credit.
Furthermore, fi rms must provide consumers, free of charge, with an informative leafl et clearly 
indicating, at minimum, the expenses involved in preparing the consolidation, relating to as-
pects such as advisory, appraisal, verifi cation of inscriptions in the Property Register and oth-
ers that may be charged to the consumer even if the loan or credit is not granted.
The Law also sets out the information that fi rms must provide to consumers, free of charge 
and at least fi ve days prior to agreements being signed. Firms are also obliged to make a bind-
ing loan or credit offer to consumers, or, as appropriate, to inform them that their loan or 
GENERAL TRANSPARENCY 
OBLIGATIONS FOR FIRMS
MORTGAGE LOANS AND CREDITS
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credit application has been denied. These binding offers shall be valid for at least ten business 
days as from the date of delivery thereof.
Mortgage loan or credit agreements granted by fi rms shall comply with all the conditions envis-
aged in the Ministerial Order of 5 May 199435 on transparency of the fi nancial conditions of 
mortgage loans, with all the specifi cations established therein.
As regards fi nancial intermediation activity, the Law regulates the legal regime of transparency 
of the fi rms’ fi nancial intermediation agreements.36
In any marketing material and advertising that refer to interest rates or to fi gures connected 
with the cost of the loans or credits to be taken out using the fi nancial intermediation services 
offered, the advertising must meet the conditions established in the legislation applicable to 
the loan or credit in question. Furthermore, fi rms must specify the range of services offered, 
indicating whether they operate exclusively with one or more credit institutions or as independ-
ent brokers. Any marketing material that refers to loan or credit consolidation must also indi-
cate the expenses connected therewith.
The Law also specifi es the information that fi rms must provide to consumers, free of charge 
and at least fi fteen days prior to agreements being signed, on the fi rm itself, the service offered 
and the fi nancial intermediation agreement. This prior information includes essential aspects, 
such as the existence of the right of withdrawal, within the fourteen calendar days following the 
date of formalisation of the agreement, with no need to give any reason and with no penalisa-
tion.
Independent brokers shall be obliged to select, from the products available on the market, 
those best suited to the needs expressed by consumers, presenting them with at least three 
binding offers from credit institutions and advising them on the legal and fi nancial conditions of 
each such offer.
Lastly, a transitional regime is set up for adaptation to the conditions established in this Law as 
from its entry into force on 2 April 2009.
15.7.2009.
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
ACTIVITY
35. See “Financial regulation: 1994 Q2”, Boletín Económico, July-August 1994, Banco de España, pp. 96-97. 36. But 
the Law does not address the legal regime of the agreements brokered. Thus, for example, consumer loans brokered will 
continue to be subject to the provisions of Consumer Credit Law 7/1995 of 23 March 1995.
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1.1.  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. VOLUME CHAIN-LINKED INDICES, REFERENCE YEAR 2000=100. DEMAND COMPONENTS.
         SPAIN AND EURO AREA (a)
Annual percentage changes
        GDP  Final consumption  General govern-     Gross fixed       Domestic     Exports of     Imports of  Memorandum item:
   of households    ment final     capital        demand     goods and     goods and   GDPmp (current 
   and NPISHs     consumption     formation     services     services   prices) (g)
   Euro    Euro    Euro    Euro    Euro    Euro    Euro    Euro 
   Spain    area    Spain    area    Spain    area    Spain    area    Spain    area   Spain    area   Spain    area  Spain    area 
    (b)     (c)     (d)     (e)     (f)    (f)
06 3.9 3.1 3.9 2.1 4.6 1.9 7.1 5.8 5.1 2.9 6.7 8.5 10.3 8.4 982 8 558 
07 3.7 2.7 3.5 1.6 4.9 2.2 5.3 4.7 4.2 2.4 4.9 5.9 6.2 5.3 1 051 8 999 
08 1.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 5.3 1.9 -3.0 -0.3 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.9 -2.5 1.0 1 095 9 266 
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Sources: INE (Quarterly National Accounts of Spain. Base year 2000) and Eurostat.
 a. Spain: prepared in accordance with ESA95, seasonally- and working-day-adjusted series (see Economic bulletin April 2002); Euro area, prepared in accordance with
 ESA95.  b. Final consumption expenditure may take place on the domestic territory or abroad (ESA95, 3.75). It therefore includes residents’ consumption abroad, which is
 subsequently deducted in Imports of goods and services.  c. Euro area, private consumption.
 d. Euro area, government consumption.  e. Residents’ demand within and outside the economic territory.
 f. Exports and imports comprise goods and services and include cross-border trade within the euro area.  g. Billions of euro.
06 Q2 3.9 3.1 3.9 2.1 4.3 1.5 6.9 6.1 5.0 3.1 7.4 8.6 10.4 8.3 243 2 130 
Q3 4.0 3.0 3.7 1.8 4.6 1.5 7.8 5.6 5.2 3.0 5.6 7.0 9.6 7.6 248 2 152 
Q4 3.9 3.4 3.9 2.4 4.5 2.3 6.5 6.5 4.9 3.4 7.2 9.4 10.0 7.9 252 2 181 
07 Q1 4.0 3.4 3.8 1.6 5.3 2.2 6.6 7.1 4.8 3.4 3.3 6.8 6.1 6.2 257 2 216 
Q2 3.9 2.6 4.1 1.7 5.0 2.3 5.8 4.2 4.6 2.6 3.9 6.0 6.2 5.4 261 2 238 
Q3 3.6 2.7 3.1 1.8 4.8 2.4 4.6 4.2 3.7 2.7 8.2 6.9 7.6 6.1 264 2 262 
Q4 3.2 2.2 2.9 1.2 4.4 2.0 4.5 3.4 3.6 2.2 4.0 3.9 4.9 3.5 268 2 283 
08 Q1 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.4 3.7 1.5 2.4 3.1 2.5 2.2 4.8 5.1 3.6 3.9 272 2 312 
Q2 1.8 1.5 0.8 0.5 5.0 2.0 -0.8 1.6 1.2 1.5 4.4 3.8 1.8 2.4 274 2 325 
Q3 0.9 0.5 -0.1 0.1 6.1 2.0 -4.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 1.5 1.4 -2.0 1.4 276 2 328 
Q4 -0.7 -1.7 -2.2 -0.6 6.3 2.1 -9.3 -5.5 -2.8 -1.7 -7.9 -6.5 -13.2 -3.7 273 2 301 
09 Q1 -3.0 -4.8 -4.0 -1.1 5.4 1.7 -13.1 -10.4 -5.0 -4.8 -19.0 -15.5 -22.3 -11.7 267 2 239 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8* ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2006 2007 2008 2009
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20%%
GDPmp
DOMESTIC DEMAND (b)
   GDP. DOMESTIC DEMAND
   Annual percentage changes
2006 2007 2008 2009
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20%%
GFCF ON CAPITAL GOODS
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
   GDP. DEMAND COMPONENTS
   Annual percentage changes
P
P
P
.
      Series depicted in chart.
1
.
2  3  4
.
5  6  7  8  9
.
  10   11   12   13
.
  14
.
  15
1.2.  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. VOLUME CHAIN-LINKED INDICES. REFERENCE YEAR 2000=100. DEMAND COMPONENTS.
         SPAIN: BREAKDOWN (a)
Annual percentage changes
          Gross fixed capital        Exports of goods and services       Imports of goods and services   Memorandum items: 
             formation
     Change  Final con-    Final 
       in  sumption of  consumption
   Total   Capital    Construc-      Other      Stocks    Total    Goods  non-resi-   Services     Total    Goods  of residents   Services    Domestic     GDP 
  goods      tión    products      (b)  dents in  in the rest     demand
 economic  of the world     (b) (c)
 territory
06 7.1 10.2 5.9 7.1 0.2 6.7 6.7 1.6 12.2 10.3 10.3 5.9 11.2 5.3 3.9
07 5.3 10.0 3.8 3.9 -0.1 4.9 4.3 0.1 11.9 6.2 4.8 7.2 12.8 4.4 3.7
08 -3.0 -1.1 -5.3 1.9 0.0 0.7 0.9 -4.9 4.6 -2.5 -2.7 -4.5 -1.2 0.2 1.2
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Source: INE (Quarterly National Accounts of Spain. Base year 2000). 
 a. Prepared in accordance with ESA95, seasonally- and working-day-adjusted series (see Economic bulletin April 2002).
 b. Contribution to GDPmp growth rate.
 c. Residents’ demand within and outside the economic territory.
06 Q2 6.9 9.2 6.1 6.4 0.2 7.4 7.7 2.8 10.9 10.4 10.0 6.9 13.3 5.2 3.9
Q3 7.8 11.3 6.1 8.4 0.5 5.6 6.2 1.0 7.6 9.6 10.6 7.6 5.3 5.5 4.0
Q4 6.5 12.3 4.7 4.6 0.2 7.2 5.6 0.0 21.6 10.0 9.5 5.6 13.7 5.2 3.9
07 Q1 6.6 13.3 5.1 2.4 -0.1 3.3 2.5 0.3 9.6 6.1 5.3 10.0 9.2 5.1 4.0
Q2 5.8 11.3 4.2 3.7 -0.1 3.9 4.0 -0.4 7.7 6.2 4.9 8.2 12.0 4.9 3.9
Q3 4.6 8.5 3.3 3.6 -0.1 8.2 6.0 -0.1 26.2 7.6 5.7 6.1 17.8 3.9 3.6
Q4 4.5 7.1 2.9 6.0 -0.0 4.0 4.6 0.4 5.2 4.9 3.5 4.5 12.1 3.8 3.2
08 Q1 2.4 5.2 0.2 5.9 0.1 4.8 4.9 -1.1 9.7 3.6 4.1 2.8 1.5 2.6 2.7
Q2 -0.8 1.8 -3.1 3.2 0.1 4.4 5.3 -2.1 6.8 1.8 2.0 -4.7 2.0 1.2 1.8
Q3 -4.1 -1.3 -7.3 2.5 0.0 1.5 3.4 -4.6 -0.7 -2.0 -2.4 -3.9 0.2 -0.2 0.9
Q4 -9.3 -9.7 -10.9 -3.7 -0.0 -7.9 -10.0 -11.8 3.6 -13.2 -14.4 -12.1 -8.1 -3.0 -0.7
09 Q1 -13.1 -18.6 -12.4 -7.4 -0.1 -19.0 -20.5 -18.7 -13.6 -22.3 -23.9 -21.7 -14.7 -5.3 -3.0
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1.3.  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. VOLUME CHAIN-LINKED INDICES. REFERENCE YEAR 2000=100. BRANCHES OF ACTIVITY. SPAIN (a)
Annual percentage changes
         Services
   Gross
   domestic   Agriculture    Net taxes      Other
   product      and     Energy    Industry  Construction      VAT      linked    net taxes 
   at market   fisheries      Total     Market   Non-market   on products    to imports   on products 
   prices    services    services
06 3.9 2.5 -0.1 1.9 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.0 4.2 6.9 2.8
07 3.7 3.0 0.8 2.8 3.5 4.6 4.6 4.4 2.8 3.3 -2.3
08 1.2 -0.6 1.9 -2.7 -3.3 3.1 2.6 4.8 0.6 -10.4 -0.5
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Source: INE (Quarterly National Accounts of Spain. Base year 2000).
 a. Prepared in accordance with ESA95, seasonally- and working-day-adjusted series (see Economic bulletin April 2002).
06 Q2 3.9 2.9 -0.9 2.1 5.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 7.1 3.4
Q3 4.0 -0.5 0.3 2.5 5.2 4.8 5.1 3.6 3.9 4.7 -0.4
Q4 3.9 8.7 -0.3 2.2 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.4 3.7 4.8 4.9
07 Q1 4.0 4.6 0.2 4.1 3.8 4.5 4.6 4.2 3.3 2.7 -0.9
Q2 3.9 2.5 1.1 3.1 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.3 3.3 2.8 -1.4
Q3 3.6 2.8 0.2 2.9 3.1 4.3 4.3 4.3 2.6 5.4 -0.1
Q4 3.2 2.1 1.7 1.0 2.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 1.9 2.2 -6.6
08 Q1 2.7 1.1 1.6 0.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.6 -1.3 -1.0
Q2 1.8 -0.1 3.5 -2.2 -2.0 3.7 3.4 4.7 1.2 -5.1 -0.9
Q3 0.9 -0.5 2.5 -2.9 -4.6 2.9 2.3 5.1 0.2 -14.3 0.2
Q4 -0.7 -2.7 0.0 -5.5 -8.0 1.7 0.7 5.5 -0.8 -20.9 -0.3
09 Q1 -3.0 -0.7 -5.7 -11.0 -8.0 -0.6 -1.7 3.5 -2.1 -21.7 0.7
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1.4.  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. IMPLICIT DEFLATORS. SPAIN (a)
Annual percentage changes
                                 Demand components                          Branches of activity
 Gross fixed capital formation             Of which 
    Gross
    General   domestic 
     Final    government     Exports     Imports    product   Agricul- 
    consump-      final    of goods    of goods   at market    ture    Market 
    tion of     consump-       and       and     prices    and    Energy    Industry   Construc-   Services   services 
   households      tion   Capital   Construc-     Other    services    services   fisheries     tion
   and NPISHs    goods      tion  products 
     (b)
06 3.4 3.7 2.0 6.7 4.9 4.0 3.8 4.0 -5.3 1.2 4.1 8.0 3.1 2.8
07 3.2 3.2 1.7 3.0 3.2 2.4 2.1 3.2 4.2 2.8 3.5 4.9 3.3 3.1
08 3.8 3.5 1.7 1.9 1.4 3.3 3.6 3.0 3.1 15.7 6.1 3.8 4.8 5.1
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Source: INE (Quarterly National Accounts of Spain. Base year 2000). 
 a. Prepared in accordance with ESA95, seasonally- and working-day-adjusted series (see Economic bulletin April 2002).
 b. Final consumption expenditure may take place on the domestic territory or abroad (ESA95, 3.75). It therefore includes residents’ consumption abroad, which is
 subsequently deducted in Imports of goods and services.
06 Q2 3.7 3.9 2.4 8.4 5.5 4.2 5.5 4.1 -3.9 3.5 4.1 9.3 3.5 3.4
Q3 3.4 3.8 1.7 5.6 5.0 3.7 2.7 4.1 -3.7 -1.2 4.6 7.8 3.1 2.9
Q4 2.9 3.3 1.4 4.9 4.1 3.7 2.0 3.8 -6.6 -2.9 4.1 5.8 2.8 2.5
07 Q1 2.9 3.2 1.9 3.7 3.7 3.0 1.7 3.5 -3.5 -1.0 3.6 5.4 3.0 2.8
Q2 2.6 3.1 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 0.7 3.3 0.7 0.1 3.3 4.7 2.9 2.7
Q3 3.1 3.0 1.3 2.6 2.7 2.1 2.0 3.0 7.6 4.7 3.0 4.5 3.3 3.1
Q4 4.2 3.2 2.1 3.1 3.5 1.7 4.1 3.0 11.8 7.5 4.0 5.2 3.9 3.9
08 Q1 4.2 3.7 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.7 4.0 3.2 8.4 14.9 5.7 5.2 4.5 4.8
Q2 4.2 3.9 1.8 2.4 1.4 3.1 4.5 3.1 10.0 18.1 6.6 4.5 4.9 5.2
Q3 4.5 3.6 2.2 2.5 1.1 4.5 5.2 3.4 3.6 19.2 6.7 4.2 4.9 5.4
Q4 2.4 2.8 0.7 -0.0 0.5 2.8 0.7 2.5 -8.2 10.5 5.6 1.4 4.7 5.2
09 Q1 0.7 0.9 0.6 -0.9 0.4 -1.1 -4.0 1.3 -0.7 8.3 2.8 0.7 3.3 3.7
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2.1.  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES
Annual percentage changes
      OECD        EU-27       Euro     Germany       Spain        United      France       Italy      Japan       United
      area        States      Kingdom
06 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.9 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.9
07 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 3.7 2.0 2.3 1.5 2.3 2.6
08 0.9 0.8 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.3 -1.0 -0.7 0.7
 Sources: ECB, INE and OECD.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Table 26.2 of the BE Boletín Estadístico.
06 Q1 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.2 3.8 3.1 2.1 1.9 2.2 3.2
Q2 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.9 3.2 2.9 1.9 2.0 2.8
Q3 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.2 4.0 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.7
Q4 3.0 3.5 3.4 4.1 3.9 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.8
07 Q1 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.0 1.3 2.5 2.4 3.1 2.4
Q2 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.5 3.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.7
Q3 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.4 3.6 2.8 2.5 1.5 2.0 2.7
Q4 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.7 3.2 2.3 2.2 0.2 1.9 2.4
08 Q1 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.8 2.7 2.5 1.9 0.4 1.2 2.5
Q2 1.8 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.0 -0.3 0.6 1.8
Q3 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.1 -1.3 -0.3 0.5
Q4 -1.7 -1.6 -1.7 -1.8 -0.7 -0.8 -1.7 -3.0 -4.4 -1.8
09 Q1 ... -4.7 -4.9 -6.9 -3.0 -2.5 -3.2 -6.0 -8.4 -4.9
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2.2.  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
 Sources: ECB and OECD.
Percentages
      OECD       EU-27       Euro     Germany      Spain        United      France      Italy      Japan       United
      area        States       Kingdom
06 6.2 8.2 8.3 9.8 8.5 4.6 9.2 6.8 4.1 5.4
07 5.7 7.1 7.5 8.4 8.3 4.6 8.3 6.1 3.9 5.3
08 6.0 7.0 7.6 7.3 11.4 5.8 7.8 6.8 4.0 5.6
07 Dec 5.6 6.9 7.3 7.9 8.8 4.9 7.7 6.4 3.7 5.1
08 Jan 5.6 6.8 7.3 7.7 9.0 4.9 7.6 6.6 3.8 5.1
     Feb 5.6 6.7 7.2 7.6 9.2 4.8 7.5 6.6 3.9 5.1
     Mar 5.6 6.7 7.2 7.4 9.5 5.1 7.6 6.6 3.8 5.2
     Apr 5.6 6.8 7.3 7.4 10.0 5.0 7.6 6.8 4.0 5.1
     May 5.8 6.8 7.4 7.4 10.5 5.5 7.6 6.8 4.0 5.3
     Jun 5.9 6.9 7.4 7.3 11.0 5.6 7.7 6.8 4.1 5.5
     Jul 6.0 7.0 7.5 7.2 11.4 5.8 7.7 6.8 4.0 5.7
     Aug 6.2 7.0 7.6 7.1 11.8 6.2 7.8 6.8 4.1 5.8
     Sep 6.2 7.1 7.7 7.1 12.4 6.2 7.9 6.8 4.0 6.0
     Oct 6.4 7.3 7.9 7.1 13.2 6.6 8.1 7.0 3.8 6.1
     Nov 6.6 7.5 8.0 7.1 14.0 6.8 8.2 7.0 4.0 6.3
     Dec 6.9 7.6 8.2 7.2 14.7 7.2 8.4 7.0 4.3 6.5
09 Jan 7.2 8.0 8.6 7.3 15.6 7.6 8.6 7.4 4.1 6.8
     Feb 7.5 8.3 8.8 7.4 16.5 8.1 8.8 7.4 4.4 7.1
     Mar 7.8 8.5 9.0 7.5 17.3 8.5 9.0 7.4 4.8 7.2
     Apr 8.0 8.7 9.3 7.7 18.0 8.9 9.1 ... 5.0 ...
     May 8.3 8.9 9.5 7.7 18.7 9.4 9.3 ... 5.2 ...
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2.3.  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON. CONSUMER PRICES (a)
 Sources: OECD, INE and Eurostat.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Tables 26.11 and 26.15 of the BE Boletín Estadístico.
 a. Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the EU countries.
Annual percentage changes
      OECD       EU-27       Euro     Germany      Spain      United      France      Italy      Japan       United
      area      States       Kingdom
05 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.9 3.4 3.4 1.9 2.2 -0.3 2.1
06 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.8 3.6 3.2 1.9 2.2 0.2 2.3
07 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.9 1.6 2.0 0.1 2.3
08 3.7 3.7 3.3 2.8 4.1 3.8 3.2 3.5 1.4 3.6
08 Jan 3.6 3.4 3.2 2.9 4.4 4.3 3.2 3.1 0.7 2.2
     Feb 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.0 4.4 4.0 3.2 3.1 1.0 2.5
     Mar 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.3 4.6 3.9 3.5 3.6 1.2 2.4
     Apr 3.5 3.6 3.3 2.6 4.2 4.0 3.4 3.6 0.8 3.0
     May 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.1 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.7 1.3 3.3
     Jun 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.4 5.1 5.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.8
     Jul 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.5 5.3 5.5 4.0 4.0 2.3 4.4
     Aug 4.6 4.3 3.8 3.3 4.9 5.4 3.5 4.2 2.1 4.8
     Sep 4.4 4.2 3.6 3.0 4.6 4.9 3.4 3.9 2.1 5.2
     Oct 3.8 3.7 3.2 2.5 3.6 3.6 3.0 3.6 1.7 4.5
     Nov 2.2 2.8 2.1 1.4 2.4 1.1 1.9 2.7 1.0 4.1
     Dec 1.6 2.2 1.6 1.1 1.5 0.1 1.2 2.4 0.4 3.1
09 Jan 1.2 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.8 - 0.8 1.4 - 3.0
     Feb 1.3 1.8 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.5 -0.1 3.1
     Mar 0.8 1.4 0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 0.4 1.1 -0.3 2.9
     Apr 0.6 1.3 0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.7 0.1 1.2 -0.1 2.3
     May 0.1 0.8 0.0 - -0.9 -1.3 -0.3 0.8 -1.1 2.2
     Jun ... 0.6 -0.1 - -1.0 ... -0.6 0.6 ... 1.8
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2.4.  BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES AND NOMINAL AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE
        RATE INDICES FOR THE EURO, US DOLLAR AND JAPANESE YEN
 Sources: ECB and BE.
 a. Geometric mean -calculated using a double weighting system based on 1995-97 (until 1999) and 1999-2001 (since 1999) manufacturing trade of changes in the spot price of
 each currency against the currencies of the other  developed countries. A fall in the index denotes a depreciation of the currency  against  those of the other  developed
 countries.
 b. Obtained by multiplying the relative prices of each area/country (relation betwen its price index and the price index of the group) by the nominal effective exchange rate.
 A decline in the index denotes a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate and, may be interpreted as an improvement in that area/country’s competitiveness.
Average of daily data
  Indices of the nominal effective              Indices of the real effective exchange rate
           Exchange rates     exchange rate vis-à-vis the (a)                  vis-à-vis the developed countries (b)
  developed countries 1999 QI=100                             1999 QI=100
   Based on consumer prices    Based on producer prices
   US dollar   Japanese yen  Japanese yen    Euro   US dollar   Japanese
     per       per       per     yen
   ECU/euro     ECU/euro    US dollar    Euro   US dollar   Japanese    Euro   US dollar   Japanese
    yen     yen
06 1.2561 146.09 116.32 103.7 86.7 93.6 105.0 94.8 76.5 103.9 97.4 74.3
07 1.3710 161.26 117.74 107.9 82.2 88.7 109.0 90.9 70.8 107.8 93.8 69.0
08 1.4707 152.31 103.36 113.0 78.2 99.5 113.6 87.5 77.7 110.8 91.8 75.7
08 J-J 1.5311 160.55 104.93 114.5 75.3 95.1 115.2 84.5 74.3 113.1 88.7 71.9
09 J-J 1.3328 127.28 95.48 112.5 84.3 114.1 112.8 94.3 89.4 108.0 97.0 88.7
08 Apr 1.5751 161.56 102.66 116.3 74.3 96.2 117.0 83.5 74.8 114.7 87.6 72.5
     May 1.5557 162.31 104.34 115.8 74.6 94.9 116.6 83.9 73.9 113.8 89.0 71.1
     Jun 1.5553 166.26 106.91 115.8 75.4 92.7 116.4 85.2 72.0 113.4 90.3 69.1
     Jul 1.5770 168.45 106.83 116.2 74.9 92.2 116.6 85.0 71.6 113.3 90.5 69.0
     Aug 1.4975 163.63 109.28 113.9 78.1 92.6 114.1 88.2 72.2 111.0 92.9 70.3
     Sep 1.4370 153.20 106.62 112.0 79.3 96.9 112.1 89.3 75.5 108.9 95.1 73.3
     Oct 1.3322 133.52 100.11 107.9 83.6 107.8 108.3 93.5 84.4 105.2 97.7 82.3
     Nov 1.2732 123.28 96.82 107.1 86.0 114.2 107.5 94.9 89.6 104.2 98.4 88.6
     Dec 1.3449 122.51 91.16 112.4 83.9 119.3 112.8 92.0 93.9 109.2 94.6 93.7
09 Jan 1.3239 119.73 90.42 111.9 84.1 121.1 112.3 93.1 94.9 108.1 95.9 93.5
     Feb 1.2785 118.30 92.54 110.4 86.2 120.1 110.6 95.5 93.3 106.3 98.0 92.5
     Mar 1.3050 127.65 97.84 113.3 87.1 112.9 113.4 96.5 87.7 108.8 98.5 87.4
     Apr 1.3190 130.25 98.74 112.5 85.8 110.8 112.8 95.2 85.9 107.8 97.6 85.4
     May 1.3650 131.85 96.61 113.0 82.3 110.8 113.3 91.3 85.6 108.1 94.9 85.0
     Jun 1.4016 135.39 96.60 114.0 80.5 109.1 114.2 ... ... 108.9 ... ...
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2.5. OFFICIAL INTERVENTION INTEREST RATES AND SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
Percentages
            Official intervention
                interest rates                               3-month interbank rates
  Euro    United States   Japan   United    OECD     EU-15    Euro  Germany    Spain    United  France  Italy   Japan   United
  area  Kingdom    area    States  Kingdom
 Discount   Federal
   rate    funds 
   (a)     (b)    rate    (c)    (d)
06 3.50 6.25 5.02 0.40 5.00 3.61 3.32 3.08 -  - 5.13 -  - 0.26 4.78
07 4.00 4.75 5.00 0.75 5.50 4.23 4.51 4.28 -  - 5.24 -  - 0.71 5.93
08 2.50 0.50 1.87 0.30 2.00 3.45 4.75 4.63 -  - 3.07 -  - 0.77 5.41
 Sorces: ECB, Reuters and BE.
 a. Main refinancing operations.
 b. As from January 2003, the Primary Credit Rate.
 c. Discount rate.
 d. Retail bank base rate.
08 Jan 4.00 3.50 3.00 0.75 5.50 3.74 4.64 4.48 -  - 3.85 -  - 0.74 5.56
     Feb 4.00 3.50 3.00 0.75 5.25 3.38 4.54 4.36 -  - 3.02 -  - 0.76 5.57
     Mar 4.00 2.50 2.25 0.75 5.25 3.36 4.78 4.60 -  - 2.73 -  - 0.80 5.82
     Apr 4.00 2.25 2.00 0.75 5.00 3.49 4.93 4.78 -  - 2.91 -  - 0.77 5.84
     May 4.00 2.25 2.00 0.75 5.00 3.46 4.98 4.86 -  - 2.83 -  - 0.79 5.75
     Jun 4.00 2.25 2.00 0.75 5.00 3.53 5.07 4.94 -  - 2.90 -  - 0.79 5.85
     Jul 4.25 2.25 2.00 0.75 5.00 3.53 5.08 4.96 -  - 2.92 -  - 0.78 5.76
     Aug 4.25 2.25 2.00 0.75 5.00 3.52 5.07 4.97 -  - 2.91 -  - 0.77 5.70
     Sep 4.25 2.25 2.00 0.75 5.00 3.72 5.13 5.02 -  - 3.35 -  - 0.77 5.79
     Oct 3.75 1.25 1.00 0.50 4.50 4.23 5.25 5.11 -  - 4.53 -  - 0.80 6.06
     Nov 3.25 1.25 1.00 0.50 3.00 3.08 4.23 4.24 -  - 2.80 -  - 0.73 4.18
     Dec 2.50 0.50 0.25 0.30 2.00 2.35 3.26 3.29 -  - 2.05 -  - 0.72 3.04
09 Jan 2.00 0.50 0.25 0.30 1.50 1.66 2.41 2.46 -  - 1.28 -  - 0.53 2.15
     Feb 2.00 0.50 0.25 0.30 1.00 1.53 1.95 1.94 -  - 1.42 -  - 0.54 1.94
     Mar 1.50 0.50 0.25 0.30 0.50 1.35 1.63 1.64 -  - 1.34 -  - 0.44 1.65
     Apr 1.25 0.50 0.25 0.30 0.50 1.19 1.40 1.42 -  - 1.25 -  - 0.31 1.30
     May 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.30 0.50 0.99 1.26 1.28 -  - 0.94 -  - 0.31 1.13
     Jun 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.30 0.50 0.90 1.19 1.23 -  - 0.82 -  - 0.21 1.01
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2.6.  10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS ON DOMESTIC MARKETS
 Sources: ECB, Reuters and BE.
Percentages
      OECD        EU-15       Euro     Germany       Spain        United      France      Italy      Japan       United
      area        States       Kingdom
06 3.99 3.95 3.86 3.78 3.79 4.85 3.80 4.05 1.75 4.55
07 4.12 4.44 4.33 4.23 4.31 4.68 4.30 4.48 1.68 5.08
08 3.63 4.33 4.36 4.00 4.36 3.69 4.24 4.66 1.49 4.55
08 Jan 3.63 4.24 4.23 4.05 4.18 3.76 4.16 4.41 1.43 4.55
     Feb 3.63 4.21 4.14 3.97 4.14 3.76 4.09 4.36 1.45 4.68
     Mar 3.46 4.13 4.07 3.82 4.12 3.53 4.02 4.39 1.31 4.43
     Apr 3.63 4.33 4.28 4.05 4.31 3.68 4.27 4.54 1.41 4.62
     May 3.82 4.48 4.42 4.22 4.42 3.90 4.40 4.64 1.67 4.86
     Jun 4.07 4.83 4.81 4.55 4.79 4.13 4.73 5.11 1.75 5.17
     Jul 3.98 4.79 4.81 4.51 4.80 4.03 4.70 5.10 1.61 5.02
     Aug 3.79 4.49 4.50 4.22 4.56 3.92 4.39 4.82 1.46 4.67
     Sep 3.67 4.43 4.50 4.11 4.57 3.71 4.36 4.82 1.49 4.54
     Oct 3.66 4.31 4.46 3.90 4.47 3.80 4.19 4.76 1.51 4.52
     Nov 3.46 4.06 4.20 3.59 4.15 3.58 4.00 4.61 1.47 4.14
     Dec 2.77 3.61 3.89 3.06 3.86 2.44 3.54 4.40 1.31 3.36
09 Jan 2.81 3.72 4.11 3.09 4.15 2.48 3.61 4.53 1.25 3.39
     Feb 3.01 3.81 4.20 3.16 4.23 2.86 3.66 4.53 1.29 3.59
     Mar 2.97 3.70 4.15 3.07 4.06 2.85 3.65 4.46 1.31 3.22
     Apr 3.03 3.72 4.09 3.18 4.01 2.90 3.66 4.35 1.44 3.38
     May 3.26 3.85 4.14 3.41 4.05 3.30 3.79 4.35 1.45 3.66
     Jun 3.52 4.02 4.32 3.56 4.24 3.74 3.90 4.62 1.47 3.86
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2.7   INTERNATIONAL MARKETS. NON-ENERGY COMMODITIES PRICE INDEX.
        CRUDE OIL AND GOLD PRICE.
 Sources: The Economist, IMF, ECB and BE.
 a. The weights are based on the value of the world commodity imports during the period 1999-2001.
 b. Index of the average price in US dollars of various medium, light and heavy crudes. 
 c. Index of the London market’s 15.30 fixing in dollars. 
Base 2000 = 100
             Non-energy commodity price index (a)           Oil             Gold
  Euro index                  US dollar index    Brent
  North sea     US
  dollars    Euro 
       Industrial products   Index    Index     per     per 
    (b)      US     (c)    troy    gram 
   General    General    Food    dollars    ounce
   Total    Non-food    Metals     per
    agricul-    barrel
     tural
    products 
04 97.4 128.3 125.5 132.2 131.5 130.7 133.8 38.3 146.7 409.2 10.58
05 100.0 134.0 125.5 144.8 131.2 152.1 189.2 54.2 159.5 445.1 11.53
06 125.6 170.8 139.3 211.6 147.3 246.4 227.8 64.9 216.7 604.6 15.45
07 136.4 202.3 175.1 237.4 162.4 278.4 252.1 73.0 249.8 696.7 16.32
08 142.2 227.4 232.4 221.0 176.0 245.5 343.7 97.2 312.5 871.7 19.07
08 J-J 152.5 252.3 252.0 252.7 193.5 285.1 383.6 109.4 326.7 911.4 19.15
09 J-J 116.6 168.2 194.1 134.6 118.6 143.2 ... 51.6 327.9 914.7 22.08
08 May 151.7 255.9 253.7 258.7 199.3 291.2 434.8 123.0 318.6 888.7 18.39
     Jun 155.2 260.3 266.2 252.6 204.1 279.2 465.8 132.0 318.8 889.5 18.39
     Jul 153.6 261.8 265.3 257.2 203.4 286.7 469.5 133.0 336.9 939.8 19.17
     Aug 148.0 239.0 243.8 232.9 190.6 256.0 405.8 114.2 300.8 839.0 18.00
     Sep 144.3 223.4 228.3 217.0 181.0 236.7 351.7 98.1 297.5 829.9 18.56
     Oct 124.4 178.1 185.7 168.2 141.3 183.0 257.5 72.0 289.1 806.6 19.48
     Nov 118.1 163.2 178.9 143.0 127.5 151.4 191.4 52.7 272.7 760.9 19.20
     Dec 103.6 151.0 176.1 118.6 108.7 124.0 147.1 40.5 292.5 816.1 19.54
09 Jan 113.0 161.1 190.0 123.8 114.9 128.0 155.5 42.9 307.8 858.7 20.85
     Feb 112.6 156.2 184.8 119.2 111.2 123.2 147.9 43.3 338.1 943.2 23.72
     Mar 111.3 156.8 182.7 123.3 108.2 131.5 166.3 46.8 331.3 924.3 22.78
     Apr 117.4 167.3 189.9 138.0 120.0 147.8 178.1 50.2 319.1 890.2 21.70
     May 122.3 180.5 206.4 147.1 128.7 157.1 205.8 57.5 332.9 928.6 21.87
     Jun 122.9 186.7 210.4 155.9 128.4 170.9 ... 68.8 339.2 946.2 21.71
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3.1  INDICATORS OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION. SPAIN AND EURO AREA
Annual percentage changes
             Opinion surveys (net percentages)      New car registrations and sales           Retail trade indices. (2005=100). (Deflated indices)
   Memoran-             General index without petrol stations
            Consumers   Retail    Memorandum   dum item:  General   
  trade   item: euro area            of which    euro area   retail   
  confi-   trade         of which   Large    Large   Small   Single-  Memoran- 
  dence    Regis-   Estima-   index   retail   chain   chain   outlet   dum item:
  Confi-    General     House-   index    Consu-   Retail   trations   Private    ted   Registra-   Total   outlets   stores   stores   retail-   euro area
  dence    economic     hold     mer   trade    use    sales     tions    Food      ers
  index  situation:    economic    confi-   confi-       (a)
  anticipa-  situation:    dence   dence   
     ted   anticipa-    index   index   
    trend      ted   
    trend   
  
06 -12 -12 -3 -9 -9 1 -1.0 -0.8 -0.9 3.6 1.6 1.8 0.9 ... ... 1.2 -0.8 2.5
07 -13 -12 -4 -13 -5 1 -1.6 -2.2 -1.2 -0.8 3.2 2.5 1.3 1.9 6.4 3.4 0.7 1.7
08 -34 -33 -21 -27 -18 -7 -27.5 -30.0 -28.1 -8.1 -5.2 -6.1 -2.3 -5.6 0.7 -9.0 -8.4 -0.8
P
A
08 J-J -26 -25 -15 -24 -13 -2 -17.8 -21.5 -17.6 -2.6 -3.5 -4.8 -1.2 -4.1 2.1 -6.7 -7.6 -0.2
09 J-J -36 -38 -20 -26 -30 -18 -38.7 -32.8 -38.3 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
P
P
P
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
 Sources: European Commission, European Economy, Supplement B, INE, Dirección General de Tráfico, Asociación Nacional de Fabricantes de Automóviles y Camiones and 
 ECB.
 a. Data adjusted by working days.
08 Jul -39 -38 -28 -26 -19 -9 -26.5 -28.6 -27.4 -8.5 -4.2 -5.4 -1.0 -4.7 1.1 -6.6 -8.3 -1.3
     Aug -37 -39 -24 -35 -19 -10 -39.7 -40.0 -41.3 -5.9 -7.6 -8.5 -4.0 -7.5 -2.8 -12.4 -10.1 -1.3
     Sep -40 -36 -25 -33 -19 -8 -31.7 -31.8 -32.2 -11.3 -5.6 -6.3 -3.1 -5.7 1.1 -10.7 -8.8 -0.7
     Oct -45 -44 -30 -30 -24 -13 -39.0 -38.6 -40.0 -14.4 -6.9 -7.4 -2.9 -6.9 -0.2 -11.7 -9.7 -2.0
     Nov -45 -42 -26 -26 -26 -13 -48.7 -47.9 -49.6 -18.3 -10.0 -10.2 -5.4 -8.1 -3.0 -16.0 -12.1 -2.0
     Dec -47 -44 -26 -34 -31 -20 -47.3 -45.6 -49.9 -23.2 -7.5 -6.4 -3.8 -9.3 -0.1 -10.2 -6.6 -1.3
09 Jan -44 -43 -25 -29 -31 -20 -42.2 -39.2 -41.6 -20.6 -6.3 -5.0 -2.1 0.4 2.7 -10.4 -9.0 -1.9
     Feb -48 -48 -30 -29 -33 -19 -49.3 -41.2 -48.8 -12.7 -11.7 -10.8 -8.9 -11.8 -7.2 -12.5 -10.9 -4.1
     Mar -42 -47 -22 -27 -34 -17 -39.0 -30.3 -38.7 -5.8 -7.6 -6.1 -6.0 -10.7 -3.6 -6.3 -4.5 -2.6
     Apr -37 -42 -18 -29 -31 -20 -46.0 -42.4 -45.6 -3.7 -8.5 -6.8 -3.1 -5.1 -0.2 -9.9 -8.7 -1.8
     May -25 -23 -12 -22 -28 -14 -38.8 -33.0 -38.7 5.6 -7.8 -6.5 -6.5 -7.8 -2.6 -7.9 -6.2 -2.7
     Jun -22 -23 -10 -22 -25 -16 -15.7 -7.9 -15.9 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
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3.2.  INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY (EXCLUDING CONSTRUCTION): OPINION SURVEYS. SPAIN
 Source: Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio.
 Note: The first forecast is made in the autumn of the previous year and the second and third ones in the spring and autumn of the current year, respectively; the information relating
 to actual investment for the year t is obtained in the spring of the year t+1.
Annual percentage changes at current prices
        ACTUAL INV.            1st FORECAST           2nd FORECAST            3rd FORECAST
03 -30 1 -2 -17
04 -3 11 16 -17
05 27 26 9 4
06 5 19 3 -4
07 3 9 4 -6
08 0 13 19 7
09 ... -12 -21 ...
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3.3.  CONSTRUCTION. INDICATORS OF BUILDING STARTS AND CONSUMPTION OF CEMENT. SPAIN
Annual percentage changes
           Permits: buildable floorage         Approvals:                               Government tenders (budget)
    buildable floorage
                of which               of which           Total                   Building     Apparent 
   consumption
    of cement 
      Non-                 of which       Civil
     Total   Residential   residential      Total       Non-    engineering
   Housing     Housing     For the    Year to     Total   Residential   residential
     month     date    Housing
06 22.0 20.1 20.4 31.9 14.2 16.5 31.3 31.3 26.8 61.7 57.0 15.8 33.3 8.5
07 -10.9 -13.1 -13.3 -0.5 -22.3 -25.2 -15.0 -15.0 -17.7 -46.5 -33.3 -5.0 -13.9 0.2
08 -48.5 -53.1 -53.8 -29.8 -52.1 -56.6 3.0 3.0 -7.4 8.6 13.4 -11.4 7.3 -23.8
P
08 J-J -45.3 -50.1 -50.9 -23.1 -51.0 -55.5 -2.2 -2.2 -17.6 -12.2 -28.3 -18.9 5.2 -16.5
09 J-J ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... -40.5
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Sources: Ministerio de Fomento and Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento de España.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Tables 23.7, 23.8, and 23.9 of the BE Boletín estadístico.
08 Mar -50.6 -51.3 -53.9 -48.3 -67.3 -70.5 70.5 27.7 -33.9 -52.0 -64.0 -27.2 135.8 -25.2
     Apr -33.5 -38.7 -40.1 -10.0 -38.6 -40.6 71.9 37.6 109.1 61.0 3.4 126.9 56.5 -2.2
     May -54.8 -59.6 -60.2 -35.3 -55.5 -58.7 -66.8 12.3 -80.3 -70.7 -68.0 -82.5 -61.4 -21.1
     Jun -45.5 -51.8 -51.0 -12.5 -52.3 -59.2 -66.7 -2.2 -58.2 43.8 -47.3 -69.1 -70.3 -33.1
     Jul -49.4 -55.6 -56.2 -20.5 -52.0 -54.5 -10.5 -3.5 5.2 -37.9 27.6 15.7 -13.9 -21.3
     Aug -62.3 -69.6 -69.7 -27.0 -60.3 -64.5 10.5 -2.4 67.2 250.5 484.0 33.7 -9.6 -30.5
     Sep -49.4 -50.3 -50.0 -47.4 -50.7 -57.5 41.3 0.0 17.5 30.7 230.2 13.9 50.9 -24.6
     Oct -53.5 -59.2 -59.9 -28.2 -56.8 -62.1 -12.4 -1.2 -35.4 -53.2 29.0 -29.8 -3.7 -34.1
     Nov -58.0 -61.7 -62.7 -44.9 -57.9 -63.6 29.5 1.0 45.7 227.9 377.2 4.7 22.8 -41.1
     Dec -41.3 -41.8 -42.4 -40.4 -44.5 -46.3 22.0 3.0 -14.7 -18.0 -44.3 -13.7 33.8 -39.6
09 Jan -61.6 -63.1 -63.4 -56.9 -55.9 -63.5 -20.9 -20.9 -30.2 21.7 -60.9 -41.0 -15.1 -51.9
     Feb ... ... ... ... -56.2 -65.3 57.3 13.8 87.3 28.1 30.0 101.0 47.4 -45.2
     Mar ... ... ... ... -42.0 -57.4 -26.7 -5.1 49.4 7.5 8.5 59.7 -40.1 -36.5
     Apr ... ... ... ... -59.0 -66.5 -47.5 -17.0 -55.8 -39.2 -21.7 -60.2 -43.0 -45.2
     May ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... -39.1
     Jun ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... -20.6
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3.4.  INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX. SPAIN AND EURO AREA (a)
Annual percentage changes
     Overall Index               By end-use of goods   By branch of activity  (NACE 2009)             Memorandum item: euro area
          of which      By end-use of goods
         Total    Consumer    Capital    Inter-    Energy     Mining    Manufac-   Electrity
    goods     goods    mediate      and     turing    and gas
    goods   quarrying    supply    Inter-
   Original   12-month   Total   Manufac-  Consumer  Capital   mediate
    series    %change    turing     goods   goods    goods 
      12
06 103.7 3.7 2.1 7.7 3.6 0.9 2.9 4.0 0.6 4.2 4.4 2.9 5.9 4.9
07 106.2 2.4 2.2 5.0 1.6 0.8 0.9 2.5 2.0 3.7 4.1 2.4 6.7 3.8
08 98.6 -7.1 -4.6 -8.7 -11.0 1.6 -13.7 -7.8 1.1 -1.8 -2.0 -2.0 -0.2 -3.4
M P
M P
08 J-M 106.2 -2.3 -1.4 -2.0 -5.1 3.7 -4.9 -2.8 3.5 2.4 2.0 -0.4 5.3 1.4
09 J-M 82.0 -22.8 -13.7 -29.4 -30.5 -9.4 -32.1 -24.0 -9.5 -18.4 ... -6.9 -23.8 -25.2
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Sources: INE and BCE.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Table 23.1 of the BE Boletín estadístico.
 a. Spain 2005 = 100; euro area 2000 = 100.
08 Feb 108.8 3.8 4.4 5.8 0.1 10.2 6.3 3.3 8.5 3.5 3.3 0.7 6.3 2.6
     Mar 98.7 -15.3 -16.9 -18.4 -17.7 3.2 -15.2 -16.7 1.9 1.2 0.9 -1.9 3.2 0.7
     Apr 111.4 12.0 15.0 16.6 9.2 5.1 11.8 12.4 6.0 4.5 4.1 0.2 8.5 3.1
     May 105.4 -8.4 -8.7 -9.6 -9.9 -0.9 -20.1 -9.0 0.2 -0.8 -0.7 -3.2 1.6 -1.4
     Jun 100.6 -10.9 -10.3 -13.2 -13.6 1.8 -22.1 -11.8 1.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.8 0.9 -1.3
     Jul 110.5 -1.9 0.6 -1.9 -5.5 3.9 -10.2 -2.1 3.1 -1.2 -1.1 -1.7 -0.6 -1.2
     Aug 69.1 -11.5 -11.4 -17.9 -14.3 0.9 -24.5 -13.3 4.3 -0.9 -0.9 -2.7 0.6 -0.7
     Sep 99.8 -4.7 -1.6 -5.7 -8.0 -0.1 -16.7 -4.8 -1.1 -2.4 -2.5 -2.4 -1.6 -4.2
     Oct 100.9 -12.2 -7.1 -18.0 -16.2 -0.1 -18.6 -12.9 -3.4 -5.9 -6.0 -4.5 -5.7 -7.5
     Nov 90.9 -18.3 -12.5 -22.3 -25.0 -3.4 -29.0 -19.4 -5.1 -8.9 -9.3 -4.9 -8.8 -12.7
     Dec 80.3 -16.0 -6.7 -18.7 -28.3 -1.6 -18.0 -17.8 -2.3 -12.2 -13.2 -4.8 -11.5 -21.5
09 Jan 80.7 -24.5 -17.8 -33.9 -32.7 -3.5 -32.7 -26.8 -3.4 -16.6 -18.7 -6.3 -22.1 -23.8
     Feb 82.4 -24.3 -14.1 -33.0 -31.8 -9.7 -35.8 -25.5 -10.9 -19.2 -21.1 -8.6 -25.2 -25.7
     Mar 85.4 -13.5 -0.9 -16.8 -21.6 -12.1 -24.3 -13.6 -11.7 -18.7 -20.2 -7.5 -22.5 -25.9
     Apr 79.8 -28.4 -20.8 -33.6 -36.4 -11.2 -38.3 -29.5 -13.2 -20.5 -21.8 -7.3 -26.8 -27.0
     May 81.9 -22.3 -13.1 -28.4 -28.9 -11.0 -28.0 -23.4 -9.0 -17.0 -18.3 -5.0 -22.1 -23.4
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3.5.  MONTHLY BUSINESS SURVEY: INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION. SPAIN AND EURO AREA
 Sources: Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio and ECB.
 a. Seasonally adjusted.
Percentage balances
                           Industry, excluding construction                     Construction     Memorandum item: euro area 
     Business climate        Trend  Industry, excluding 
  Business  Produc-   Trend   Total   Foreign   Stocks          indicator   Business   Produc-  Orders     construction   Construc-
   climate    tion   in pro-   orders   orders     of    climate    tion     tion
   indi-    over   duction   finished   indicator    climate 
   cator-  the last   products  Con-   In-   In-    Other   Produc-  Orders   Business   Order   indicator
  three   sum-   vest-   ter-    sec-    tion    climate   Book
  months   ption   ment   me-    tors   indicator 
  diate
    (a)    (a)    (a)    (a)    (a)   (a)   goods   (a)
   (a) 
06 -2 7 6 -1 -11 12 -3 1 -3 -1 15 27 22 23 15 2 -0 1
07 -1 7 6 2 -5 10 -2 6 -3 -3 9 21 12 18 21 5 5 -0
08 -17 -16 -8 -24 -21 20 -11 -8 -28 -6 -22 -0 -19 -16 -16 -9 -15 -14
08 J-J -9 -6 -1 -11 -11 17 -7 3 -19 -5 -15 6 -14 -9 -13 -1 -4 -9
09 J-J -33 -44 -18 -55 -55 27 -20 -31 -46 -32 -34 -21 -33 -11 -22 -35 -59 -33
08 Mar -8 -6 -0 -7 -10 16 -5 5 -17 -11 -20 -6 -21 -9 -17 - -1 -8
     Apr -8 -4 1 -10 -10 15 -6 4 -16 -3 -18 4 -18 -23 -13 -2 -5 -11
     May -13 -6 -6 -16 -13 17 -7 -2 -25 -6 -11 23 -10 -9 -26 -2 -5 -8
     Jun -18 -10 -10 -20 -19 23 -13 -2 -29 -3 -11 13 -15 -4 -27 -5 -9 -11
     Jul -17 -16 -7 -29 -19 14 -10 -9 -25 -7 -25 -8 -21 -26 -26 -8 -13 -14
     Aug -18 -10 -8 -25 -20 21 -13 -8 -25 -7 -17 -6 -15 -3 -6 -9 -13 -12
     Sep -22 -20 -11 -33 -27 21 -16 -6 -35 -3 -24 -9 -8 -1 -38 -12 -20 -15
     Oct -27 -20 -17 -37 -32 27 -16 -27 -38 0 -44 -37 -38 -11 -27 -18 -26 -20
     Nov -33 -40 -21 -47 -38 31 -19 -26 -49 -19 -30 4 -27 -50 -8 -25 -36 -23
     Dec -35 -47 -23 -53 -48 29 -22 -34 -50 -3 -34 20 -31 -43 -4 -33 -47 -27
09 Jan -31 -41 -21 -47 -44 26 -17 -27 -47 -4 -40 19 -27 -29 -2 -33 -49 -30
     Feb -36 -54 -23 -55 -57 29 -22 -31 -53 -4 -39 -38 -26 -24 -36 -36 -57 -32
     Mar -37 -55 -26 -58 -60 28 -21 -38 -52 -31 -36 -37 -35 -11 -26 -38 -61 -32
     Apr -34 -42 -16 -59 -58 27 -21 -33 -43 -47 -37 -17 -38 -3 -15 -35 -60 -34
     May -31 -41 -13 -56 -57 25 -21 -31 -39 -51 -25 -26 -37 2 -18 -33 -61 -34
     Jun -32 -32 -11 -57 -54 26 -18 -25 -43 -58 -26 -24 -35 -3 -34 -32 -63 -34
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23* ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2006 2007 2008 2009
60
64
68
72
76
80
84
88
92
96
100
60
64
68
72
76
80
84
88
92
96
100%%
TOTAL INDUSTRY (SPAIN)
TOTAL INDUSTRY (EURO AREA)
   CAPACITY UTILISATION. TOTAL INDUSTRY
   Percentages
2006 2007 2008 2009
60
64
68
72
76
80
84
88
92
96
100
60
64
68
72
76
80
84
88
92
96
100%%
INVESTMENT GOODS
CONSUMPTION GOODS
INTERMEDIATE GOODS
OTHER SECTORS
   CAPACITY UTILISATION. BY TYPE OF GOOD
   Percentages
.
      Series depicted in chart.
.
1  2  3
.
4  5  6
.
7  8  9
.
  10   11   12
.
  13   14   15
.
  16
3.6.  BUSINESS SURVEY: CAPACITY UTILISATION. SPAIN AND EURO AREA
Percentages and percentage balances
  
  
          Total industry          Consumer goods          Investment goods        Intermediate goods            Other sectors    Memo- 
     ramdum
     item: 
      Capacity        Capacity        Capacity        Capacity         Capacity    euro
     utilisation       utilisation       utilisation       utilisation        utilisation    area
  Installed   Installed   Installed   Installed    Installed   capacity
  capacity   capacity   capacity   capacity    capacity   utilisa-
      tion 
  Over last    (Per-   Over last    (Per-   Over last    (Per-   Over last    (Per-    Over last    (Per-
   three   Forecast   centage    three   Forecast   centage    three   Forecast   centage    three   Forecast   centage    three   Forecast   centage 
   months    balan-    months    balan-    months    balan-    months    balan-     months    balan-
    (%)     ces)     (%)     ces)     (%)     ces)     (%)     ces)       (%)    ces)     (%)
     (%)       (%)
     (%)      (%)      (%)   
  
06 80.5 81.6 4 74.8 76.5 4 83.4 83.8 7 82.6 83.5 4 97.3 97.5 - 82.8
07 81.3 82.6 3 76.6 78.2 5 84.2 85.0 -0 82.7 84.2 2 94.7 95.5 - 84.2
08 79.4 79.8 8 75.6 76.7 9 83.0 82.8 4 79.8 79.8 9 93.6 94.1 -0 83.0
08 Q1-Q2 80.8 81.8 5 76.5 78.2 9 84.0 84.7 4 81.8 82.5 3 93.5 94.2 - 83.8
09 Q1-Q2 71.2 71.1 24 70.1 70.3 13 75.6 74.4 19 68.5 68.6 35 90.2 91.1 - 72.6
 Sources: Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio and ECB.
06 Q4 81.6 82.4 2 75.9 76.5 3 83.8 84.8 5 83.9 84.8 -0 98.9 98.4 - 83.7
07 Q1 80.6 81.7 2 75.8 77.2 4 83.5 83.8 1 82.2 83.4 1 93.4 95.9 - 84.2
Q2 81.3 82.8 3 75.5 78.1 6 83.4 84.0 2 83.8 85.2 2 96.0 95.3 - 84.5
Q3 82.1 83.3 1 77.9 79.4 5 85.2 86.5 -7 83.2 84.2 1 93.8 94.6 - 84.1
Q4 81.1 82.5 5 77.1 77.9 6 84.8 85.6 4 81.6 83.9 6 95.5 96.2 - 84.0
08 Q1 81.3 82.1 5 76.7 77.8 9 84.4 85.8 5 82.5 82.9 3 93.8 94.9 - 83.8
Q2 80.3 81.5 5 76.2 78.5 9 83.6 83.5 3 81.1 82.1 4 93.1 93.5 - 83.7
Q3 79.3 79.5 7 76.0 76.5 11 83.8 83.6 4 78.7 79.0 7 93.2 93.0 - 82.8
Q4 76.8 75.9 14 73.4 73.9 10 80.1 78.3 6 76.9 75.0 23 94.3 94.8 -0 81.5
09 Q1 72.8 72.4 20 72.5 71.9 9 77.6 75.6 16 69.5 69.9 32 85.0 86.1 - 74.7
Q2 69.5 69.7 27 67.6 68.6 18 73.6 73.2 23 67.4 67.3 39 95.4 96.0 - 70.5
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3.7.  TOURISM AND TRANSPORT STATISTICS. SPAIN
Annual percentage changes
     Hotel stays (a)     Overnight stays      Visitors entering Spain                    Air transport Maritime transport      Rail transport
               Passengers
    Total    Foreig-     Total    Foreig-    Total   Tourists   Day-trip-
   ners    ners     pers    Interna-   Freight  Passen-   Freight    Passen-   Freight 
   Total    Domestic    tional  gers    gers
   flights    flights
06 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.5 3.9 3.7 4.1 6.7 6.7 6.8 -4.5 10.2 4.9 2.0 -3.1
07 3.1 4.0 1.7 2.1 2.9 1.1 5.5 9.1 9.0 9.2 4.2 5.2 4.7 -1.7 -1.5
08 -1.6 0.1 -1.1 0.3 -1.1 -2.4 0.7 -3.0 -7.5 0.3 0.0 -1.5 -2.1 -1.1 -10.3
P
P
08 J-M 2.5 5.0 2.9 4.2 4.1 3.3 5.3 4.3 1.8 6.3 1.8 3.3 4.4 -1.7 -5.3
09 J-M -10.9 -13.4 -10.2 -11.5 -9.8 -11.8 -7.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... -6.3 ...
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Sources: INE and Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, Estadística de Movimientos Turísticos en Frontera.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Table 23.15 of the BE Boletín estadístico .
 a. From January 2003, the information for Galicia is based on total figures for hotel stays and overnight stays for the month. The directory of hotels has been reviewed
 thoroughly. Since January 2006, the directories have been update and the information-collection period extended to every day of the month
08 Feb 8.0 8.6 9.4 9.6 5.9 6.3 5.3 10.2 9.9 10.5 4.2 2.9 1.0 1.6 3.6
     Mar 7.5 5.6 10.3 3.9 6.6 6.5 6.7 6.8 2.4 10.6 -2.4 27.2 0.3 -6.6 -18.4
     Apr -10.0 -1.1 -11.0 -1.7 -2.8 -2.2 -3.5 -2.4 -2.0 -2.7 9.9 -19.2 9.6 4.1 7.7
     May 6.2 7.2 6.7 6.3 9.7 4.7 18.5 2.3 -5.3 7.9 -0.3 7.3 -1.1 -4.5 -13.8
     Jun -2.6 -0.7 -2.3 -1.4 1.7 0.8 3.2 -1.6 -6.2 1.5 8.9 0.3 1.7 -4.4 -9.7
     Jul 0.6 2.0 0.9 2.9 -4.2 -7.1 1.0 -3.5 -9.0 0.0 3.5 -5.0 0.0 1.3 -2.9
     Aug -0.7 0.1 -0.6 1.1 -0.1 -2.7 3.2 -2.4 -9.7 2.3 5.6 -1.5 -5.1 4.1 -16.9
     Sep -3.3 -2.3 -2.8 -2.3 -5.8 -5.4 -6.5 -8.8 -15.9 -4.3 -1.4 -8.2 -6.1 -2.6 -2.5
     Oct -6.6 -3.3 -5.1 -2.8 -5.8 -4.9 -7.2 -10.9 -18.3 -5.8 -2.7 -1.1 -5.7 0.5 -14.2
     Nov -11.8 -11.3 -10.6 -8.7 -7.9 -11.5 -3.5 -14.3 -19.5 -9.6 -6.5 -4.6 -15.0 0.3 -26.8
     Dec -9.6 -12.6 -10.6 -10.9 -10.3 -12.9 -7.6 -13.7 -16.2 -11.4 -13.3 -5.4 -14.1 -2.9 -27.8
09 Jan -13.3 -14.8 -12.0 -11.6 -5.2 -9.8 -0.0 -17.1 -23.1 -11.9 -15.0 -5.1 -23.1 -6.5 -38.7
     Feb -14.7 -18.1 -15.5 -17.2 -11.8 -15.9 -6.6 -18.5 -20.8 -16.4 -19.8 5.5 -13.6 -10.8 -32.9
     Mar -19.4 -19.6 -18.9 -15.1 -17.3 -20.8 -12.5 -19.0 -18.2 -19.5 -13.0 -27.2 -14.0 -4.2 -12.6
     Apr -1.2 -8.3 2.0 -5.9 -2.6 -1.7 -3.9 -5.0 -9.3 -1.6 -23.0 23.5 -19.6 -6.1 -40.5
     May -8.2 -10.4 -8.9 -10.2 -11.1 -11.7 -10.3 ... ... ... ... ... ... -3.8 ...
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4.1.  LABOUR FORCE. SPAIN
Thousands and annual percentage changes
        Population over 16 years of age                        Labour force
                Annual change (b)
 Participation
     rate  Due to change  Due to change
   Thousands     Annual   4-quarter       (%)    Thousands      Total  in population  in partici-    4-quarter 
    change   % change       (a)  over 16 years  pation rate    %  change 
      (a)     of age
06 37 008 592 1.6 58.33 21 585 699 345 354 3.3
07 37 663 655 1.8 58.92 22 190 605 386 219 2.8
08 38 208 545 1.4 59.80 22 848 658 326 333 3.0
M  
M  
08 Q1-Q1 38 043 614 1.6 59.35 22 577 651 364 287 3.0
09 Q1-Q1 38 409 366 1.0 60.15 23 102 525 220 305 2.3
Source: INE (Labour Force Survey: 2005 methodology).
 a. the new definition of unemployment applies from 2001 Q1 onwards, entailing a break in the series. (See www.ine.es).
b. Col.7 = (col.5/col.1)x annual change in col.1. Col. 8  = (annual change in col.4/100) x col.1(t-4).
General note to the tables: As a result of the change in the population base (2001 Census), all the series in this table have been revised as from 1996. In addition, since 2005
Q1 the new obligatory variables referred to in Regulation (EC) 2257/2003 (on the adaptation of the list of labour force survey characteristics) have been included, a centralised
procedure for telephone interviews has been set in place and the questionnaire has been modified. Thus, in 2005 Q1, there is a break in the series of some variables. For further
 information, see www.ine.es 
06 Q3 37 065 575 1.6 58.44 21 661 705 336 368 3.4
Q4 37 236 583 1.6 58.58 21 812 657 342 315 3.1
07 Q1 37 429 629 1.7 58.58 21 925 589 368 221 2.8
Q2 37 592 661 1.8 58.86 22 127 597 389 208 2.8
Q3 37 734 669 1.8 59.10 22 303 642 395 246 3.0
Q4 37 897 661 1.8 59.12 22 405 592 391 201 2.7
08 Q1 38 043 614 1.6 59.35 22 577 651 364 287 3.0
Q2 38 162 570 1.5 59.76 22 807 679 340 339 3.1
Q3 38 271 537 1.4 59.95 22 945 643 322 321 2.9
Q4 38 357 460 1.2 60.13 23 065 660 276 384 2.9
09 Q1 38 409 366 1.0 60.15 23 102 525 220 305 2.3
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4.2.  EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE-EARNERS. SPAIN AND EURO AREA
Thousands and annual percentage changes
     Memorandum item: 
                                                Employment             Unemployment          euro area
                 Total               Wage-earners                  Other
   Employ-
    Unem-    ment     Unem- 
   Annual    4-quarter    Annual    4-quarter    Annual    4-quarter    Annual 4-quarter   ployment   4-quarter   ployment
   Thousands   change   % change   Thousands   change   % change   Thousands   change   % change   Thousands   change   % change     rate    % change      rate 
      (a)      (a)
06 19 748 774 4.1 16 208 706 4.6 3 540 68 2.0 1 837 -75 -3.9 8.51 1.6 8.34
07 20 356 608 3.1 16 760 552 3.4 3 596 56 1.6 1 834 -3 -0.2 8.26 1.8 7.48
08 20 258 -98 -0.5 16 681 -79 -0.5 3 576 -20 -0.5 2 591 757 41.3 11.33 0.7 7.56
M  
M  
08 Q1-Q1 20 402 333 1.7 16 817 303 1.8 3 585 30 0.8 2 174 318 17.1 9.63 1.5 7.24
09 Q1-Q1 19 091 -1 312 -6.4 15 843 -974 -5.8 3 248 -337 -9.4 4 011 1 837 84.5 17.36 -1.4 8.80
Sources: INE (Labour Force Survey: 2005 methodology), and ECB.
a. the new definition of unemployment applies from 2001 Q1 onwards, entailing a break in the series. (See www.ine.es).
General note to the tables: As a result of the change in the population base (2001 Census), all the series in this table have been revised as from 1996. In addition, since 2005
Q1 the new obligatory variables referred to in Regulation (EC) 2257/2003 (on the adaptation of the list of labour force survey characteristics) have been included, a centralised
procedure for telephone interviews has been set in place and the questionnaire has been modified. Thus, in 2005 Q1, there is a break in the series of some variables. For further
 information, see www.ine.es.
06 Q3 19 896 705 3.7 16 366 616 3.9 3 530 88 2.6 1 765 - - 8.15 1.7 8.19
Q4 20 002 688 3.6 16 466 625 3.9 3 536 63 1.8 1 811 -31 -1.7 8.30 1.7 7.99
07 Q1 20 069 669 3.4 16 515 626 3.9 3 555 44 1.2 1 856 -80 -4.1 8.47 1.8 7.68
Q2 20 367 674 3.4 16 779 668 4.1 3 588 6 0.2 1 760 -77 -4.2 7.95 1.7 7.48
Q3 20 511 615 3.1 16 870 504 3.1 3 641 111 3.1 1 792 27 1.5 8.03 1.8 7.44
Q4 20 477 475 2.4 16 877 410 2.5 3 600 65 1.8 1 928 117 6.5 8.60 1.7 7.32
08 Q1 20 402 333 1.7 16 817 303 1.8 3 585 30 0.8 2 174 318 17.1 9.63 1.5 7.24
Q2 20 425 58 0.3 16 853 74 0.4 3 572 -16 -0.4 2 382 622 35.3 10.44 1.1 7.37
Q3 20 346 -164 -0.8 16 746 -124 -0.7 3 600 -41 -1.1 2 599 807 45.0 11.33 0.5 7.59
Q4 19 857 -620 -3.0 16 308 -568 -3.4 3 549 -52 -1.4 3 208 1 280 66.4 13.91 -0.1 8.03
09 Q1 19 091 -1 312 -6.4 15 843 -974 -5.8 3 248 -337 -9.4 4 011 1 837 84.5 17.36 -1.4 8.80
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27* ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2006 2007 2008 2009
-24
-20
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
-24
-20
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12%%
INDUSTRY
CONSTRUCTION
SERVICES
   EMPLOYMENT
   Annual percentage changes
2005 2006 2007 2008
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60%%
TOTAL
INDUSTRY
CONSTRUCTION
SERVICES
   TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT
   Percentages
M  
M  
M  
.
      Series depicted in chart.
1  2
.
3  4  5  6
.
7  8
.
9
.
  10   11
.
  12
.
  13   14
.
  15   16
4.3.  EMPLOYMENT BY BRANCH OF ACTIVITY. SPAIN (a)
Annual percentage changes
    Memorandum
                Total              Agriculture             Industry             Construction      Services     item:
   Propor-    Propor-    Propor-    Propor-    Propor-     Employment 
   tion of    tion of    tion of    tion of    tion of        in
   Employ-    Wage-    tempora   Employ-    Wage-    tempora   Employ-    Wage-    tempora   Employ-    Wage-    tempora   Employ-    Wage-    tempora-     branches
    ment    earners    ry em-     ment    earners    ry em-     ment    earners    ry em-     ment    earners    ry em-     ment    earners    ry em-      other
   ploy-    ploy-    ploy-    ploy-    ployment      than
   ment    ment    ment    ment    agriculture 
06 4.1 4.6 34.0 -5.6 -1.2 59.0 0.4 0.5 24.5 8.0 8.1 56.2 5.0 5.3 31.3 4.6
07 3.1 3.4 31.7 -2.0 2.0 58.6 -0.9 -0.5 22.8 6.0 6.7 54.2 3.8 3.9 28.4 3.3
08 -0.5 -0.5 29.2 -5.1 -8.0 58.0 -1.2 -1.2 20.7 -10.5 -12.2 48.9 2.0 2.3 27.0 -0.3
M  
M  
08 Q1-Q1 1.7 1.8 30.1 -6.4 -10.2 61.3 2.3 3.2 21.9 -1.5 -2.0 51.3 2.7 2.8 27.0 2.0
09 Q1-Q1 -6.4 -5.8 25.4 -3.0 3.3 63.0 -12.5 -12.0 16.6 -25.9 -29.9 40.5 -1.3 0.0 23.9 -6.6
 Source: INE (Labour Force Survey: 2005 methodology).
 a.  Series re-calculated drawing on the transition matrix to NACE 2009 published by INE. The underlying series of this indicator are in Tables 24.4 and 24.6 of the BE Boletín
 Estadístico.
 General note to the tables:As a result of the change in the population base (2001 Census), all the series in this table have been revised as from 1996. In addition, since 2005
 Q1 the new obligatory variables referred to in Regulation (EC) 2257/2003 (on the adaptation of the list of labour force survey characteristics) have been included, a centralised
 procedure for telephone interviews has been set in place and the questionnaire has been modified. Thus, in 2005 Q1, there is a break in the series of some variables. For further
 information, see www.ine.es. 
06 Q3 3.7 3.9 34.6 -7.9 -5.8 57.2 -0.9 -0.7 25.0 8.3 8.5 56.6 4.8 4.8 32.0 4.3
Q4 3.6 3.9 33.8 -8.4 -7.1 59.0 0.8 0.9 24.2 8.1 8.0 56.1 4.3 4.5 31.0 4.2
07 Q1 3.4 3.9 32.0 0.5 7.2 63.1 -0.4 -0.2 22.7 9.3 10.0 54.7 3.5 3.8 28.4 3.6
Q2 3.4 4.1 31.8 -3.8 0.3 58.6 -1.2 -0.8 22.8 7.5 8.9 55.2 4.3 4.7 28.4 3.8
Q3 3.1 3.1 31.9 -3.1 0.3 55.6 -0.9 -0.7 23.2 4.8 5.3 54.4 4.1 3.7 28.9 3.4
Q4 2.4 2.5 30.9 -1.8 0.0 57.1 -1.0 -0.4 22.7 2.6 2.8 52.7 3.5 3.3 27.8 2.6
08 Q1 1.7 1.8 30.1 -6.4 -10.2 61.3 2.3 3.2 21.9 -1.5 -2.0 51.3 2.7 2.8 27.0 2.0
Q2 0.3 0.4 29.4 -4.4 -8.7 56.6 0.9 1.1 21.4 -7.6 -8.8 49.8 2.0 2.5 26.8 0.5
Q3 -0.8 -0.7 29.5 -4.6 -9.5 54.2 -1.4 -1.5 20.8 -12.6 -14.2 48.7 1.9 2.4 27.7 -0.6
Q4 -3.0 -3.4 27.9 -4.8 -3.4 59.8 -6.6 -7.6 18.7 -20.3 -23.9 45.7 1.4 1.7 26.3 -3.0
09 Q1 -6.4 -5.8 25.4 -3.0 3.3 63.0 -12.5 -12.0 16.6 -25.9 -29.9 40.5 -1.3 0.0 23.9 -6.6
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4.4.  WAGE-EARNERS BY TYPE OF CONTRACT AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY DURATION. SPAIN. (a)
Thousands, annual percentage changes and %
                                                  Wage-earners                  Unemployment
                  By type of contract                 By duration of working day                  By duration
          Less         More
       Permanent             Temporary       Full-time             Part-time       than one year     than one year 
    Annual   4-quar-    Annual   4-quar-   Proportion     Annual   4-quar-     Annual   4-quar-   As % for    Unem-   4-quar-   Unem-   4-quar-
    change   ter %    change   ter %   of tempo-     change   ter %     change   ter %     wage    ployment    ter %   ployment   ter % 
   change    change   rary em-    change    change   earners     rate    change    rate    change
   ployment 
   Thousands    Thousands    Thousands    Thousands      (a)     (a)
06 358 3.5 348 6.7 34.03 645 4.7 61 3.2 12.13 5.20 -2.0 2.18 -14.9
07 762 7.1 -210 -3.8 31.67 495 3.5 57 2.9 12.07 5.14 1.5 1.96 -7.6
08 348 3.0 -426 -8.0 29.25 -112 -0.8 33 1.6 12.33 7.75 55.5 2.41 27.0
M  
M  
08 Q1-Q1 509 4.5 -207 -3.9 30.15 321 2.2 -18 -0.9 12.33 6.36 26.2 2.15 2.1
09 Q1-Q1 70 0.6 -1 045 -20.6 25.41 -996 -6.8 22 1.1 13.22 12.42 99.7 4.01 91.0
Source: INE (Labour Force Survey: 2005 methodology).
a. The new definition of unemployment applies from 2001 Q1 onwards, entailing a break in the series. (See www.ine.es).
General note to the tables: As a result of the change in the population base (2001 Census), all the series in this table have been revised as from 1996. In addition, since 2005 
Q1 the new obligatory variables referred to in Regulation (EC) 2257/2003 (on the adaptation of the list of labour force survey characteristics) have been included, a centralised 
 procedure for telephone interviews has been set in place and the questionnaire has been modified. Thus, in 2005 Q1, there is a break in the series of some variables. For further
 information, see www.ine.es.
06 Q3 371 3.6 245 4.5 34.59 549 3.9 67 3.7 11.49 4.79 0.6 2.08 -11.5
Q4 406 3.9 218 4.1 33.82 515 3.7 109 5.8 12.19 5.14 -0.5 2.07 -14.5
07 Q1 645 6.1 -19 -0.4 31.95 519 3.7 107 5.4 12.66 5.19 -7.2 2.17 -5.8
Q2 865 8.2 -197 -3.6 31.85 587 4.2 81 4.1 12.34 4.87 -2.6 1.96 -8.9
Q3 777 7.3 -273 -4.8 31.94 475 3.3 29 1.6 11.32 4.95 6.4 1.76 -12.6
Q4 761 7.0 -350 -6.3 30.92 399 2.8 11 0.6 11.96 5.53 10.5 1.95 -3.3
08 Q1 509 4.5 -207 -3.9 30.15 321 2.2 -18 -0.9 12.33 6.36 26.2 2.15 2.1
Q2 465 4.1 -391 -7.3 29.39 62 0.4 11 0.5 12.36 7.09 50.0 2.20 15.7
Q3 320 2.8 -444 -8.2 29.53 -175 -1.2 52 2.7 11.72 7.67 59.5 2.34 36.3
Q4 96 0.8 -664 -12.7 27.93 -656 -4.4 88 4.3 12.92 9.86 83.6 2.97 56.8
09 Q1 70 0.6 -1 045 -20.6 25.41 -996 -6.8 22 1.1 13.22 12.42 99.7 4.01 91.0
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4.5.  REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT BY BRANCH OF ACTIVITY. CONTRACTS AND PLACEMENTS. SPAIN
Thousands, annual percentage changes and %
                                          Registered unemployment                     Contracts      Placements
              Total   First time                         Previously employed (a)         Total   Percentage of total         Total
 job-seekers(a) 
                            12-month
                            % change
  Annual     12        12      12      12 
  change    month       month    month     month
    Thou-      %         %          Branches other than agriculture     Thou-       % Perma-    Part    Tempo-     Thou-       % 
    sands    Thou-    change       change     sands    change nent    time     rary     sands    change
   sands    Total    Agri- 
  culture    Total    Industry  Construc-   Services
    tion
06 2 039 -30 -1.5 -0.6 -1.6 7.4 -1.9 -4.0 -4.0 -1.0 1 544 7.9 11.77 23.39 88.23 1 475 6.0
07 2 039 -0 -0.0 -0.7 0.1 1.9 -0.0 -4.3 5.7 -0.0 1 552 0.5 11.88 23.90 88.12 1 505 2.0
08 2 540 501 24.6 7.9 26.6 30.6 26.5 17.0 71.1 20.1 1 383 -10.9 11.39 25.61 88.61 1 358 -9.8
M  
M  
08 J-J 2 327 297 14.6 0.8 16.4 24.0 16.1 6.9 48.7 12.4 1 426 -7.2 12.38 23.62 87.62 1 397 -5.8
09 J-J 3 541 1 214 52.2 26.1 54.3 52.3 54.4 57.1 88.3 45.0 1 103 -22.7 10.41 26.13 89.59 ... ...
 Source: Instituto de Empleo Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal (INEM).
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Tables 24.16 and 24.17 of the BE Boletín estadístico.
 a. To December 2008, NACE 1993; from January 2009, NACE 2009.
08 May 2 354 380 19.3 2.3 21.5 23.4 21.4 10.9 63.0 16.3 1 385 -14.8 11.88 24.30 88.12 1 358 -14.4
     Jun 2 390 425 21.6 3.2 24.0 26.2 23.9 13.5 70.7 17.7 1 419 -10.3 10.85 25.09 89.15 1 381 -9.7
     Jul 2 427 457 23.2 5.6 25.4 26.8 25.3 15.2 70.7 18.9 1 626 -7.3 9.86 26.45 90.14 1 580 -6.8
     Aug 2 530 502 24.7 8.1 26.7 27.8 26.7 16.3 71.0 19.9 1 050 -18.4 9.29 24.35 90.71 1 030 -17.5
     Sep 2 625 608 30.1 12.2 32.4 31.4 32.4 22.0 85.6 24.3 1 502 -5.9 11.55 28.59 88.45 1 508 -4.8
     Oct 2 818 769 37.6 20.9 39.5 41.7 39.4 29.2 99.5 30.2 1 585 -17.1 11.37 30.44 88.63 1 570 -16.0
     Nov 2 989 895 42.7 22.3 45.1 45.1 45.1 37.1 106.7 34.7 1 163 -27.0 11.11 28.35 88.89 1 135 -26.3
     Dec 3 129 999 46.9 22.7 49.6 47.3 49.7 42.8 108.1 38.3 1 118 -11.4 9.22 27.44 90.78 1 093 -10.6
09 Jan 3 328 1 066 47.1 10.6 50.1 41.5 50.4 47.8 98.9 39.0 1 126 -28.8 10.59 23.69 89.41 1 112 -27.6
     Feb 3 482 1 167 50.4 14.5 53.4 31.4 54.1 55.7 99.3 42.4 1 017 -28.8 11.38 25.22 88.62 999 -30.3
     Mar 3 605 1 304 56.7 23.9 59.5 64.2 59.4 61.7 97.6 48.8 1 061 -17.5 11.42 26.47 88.58 1 047 -16.8
     Apr 3 645 1 306 55.9 33.3 57.7 63.1 57.6 62.1 90.0 47.8 1 031 -29.3 10.81 27.08 89.19 1 031 -27.2
     May 3 620 1 267 53.8 38.4 55.1 59.5 55.0 59.8 78.5 47.2 1 110 -19.8 9.83 26.62 90.17 1 110 -18.2
     Jun 3 565 1 174 49.1 35.7 50.3 54.0 50.1 55.3 65.3 44.5 1 275 -10.2 8.45 27.70 91.55 ... ...
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4.6.  COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
 Source: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración (MTIN), Estadística de Convenios Colectivos de Trabajo. Avance mensual.
 a. Cumulative data.
 b. Includes revisions arising from indexation clauses, except in 2009.
 c. To December 2008, NACE 1993; from January 2009, NACE 2009.
Thousands and %
      As per month                                                                      As per month recorded
   economic effects 
  come into force(a)
                   Employees affected (a)                 Average wage settlement (%)
     Em-    Average  Automa-   Newly-    Auto-     Newly 
   ployees     wage     tic    signed    Annual   Agricul-    Indus-  Construc-   Services    matic     signed  Agricul-    Indus-  Construc-
   affec-    settle-   adjust-    agree-    Total    change     ture     try     tion   adjust-     agree-    Total    ture      try     tion    Services
    ted     ment    ment    ments     ment     ments 
    (b)
    (c)     (c)      (c)     (c)     (c)      (c)       (c)       (c) 
06 11 119 3.59 6 765 2 156 8 921 540 656 2 445 1 072 4 748 3.21 3.35 3.24 3.94 3.26 2.97 3.20
07 11 606 4.21 5 778 2 634 8 412 -509 510 2 172 475 5 254 2.87 2.96 2.90 3.35 2.88 3.55 2.81
08 10 916 3.58 7 069 1 733 8 802 390 406 2 419 1 070 4 907 3.48 3.80 3.54 3.21 3.39 3.64 3.62
08 Jan 10 335 3.51 4 503 5 4 508 1 263 270 1 331 161 2 746 3.27 4.59 3.27 2.91 3.32 3.61 3.27
     Feb 10 363 3.51 5 281 12 5 293 1 271 293 1 462 487 3 052 3.36 3.77 3.36 2.92 3.32 3.83 3.35
     Mar 10 405 3.51 5 601 24 5 624 889 298 1 612 530 3 184 3.38 4.20 3.39 2.94 3.41 3.77 3.35
     Apr 10 691 3.55 6 352 241 6 593 1 851 299 1 954 690 3 650 3.39 4.47 3.43 2.94 3.39 3.72 3.43
     May 10 697 3.55 6 568 408 6 975 2 208 339 1 975 830 3 831 3.43 4.09 3.47 3.10 3.40 3.68 3.49
     Jun 10 747 3.55 6 790 459 7 250 1 662 381 2 028 875 3 966 3.43 4.07 3.47 3.11 3.40 3.67 3.49
     Jul 10 754 3.55 6 825 641 7 466 1 513 381 2 061 895 4 130 3.43 3.88 3.47 3.11 3.40 3.67 3.49
     Aug 10 755 3.55 6 844 809 7 653 1 271 393 2 082 964 4 214 3.43 3.96 3.49 3.17 3.41 3.65 3.52
     Sep 10 877 3.57 6 911 1 079 7 990 949 405 2 133 1 013 4 439 3.43 4.01 3.51 3.20 3.40 3.65 3.56
     Oct 10 913 3.58 6 951 1 416 8 367 801 408 2 317 1 022 4 620 3.47 3.80 3.52 3.21 3.37 3.64 3.60
     Nov 10 914 3.58 7 028 1 557 8 585 375 405 2 367 1 056 4 757 3.47 3.82 3.53 3.21 3.37 3.64 3.61
     Dec 10 916 3.58 7 069 1 733 8 802 390 406 2 419 1 070 4 907 3.48 3.80 3.54 3.21 3.39 3.64 3.62
09 Jan 7 247 2.68 3 494 0 3 494 -1 014 115 1 104 813 1 462 2.93 4.50 2.93 2.93 2.70 3.54 2.77
     Feb 7 253 2.68 5 977 6 5 983 689 189 1 827 841 3 125 2.68 1.86 2.68 2.81 2.52 3.59 2.53
     Mar 7 254 2.68 6 215 19 6 234 610 193 1 862 939 3 240 2.70 2.73 2.70 2.85 2.52 3.58 2.55
     Apr 7 380 2.67 6 711 63 6 774 181 208 1 883 994 3 689 2.68 2.05 2.67 2.77 2.51 3.57 2.50
     May 7 380 2.67 6 836 162 6 998 23 278 1 893 995 3 832 2.67 3.10 2.68 2.70 2.51 3.57 2.53
     Jun 7 381 2.67 7 042 343 7 385 135 440 1 913 1 114 3 918 2.66 2.99 2.67 2.45 2.51 3.56 2.52
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4.7.  QUARTERLY LABOUR COSTS SURVEY
Annual percentage change
                     Labour costs                          Wage costs    Other memoram-
   costs   dum
    per   item: 
                Monthly earnings    Per hour               Monthly earnings   Per hour   worker euro area
    worked    worked    and   total 
  month  hourly 
 labour 
   Total   Industry   Construction   Services    Total   Industry   Construction   Services  costs
  (a)
06 4.8 3.8 3.1 6.3 5.8 4.8 3.5 2.5 6.3 5.8 4.9 2.7
07 4.1 3.6 4.8 4.1 4.6 4.0 3.4 4.5 4.2 4.6 4.1 2.7
08 5.2 5.1 6.3 5.1 4.9 5.4 5.6 6.3 5.1 5.1 4.5 3.3
M P
M P
08 Q1-Q1 5.0 4.3 5.6 5.1 9.0 5.6 6.1 5.4 5.2 9.6 3.5 4.5
09 Q1-Q1 3.9 3.8 6.2 3.7 3.5 2.8 1.1 4.3 2.9 2.5 6.8 ...
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Sources: INE (Quarterly labour costs survey) and Eurostat.
  Note:    The underlying series for this indicator are in Tables 24.25, 24.26 and 24.27 of de BE Boletín estadístico.
  a. Whole economy, excluding the agriculture, public administration, education and health sectors
06 Q3 4.8 3.7 3.4 6.2 5.5 4.9 3.7 3.6 6.1 5.6 4.6 2.8
Q4 4.8 3.4 2.5 6.5 6.5 5.2 3.4 2.0 7.0 6.8 3.6 2.7
07 Q1 4.0 4.2 4.7 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.9 4.5 4.7 2.9 2.7
Q2 3.8 2.6 4.2 4.1 4.2 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.0 2.5
Q3 4.1 3.7 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.9 2.9 4.0 4.2 5.0 4.8 2.5
Q4 4.3 3.9 5.3 4.3 4.6 4.1 3.3 5.4 4.1 4.4 4.8 2.8
08 Q1 5.0 4.3 5.6 5.1 9.0 5.6 6.1 5.4 5.2 9.6 3.5 4.5
Q2 5.1 6.2 6.0 4.8 2.1 5.4 5.6 7.0 4.9 2.3 4.4 1.7
Q3 5.3 4.5 5.7 5.6 5.9 5.8 5.2 6.1 5.8 6.3 3.9 3.7
Q4 5.3 5.2 7.8 5.0 3.2 5.1 5.3 6.6 4.8 3.0 6.0 3.6
09 Q1 3.9 3.8 6.2 3.7 3.5 2.8 1.1 4.3 2.9 2.5 6.8 ...
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4.8.  UNIT LABOUR COSTS. SPAIN AND EURO AREA (a)
Annual percentage changes
      Memorandum item:
      Whole-economy unit       Compensation per                                  Productivity     unit labour costs in
         labour costs           employee         manufacturing
           Output          Employment 
      Euro      Euro       Euro       Euro
     Spain       area       Spain      area       Spain       area       Spain       area
       (b)       Euro       Euro        (c)       (d)
     Spain       area      Spain       area
      (b)
06 3.2 0.8 3.9 2.2 0.7 1.4 3.9 3.1 3.2 1.6 2.7 -0.9
07 2.9 1.6 3.7 2.5 0.8 0.9 3.7 2.7 2.9 1.8 1.1 -0.3
08 3.4 3.3 5.3 3.1 1.8 -0.2 1.2 0.6 -0.6 0.7 6.2 3.8
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
 Sources: INE (Quarterly National Accounts of Spain. Base year 2000) and ECB.
 a. Spain: prepared in accordance with ESA95. SEASONALLY- AND WORKING-DAY-ADJUSTED SERIES (see economic bulletin April 2002).
 b. Full-time equivalent employment.
 c. Industry.
 d. Industry and energy.
06 Q2 3.5 1.1 3.8 2.4 0.3 1.3 3.9 3.1 3.6 1.8 2.9 -0.9
Q3 2.7 1.1 3.9 2.4 1.2 1.3 4.0 3.0 2.8 1.7 1.9 -0.5
Q4 3.2 0.4 4.1 2.1 0.9 1.7 3.9 3.4 2.9 1.7 2.1 -1.1
07 Q1 2.7 1.0 3.4 2.5 0.7 1.5 4.0 3.4 3.2 1.8 0.0 -1.1
Q2 2.7 1.5 3.5 2.4 0.7 0.9 3.9 2.6 3.2 1.7 0.1 0.3
Q3 3.1 1.5 3.8 2.3 0.7 0.8 3.6 2.7 2.8 1.8 1.1 -0.9
Q4 3.0 2.5 4.1 2.9 1.0 0.4 3.2 2.2 2.2 1.7 3.4 0.4
08 Q1 4.2 2.5 5.2 3.1 1.0 0.6 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.5 6.0 0.9
Q2 3.6 2.8 5.4 3.2 1.7 0.3 1.8 1.5 0.1 1.1 7.8 1.4
Q3 3.4 3.5 5.3 3.4 1.8 -0.1 0.9 0.5 -0.9 0.5 6.6 3.9
Q4 2.6 4.5 5.2 2.8 2.5 -1.6 -0.7 -1.7 -3.1 -0.1 4.6 9.0
09 Q1 0.8 5.5 4.0 1.8 3.1 -3.6 -3.0 -4.9 -6.0 -1.4 4.1 15.7
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5.1.  CONSUMER PRICE INDEX. SPAIN (2006=100) 
Indices and annual percentage changes
Memorandum item:prices for 
                  Total   (100%)                 Annual percentage change (12-month % change)  agricultural products
       (2000=100)
  Industrial 
   Month-on-    12-month    Cumulative     goods Original      12-month 
   Original     month    % change     % change     Unprocessed  Processed     excl.     Energy    Services    IPSEBENE   series      % change 
    series    % change   during year        food     food     energy      (c)
      (a)       (b)    products
06 100.0 _ 3.5 2.7 4.4 3.6 1.4 8.2 3.9 2.9 108.9 -0.9
07 102.8 _ 2.8 4.2 4.8 3.7 0.7 1.8 3.8 2.7 115.5 6.0
08 107.0 _ 4.1 1.4 4.0 6.5 0.3 12.1 3.9 3.2 118.8 2.9
M  
M  
 Sources: INE, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Medio Rural y Marino, Pesca y Alimentación and BE.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Tables 25.2 and 25.8 of the BE Boletín estadístico.
 a. For annual periods: average growth for each year on the previous year.
 b. For annual periods: December-on-December growth rate.
 c. Index of non-energy processed goods and service prices.
08 J-J 106.4 0.5 4.5 1.0 4.8 7.4 0.2 15.0 3.8 3.3 127.5 10.3
09 J-J 106.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 1.1 -0.7 -11.9 2.9 1.3 ... ...
08 Mar 105.8 0.9 4.5 0.4 4.7 7.4 0.3 14.1 4.0 3.4 127.4 10.5
     Apr 107.0 1.1 4.2 1.5 4.0 7.4 0.2 13.3 3.5 3.1 130.6 8.5
     May 107.7 0.7 4.6 2.2 4.1 7.5 0.2 16.5 3.8 3.3 133.9 15.2
     Jun 108.3 0.6 5.0 2.8 5.1 7.7 0.1 19.2 3.9 3.3 126.3 8.6
     Jul 107.8 -0.5 5.3 2.3 4.4 7.8 0.3 21.4 4.0 3.5 121.0 14.1
     Aug 107.6 -0.2 4.9 2.1 4.2 7.6 0.5 17.6 4.0 3.5 115.4 6.9
     Sep 107.5 - 4.5 2.0 3.9 6.9 0.5 14.8 4.1 3.4 110.1 -2.3
     Oct 107.9 0.3 3.6 2.4 3.0 4.5 0.5 9.3 4.1 2.9 106.4 -8.2
     Nov 107.5 -0.4 2.4 2.0 2.5 3.6 0.6 -0.5 4.0 2.7 110.4 -11.4
     Dec 106.9 -0.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 3.0 0.4 -7.2 3.8 2.4 113.7 -9.7
09 Jan 105.6 -1.2 0.8 -1.2 1.3 2.5 -0.3 -9.3 3.6 2.0 ... ...
     Feb 105.6 - 0.7 -1.2 2.2 1.7 -0.7 -8.1 3.3 1.6 ... ...
     Mar 105.8 0.2 -0.1 -1.1 0.8 1.2 -0.6 -11.6 2.7 1.3 ... ...
     Apr 106.8 1.0 -0.2 -0.1 - 0.7 -0.7 -12.4 3.1 1.3 ... ...
     May 106.8 - -0.9 -0.1 -0.6 - -0.8 -15.3 2.6 0.9 ... ...
     Jun 107.2 0.4 -1.0 0.3 -2.7 0.4 -1.1 -14.2 2.4 0.8 ... ...
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5.2.  HARMONISED INDEX OF CONSUMER PRICES. SPAIN AND EURO AREA (2005=100) (a)
Annual percentage changes
       Total                                                      Goods    Services
                    Food                   Industrial
  
  
   Euro    Euro       Total     Processed     Unprocessed    Euro     Non-energy       Energy      Euro 
   Spain    area    Spain    area    Spain    area     Spain    area 
  
   Euro    Euro    Euro    Euro    Euro  
   Spain    area    Spain    area    Spain    area    Spain    area    Spain    area  
  
06 3.6 2.2 3.4 2.3 3.9 2.4 3.9 2.1 3.9 2.8 3.1 2.3 1.5 0.6 8.0 7.7 3.9 2.0
07 2.8 2.1 2.2 1.9 4.1 2.8 3.9 2.8 4.3 3.0 1.0 1.4 0.7 1.0 1.7 2.6 3.9 2.5
08 4.1 3.3 4.2 3.8 5.7 5.1 7.4 6.1 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.1 0.4 0.8 11.9 10.3 3.9 2.6
M  
M P
08 J-J 4.6 3.5 5.0 4.2 6.6 5.5 8.7 6.7 4.4 3.6 4.0 3.6 0.3 0.8 15.0 12.2 3.8 2.5
09 J-J -0.1 0.6 -1.9 -0.6 0.8 1.7 1.0 1.6 0.6 1.8 -3.5 -1.7 -0.5 0.7 -11.8 -8.5 2.8 2.2
P
 Source: Eurostat.
 a. Compliance with the Regulation on the treatment of price reductions is now complete with the inclusion of sales prices in the Italian and Spanish HICP.
 The Spanish HICP has included a new basket of goods and services since January 2001. In accordance with the related regulations,the series for the year
 2001 have been revised. More detailed methodological notes can be consulted on the Eurostat Internet site (www.europa.eu.int).
08 Mar 4.6 3.6 4.9 4.1 6.6 5.6 8.8 6.8 4.3 3.8 3.9 3.4 0.4 0.9 14.1 11.2 4.1 2.8
     Apr 4.2 3.3 4.7 4.0 6.3 5.4 8.8 7.0 3.9 3.1 3.6 3.2 0.3 0.8 13.3 10.8 3.5 2.3
     May 4.7 3.7 5.2 4.5 6.4 5.8 8.8 6.9 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.9 0.2 0.7 16.5 13.7 3.8 2.5
     Jun 5.1 4.0 5.7 5.0 6.8 5.8 9.0 7.0 4.6 4.0 5.0 4.5 0.2 0.8 19.1 16.1 3.9 2.5
     Jul 5.3 4.0 6.1 5.1 6.7 6.1 9.2 7.2 4.2 4.4 5.7 4.6 0.4 0.5 21.3 17.1 4.0 2.6
     Aug 4.9 3.8 5.4 4.6 6.5 5.6 9.0 6.8 4.0 3.7 4.8 4.2 0.5 0.7 17.5 14.6 4.1 2.7
     Sep 4.6 3.6 4.8 4.4 5.9 5.2 7.9 6.2 3.9 3.6 4.2 4.0 0.6 0.9 14.8 13.5 4.1 2.6
     Oct 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.1 3.3 3.4 2.8 3.1 0.5 1.0 9.3 9.6 4.1 2.6
     Nov 2.4 2.1 1.5 1.8 3.2 3.7 3.5 4.2 2.9 2.8 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.9 -0.4 0.7 4.0 2.6
     Dec 1.5 1.6 - 0.9 2.6 3.3 3.0 3.5 2.1 2.8 -1.5 -0.3 0.4 0.8 -7.1 -3.7 3.8 2.6
09 Jan 0.8 1.1 -0.9 0.2 2.1 2.7 2.4 2.7 1.8 2.6 -2.5 -1.0 -0.2 0.5 -9.2 -5.3 3.5 2.4
     Feb 0.7 1.2 -0.9 0.3 1.9 2.5 1.6 2.0 2.2 3.3 -2.4 -0.7 -0.5 0.7 -8.0 -4.9 3.2 2.4
     Mar -0.1 0.6 -1.7 -0.4 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.6 1.1 2.4 -3.3 -1.5 -0.4 0.8 -11.5 -8.1 2.6 1.9
     Apr -0.2 0.6 -2.1 -0.7 0.5 1.4 0.6 1.2 0.3 1.6 -3.6 -1.7 -0.6 0.8 -12.3 -8.8 3.0 2.5
     May -0.9 - -2.9 -1.4 -0.2 0.9 -0.1 1.0 -0.3 0.7 -4.5 -2.5 -0.6 0.8 -15.2 -11.6 2.4 2.1
     Jun -1.0 -0.1 -2.9 -1.5 -0.6 0.8 0.5 1.1 -1.7 0.3 -4.4 -2.7 -0.9 0.6 -14.1 -11.8 2.2 1.9
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5.3.  PRODUCER PRICE INDEX. SPAIN AND EURO AREA (2005 = 100)
Annual percentage changes
              Total           Consumer            Capital      Intermediate        Energy               Memorandum item: euro area
            goods             goods          goods
   Consumer    Capital    Intermediate
Total     goods     goods       goods       Energy 
    Month-     12-        Month-     12-       Month-     12-    Month-     12-    Month-     12-
   Original      on -     month         on -     month        on -     month     on -     month     on -    month
    series     month       %        month       %       month       %    month       %    month      % 12-        12-       12-          12-       12- 
      %    change          %    change         %    change      %    change      %    change    month       month      month         month      month 
    change        change       change    change    change  %         %        %           %        %
change     change     change        change     change 
06 105.4 _ 5.4 _ 3.2 _ 3.1 _ 6.2 _ 9.1 5.0 1.5 1.6 4.6 13.5
07 109.2 _ 3.6 _ 2.4 _ 3.4 _ 5.9 _ 1.6 2.7 2.1 2.2 4.6 1.3
08 116.3 _ 6.5 _ 4.4 _ 2.5 _ 5.5 _ 14.3 5.9 3.9 2.1 4.0 13.8
M P
M P
08 J-M 114.9 _ 6.7 _ 5.3 _ 2.6 _ 5.8 _ 13.1 5.7 4.7 1.7 3.8 12.7
09 J-M 112.1 _ -2.4 _ -0.2 _ 1.4 _ -4.2 _ -5.2 -3.1 -1.0 1.5 -3.9 -7.5
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
08 Feb 113.9 0.6 6.3 0.6 5.6 0.3 2.6 1.5 5.9 -0.3 11.0 5.3 4.6 1.5 4.0 10.9
     Mar 114.9 0.9 6.6 0.3 5.4 0.2 2.5 0.7 5.9 2.3 12.4 5.6 5.0 1.5 3.9 12.1
     Apr 115.6 0.6 6.6 0.3 5.1 0.2 2.5 0.6 5.8 1.6 13.3 6.0 4.8 1.7 3.7 13.7
     May 117.0 1.2 7.4 0.1 5.1 0.1 2.3 0.6 5.9 4.5 17.4 6.7 4.8 2.0 3.8 16.7
     Jun 118.3 1.1 8.4 0.2 5.2 0.1 2.3 0.5 6.2 3.6 21.1 7.7 4.8 2.2 4.3 19.9
     Jul 120.4 1.8 10.2 0.1 5.1 0.3 2.5 1.1 7.3 5.9 27.4 8.9 4.6 2.3 5.4 23.4
     Aug 119.6 -0.7 9.2 0.1 4.8 0.1 2.5 0.4 7.6 -3.5 23.2 8.2 4.2 2.4 5.4 21.0
     Sep 118.9 -0.6 8.3 -0.1 4.1 0.1 2.4 -0.2 7.1 -2.2 19.9 7.6 3.7 2.2 5.5 18.9
     Oct 117.4 -1.3 6.1 -0.4 2.8 0.1 2.4 -1.4 5.3 -2.8 14.9 6.0 2.8 2.8 4.1 14.1
     Nov 114.5 -2.5 2.9 -0.4 2.2 - 2.3 -2.2 2.9 -6.9 4.3 2.9 1.9 2.7 2.5 4.5
     Dec 112.1 -2.1 0.4 -0.2 1.6 - 2.3 -1.9 1.0 -6.5 -3.4 1.2 1.2 2.1 1.2 0.6
09 Jan 112.6 0.4 -0.5 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.9 -1.2 -1.6 3.2 -2.2 -0.6 -0.1 1.9 -1.2 -2.1
     Feb 112.6 - -1.1 0.1 0.4 -0.2 1.5 -0.2 -3.2 - -1.9 -1.6 -0.6 1.9 -3.0 -3.6
     Mar 112.0 -0.5 -2.5 -0.5 -0.4 - 1.3 -0.5 -4.4 -0.9 -5.0 -2.9 -1.2 1.6 -4.0 -6.7
     Apr 111.7 -0.3 -3.4 -0.2 -0.8 0.1 1.2 -0.5 -5.5 -0.3 -6.8 -4.6 -1.4 1.2 -5.2 -10.9
     May 111.8 0.1 -4.4 -0.3 -1.2 - 1.1 -0.3 -6.3 1.2 -9.7 -5.8 -1.7 0.6 -5.9 -14.0
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5.4.  UNIT VALUE INDICES FOR SPANISH FOREIGN TRADE
 Sources: ME and BE.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in the Tables 18.6 and 18.7 of the Boletín Estadístico.
 a. Annual percentage changes (trend obtained with TRAMO-SEATS). 
Annual percentage changes
                      Exports/dispatches                    Imports/arrivals
  Consumer   Capital           Intermediate goods   Consumer   Capital            Intermediate goods
   Total     goods    goods     goods    goods
   Total
   Total     Energy    Non-energy    Total     Energy    Non-energy
06 4,8 3,7 3,0 6,1 18,0 5,6 3,4 -0,1 -1,7 6,1 21,5 2,1
07 2,5 2,4 -0,8 3,3 2,0 3,3 1,0 1,2 -2,3 1,6 -1,0 2,9
08 1,9 0,7 1,7 2,7 30,9 0,1 3,8 0,1 1,9 5,7 21,3 -0,7
08 J-A 2,6 2,9 1,4 2,5 35,6 0,2 3,3 -2,4 5,1 5,4 25,7 -2,2
09 J-A -4,6 -2,5 -7,1 -5,8 -17,3 -4,7 -7,7 3,6 -2,3 -13,4 -30,0 -6,9
07 Nov 1,5 1,0 -4,4 3,0 17,0 1,0 6,5 5,3 5,0 7,3 23,0 3,5
     Dec 0,4 4,8 -6,3 -0,7 27,2 -2,1 -2,1 -10,9 -14,3 4,5 13,3 -0,1
08 Jan 3,8 7,0 2,5 1,7 21,3 0,2 5,4 -0,4 3,4 8,0 25,5 0,1
     Feb 4,2 3,9 0,7 5,0 46,2 2,9 2,7 -4,6 4,8 5,5 28,8 0,1
     Mar 0,6 1,5 -0,1 0,2 37,2 -2,9 0,9 -4,6 0,2 3,0 25,0 -7,4
     Apr 1,7 -1,0 2,4 3,2 38,5 0,6 4,4 -0,0 12,3 4,9 23,7 -1,7
     May 0,5 -1,4 3,4 1,3 43,8 -1,6 6,4 4,0 3,5 7,8 38,5 -0,3
     Jun 0,9 -2,4 3,8 2,5 42,1 -1,4 3,1 -0,5 -0,8 4,9 31,3 -4,8
     Jul 2,4 -0,1 2,3 4,2 46,6 -0,3 4,9 -3,8 -3,6 9,8 29,9 0,1
     Aug 2,7 1,9 2,4 3,4 18,4 1,0 7,6 -2,5 2,2 13,1 32,0 3,3
     Sep 1,1 -1,0 3,9 2,3 23,7 -0,9 4,5 -4,2 -3,3 9,7 24,9 3,0
     Oct 0,1 1,1 -16,4 2,6 21,7 0,5 3,6 2,3 -0,1 4,8 14,5 0,2
     Nov 3,2 1,7 9,2 3,3 20,3 1,0 0,6 2,3 0,6 -0,0 -3,2 -1,5
     Dec 1,2 -3,1 7,2 2,9 11,6 1,7 1,9 12,8 4,0 -2,9 -15,6 0,9
09 Jan -2,8 -0,5 -6,9 -4,0 -7,0 -4,1 -7,4 2,9 -7,7 -11,9 -27,4 -4,9
     Feb -5,9 -4,8 -5,9 -6,7 -18,5 -6,2 -7,1 7,7 -3,7 -14,3 -29,6 -11,6
     Mar -4,6 -4,4 -5,9 -4,7 -20,7 -2,6 -7,6 4,9 2,0 -14,3 -31,0 -5,4
     Apr -5,1 -0,4 -9,6 -7,9 -23,2 -6,0 -8,6 -0,7 0,3 -13,0 -32,1 -6,2
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6.1.   STATE RESOURCES ANS USES ACCORDING TO THE NACIONAL ACCOUNTS. SPAIN
 Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (IGAE).
EUR millions
                 Current and capital resources                 Current and capital uses Memorandum item:
  cash-basis deficit
   Net    Other  Inter-   Income    Compen-   Current   Invest-    Cash-   Expendi-
  lending     taxes   est    and    sation   and ca-   ment    Other    basis     ture 
  (+) or   Value      on   and   wealth      of   pital   grants    deficit    Revenue 
  borro-   added   products  other    taxes    emplo-   Inter-   trans-    and
   wing     Total    tax     and   income     Other      Total    yees    est   fers    other 
   (-)   (VAT)    imports     on   within   capital
  pro-   general   trans- 
  perty   govern-   fers
  ment
99 -7 303 109 643 29 002 16 408 6 059 46 909 11 265 116 946 15 013 16 958 60 249 3 750 20 976 -6 354 110 370 116 724 
00 -6 330 118 005 31 566 17 171 5 419 52 671 11 178 124 335 12 881 16 817 68 917 4 336 21 384 -2 431 118 693 121 124 
01 -5 076 126 032 33 160 17 838 7 335 56 312 11 387 131 108 12 890 17 031 73 716 4 269 23 202 -2 884 125 193 128 077 
02 -4 780 109 142 24 701 11 431 5 614 56 616 10 780 113 922 13 526 16 652 53 800 4 596 25 348 -2 626 108 456 111 082 
03 -3 692 111 008 26 542 10 918 5 089 57 398 11 061 114 700 13 966 15 890 53 259 4 009 27 576 -4 132 109 655 113 787 
04 -10 762 116 577 28 947 10 991 4 730 60 054 11 855 127 339 14 831 15 060 57 177 8 760 31 511 59 114 793 114 734 
05 1 590 130 171 31 542 11 068 4 401 70 986 12 174 128 581 15 665 14 343 60 311 5 122 33 140 6 022 128 777 122 755 
06 5 005 147 220 34 929 11 331 5 328 82 528 13 104 142 215 16 839 13 820 69 588 5 808 36 160 11 471 141 847 130 375 
07 13 525 165 179 33 332 12 938 6 857 99 257 12 795 151 654 18 109 14 002 77 436 5 338 36 769 20 135 159 840 139 704 
08 -30 248 135 060 26 065 12 715 6 824 76 955 12 501 165 308 19 356 14 134 85 076 5 868 40 874 -18 747 129 336 148 082 
08 J-M 2 982 60 404 17 563 5 029 2 348 31 033 4 431 57 422 7 021 5 677 30 617 1 394 12 713 3 185 59 923 56 738 
09 J-M -19 552 45 358 12 686 4 564 2 486 23 453 2 169 64 910 7 319 6 583 37 405 917 12 686 -19 102 45 680 64 782 
08 Sep 1 068 12 892 3 662 1 168 604 6 240 1 218 11 824 1 426 1 176 6 228 158 2 836 2 027 11 978 9 950 
     Oct 4 995 20 009 5 997 1 045 251 12 024 692 15 014 1 447 1 263 8 270 757 3 277 6 191 19 074 12 883 
     Nov -5 483 8 163 1 052 1 088 290 4 885 848 13 646 1 425 1 200 7 477 212 3 332 -4 220 7 510 11 730 
     Dec -16 234 10 158 290 915 2 045 4 034 2 874 26 392 2 732 1 303 9 588 2 302 10 467 -7 708 9 186 16 894 
09 Jan 722 10 009 -585 1 164 383 9 303 -256 9 287 1 377 1 335 4 865 75 1 635 -2 358 10 377 12 735 
     Feb 4 591 18 340 13 248 848 260 2 761 1 223 13 749 1 372 1 200 8 208 111 2 858 2 288 18 279 15 991 
     Mar -12 907 2 039 -1 328 687 1 020 2 205 -545 14 946 1 516 1 335 8 835 168 3 092 -11 275 2 614 13 888 
     Apr 1 034 14 788 2 532 938 580 10 014 724 13 754 1 555 1 325 7 972 221 2 681 2 878 14 613 11 735 
     May -12 992 182 -1 181 927 243 -830 1 023 13 174 1 499 1 388 7 525 342 2 420 -10 635 -202 10 433 
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6.2.   STATE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS. SPAIN
EUR millions
  Net acquisi-                              Net incurrence of liabilities  Net
   tion of incurren-
  financial  ce of 
    assets           Of which            By instrument         By counterpart sector liabili-
  Net  ties
 lending (exclu-
 (+) or       Of which  In cur-   Short-   Goverment   Banco   Other    Other    Held by resident sectors   Rest  ding
  net   rencies    term     bonds    de  marketa-  accounts   of the  other 
 borro-   other   securi-     and   España   ble  payable   world accounts
 wing(-)   Depo-   than the    ties    assumed   loans  liabili- payable)
  sits   Total   peseta/     debt   ties   Monetary   Other
  at the   euro    (a)   Total  financial  resident
  Banco  institu-   sectors
 Total     de   tions
  España
99 -7 303 4 212 4 574 11 515 209 -6 629 19 592 -499 -446 -503 -10 511 -7 605 -2 905 22 026 12 018 
00 -6 330 4 584 5 690 10 914 1 162 -8 683 17 127 -499 283 2 686 -22 009 -10 117 -11 892 32 924 8 228 
01 -5 076 -5 973 -20 141 -897 803 -8 616 12 521 -499 -3 101 -1 202 -10 103 4 424 -14 527 9 206 305
02 -4 780 2 783 -95 7 563 -888 346 6 655 -486 1 488 -439 1 773 3 148 -1 374 5 790 8 002 
03 -3 692 -5 850 0 -2 158 -135 3 146 -3 761 -486 -254 -803 7 817 8 551 -734 -9 975 -1 354 
04 -10 762 1 866 -0 12 628 -1 600 -1 688 9 416 -486 5 486 -100 -6 347 -12 696 6 349 18 975 12 728 
05 1 590 2 607 0 1 017 -1 910 -3 771 7 276 -486 -3 411 1 409 1 775 -8 257 10 032 -758 -392
06 5 005 1 293 -200 -3 712 175 -2 198 -2 976 -486 -418 2 365 -14 069 -17 968 3 899 10 357 -6 077 
07 13 525 6 712 65 -6 813 -120 1 206 -4 916 -519 -2 236 -348 8 214 5 698 2 515 -15 026 -6 465 
08 -30 248 21 339 4 337 51 587 2 243 19 355 33 275 -520 -48 -476 24 386 23 013 1 373 27 201 52 062 
P
A
P
P
P
P
A
A
A
A
A
 Source: BE.
 a.Includes other loans, non-negotiable securities, coined money and Caja General de Depósitos (General Deposit Fund).
08 J-M 2 982 3 371 -63 389 2 374 -335 3 625 -520 -363 -2 018 -3 848 -1 825 -2 023 4 237 2 406 
09 J-M -19 552 35 814 8 498 55 366 773 17 866 37 660 -583 -87 511 37 509 26 748 10 761 17 930 54 855 
08 Sep 1 068 11 063 82 9 995 -2 2 330 8 060 - -18 -378 593 4 396 -3 803 9 402 10 373 
     Oct 4 995 4 108 14 815 -887 -260 4 371 -7 440 - -1 2 183 283 1 518 -1 234 -1 170 -3 069 
     Nov -5 483 12 225 2 008 17 708 -156 6 513 13 052 - -1 -1 856 13 073 13 174 -101 4 635 19 564 
     Dec -16 234 -489 -12 503 15 745 2 4 714 10 602 - 257 172 9 850 7 484 2 366 5 895 15 573 
09 Jan 722 11 610 3 998 10 888 3 5 821 -7 170 - -24 12 260 6 673 5 024 1 648 4 215 -1 373 
     Feb 4 591 8 313 1 500 3 722 2 1 714 13 701 - -11 -11 682 2 433 7 552 -5 119 1 289 15 404 
     Mar -12 907 -1 923 -3 498 10 984 780 3 916 11 559 - -56 -4 435 7 335 6 981 353 3 723 15 420 
     Apr 1 034 18 677 13 478 17 643 -14 5 475 11 321 -583 -6 1 437 12 898 7 650 5 247 4 745 16 206 
     May -12 992 -863 -6 980 12 129 2 940 8 248 - 10 2 931 8 171 -459 8 631 3 958 9 198 
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6.3.   STATE: LIABILITIES OUTSTANDING. SPAIN
 Source: BE.
 a. Includes other loans, non-negotiable securities, coined money and Caja General de Depósitos (General Deposit Fund).
EUR millions
                Liabilities outstanding (excluding other accounts payable)     Memorandum item: 
  State   of which                By instrument         By counterpart sector  Guarantees
  debt    given
  accor-   (contin- 
 ding to   Short-term   Government    Banco   Other      Held by resident sectors    Rest  Deposits   gent lia-
 the me-     In   securities    bonds and     de  marketable   of the   at the  bilities).
 todolofy   curren-    assumed   España  liabili-    world  Banco de   Outstand-
  of the   cies      debt    loans   ties   España   ing
  exce-   other     (a)    Total    General   Other    level
  ssive   than the   government  resident 
  deficit   peseta/   sectors 
   proce-   euro
   dure
95 232 754 19 362 71 070 132 463 11 050 18 171 180 408 385 180 023 52 731 9 379 6 059 
96 263 972 20 434 81 084 152 302 10 814 19 772 210 497 529 209 969 54 003 15 195 8 185 
97 274 176 23 270 71 730 180 566 10 578 11 303 211 538 445 211 093 63 083 9 829 7 251 
98 284 161 30 048 59 939 205 189 10 341 8 691 215 207 305 214 902 69 258 10 273 6 412 
99 298 384 7 189 53 142 227 157 9 843 8 243 207 465 150 207 315 91 070 14 846 5 310 
00 307 726 8 197 44 575 245 255 9 344 8 552 188 488 1 187 187 301 120 424 20 536 5 430 
01 306 895 7 611 35 413 257 192 8 845 5 445 179 123 2 018 177 105 129 791 395 5 460 
02 307 610 5 823 35 459 258 877 8 359 4 914 177 561 6 831 170 730 136 880 300 6 819 
03 301 503 5 105 38 702 250 337 7 873 4 591 192 426 10 952 181 474 120 029 300 6 821 
04 303 563 3 267 35 996 250 125 7 388 10 055 183 276 19 412 163 863 139 700 300 7 186 
05 299 656 2 154 31 647 254 442 6 902 6 666 178 476 22 810 155 666 143 990 300 6 020 
06 294 419 515 31 060 250 702 6 416 6 242 163 799 21 897 141 902 152 517 100 5 794 
07 286 349 355 31 644 243 246 5 832 5 626 171 657 25 551 146 106 140 243 165 6 162 
08 Sep 299 654 76 35 516 253 327 5 249 5 563 175 541 33 342 142 199 157 455 182 7 614 
     Oct 298 500 76 40 024 247 665 5 249 5 562 174 335 31 915 142 420 156 080 14 997 7 790 
     Nov 316 677 72 46 663 259 204 5 249 5 561 187 931 31 971 155 959 160 718 17 005 8 416 
     Dec 328 242 63 50 790 266 385 5 249 5 818 200 921 34 458 166 463 161 779 4 502 8 152 
09 Jan 329 187 67 56 556 261 588 5 249 5 794 198 748 35 558 163 190 165 997 8 500 8 051 
     Feb 343 656 67 58 211 274 413 5 249 5 783 211 602 35 226 176 376 167 280 10 000 15 106 
     Mar 356 551 64 62 154 283 421 5 249 5 727 221 812 36 178 185 633 170 918 6 502 22 453 
     Apr 368 887 67 67 566 290 935 4 665 5 720 232 785 39 564 193 221 175 666 19 980 34 048 
     May 373 821 69 68 521 294 904 4 665 5 731 236 208 42 059 194 149 179 672 13 000 39 874 
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7.1. SPANISH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS VIS-à-VIS OTHER EURO AREA RESIDENTS AND THE REST OF THE WORLD.
        CURRENT ACCOUNT
 Sources: BE. Data compiled in accordance with the IMF Balance of Payments Manual (5th edition). 
 a. A positive sign for the current and capital account balances indicates a surplus (receipts greater than payments) and, thus, a Spanish net loan abroad (increase in the 
 creditor position or decrease in the debtor position). 
 b. A positive sign for the financial account balance (the net change in liabilities exceeds the net change in financial assets) means a net credit inflow, i.e. a net foreign 
 loan to Spain (increase in the debtor position or decrease in the creditor position).
EUR millions
                                                   Current account (a)
  
  
              Goods                  Services              Income     Capital   Current    Financial
   Current  account   account    account    Errors 
   trans-     plus    and
   Total    Balance   Receipts    Payments   Balance       Receipts      Payments    Balance   Receipts      Pay-    fers    capital   (balance)   omis- 
  (balance)      ments   (bal-   (bal-    account      (b)    sion
    ance)    ance) 
            Of which            Of which   
  
   Total    Total   
  Travel   Travel   
  1=2+5+  10=    17=-
06 -88 313 -83 246 175 808 259 054 22 235 84 761 40 715 62 525 13 266 -20 799 47 701 68 500 -6 503 6 194 -82 118 85 624 -3 506 
07 -105 378 -91 246 192 613 283 859 23 076 93 234 42 061 70 158 14 360 -30 142 56 827 86 969 -7 067 4 578 -100 800 101 066 -265
08 -104 412 -87 660 193 899 281 559 26 265 97 513 41 901 71 248 13 834 -33 782 60 991 94 773 -9 235 5 506 -98 906 95 471 3 435 
08 J-A -41 452 -32 580 67 424 100 004 5 119 28 075 10 785 22 957 4 368 -8 652 19 979 28 632 -5 338 2 498 -38 954 37 043 1 910 
09 J-A -25 753 -16 058 51 982 68 040 5 479 25 825 9 524 20 346 3 613 -10 505 17 299 27 804 -4 667 1 864 -23 889 21 938 1 951 
08 Jan -12 031 -8 616 15 374 23 991 1 395 7 309 2 756 5 914 1 112 -3 524 4 964 8 487 -1 286 1 238 -10 793 10 139 654
     Feb -8 964 -7 557 17 148 24 705 1 102 6 811 2 441 5 710 1 200 -818 5 371 6 189 -1 690 626 -8 338 9 865 -1 527 
     Mar -11 314 -8 974 16 374 25 347 1 307 6 774 2 975 5 467 1 031 -2 241 4 878 7 118 -1 407 370 -10 944 8 684 2 260 
     Apr -9 143 -7 433 18 528 25 961 1 315 7 181 2 613 5 866 1 025 -2 069 4 768 6 837 -955 264 -8 879 8 355 524
     May -9 201 -7 428 17 130 24 558 2 577 7 745 3 533 5 169 820 -3 617 5 669 9 286 -733 976 -8 225 9 148 -922
     Jun -7 918 -8 101 15 929 24 030 3 024 9 115 4 115 6 090 1 299 -2 604 5 466 8 070 -237 250 -7 669 9 130 -1 462 
     Jul -7 752 -7 419 17 689 25 108 3 942 10 562 5 143 6 619 1 320 -3 784 6 549 10 333 -492 318 -7 434 7 523 -89
     Aug -7 118 -7 214 12 464 19 679 3 986 9 691 5 398 5 706 1 454 -3 107 3 245 6 352 -782 414 -6 703 7 267 -564
     Sep -8 083 -6 719 17 825 24 543 2 585 9 027 4 461 6 443 1 313 -3 061 4 241 7 302 -888 379 -7 704 7 353 351
     Oct -7 707 -6 093 17 194 23 286 2 503 8 964 3 852 6 461 1 298 -3 042 5 267 8 310 -1 075 212 -7 495 7 160 335
     Nov -8 555 -5 523 14 738 20 261 1 687 6 986 2 512 5 298 1 038 -3 547 4 265 7 812 -1 173 251 -8 304 7 933 372
     Dec -6 626 -6 583 13 506 20 090 843 7 349 2 102 6 506 924 -2 368 6 309 8 677 1 482 209 -6 417 2 914 3 503 
09 Jan -6 193 -4 114 11 444 15 559 1 460 6 558 2 486 5 098 948 -3 054 4 642 7 696 -484 340 -5 853 6 259 -407
     Feb -9 417 -5 490 12 785 18 275 1 236 6 311 2 077 5 076 890 -3 002 3 251 6 254 -2 160 238 -9 179 5 505 3 674 
     Mar -6 649 -3 227 14 139 17 366 1 335 6 470 2 441 5 135 829 -3 850 4 359 8 209 -906 374 -6 275 7 917 -1 642 
     Apr -3 494 -3 227 13 614 16 841 1 448 6 486 2 520 5 038 946 -598 5 047 5 645 -1 117 912 -2 582 2 257 325
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7.2.  SPANISH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS VIS-à-VIS OTHER EURO AREA RESIDENTS AND THE REST OF THE WORLD.
        FINANCIAL ACCOUNT (a)
 Sources: BE. Data compiled in accordance with the IMF Balance of Payments Manual (5th edition). 
 a. Changes in assets (NCA) and changes in liabilities (NCL) are both net of repayments.  A positive (negative) sign in  NCA columns indicates an outflow (inflow) of foreign 
 financing. A positive (negative) sign in NCL columns implies an inflow (outflow) of foreign financing.
 b. This does not include direct investment in quoted shares, but does include portfolio investment in unquoted shares.
 c. This includes direct investment in quoted shares, but does not include portfolio investment in unquoted shares.  d. Mainly, loans, deposits and repos. 
 e. A positive (negative) sign indicates a decrease (increase) in the reserves and/or claims of the BE with the Eurosystem.
EUR millions
                                    Total, excluding Banco de España              Banco de España
  
  
  Financial         Direct investment         Portfolio investment       Other investment  (d)       Net
   account    Net      claims     Other 
   Total   finan-    Balance    Re-    with      net
  Spanish   Foreign   Spanish    Foreign   Spanish   Foreign    cial      serves    the     assets 
   Balance   invest-   invest-    Balance   invest-    invest-   Balance   invest-    invest-   deriva-     Euro-
  (NCL-    (NCL-    (NCL-    ment   ment in     (NCL-    ment    ment in   (NCL-    ment   ment in    tives      (NCL-    system     (NCL- 
   NCA)     NCA)     NCA)   abroad    Spain      NCA)   abroad    Spain    NCA)   abroad    Spain   (NCL-       NCA)      NCA) 
   (NCA)    (NCL)     (NCA)    (NCL)    (NCA)    (NCL)    NCA)       (e)     (e)
  1=   2=3+6+     (b)     (c)    13=14+
06 85 624 111 425 -58 547 83 100 24 554 199 615 -3 928 195 687 -31 647 66 093 34 446 2 003 -25 800 -480 -12 327 -12 993 
07 101 066 86 743 -50 902 101 191 50 289 104 779 -8 601 96 178 37 025 57 196 94 221 -4 159 14 322 -164 28 329 -13 843 
08 95 471 65 334 -6 913 54 662 47 749 3 763 -21 869 -18 106 76 284 14 822 91 106 -7 800 30 137 -645 31 713 -931
08 J-A 37 043 22 302 4 928 15 139 20 067 -28 176 -2 539 -30 715 50 420 22 817 73 236 -4 870 14 741 156 14 116 469
09 J-A 21 938 27 747 -9 638 11 927 2 288 8 726 -7 451 1 275 26 541 -13 903 12 639 2 119 -5 809 -284 -9 227 3 702 
08 Jan 10 139 4 637 10 369 4 909 15 279 -1 075 -12 995 -14 070 -3 241 34 207 30 966 -1 416 5 502 123 5 483 -104
     Feb 9 865 9 664 -1 024 3 583 2 559 -11 800 9 899 -1 902 24 100 12 326 36 426 -1 611 201 -36 61 177
     Mar 8 684 15 700 -4 322 3 507 -815 -16 628 3 346 -13 283 36 736 -40 348 -3 612 -86 -7 016 22 -7 297 259
     Apr 8 355 -7 698 -95 3 140 3 044 1 329 -2 789 -1 460 -7 175 16 631 9 456 -1 757 16 053 47 15 869 137
     May 9 148 11 635 -2 900 4 320 1 420 17 178 -2 114 15 064 1 258 9 897 11 155 -3 901 -2 487 61 -3 443 894
     Jun 9 130 10 419 5 772 6 140 11 913 9 456 -2 081 7 375 -3 912 14 538 10 626 -898 -1 289 87 -2 056 681
     Jul 7 523 -327 -648 4 146 3 498 8 547 -745 7 802 -6 245 1 828 -4 417 -1 980 7 850 -184 8 024 10
     Aug 7 267 1 785 -3 966 3 406 -561 8 855 -107 8 748 -3 724 9 980 6 256 620 5 482 -146 5 621 7
     Sep 7 353 9 465 -1 494 5 004 3 511 4 132 -4 325 -193 6 660 -11 901 -5 240 167 -2 112 -100 -1 569 -444
     Oct 7 160 15 217 -4 593 6 993 2 400 -11 047 -10 171 -21 218 30 865 -12 481 18 384 -8 -8 057 -28 -5 640 -2 389 
     Nov 7 933 289 -1 696 4 006 2 310 -2 881 -458 -3 339 1 629 -6 558 -4 928 3 236 7 643 -318 8 131 -171
     Dec 2 914 -5 452 -2 316 5 508 3 192 -2 302 673 -1 629 -669 -13 298 -13 967 -165 8 366 -172 8 528 10
09 Jan 6 259 9 280 -5 468 5 379 -88 10 473 -6 929 3 544 3 938 7 708 11 647 337 -3 021 -16 -2 439 -566
     Feb 5 505 314 -461 1 741 1 280 -3 665 -1 599 -5 264 4 841 -11 613 -6 772 -401 5 191 -84 4 972 303
     Mar 7 917 10 604 -3 363 3 018 -345 1 968 1 687 3 655 13 048 -7 274 5 774 -1 049 -2 687 -165 -5 382 2 859 
     Apr 2 257 7 549 -346 1 788 1 442 -50 -610 -661 4 714 -2 725 1 990 3 232 -5 292 -19 -6 379 1 106 
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7.3.  SPANISH FOREIGN TRADE WITH OTHER EURO AREA COUNTRIES AND WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD
        EXPORT AND DISPATCHES 
Eur millions and annual percentage changes
          Total        By product (deflated data)   (a)            By geographical area (nominal data)
         Intermediate      EU 27       OECD    Newly
    EUR   Nom-    De-   Con-   Other   industri-
 millions   inal   flated   sumer   Capital   Amer-   alised
   (a)    Total    Energy     Non-          of which:   OPEC   ican   China    coun-
  energy   Euro   coun-    tries
  Total   Area   Total   tries 
  United 
  States 
03 138 119 3.6 5.2 4.2 11.9 4.8 24.7 3.9 4.5 5.1 3.8 -1.7 -4.9 2.2 38.2 -23.4
04 146 925 6.4 5.3 2.2 13.1 6.6 10.2 6.4 5.0 5.0 5.9 2.0 11.0 3.3 5.6 4.7
05 155 005 5.5 0.8 -0.9 5.3 1.4 -8.9 2.0 2.6 2.3 4.2 10.2 10.4 11.8 31.4 14.5
06 170 439 10.0 5.0 3.0 12.5 5.1 -5.0 5.6 8.1 7.8 8.4 17.7 4.2 34.5 12.8 16.5
07 185 023 8.6 5.9 3.3 5.2 7.8 8.6 7.7 8.0 8.4 7.0 -1.1 22.4 -12.5 23.5 -0.8
P  08 188 184 3.9 1.8 4.0 -2.7 1.1 22.3 0.5 1.9 1.4 1.8 3.0 31.3 -2.1 8.0 2.7
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
 Sources: ME y BE.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in  Tables 18.4 and 18.5 of the Boletín estadístico.
 The monthly series are provisional data, while the annual series are the final foreign trade data.
 a. Series deflated by unit value indices.
08 Mar 15 882 -2.6 -3.2 -1.8 -10.3 -3.1 44.6 -4.8 -2.2 -4.0 -4.6 -15.5 8.7 -3.7 1.7 -18.5
     Apr 17 964 24.8 22.7 21.2 4.5 27.2 49.5 26.3 21.2 19.8 23.8 33.7 30.8 -16.6 45.2 8.8
     May 16 621 3.8 3.2 4.9 1.3 2.4 18.8 1.8 2.3 2.3 1.0 12.0 50.5 -15.4 -1.5 4.2
     Jun 15 464 -4.0 -4.8 -7.6 -12.2 -1.8 38.8 -3.3 -4.0 -2.9 -6.2 -25.4 11.9 -32.5 20.8 0.6
     Jul 17 189 12.2 9.5 6.0 19.7 10.2 48.0 8.5 3.5 3.1 5.1 16.6 74.3 37.3 16.2 23.9
     Aug 12 122 -0.0 -2.7 -6.1 -4.9 -0.7 4.8 -1.1 -3.3 -6.7 -2.3 -1.8 24.8 7.1 -0.4 18.8
     Sep 17 290 16.0 14.8 29.4 -1.1 8.0 38.5 6.6 18.7 17.6 16.1 0.1 42.9 39.8 -10.5 18.8
     Oct 16 672 -0.2 -0.3 -1.3 10.5 -1.5 9.7 -2.0 -2.8 -3.0 -2.4 -4.3 53.0 -8.7 -24.8 6.2
     Nov 14 289 -13.8 -16.5 -5.3 -30.9 -21.1 -7.0 -21.8 -15.5 -14.2 -14.2 13.9 -15.0 -10.6 -28.5 -14.1
     Dec 13 142 -7.4 -8.6 3.9 -0.3 -17.8 -10.1 -18.2 -13.1 -10.7 -11.6 19.1 56.4 20.8 -0.2 -9.8
09 Jan 11 092 -25.7 -23.6 -16.4 -31.5 -27.3 -16.5 -27.8 -25.5 -22.6 -25.7 -21.1 -2.3 -30.2 -46.1 -19.9
     Feb 12 401 -25.4 -20.7 -17.8 1.9 -26.3 -15.0 -26.7 -29.5 -27.0 -28.0 -22.1 27.3 -19.6 -27.0 2.9
     Mar 13 714 -13.6 -9.5 2.1 -16.3 -16.7 -35.9 -15.6 -17.5 -16.1 -15.0 -4.4 18.9 8.1 -7.4 36.8
     Apr 13 192 -26.6 -22.6 -13.8 -28.5 -27.6 -45.2 -26.7 -23.8 -21.1 -25.7 -34.3 -6.3 -26.7 -26.5 -3.6
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7.4.  SPANISH FOREIGN TRADE WITH OTHER EURO AREA COUNTRIES AND WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD
        IMPORTS AND ARRIVALS 
Eur millions and annual percentage changes
          Total        By product (deflated data)   (a)            By geographical area (nominal data)
         Intermediate      EU 27       OECD    Newly
    EUR   Nom-    De-   Con-   Other   industri-
 millions   inal   flated   sumer   Capital   Amer-   alised
   (a)    Total    Energy     Non-          of which:   OPEC   ican   China    coun-
  energy   Euro   coun-    tries
  Total   Area   Total   tries 
  United 
  States 
03 185 114 5.6 7.1 9.6 12.9 4.8 1.0 5.7 5.8 5.3 5.8 -4.8 -0.5 12.9 16.6 1.1
04 208 411 12.6 9.9 13.5 14.4 7.3 10.6 6.5 9.9 10.0 11.3 9.3 13.4 7.9 26.8 14.6
05 232 954 11.8 6.4 8.4 17.6 3.4 10.9 1.5 5.6 5.3 6.1 -0.1 39.2 29.3 37.3 11.2
06 262 687 12.8 9.2 7.4 5.9 10.6 4.8 12.2 8.4 8.0 8.5 14.7 24.9 24.1 22.7 28.6
07 285 038 8.5 7.4 6.8 7.5 7.5 4.1 8.3 10.5 11.0 9.8 16.4 -4.8 -6.8 28.7 -3.7
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
 Sources: ME y BE.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Tables 18.2 and 18.3 of the Boletín estadístico.
 The monthly series are provisional data, while the annual series are the final foreign trade data.
 a. Series deflated by unit value indices .
08 Mar 25 484 5.7 4.8 -8.8 -23.4 16.7 57.2 8.2 -5.5 -6.5 -5.5 29.7 42.1 0.7 -2.8 -26.1
     Apr 26 012 17.9 13.0 3.2 -6.6 20.5 29.3 18.6 11.3 11.0 10.0 13.5 40.9 42.0 34.7 6.9
     May 24 585 2.7 -3.5 -6.5 -22.4 0.9 -4.0 2.0 -3.0 -1.6 -3.5 12.3 52.9 29.5 6.7 -24.6
     Jun 24 126 -1.2 -4.2 -16.2 -19.5 3.7 17.0 1.0 -13.2 -14.3 -11.1 24.2 56.9 24.6 13.5 -24.3
     Jul 25 201 5.1 0.1 -4.0 -7.8 3.0 22.2 -1.2 -5.4 -7.4 -5.6 22.5 35.5 31.6 15.8 -17.9
     Aug 19 719 -1.1 -8.1 -12.6 -28.1 -3.4 5.0 -5.8 -10.4 -10.9 -10.2 -1.4 47.2 3.2 -0.7 -7.9
     Sep 24 723 6.0 1.5 3.1 -14.0 3.1 18.3 -0.0 0.4 -1.4 -1.7 2.5 40.9 5.8 17.8 -11.1
     Oct 23 317 -10.4 -13.5 -19.6 -20.9 -9.3 -1.0 -11.2 -15.1 -15.6 -15.1 -18.3 30.1 -20.3 -7.6 -10.6
     Nov 20 237 -19.9 -20.4 -17.9 -39.1 -17.9 0.4 -21.6 -22.8 -23.7 -22.3 -12.0 13.3 -9.4 -26.3 -21.3
     Dec 20 072 -16.5 -18.0 -14.0 -25.7 -18.4 -4.3 -22.1 -24.1 -27.4 -19.2 24.4 -4.3 -4.0 9.3 -29.4
09 Jan 15 591 -35.3 -30.1 -16.4 -32.3 -34.8 -32.9 -35.3 -32.5 -31.1 -33.8 -28.9 -50.0 -31.6 -28.0 -34.8
     Feb 18 268 -26.0 -20.3 -3.5 -35.4 -24.9 10.6 -32.3 -26.0 -25.4 -26.1 -3.4 -7.5 -22.4 -26.2 -34.0
     Mar 17 372 -31.8 -26.2 -9.0 -26.3 -32.3 -35.6 -31.3 -28.0 -28.1 -26.8 -21.5 -36.9 -7.8 -22.4 -22.5
     Apr 16 828 -35.3 -29.2 -17.1 -37.6 -32.5 -21.3 -35.1 -31.8 -32.0 -32.1 -22.9 -38.6 -29.6 -35.2 -33.6
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7.5.  SPANISH FOREIGN TRADE WITH OTHER EURO AREA COUNTRIES AND WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD.
        TRADE BALANCE. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
EUR millions
                    European Union (EU 27)            OECD
            Euro area    Other EU 27          Of which:   Other Newly
    World  American indus-
    total    Total    OPEC   coun-   China  trialised
   tries  countries
                 Of which:         Of which:   Total 
 United   Japan 
   Total   Total  States
  Germany   France   Italy   United 
  Kingdom
03 -46 995 -19 057 -19 120 -13 731 -3 239 -3 517 63 1 035 -27 616 -1 170 -3 855 -8 146 -1 467 -5 629 -2 600 
04 -61 486 -25 991 -25 267 -16 282 -3 353 -5 671 -724 472 -36 990 -1 692 -4 583 -9 321 -1 784 -7 369 -3 104 
05 -77 950 -30 703 -29 422 -16 749 -3 112 -6 938 -1 281 -210 -41 592 -1 092 -4 769 -14 136 -3 089 -10 182 -3 411 
06 -92 249 -33 547 -32 172 -18 689 -1 625 -7 184 -1 375 294 -45 357 -1 062 -4 652 -18 576 -3 316 -12 647 -4 564 
07 -100 015 -40 176 -38 176 -23 752 -214 -8 375 -2 000 133 -53 745 -2 555 -4 779 -16 423 -3 477 -16 366 -4 347 
P  08 -94 067 -25 314 -25 188 -20 054 3 865 -6 350 -125 418 -38 121 -3 479 -3 626 -22 158 -5 061 -17 903 -3 321 
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
 Source: ME.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Tables 18.3 and 18.5 of the Boletín Estadístico.
 The monthly series are provisional data, while the annual series are the final foreign trade data.
08 Mar -9 602 -2 251 -2 345 -1 716 174 -574 93 220 -3 579 -468 -437 -1 905 -447 -1 156 -251
     Apr -8 048 -2 673 -2 657 -2 022 335 -650 -16 130 -3 427 -279 -378 -1 656 -387 -1 396 -302
     May -7 963 -2 153 -2 315 -2 116 553 -490 163 160 -3 458 -304 -365 -1 973 -516 -1 405 -257
     Jun -8 662 -2 064 -2 052 -1 726 366 -417 -12 -40 -3 386 -310 -378 -2 558 -523 -1 467 -373
     Jul -8 012 -2 061 -2 044 -1 736 477 -769 -17 -5 -2 895 -266 -179 -1 769 -488 -1 783 -234
     Aug -7 597 -2 121 -2 093 -1 091 -199 -472 -28 -6 -2 933 -195 -150 -2 174 -379 -1 578 -196
     Sep -7 433 -1 262 -1 349 -1 489 604 -446 86 93 -2 222 -262 -250 -1 972 -590 -1 861 -279
     Oct -6 645 -1 780 -1 800 -1 622 492 -408 20 9 -2 633 -185 -242 -1 910 -336 -1 454 -278
     Nov -5 948 -1 939 -1 780 -1 372 441 -541 -159 -145 -2 682 -126 -200 -1 285 -406 -1 291 -293
     Dec -6 930 -2 559 -2 015 -1 508 210 -434 -544 -404 -3 724 -269 -282 -1 347 -208 -1 288 -241
09 Jan -4 498 -511 -531 -1 034 662 -154 20 33 -1 235 -265 -166 -917 -343 -1 265 -199
     Feb -5 868 -2 335 -2 316 -1 289 -718 -271 -18 10 -3 071 -475 -125 -1 124 -199 -1 119 -130
     Mar -3 657 -395 -571 -1 242 773 -109 175 188 -1 110 -274 -169 -919 -344 -870 -124
     Apr -3 636 -832 -725 -1 236 659 -63 -107 20 -1 424 -293 -133 -831 -256 -884 -155
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7.6.  SPANISH INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION VIS-à-VIS OTHER EURO AREA RESIDENTS AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
        SUMMARY
 Source: BE.
 Note: As from December 2002, portfolio investment data have been calculated using a new information system (see Banco de España Circular 2/2001 and note on changes
 introduced in the economic indicators). The incorporation of the new data under the heading ’shares and mutual funds’ of other resident sectors entails a very significant 
 break in the time series, both in the financial assets and the liabilities, so that the series have been revised back to 1992. This methodological change introduced by the
 new system also affects the rest of the headings, to some extent, but the effect does not justify a complete revision of the series.
End-of-period stocks in EUR billions
                            Total excluding Banco de España               Banco de España
    Net
  interna- 
   tional     Net       Direct investment      Portfolio investment         Other investment   Financial    Net
  invest-   position   derivat- Banco de   assets    Other 
   ment   excluding    ives España  vis-à-vis     net
  position   Banco de     Net   Spanish   Foreign     Net   Spanish   Foreign     Net   Spanish   Foreign     Net  Net   Reserves     the   assets 
  (assets-    España   position   invest-   invest-   position    invest-   invest-   position   invest-   invest-   position   position   Euro-   (assets-
  liabil.)   (assets -   (assets-     ment   ment in   (assets-     ment   ment in   (assets-     ment   ment in   (assets- (assets-   system   liabil.)
  liabil.)   liabil.)   abroad    Spain   liabil.)   abroad    Spain   liabil.)    abroad    Spain   liabil.) liabil.)
  (assets)  (liabil.)   (assets)  (liabil.)   (assets)  (liabil.)
  2=3+6+  13=
01 -242.5 -311.0 -38.2 162.9 201.1 -100.4 232.6 333.1 -172.3 172.5 344.8 ... 68.5 38.9 29.2 0.4
02 -303.1 -363.7 -89.2 156.0 245.2 -105.7 256.8 362.5 -168.9 197.4 366.3 ... 60.6 38.4 22.7 -0.4
03 -354.3 -410.3 -93.9 175.0 268.9 -102.3 319.8 422.0 -214.2 204.0 418.1 ... 56.1 21.2 18.3 16.6
04 -436.4 -504.5 -91.9 207.2 299.1 -203.2 359.3 562.5 -209.4 222.2 431.6 ... 68.1 14.5 31.9 21.7
05 -505.5 -577.2 -67.1 258.9 326.0 -273.6 454.7 728.4 -236.5 268.2 504.7 ... 71.7 14.6 17.1 40.1
06 Q1 -535.9 -618.4 -38.9 287.0 325.9 -327.1 476.7 803.8 -252.3 284.9 537.2 - 82.4 15.4 26.8 40.3
Q2 -551.2 -638.5 -30.3 302.2 332.5 -399.2 444.3 843.5 -209.0 299.5 508.5 - 87.3 14.6 32.2 40.5
Q3 -602.4 -685.8 -23.4 319.6 343.0 -459.1 447.7 906.8 -203.3 313.1 516.4 - 83.4 15.0 25.4 43.0
Q4 -664.4 -760.1 -35.6 314.0 349.6 -508.9 455.7 964.6 -206.1 324.9 530.9 -9.6 95.7 14.7 29.4 51.6
07 Q1 -712.3 -812.7 -31.4 320.5 351.8 -582.4 461.0 1 043.3 -187.6 358.4 546.1 -11.3 100.4 14.0 31.9 54.5
Q2 -744.6 -856.7 -22.7 351.5 374.2 -617.2 471.0 1 088.2 -200.8 361.7 562.6 -15.9 112.1 12.9 40.7 58.5
Q3 -786.5 -876.2 -14.7 361.0 375.7 -643.4 455.2 1 098.6 -200.1 383.7 583.8 -17.9 89.6 12.5 14.8 62.4
Q4 -827.2 -906.2 -9.4 401.3 410.6 -647.6 443.3 1 090.8 -230.4 378.8 609.2 -18.8 78.9 12.9 1.1 64.9
08 Q1 -847.7 -928.4 -26.4 401.7 428.1 -599.6 420.7 1 020.3 -281.6 380.3 661.9 -20.7 80.6 13.0 2.8 64.8
Q2 -866.5 -933.7 -27.2 417.1 444.3 -611.5 401.2 1 012.8 -271.6 416.6 688.1 -23.4 67.2 12.7 -7.5 62.0
Q3 -867.4 -924.4 -17.3 435.2 452.5 -624.9 387.7 1 012.6 -270.6 422.3 692.9 -11.7 57.0 13.8 -19.6 62.8
Q4 -877.0 -927.8 -24.4 434.9 459.3 -595.2 362.2 957.4 -301.9 385.4 687.3 -6.4 50.9 14.5 -30.6 66.9
09 Q1 -866.7 -918.9 -7.9 453.2 461.1 -578.5 352.5 930.9 -332.5 374.1 706.7 0.0 52.2 15.7 -27.4 63.9
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7.7.  SPANISH INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION VIS-à-VIS OTHER EURO AREA RESIDENTES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
        BREAKDOWN BY INVESTMENT
 Source: BE.
 Note: See footnote to Indicator 7.6
End-of-period stocks in EUR millions
                 Direct investment     Portfolio investment, including Banco de España         Other investment,     Financial derivatives 
   including Banco de España         including BE
     Spanish investment      Foreign investment      Spanish investment        Foreign investment
         abroad          in Spain            abroad             in Spain
    Spanish     Foreign    Spanish     Foreign 
   investment    investment   investment   investment 
  Shares and   Intercompany   Shares and  Intercompany  Shares and      Debt   Shares and       Debt     abroad     in Spain    abroad     in Spain 
    other       debt     other      debt   mutual funds    securities   mutual funds    securities 
   equities   transactions     equities   transactions 
01 142 688 20 231 164 360 36 768 74 596 158 052 144 151 188 925 202 099 344 845 ... ...
02 139 178 16 815 194 711 50 456 50 712 206 581 116 967 245 492 220 483 367 646 - -
03 160 519 14 477 207 096 61 828 62 677 273 344 147 878 274 166 222 670 418 202 - -
04 189 622 17 627 231 649 67 501 78 053 302 067 183 211 379 279 254 992 431 651 - -
05 236 769 22 133 250 641 75 322 104 157 388 472 197 347 531 035 287 551 504 831 - -
06 Q1 267 995 18 980 252 144 73 779 119 452 395 944 214 645 589 149 313 799 537 742 - -
Q2 279 692 22 501 259 325 73 179 122 047 361 127 206 547 636 951 333 653 508 828 - -
Q3 298 024 21 608 263 985 79 063 126 170 363 383 232 494 674 271 339 974 516 719 - -
Q4 290 841 23 206 270 481 79 125 133 193 373 001 245 683 718 897 355 621 531 211 32 973 42 569 
07 Q1 299 321 21 139 273 061 78 768 140 704 373 512 256 533 786 784 391 843 546 396 33 197 44 487 
Q2 335 868 15 665 288 590 85 654 153 730 374 852 269 506 818 657 403 805 563 003 39 921 55 856 
Q3 339 394 21 633 293 476 82 274 142 095 374 617 273 560 825 065 399 573 584 058 44 181 62 069 
Q4 374 419 26 861 319 861 90 777 134 762 372 789 286 207 804 620 383 993 612 706 44 642 63 487 
08 Q1 374 132 27 555 341 161 86 941 105 912 379 311 239 395 780 900 385 209 663 720 53 297 74 001 
Q2 388 437 28 687 354 781 89 554 98 479 364 805 220 273 792 495 421 356 700 447 58 579 82 016 
Q3 404 074 31 131 356 162 96 305 84 523 365 861 203 600 808 962 427 107 717 182 70 066 81 757 
Q4 403 625 31 323 359 678 99 651 64 794 363 565 174 373 783 004 390 233 722 556 108 228 114 023 
09 Q1 420 426 32 773 360 122 101 018 57 269 358 747 145 316 785 632 379 576 739 143 111 632 111 519 
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7.8.  SPANISH RESERVE ASSETS
 Source: BE.
 Note: From January 1999 the assets denominated in euro and other currencies vis-à-vis residents of other euro area countries are not considered reserve assets. To December 
 1998, data in pesetas have been converted to euro using the irrevocable euro conversion rate. Since January 1999, all reserve assets are valued at market prices. As of January 
 2000 reserve assets data have been compiled in accordance with the IMF´s new methodological guidelines published in the document ’International Reserves and Foreign
 Currency Liquidity 
 Guidelines for a Data Template’, October 2001 (http://dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/sddsguide). Using this new definition, total reserve assets as at 31.12.99 would 
 have been EUR 37835 million instead of the ammount of EUR 37288 million published in this table. 
End-of-period stocks in EUR millions
                               Reserve assets   Memorandum item:
       gold
    Reserve
    Total    Foreign   position in    Monetary    Financial     Millions of
   exchange    the IMF     SDRs      gold   derivatives     troy ounces
03 21 229 13 073 1 476 328 5 559 793 16.8
04 14 505 7 680 1 156 244 5 411 15 16.8
05 14 601 7 306 636 281 6 400 -21 14.7
06 14 685 7 533 303 254 6 467 127 13.4
07 12 946 7 285 218 252 5 145 46 9.1
08 Jan 13 450 7 316 218 255 5 630 31 9.1
     Feb 13 586 7 222 216 253 5 795 101 9.1
     Mar 12 976 7 021 211 189 5 367 189 9.1
     Apr 12 568 7 045 204 190 5 070 59 9.1
     May 12 598 7 029 245 176 5 166 -18 9.1
     Jun 12 709 6 921 233 175 5 357 23 9.1
     Jul 12 887 7 169 234 172 5 314 -1 9.1
     Aug 12 987 7 638 233 155 5 128 -168 9.1
     Sep 13 806 7 857 238 159 5 678 -126 9.1
     Oct 14 037 8 546 256 170 5 201 -135 9.1
     Nov 15 150 8 796 449 168 5 797 -60 9.1
     Dec 14 546 8 292 467 160 5 627 - 9.1
09 Jan 16 033 8 889 492 173 6 479 - 9.1
     Feb 16 519 9 040 490 173 6 816 - 9.1
     Mar 15 663 8 691 556 167 6 249 - 9.1
     Apr 15 490 8 713 560 168 6 050 - 9.1
     May 15 225 8 180 632 156 6 257 - 9.1
     Jun 15 142 8 372 693 48 6 028 - 9.1
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7.9.  SPANISH EXTERNAL DEBT VIS-À-VIS OTHER EURO AREA RESIDENTS AND THE REST OF THE WORLD. SUMMARY
 Source: BE.
                          End-of-period positions EUR millions
                           General government           Other monetary financial institutions
      Short-term              Long-term        Short-term Long-term
   Total
    Total    Total
    Money     Loans   Bonds and     Loans     Trade     Money   Deposits   Bonds and    Deposits 
    market     notes    credits     market     notes
   instru-    instru-
    ments     ments
05 Q1 958 055 204 834 2 513 1 024 183 038 18 259 - 460 500 467 202 197 125 535 132 301 
Q2 1 038 214 213 939 2 110 437 194 059 17 333 - 490 258 587 232 191 139 670 117 810 
Q3 1 080 328 213 370 3 088 1 424 191 719 17 139 - 517 879 400 264 976 150 727 101 776 
Q4 1 144 447 213 412 2 465 65 192 798 18 085 - 548 891 981 276 566 164 457 106 887 
06 Q1 1 238 533 214 081 4 628 14 191 300 18 137 - 589 544 1 003 295 793 193 633 99 115 
Q2 1 258 491 213 347 3 620 348 191 381 17 998 - 580 931 2 186 268 495 208 797 101 453 
Q3 1 308 130 214 181 6 070 1 472 188 569 18 070 - 602 379 5 274 267 227 225 647 104 232 
Q4 1 370 277 215 585 4 836 665 191 871 18 213 - 622 836 6 252 277 193 236 038 103 352 
07 Q1 1 461 842 219 413 4 901 40 195 781 18 692 - 658 096 11 331 295 528 252 211 99 027 
Q2 1 523 014 215 158 5 446 443 190 503 18 766 - 684 742 11 316 294 402 269 682 109 341 
Q3 1 542 186 207 169 4 820 1 329 182 455 18 566 - 707 016 15 079 308 889 273 907 109 140 
Q4 1 561 759 197 861 4 505 878 173 414 19 064 - 723 951 20 039 327 391 262 222 114 300 
08 Q1 1 588 487 194 208 6 329 549 167 692 19 637 - 768 529 20 424 380 522 256 302 111 281 
Q2 1 642 142 196 206 5 594 152 170 922 19 538 - 794 086 22 729 399 932 258 374 113 051 
Q3 1 680 102 212 325 9 722 485 182 155 19 964 - 792 491 21 269 400 051 258 393 112 778 
Q4 1 661 730 227 201 12 330 2 089 191 968 20 815 - 766 316 12 214 400 693 249 210 104 200 
09 Q1 1 683 347 235 620 15 801 470 198 385 20 964 - 781 797 15 198 411 446 246 447 108 706 
  13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25
7.9. (CONT.) SPANISH EXTERNAL DEBT VIS-À-VIS OTHER EURO AREA RESIDENTS AND THE REST OF THE WORLD. SUMMARY
                          End-of-period positions EUR millions
    Monetary authority                                   Other residents sectors   Direct investment
  Short-term              Short-term                     Long-term          Vis-à-vis
   Total    Total
   Deposits     Money     Loans    Other    Bonds and    Loans      Trade     Other    Total     Direct   Subsidia- 
    market  liabilities     notes     credits  liabilities   investors     ries
    instru- 
    ments
05 Q1 0 0 194 559 4 274 20 471 787 98 620 69 232 387 788 98 161 39 449 58 712 
Q2 71 71 232 928 3 839 19 803 1 569 133 435 73 111 384 788 101 020 41 447 59 573 
Q3 42 42 244 638 3 401 19 164 1 636 142 932 76 503 356 646 104 399 42 506 61 893 
Q4 126 126 273 437 3 380 17 817 996 166 955 83 404 358 527 108 581 43 547 65 034 
06 Q1 535 535 322 731 2 905 19 500 417 195 679 102 731 360 1 139 111 642 46 426 65 216 
Q2 328 328 351 173 4 283 18 432 338 226 684 100 123 352 961 112 712 47 702 65 010 
Q3 316 316 374 113 4 641 22 224 838 244 071 101 073 348 918 117 140 51 141 65 999 
Q4 281 281 411 407 4 786 22 967 702 275 114 106 946 338 555 120 168 49 588 70 581 
07 Q1 322 322 455 348 5 303 21 641 550 317 258 109 329 334 932 128 663 50 034 78 629 
Q2 423 423 481 337 5 418 26 985 1 066 336 291 110 223 331 1 022 141 355 50 486 90 868 
Q3 277 277 494 661 2 153 21 864 854 346 652 121 804 339 994 133 063 52 229 80 834 
Q4 3 550 3 550 491 964 201 20 050 314 344 239 126 136 331 692 144 433 55 142 89 291 
08 Q1 1 855 1 855 480 029 927 19 573 430 329 226 128 257 320 1 296 143 867 56 287 87 579 
Q2 12 326 12 326 490 324 6 397 20 880 1 368 328 479 131 763 317 1 120 149 201 61 386 87 815 
Q3 24 276 24 276 497 052 18 093 22 983 1 205 319 331 134 294 323 824 153 958 62 351 91 607 
Q4 35 233 35 233 476 809 12 955 20 866 2 442 304 328 135 073 322 824 156 170 64 600 91 570 
09 Q1 32 491 32 491 474 868 19 521 17 319 3 270 290 280 143 099 356 1 023 158 572 65 894 92 678 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49* ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 ECONOMIC INDICATORS
  +5+6-7 2  3  4  5  6  7   -11-12 9   10   11   12   13
8.1.a CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF THE EUROSYSTEM. NET LENDING TO CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND ITS COUNTERPARTS
Average of daily data, EUR millions
                    Net lending in euro                   Counterparts
       Open market operations       Standing               Autonomous factors   Actual
     facilities  reserves
  Total     of
  credit 
  Main  Longer-   Fine-  Structu-  Marginal  Deposit    Total   Bank-  Deposits  Gold and   Other  institu-
 refinan-   term  tuning  ral re-  lending  facility   notes    to  net as-   assets   tions 
 cing  refinan-   reverse  verse  facility  general  sets in    (net) 
 opera-  cing  opera-  opera-  govern-  foreign 
 tions  opera-  tions  tions   ment  currency
 tions  (net)  (net)
 1=2+3+4  8=9+10
08 Jan 438 306 191 905 268 486 -21 373 - 199 911 245 582 658 002 52 664 354 557 110 527 192 724 
     Feb 443 028 175 548 268 494 -762 - 158 410 238 533 651 786 52 814 348 531 117 537 204 496 
     Mar 470 375 198 667 268 696 3 286 - 196 470 254 680 659 638 68 872 341 404 132 425 215 695 
     Apr 458 583 166 978 292 729 -676 - 111 558 258 599 662 688 74 650 360 191 118 549 199 984 
     May 462 508 171 819 291 841 -1 068 - 172 256 255 055 670 599 65 643 370 568 110 619 207 453 
     Jun 460 645 182 477 278 839 -667 - 304 308 245 546 674 406 64 832 376 972 116 720 215 099 
     Jul 458 121 166 956 292 400 -634 - 56 657 250 649 683 700 63 596 374 744 121 903 207 473 
     Aug 462 440 163 524 300 014 -1 000 - 90 188 247 021 686 797 58 194 376 096 121 875 215 420 
     Sep 471 362 166 660 305 321 6 584 - 2 284 9 487 241 752 682 161 55 504 392 028 103 885 229 611 
     Oct 534 868 272 768 444 976 -34 226 - 15 549 164 198 308 820 713 519 80 454 524 301 -39 148 226 049 
     Nov 579 941 329 562 457 732 -3 978 - 4 612 207 988 365 023 727 623 95 385 572 539 -114 554 214 918 
     Dec 613 857 256 810 565 508 -5 976 - 2 644 205 129 379 866 749 344 110 732 587 525 -107 316 233 990 
09 Jan 580 046 224 907 598 376 -8 568 -638 2 646 236 676 365 644 746 945 98 051 571 542 -92 189 214 402 
     Feb 592 161 212 759 498 364 -6 449 - 2 227 114 740 370 902 739 970 96 499 526 691 -61 125 221 259 
     Mar 607 356 232 617 451 005 -5 038 - 1 146 72 373 388 329 745 155 133 214 498 652 -8 613 219 027 
     Apr 629 124 241 479 430 873 -4 722 - 876 39 381 401 450 755 635 142 817 519 780 -22 778 227 674 
     May 602 531 235 969 406 653 -5 146 - 229 35 175 394 929 758 300 139 329 497 607 5 093 207 602 
     Jun 615 980 254 069 416 844 -2 632 - 2 197 54 498 391 872 761 763 145 461 468 695 46 656 224 107 
  +19-20   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   -26-27   24   25   26   27   28
8.1.b BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA. NET LENDING TO CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND ITS COUNTERPARTS
 Sources: ECB for Table 8.1.a and BE for Table 8.1.b.
Average of daily data, EUR millions
                     Net lending  in euro                              Counterparts
        Open market operations      Standing    Intra-ESCB               Autonomous factors    Actual
    facilities   reserves
  Total      of
   credit 
  Main   Longer-   Fine-  Struc-   Margi-   Deposit   Target    Rest    Total   Bank-  Deposits   Gold   Other   institu-
 refinan-   term   tuning  tural   nal  facility   notes     to   and net   assets    tions 
  cing  refinan-  reserve  reserve   lending  general   assets    (net) 
  opera-   cing  opera-  opera-  facility  govern-   in
  tions   opera-   tions   tions   ment   foreign
  tions   (net)   (net)   curren-
  cy
  14=15+16   t
   +17+18  23=24+25
08 Jan 39 645 28 261 14 356 -2 957 - 22 37 4 993 -4 787 18 104 82 646 18 048 11 174 71 416 21 336 
     Feb 44 170 24 201 20 086 -115 - 1 3 7 985 -4 787 18 829 80 774 19 962 9 836 72 071 22 143 
     Mar 44 173 21 534 22 480 161 - - 2 6 549 -4 787 18 842 81 638 19 314 9 313 72 798 23 569 
     Apr 47 940 18 749 29 240 -27 - - 23 12 728 -4 787 17 878 80 339 20 191 9 608 73 045 22 121 
     May 47 981 20 386 27 966 -373 - 3 0 9 119 -4 787 19 386 79 609 22 623 10 697 72 149 24 263 
     Jun 47 077 19 627 27 534 -59 - 27 51 8 300 -4 787 19 006 79 207 23 987 11 228 72 960 24 559 
     Jul 49 384 15 745 33 727 -77 - 0 11 18 770 -4 787 11 374 79 782 16 554 12 134 72 828 24 027 
     Aug 46 741 12 338 34 467 -62 - 0 1 20 634 -4 787 6 400 78 759 13 276 12 171 73 465 24 495 
     Sep 49 144 10 689 38 695 204 - 50 493 21 118 -4 787 5 006 76 660 14 077 11 885 73 846 27 807 
     Oct 52 692 21 520 56 729 -6 008 - 379 19 929 11 844 -4 787 20 175 79 383 29 728 15 099 73 837 25 459 
     Nov 58 218 33 238 58 454 -764 - 210 32 921 15 379 -4 787 21 135 79 783 34 089 18 251 74 485 26 490 
     Dec 63 598 25 688 67 106 -1 780 - 56 27 471 28 274 -4 787 13 156 81 432 23 611 17 972 73 916 26 955 
09 Jan 57 488 22 338 63 324 -1 721 - 19 26 472 29 076 -5 265 8 734 80 105 19 644 20 871 70 144 24 942 
     Feb 74 090 20 781 57 578 -614 - 60 3 716 38 001 -5 265 14 731 78 492 23 060 16 857 69 964 26 622 
     Mar 72 709 19 233 55 363 -600 - 21 1 308 38 496 -5 406 13 986 78 839 24 844 17 455 72 242 25 633 
     Apr 67 434 20 482 48 530 -314 - - 1 264 29 462 -5 447 16 532 80 098 27 400 19 354 71 611 26 887 
     May 67 668 23 171 46 028 -509 - - 1 022 26 575 -5 447 21 139 79 163 31 162 18 427 70 759 25 400 
     Jun 70 703 29 661 46 695 -118 - - 5 535 29 962 -5 447 19 221 79 275 27 795 16 672 71 177 26 966 
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8.2 CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS, OTHER LIABILITIES OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND MUTUAL FUNDS SHARES
      OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHS RESIDENT IN SPAIN (a)
 Source: BE.
 a. This concept refers to the instruments included in the headings of the table, issued by resident credit institutions and mutual funds. The exception is column 9, which
 includes deposits in Spanish bank branches abroad.
 b. Current accounts, savings accounts and deposits redeemable at up to 3 months’ notice.
 c. Deposits redeemable at over 3 months’ notice and time deposits.
 d. The series includes the old categories of Money market funds and Fixed income mutual funds in euros.
 e. Defined as cash and cash equivalents, other liabilities of credit institutions and Fixed income mutual funds shares in euros.
EUR millions and %
      Cash and cash equivalents     Other liabilities of credit institutions           Mutual funds shares   Memorandum items 
   12-m. % change      12-month % change   12-month % change   12-month % change
   12-    12    12-
   Stocks   month    Stocks   month    Stocks   month
   %   Depo-    %   Other   Repos +   Depo-    %   Fixed   Other AL   Contri- 
  change    Cash   sits   change   depo-   credit   sits   change   income (e)   bution 
  (b)   sits   insti-   in   in EUR   of the 
   (c)   tutions’   bran-    (d)   MFIs
  securi-   ches   resid. 
  ties   abroad   to M3
06 512 581 11.5 9.9 11.9 365 983 21.7 22.8 21.6 0.9 224 851 2.1 -10.1 13.5 12.4 17.3
07 497 887 -2.9 2.3 -4.1 458 887 25.4 29.8 7.3 -10.7 209 767 -6.7 -3.9 -8.8 7.7 14.7
08 481 725 -3.2 0.6 -4.2 547 234 19.3 24.3 -12.7 -8.9 145 099 -30.8 -16.2 -42.2 5.5 8.0
08 Feb 480 343 -2.2 1.5 -3.1 482 232 26.8 31.2 6.3 -7.4 197 714 -12.5 2.6 -23.1 9.7 14.8
     Mar 480 671 -4.2 -0.3 -5.2 488 556 24.7 29.7 2.5 -15.4 192 015 -16.1 -0.1 -27.6 7.6 12.9
     Apr 471 030 -4.1 -0.6 -5.0 499 700 26.2 31.6 -0.3 -10.7 188 789 -17.6 -1.2 -29.3 8.4 12.1
     May 477 157 -4.3 -1.3 -5.0 505 476 25.3 31.5 -3.3 -19.6 184 113 -20.1 -3.3 -31.9 7.8 11.9
     Jun 487 821 -5.6 -2.5 -6.3 518 447 25.7 30.7 -0.7 2.5 175 162 -23.7 -6.9 -35.6 6.9 12.9
     Jul 479 771 -4.6 -2.8 -5.0 523 983 26.1 31.7 -1.2 -9.5 169 786 -25.5 -8.9 -37.3 7.6 13.0
     Aug 478 080 -2.8 -3.2 -2.7 531 720 25.6 31.8 -6.0 -7.3 167 975 -26.2 -11.6 -37.1 8.2 13.1
     Sep 478 656 -4.5 -3.7 -4.7 534 820 24.3 29.6 -2.1 -11.7 162 715 -27.2 -13.4 -37.8 6.7 10.8
     Oct 465 576 -4.1 1.2 -5.4 541 397 23.0 27.5 1.2 -18.8 151 857 -31.1 -15.4 -42.7 6.6 9.8
     Nov 475 795 -2.5 0.9 -3.4 542 175 20.7 25.8 -6.4 -24.5 147 925 -31.1 -15.8 -42.7 6.4 9.0
     Dec 481 725 -3.2 0.6 -4.2 547 234 19.3 24.3 -12.7 -8.9 145 099 -30.8 -16.2 -42.2 5.5 8.0
09 Jan 473 030 -1.9 1.3 -2.8 538 749 14.5 19.9 -19.5 -23.7 144 119 -28.7 -20.9 -36.0 3.7 7.8
     Feb 476 275 -0.8 1.4 -1.4 538 668 11.7 16.8 -22.1 -22.3 142 710 -27.8 -18.9 -36.2 3.2 7.4
     Mar 477 051 -0.8 2.0 -1.4 538 244 10.2 15.5 -26.3 -21.3 144 862 -24.6 -17.6 -31.5 2.7 7.6
     Apr 476 061 1.1 2.9 0.6 538 225 7.7 11.8 -20.4 -26.4 145 422 -23.0 -15.3 -30.6 2.7 7.0
     May 490 150 2.7 2.8 2.7 536 603 6.2 9.8 -18.4 -25.5 144 326 -21.6 -19.3 -23.9 2.5 5.3
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8.3 CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS, OTHER LIABILITIES OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND MUTUAL FUNDS SHARES
      OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS RESIDENT IN SPAIN (a)
 Source: BE.
 a. This concept refers to the instruments included in the headings of the table, issued by resident credit institutions and mutual funds. The exception is column 6, which
 includes deposits in Spanish bank branches abroad.
 b. Cash, current accounts, savings accounts and deposits redeemable at up to and including 3 months’ notice.
 c. Deposits redeemable at over 3 months’ notice and time deposits.
 d. The series includes the old categories of Money market funds and Fixed income mutual funds in euros.
EUR millions and %
 Cash and cash equivalents (b)  Other liabilities of credit institutions           Mutual funds shares
        Annual   Annual growth rate
      growth rate
     Stocks     Annual    Stocks   Annual    Stocks   Annual 
    growth   growth   Repos +   growth   Fixed    Other 
    rate   rate    Other   credit   rate   income
   depo-   instit.’   in EUR
   sits   securit.+    (d)
   (c)   dep. in
  branches
  abroad
06 137 357 19.6 78 769 11.3 17.4 2.8 26 523 -9.9 -15.9 -5.0
07 133 469 -2.8 94 413 19.9 37.4 -8.2 21 692 -18.2 -15.7 -20.0
08 122 377 -8.3 112 786 19.5 25.1 5.9 11 854 -45.4 -33.6 -54.5
08 Feb 124 315 -4.2 96 821 23.5 38.6 -4.6 20 024 -30.7 -17.2 -40.2
     Mar 123 351 -8.3 98 807 20.2 35.6 -8.3 19 083 -37.3 -23.9 -47.1
     Apr 118 718 -7.8 101 892 26.9 44.4 -7.5 18 113 -39.3 -24.4 -49.9
     May 121 193 -9.2 103 551 24.0 43.1 -12.0 16 996 -41.9 -25.7 -53.3
     Jun 125 284 -8.7 110 055 24.2 35.7 1.0 15 587 -45.3 -28.0 -57.4
     Jul 118 279 -7.8 107 692 25.6 38.1 1.0 14 913 -46.2 -29.7 -57.9
     Aug 120 854 -4.2 110 438 23.7 38.2 -3.2 14 573 -46.2 -31.9 -56.9
     Sep 126 336 -4.6 111 310 21.4 30.6 3.6 13 946 -46.6 -33.4 -56.6
     Oct 116 473 -7.2 113 948 23.6 28.9 11.9 12 858 -48.0 -34.1 -58.3
     Nov 121 399 -6.0 110 632 18.2 23.1 6.7 12 333 -46.8 -33.8 -56.6
     Dec 122 377 -8.3 112 786 19.5 25.1 5.9 11 854 -45.4 -33.6 -54.5
09 Jan 116 487 -7.0 106 356 12.7 20.1 -6.0 11 845 -43.1 -37.6 -48.4
     Feb 118 191 -4.9 106 928 10.4 16.8 -6.9 12 302 -38.6 -29.3 -47.6
     Mar 116 255 -5.8 107 570 8.9 16.7 -12.3 11 915 -37.6 -32.8 -42.5
     Apr 110 400 -7.0 110 411 8.4 11.7 -1.9 11 962 -34.0 -29.7 -38.6
     May 115 192 -5.0 112 876 9.0 12.0 -0.1 11 836 -30.4 -32.0 -28.6
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8.4 CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS, OTHER LIABILITIES OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND MUTUAL FUNDS SHARES
      OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHS RESIDENT IN SPAIN (a)
 Source: BE.
 a. This concept refers to the instruments included in the headings of the table, issued by resident credit institutions and mutual funds. The exception is column 6, which
 includes deposits in Spanish bank branches abroad.
 b. Current accounts, savings accounts and deposits redeemable at up to 3 months’ notice.
 c. Deposits redeemable at over 3 months’ notice and time deposits.
 d. The series includes the old categories of Money market funds and Fixed income mutual funds in euros.
EUR millions and %
       Cash and cash equivalents  Other liabilities of credit institutions           Mutual funds shares
 Annual growth rate         Annual   Annual growth rate
      growth rate
   Stocks   Annual    Stocks   Annual    Stocks   Annual 
  growth     Cash    Depo-   growth   Repos +   growth   Fixed    Other 
  rate    sits   rate    Other   credit   rate   income
   (b)    depo-   instit.’   in EUR
   sits   securit.+    (d)
   (c)   dep. in
  branches
  abroad
06 375 224 8.9 9.2 8.8 287 214 24.9 23.8 34.1 198 328 4.0 -9.3 16.5
07 364 418 -2.9 2.9 -4.6 364 474 26.9 28.4 15.0 188 075 -5.2 -2.3 -7.3
08 359 348 -1.4 2.7 -2.7 434 448 19.2 24.2 -25.8 133 245 -29.2 -14.2 -40.7
08 Feb 356 028 -1.5 2.4 -2.6 385 412 27.7 29.8 10.5 177 690 -9.8 5.5 -20.6
     Mar 357 320 -2.7 0.8 -3.8 389 750 25.8 28.5 4.9 172 932 -12.8 3.5 -24.6
     Apr 352 312 -2.8 0.6 -3.9 397 809 26.0 29.2 1.5 170 675 -14.4 2.2 -26.3
     May 355 965 -2.5 0.1 -3.3 401 925 25.6 29.3 -2.2 167 116 -17.0 -0.1 -28.8
     Jun 362 537 -4.5 -1.0 -5.6 408 392 26.1 29.6 -1.0 159 574 -20.7 -4.0 -32.5
     Jul 361 492 -3.5 -1.2 -4.2 416 292 26.3 30.4 -5.8 154 873 -22.7 -6.1 -34.5
     Aug 357 226 -2.3 -1.5 -2.5 421 281 26.1 30.5 -8.7 153 402 -23.5 -8.8 -34.4
     Sep 352 319 -4.4 -1.8 -5.3 423 510 25.1 29.4 -10.6 148 769 -24.7 -10.7 -35.3
     Oct 349 103 -3.0 3.1 -5.0 427 449 22.9 27.2 -14.5 138 999 -28.9 -13.0 -40.8
     Nov 354 396 -1.3 3.0 -2.6 431 543 21.3 26.3 -22.6 135 593 -29.2 -13.7 -41.0
     Dec 359 348 -1.4 2.7 -2.7 434 448 19.2 24.2 -25.8 133 245 -29.2 -14.2 -40.7
09 Jan 356 543 -0.2 3.3 -1.3 432 393 14.9 19.8 -30.7 132 274 -27.1 -18.9 -34.6
     Feb 358 084 0.6 3.3 -0.3 431 740 12.0 16.7 -33.0 130 408 -26.6 -17.8 -34.9
     Mar 360 796 1.0 3.6 0.1 430 674 10.5 15.2 -34.9 132 947 -23.1 -15.9 -30.3
     Apr 365 661 3.8 4.4 3.6 427 815 7.5 11.8 -34.8 133 460 -21.8 -13.7 -29.8
     May 374 959 5.3 4.1 5.7 423 727 5.4 9.3 -33.3 132 490 -20.7 -17.9 -23.5
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8.5. FINANCING OF NON-FINANCIAL SECTORS RESIDENT IN SPAIN (a)
 Source: BE.
 GENERAL NOTE: Tables 8.2 to 8.7 were revised in September 2000, to take into account the criteria used to compile the Financial Accounts of the Spanish economy in
 accordance with ESA 95 (see the box appearing in the article "Evolución reciente de la economía española" in the September 2000 edition of the Boletín Económico).
 a. The annual percentage changes are calculated as the effective flow of the period / the stock at the beginning of the period.
 b. Total liabilities (consolidated) less deposits. Inter-general government liabilities are deduced.
EUR millions and %
             Total                      Annual growth rate                  Contribution to col. 3 
  Non-financial corp. and households and NPISHs   Non-financial corp. and households and NPISHs 
   Stocks   Effec-   Annual   Gene-   Gene-
  tive   growth   ral   ral
  flow   rate   go-    By sectors       By instruments   go-    By sectors By instrumentss
  vern-   vern-
  ment   ment
   (b)   Non-   House-  Credit  Securi-  Exter-    (b)   Non-   House-  Credit  Securi-  Exter- 
  finan-   holds  institu-  ties  nal   finan-   holds  institu-  ties  nal
  cial   and  tions’  other   loans   cial   and  tions’  other   loans 
  corpo-   NPISHs   loans &  than   corpo-   NPISHs   loans &  than
 rations  securit.   shares  rations  securit.   shares
  funds   funds
06 2 103 406 335 822 19.0 -4.7 24.2 27.9 19.6 24.4 134.2 15.9 -0.8 19.9 12.6 7.2 17.0 1.0 1.9
07 2 368 926 258 245 12.3 -6.9 15.5 17.7 12.5 15.9 18.4 12.3 -1.0 13.3 8.6 4.6 11.6 0.3 1.4
08 2 544 009 179 144 7.6 18.1 6.1 7.4 4.4 5.6 12.1 8.8 2.1 5.4 3.8 1.6 4.2 0.2 1.1
08 Feb 2 389 555 12 045 11.8 -4.9 14.5 16.5 11.8 14.9 14.2 11.8 -0.7 12.5 8.1 4.4 10.9 0.2 1.4
     Mar 2 405 873 16 420 10.9 -4.8 13.3 15.5 10.5 13.6 11.0 12.0 -0.7 11.5 7.6 3.9 9.9 0.2 1.4
     Apr 2 411 268 5 294 10.3 -2.8 12.3 13.9 10.1 12.6 15.4 9.8 -0.4 10.7 6.9 3.8 9.3 0.2 1.2
     May 2 433 092 19 736 9.4 -1.4 11.0 12.1 9.6 11.6 17.4 6.6 -0.2 9.6 6.1 3.5 8.6 0.3 0.8
     Jun 2 459 635 27 965 8.8 -1.7 10.3 11.7 8.4 10.2 18.0 9.9 -0.2 9.0 5.9 3.1 7.5 0.3 1.2
     Jul 2 469 493 14 532 8.5 4.6 9.1 10.1 7.6 8.9 10.1 9.8 0.5 8.0 5.2 2.8 6.7 0.2 1.2
     Aug 2 484 988 14 392 8.4 5.9 8.7 9.9 7.0 8.4 10.0 10.3 0.7 7.6 5.0 2.6 6.3 0.2 1.2
     Sep 2 498 177 11 262 8.1 6.9 8.3 9.6 6.5 7.8 6.9 11.9 0.8 7.3 4.9 2.4 5.8 0.1 1.4
     Oct 2 501 885 1 702 8.0 10.6 7.7 9.2 5.7 7.4 6.7 9.6 1.2 6.8 4.7 2.1 5.6 0.1 1.1
     Nov 2 516 612 15 018 7.6 13.4 6.8 8.3 4.9 6.4 12.4 8.8 1.5 6.1 4.2 1.8 4.8 0.2 1.0
     Dec 2 544 009 32 176 7.6 18.1 6.1 7.4 4.4 5.6 12.1 8.8 2.1 5.4 3.8 1.6 4.2 0.2 1.1
09 Jan 2 526 956 -20 016 6.3 12.7 5.5 6.8 3.7 4.9 17.9 7.6 1.5 4.9 3.5 1.4 3.7 0.3 0.9
     Feb 2 550 678 24 044 6.8 20.2 5.0 6.6 2.8 4.2 22.0 8.2 2.4 4.4 3.4 1.1 3.1 0.3 1.0
     Mar 2 563 679 15 293 6.7 22.7 4.6 6.3 2.2 3.3 26.5 9.6 2.7 4.0 3.2 0.8 2.5 0.4 1.1
     Apr 2 567 720 4 357 6.7 26.2 4.1 6.0 1.6 2.9 24.4 9.4 3.0 3.7 3.1 0.6 2.2 0.4 1.1
     May 2 580 108 12 746 6.3 27.7 3.5 5.3 0.9 2.2 18.0 9.9 3.2 3.1 2.8 0.3 1.6 0.3 1.2
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8.6. FINANCING OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS RESIDENT IN SPAIN (a)
 Source: BE.
 GENERAL NOTE: Tables 8.2 to 8.7 were revised in September 2000, to take into account the criteria used to compile the Financial Accounts of the Spanish economy in
 accordance with ESA 95 (see the box appearing in the article "Evolución reciente de la economía española" in the September 2000 edition of the Boletín Económico).
 a. The annual percentage changes are calculated as the effective flow of the period / the stock at the beginning of the period.
 b. Includes issues of resident financial subsidiaries of non-financial corporations, insofar as the funds raised in these issues are routed to the parent company as loans. The issuing
 institutions of these financial instruments are classified as Other financial intermediaries in the Boletín Estadístico and in the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy.
EUR millions and %
  Resident credit institu-
          Total   tions’ loans and          Securities other        External loans   Memoran- 
  off-balance-sheet           than shares (b)   dum items:
  securitised loans   off-
  balance- 
  sheet
  Stocks   Effec-  Annual   Stocks  Annual   Contri-          of which  Annual   Contri-   Stocks  Annual   Contri-   securi-
  tive  growth  growth   bution  growth   bution  growth   bution  tised loans
  flow   rate   rate    to   Stocks   rate    to   rate    to
  col.3  Issues   col.3   col.3
 by re- 
 sident 
 financ.
 subsid.
06 1 024 589 222 911 27.9 750 137 29.8 21.6 30 934 19 370 134.2 2.2 243 518 15.9 4.1 3 230 
07 1 214 901 181 572 17.7 895 668 19.5 14.3 36 636 23 056 18.4 0.6 282 597 12.1 2.9 2 678 
08 1 303 097 90 003 7.4 954 134 6.8 5.0 41 076 25 648 12.1 0.4 307 887 8.7 2.0 2 060 
08 Feb 1 227 261 3 930 16.5 906 447 18.2 13.3 36 632 22 667 14.2 0.4 284 182 11.4 2.7 2 552 
     Mar 1 235 032 7 450 15.5 914 494 16.9 12.4 35 920 22 587 11.0 0.3 284 619 11.6 2.8 2 489 
     Apr 1 243 320 8 143 13.9 919 170 15.3 11.2 36 787 22 573 15.4 0.5 287 363 9.5 2.2 2 461 
     May 1 252 505 6 933 12.1 924 039 13.8 10.1 38 228 24 195 17.4 0.5 290 238 6.2 1.5 2 500 
     Jun 1 266 559 15 127 11.7 931 984 12.1 8.9 39 409 25 408 18.0 0.5 295 166 9.6 2.3 2 422 
     Jul 1 277 434 15 505 10.1 941 095 10.4 7.6 39 536 25 433 10.1 0.3 296 803 9.5 2.2 2 351 
     Aug 1 277 235 -1 383 9.9 939 387 9.9 7.3 39 486 25 439 10.0 0.3 298 362 10.0 2.3 2 205 
     Sep 1 289 717 10 230 9.6 946 651 9.1 6.7 38 937 24 751 6.9 0.2 304 129 11.6 2.7 2 187 
     Oct 1 299 825 7 940 9.2 952 803 9.2 6.8 39 275 25 132 6.7 0.2 307 747 9.4 2.2 2 103 
     Nov 1 302 658 2 979 8.3 952 583 8.0 5.9 41 199 26 580 12.4 0.4 308 877 8.6 2.0 2 075 
     Dec 1 303 097 4 741 7.4 954 134 6.8 5.0 41 076 25 648 12.1 0.4 307 887 8.7 2.0 2 060 
09 Jan 1 307 648 1 450 6.8 954 548 6.1 4.5 43 266 27 882 17.9 0.5 309 834 7.6 1.8 1 944 
     Feb 1 309 251 1 735 6.6 953 408 5.5 4.0 44 679 30 002 22.0 0.7 311 164 8.1 1.9 1 900 
     Mar 1 311 725 4 059 6.3 952 532 4.4 3.3 45 423 30 788 26.5 0.8 313 770 9.6 2.2 1 788 
     Apr 1 316 312 4 877 6.0 954 694 4.2 3.1 45 773 31 893 24.4 0.7 315 844 9.4 2.2 2 688 
     May 1 315 911 -286 5.3 952 893 3.4 2.5 45 100 31 520 18.0 0.5 317 918 9.8 2.3 2 393 
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8.7. FINANCING OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHS RESIDENT IN SPAIN (a)
 Source: BE.
 GENERAL NOTE: Tables 8.2 to 8.7 were revised in September 2000, to take into account the criteria used to compile the Financial Accounts of the Spanish economy in
 accordance with ESA 95 (see the box appearing in the article "Evolución reciente de la economía española" in the September 2000 edition of the Boletín Económico).
 a. The annual percentage changes are calculated as the effective flow of the period / the stock at the beginning of the period.
EUR millions and %
  Resident credit institu-   Resident credit institu- 
             Total   tions’ loans and   tions’ loans and        External loans   Memorandum items:
  off-balance-sheet   off-balance-sheet   off-balance-sheet
 securitised loans. Housing  securitised loans. Other   securitised loans
  Contri-    Contri-   Contri-
   Stocks   Effective   Annual    Stocks   Annual   bution    Stocks   Annual   bution    Stocks   Annual   bution   Housing    Other
  flow   growth   growth    to   growth    to   growth    to
  rate   rate   col.3   rate   col.3   rate   col.3
06 778 372 127 886 19.6 571 325 20.4 14.9 205 872 17.5 4.7 1 175 26.7 0.0 26 937 3 421 
07 874 405 97 497 12.5 644 787 13.0 9.5 227 839 11.1 2.9 1 778 51.4 0.1 26 576 5 625 
08 910 545 38 394 4.4 673 154 4.5 3.3 235 007 3.8 1.0 2 384 34.1 0.1 23 304 4 436 
08 Feb 882 251 4 525 11.8 651 849 12.2 9.0 228 214 10.3 2.7 2 188 85.4 0.1 25 885 5 492 
     Mar 886 183 4 355 10.5 655 757 11.0 8.1 228 195 8.9 2.3 2 232 80.6 0.1 25 595 5 496 
     Apr 892 678 6 538 10.1 660 265 10.5 7.7 230 165 8.8 2.3 2 248 80.0 0.1 25 308 5 495 
     May 897 841 5 328 9.6 663 535 9.9 7.3 232 025 8.3 2.2 2 281 77.5 0.1 25 026 5 325 
     Jun 906 874 9 382 8.4 665 070 8.1 5.9 239 510 9.0 2.4 2 294 76.3 0.1 24 823 5 298 
     Jul 907 208 378 7.6 667 768 7.1 5.2 237 132 8.8 2.3 2 308 68.0 0.1 24 407 5 685 
     Aug 906 863 -264 7.0 669 041 6.6 4.9 235 513 7.9 2.0 2 309 57.2 0.1 23 942 5 444 
     Sep 907 457 920 6.5 670 802 6.3 4.7 234 337 6.7 1.7 2 318 52.6 0.1 24 041 4 830 
     Oct 909 437 2 142 5.7 672 182 5.6 4.2 234 899 5.5 1.4 2 356 47.3 0.1 23 427 4 617 
     Nov 915 358 6 065 4.9 673 685 5.0 3.7 239 306 4.3 1.1 2 367 42.2 0.1 23 515 4 540 
     Dec 910 545 -4 336 4.4 673 154 4.5 3.3 235 007 3.8 1.0 2 384 34.1 0.1 23 304 4 436 
09 Jan 907 824 -2 583 3.7 673 014 4.0 2.9 232 301 2.7 0.7 2 509 14.9 0.0 23 179 4 319 
     Feb 904 847 -2 787 2.8 672 388 3.3 2.4 229 935 1.6 0.4 2 523 15.3 0.0 23 054 4 217 
     Mar 902 740 -1 401 2.2 671 335 2.5 1.8 228 846 1.2 0.3 2 559 14.7 0.0 25 356 4 497 
     Apr 904 144 1 430 1.6 671 546 1.8 1.3 230 012 0.8 0.2 2 586 15.0 0.0 25 015 4 798 
     May 903 021 -879 0.9 670 397 1.2 0.9 230 011 0.0 0.0 2 613 14.5 0.0 24 000 4 480 
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8.8.  NET FINANCING OF SPAIN’S GENERAL GOVERNMENT
 Source: BE.
 a.Consolidated: deducted securities and loans held by other General Government units.
 b.Including coined money and Caja General de Depositos.
EUR millions and %
  Contribution to 12-month % change
                Monthly change in stocks         12-month % change in stocks   in net stocks of liabilities
        Net financing
                Liabilities (a)        Assets                Liabilities     Liabilities
     Net   Monthly    12-      Securities    Non-   Depo-    Other      Securities    Non-   Assets  Securities     Non-   Assets
     stock    change   month   commer-   sits    depo-   commer-    commer-
      of   (columns     %    cial   at the    sits    cial      cial 
     lia-   4-8-9)   change    Total    Short-    Medium    loans   Banco   Total   Short-  Medium   loans   Short-   Medium     loans 
     bili-     of     term     and    and    de   term     and     and   term     and      and
     ties   col. 1     long-    other   Espana    long-    other     long-     other 
   term     (b)    term      (a)     term      (a)
05 315 420 -9 037 -2.8 2 343 -4 042 7 366 -982 -695 12 075 0.6 -10.8 2.6 -1.4 17.7 -1.2 2.3 -0.3 -3.5
06 300 445 -14 975 -4.7 -1 635 -770 -1 217 352 1 780 11 560 -0.4 -2.3 -0.4 0.5 17.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.1 -4.2
07 279 620 -20 825 -6.9 -8 657 823 -9 001 -479 2 973 9 195 -2.2 2.5 -3.1 -0.7 13.7 0.3 -3.0 -0.2 -4.0
08 330 367 50 747 18.1 51 566 19 481 22 835 9 251 740 79 13.5 58.3 8.2 13.7 0.8 7.0 8.2 3.3 -0.3
07 Dec 279 620 16 339 -6.9 -705 -1 497 -778 1 570 -5 695 -11 349 -2.2 2.5 -3.1 -0.7 13.7 0.3 -3.0 -0.2 -4.0
08 Jan 276 454 -3 166 -4.9 -5 786 3 506 -9 094 -197 621 -3 240 -4.8 7.9 -7.6 1.0 -4.6 0.9 -7.7 0.2 1.6
     Feb 280 043 3 589 -4.9 4 847 -956 4 588 1 215 3 471 -2 213 -3.7 15.2 -6.9 1.2 -0.2 1.6 -6.9 0.3 0.1
     Mar 284 657 4 614 -4.8 -4 058 -708 -3 606 257 -3 368 -5 304 -5.1 4.9 -7.6 0.4 -6.3 0.6 -7.4 0.1 2.1
     Apr 275 270 -9 387 -2.8 2 210 -1 286 3 632 -136 2 833 8 764 -3.8 9.9 -6.3 0.8 -6.5 1.1 -6.5 0.2 2.5
     May 282 746 7 475 -1.4 5 433 -321 4 808 946 1 913 -3 955 -2.7 1.4 -4.7 3.8 -6.2 0.2 -4.8 0.9 2.3
     Jun 286 202 3 456 -1.7 2 145 -476 1 571 1 050 -355 -957 -3.0 8.6 -6.0 5.2 -6.5 0.9 -6.1 1.2 2.4
     Jul 284 851 -1 351 4.6 1 729 -241 3 126 -1 156 -6 785 9 865 -0.0 1.5 -1.5 5.6 -11.0 0.2 -1.6 1.4 4.6
     Aug 300 890 16 039 5.9 637 1 873 -899 -337 -2 929 -12 473 1.3 13.6 -1.1 6.2 -11.9 1.5 -1.1 1.4 4.1
     Sep 301 002 113 6.9 10 367 2 531 6 856 980 2 646 7 608 2.5 12.4 0.3 7.1 -9.1 1.5 0.3 1.7 3.5
     Oct 292 622 -8 380 10.6 -727 4 530 -5 917 65919 739 -12 086 5.2 30.7 1.8 7.0 -7.5 3.7 1.9 1.8 3.2
     Nov 298 596 5 974 13.4 19 540 6 851 11 820 869 4 542 9 024 9.3 39.6 5.7 8.7 0.3 5.2 6.1 2.2 -0.1
     Dec 330 367 31 771 18.1 15 230 4 179 5 950 5 101 -21 588 5 047 13.5 58.3 8.2 13.7 0.8 7.0 8.2 3.3 -0.3
09 Jan 311 484 -18 883 12.7 1 033 5 540 -4 659 152 6 810 13 105 15.6 58.3 10.1 14.3 23.7 7.8 9.9 3.5 -8.4
     Feb 336 580 25 096 20.2 17 024 1 871 14 068 1 084 3 922 -11 994 18.6 67.7 13.3 13.8 14.1 8.7 13.1 3.4 -5.0
     Mar 349 215 12 634 22.7 15 098 4 118 10 244 735 -2 259 4 722 23.9 82.8 18.6 14.5 27.6 10.2 17.8 3.5 -8.8
     Apr 347 265 -1 950 26.2 14 311 5 335 8 687 28911 305 4 955 26.9 105.4 20.2 15.1 29.0 13.0 20.2 3.8 -10.8
     May 361 176 13 911 27.7 3 985 621 3 781 -417 -9 383 -544 26.2 109.2 19.5 13.0 21.8 13.0 19.3 3.2 -7.8
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8.9   LENDING BY CREDIT INSTITUTIONS TO OTHER RESIDENT SECTORS.
        BREAKDOWN BY END-USE.
 SOURCE: BE.
 a. Series obtained from information in the accounting statement established for the supervision of resident institutions. See the changes introduced in the October 2001 edition
 of the Boletín estadístico and Tables 4.13, 4.18 and 4.23 of the Boletin estadístico, which are published at www.bde.es.
 b. Includes loans and credit to households for the purchase of land and rural property, the purchase of securities, the purchase of current goods and services not considered to
 be consumer durables (e.g. loans to finance travel expenses) and for various end-uses not included in the foregoing.
 c. Asset-backed securities brought back onto the balance sheet as a result of the entry into force of Banco de España Circular BE 4/2004 have caused a break in the series in
 June 2005. The rates depicted in the chart have been adjusted to eliminate this effect.         d. Including: construction, real estate activities and home purchases and improvements
EUR millions and percentages
               Financing of productive activities                 Financing of individuals  Finan-   Unclas-    Memo-
 cing of    sified    randum
 private    item:
 Agricul-   Industry    Cons-       Services    Home purchases and     Pur-  non-    cons-
    Total    Total   ture   excluding    truc-    Total     improvements   chases    Other  profit    truction 
     (a)   and   construc-    tion               Of which     of  institu-    and
 fish-     tion               Of which   consumer    (b)  tions    housing 
  eries   durables     (d)
   Total   Real
  estate    Total   Purchases
 activities
06 1 508 625 781 644 23 014 119 488 134 317 504 825 244 050 700 294 544 389 519 244 51 461 104 445 5 704 20 983 922 756 
07 1 760 213 943 086 25 245 141 571 153 453 622 818 303 514 789 250 618 212 590 600 56 576 114 462 6 089 21 788 1 075 179 
08 1 869 882 1 016 948 26 244 156 141 151 848 682 716 318 032 819 412 649 850 621 326 54 176 115 386 6 091 27 431 1 119 730 
04 Q4 945 697 482 984 18 104 90 487 78 372 296 020 112 165 441 443 333 826 317 268 38 379 69 238 3 677 17 594 524 363 
05 Q1 989 196 507 089 18 188 93 815 83 421 311 665 121 444 462 910 351 757 334 224 39 375 71 778 3 548 15 649 556 622 
Q2 1 085 320 544 048 19 501 99 393 89 806 335 349 135 483 516 384 394 989 375 523 42 531 78 864 4 200 20 687 620 277 
Q3 1 131 241 567 022 20 182 101 716 94 411 350 714 144 811 541 346 419 032 398 498 44 644 77 670 4 355 18 518 658 253 
Q4 1 202 628 604 061 20 738 104 695 100 761 377 867 162 087 576 253 445 972 424 238 45 928 84 354 4 666 17 648 708 819 
06 Q1 1 265 755 637 277 21 213 105 687 106 183 404 195 181 491 604 878 471 966 449 246 46 320 86 592 4 788 18 813 759 639 
Q2 1 350 191 681 307 21 946 109 856 116 195 433 311 198 998 642 698 498 248 474 404 49 161 95 289 5 109 21 077 813 441 
Q3 1 419 973 728 058 22 460 115 266 127 420 462 911 216 642 666 972 519 130 494 739 50 552 97 291 5 359 19 584 863 192 
Q4 1 508 625 781 644 23 014 119 488 134 317 504 825 244 050 700 294 544 389 519 244 51 461 104 445 5 704 20 983 922 756 
07 Q1 1 569 169 816 098 23 436 121 148 137 836 533 678 264 653 726 179 566 341 540 541 52 713 107 125 5 743 21 149 968 830 
Q2 1 652 352 869 174 24 294 132 145 144 552 568 184 282 081 754 726 588 694 562 101 53 898 112 135 5 955 22 497 1 015 326 
Q3 1 706 126 910 001 25 085 140 332 150 341 594 243 292 599 768 197 604 623 577 337 54 035 109 539 6 106 21 822 1 047 563 
Q4 1 760 213 943 086 25 245 141 571 153 453 622 818 303 514 789 250 618 212 590 600 56 576 114 462 6 089 21 788 1 075 179 
08 Q1 1 793 356 962 331 25 003 143 816 154 237 639 275 311 272 802 258 630 161 601 958 57 357 114 740 5 804 22 962 1 095 670 
Q2 1 838 174 991 307 25 727 148 218 155 600 661 762 313 176 817 074 640 247 611 447 57 726 119 101 5 952 23 840 1 109 023 
Q3 1 852 560 1 005 670 26 593 155 481 156 363 667 233 315 444 816 752 646 761 617 904 55 859 114 132 6 063 24 075 1 118 568 
Q4 1 869 882 1 016 948 26 244 156 141 151 848 682 716 318 032 819 412 649 850 621 326 54 176 115 386 6 091 27 431 1 119 730 
09 Q1 1 861 747 1 014 668 24 492 158 707 141 308 690 161 322 960 806 995 645 979 616 312 50 493 110 523 5 125 34 958 1 110 246 
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8.10. PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT OF BANKS, SAVINGS BANKS AND CREDIT CO-OPERATIVES RESIDENT IN SPAIN
 Source: BE.
 Note: The underlying series for this indicator are in Table 4.36 of the BE Boletín estadístico.
 a. Profit before tax divided by own funds.
 b. Only those financial assets and liabilities which respectively give rise to financial income and costs have been considered to calculate the averge return and cost.
 c. Average of the last four quarters.
                  As a percentage of the adjusted average balance sheet            Percentages
 Return  Average  Average  Average 
  Inte-    on             Of   Other  Adjus-   Other   return   return  cost of 
  Inte-   rest  Net in-  equity   Gross  Opera-   which:  opera-   ted    net   Profit   on own  on lend-  borrow-  Differ- 
  rest  expen-  terest  instru-  income   ting   ting   net   income   before   funds    ing    ing   ence
 income   ses  income   ments  expen-  Staff  income  income     tax   opera-   opera-  (12-13 )
 and non  ses:  costs    (a)   tions   tions
 interest     (b)    (b)
  income 
06 3.8 2.6 1.2 1.5 2.8 1.2 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.6 1.6 19.5 3.7 2.6 1.1
07 4.7 3.5 1.2 1.3 2.5 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.4 1.0 20.8 4.6 3.6 1.0
08 4.8 3.6 1.2 1.0 2.1 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 12.5 5.1 4.2 1.0
06 Q1 3.2 2.0 1.2 1.0 2.2 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.8 14.9 3.3 2.1 1.2
Q2 3.4 2.2 1.2 1.4 2.6 1.2 0.7 0.4 1.1 0.2 1.2 16.0 3.4 2.2 1.2
Q3 3.6 2.4 1.2 0.9 2.1 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.7 15.9 3.5 2.4 1.1
Q4 3.8 2.6 1.2 1.5 2.8 1.2 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.6 1.6 19.5 3.7 2.6 1.1
07 Q1 4.1 2.8 1.2 1.2 2.4 1.1 0.7 0.2 1.1 0.0 1.1 20.9 3.9 2.8 1.1
Q2 4.3 3.0 1.2 1.8 3.0 1.1 0.7 0.4 1.6 0.1 1.7 23.3 4.2 3.1 1.1
Q3 4.5 3.2 1.3 0.8 2.1 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.8 23.7 4.4 3.3 1.1
Q4 4.7 3.5 1.2 1.3 2.5 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.4 1.0 20.8 4.6 3.6 1.0
08 Q1 4.8 3.5 1.2 1.1 2.4 1.0 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 20.1 4.8 3.8 1.0
Q2 4.9 3.6 1.2 1.3 2.5 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.1 1.0 16.9 5.0 3.9 1.0
Q3 5.0 3.8 1.2 0.9 2.1 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.7 16.1 5.1 4.1 1.0
Q4 4.8 3.6 1.2 1.0 2.1 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 12.5 5.1 4.2 1.0
09 Q1 4.1 2.7 1.4 0.7 2.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.8 11.4 5.0 3.9 1.1
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8.11.  MUTUAL FUNDS RESIDENT IN SPAIN
 SOURCES: CNMV and Inverco.
 a. Includes short and long-term fixed-income funds in euros and international, mixed fixed-income funds in euros and international and guaranteed funds.
 b. Includes equity funds and mixed equity funds in euros, national and international.
 c. Global funds.
EUR millions
  Others 
                 Total          Money-market funds           Fixed-income funds (a)             Equity funds (b)   funds 
   (c)
          Of which          Of which          Of which         Of which
  Net  Monthly  Return   Net  Monthly  Return   Net   Monthly  Return   Net  Monthly  Return    Net
  asset  change   Net   over   asset  change   Net   over   asset   change   Net   over   asset  change   Net   over    asset 
  value  funds   last   value  funds   last   value  funds   last   value  funds   last    value 
 inves-    12  inves-    12  inves-    12  inves-    12
  ted  months   ted  months   ted  months   ted  months 
05 262 201 26 113 14 270 5.1 54 751 -3 237 -3 881 1.2 143 047 15 312 12 061 2.8 40 672 8 649 2 303 20.0 23 730 
06 270 407 8 206 -10 861 5.4 106 -54 645 -55 113 2.0 191 002 47 954 39 212 2.8 45 365 4 693 -2 189 18.2 33 934 
07 256 055 -14 352 -22 008 2.6 - -106 -106 ... 185 963 -5 039 -8 287 2.6 39 449 -5 916 -7 179 3.6 30 643 
07 Aug 275 016 -19 -242 5.3 - - - ... 193 565 3 073 2 697 3.3 46 136 -2 060 -1 421 14.7 35 314 
     Sep 270 736 -4 279 -5 439 4.8 - - - ... 192 289 -1 277 -1 624 3.1 44 560 -1 576 -1 877 12.1 33 887 
     Oct 267 586 -3 151 -6 069 4.8 - - - ... 189 387 -2 902 -3 907 3.1 44 816 255 -1 196 12.5 33 383 
     Nov 261 331 -6 255 -4 310 3.8 - - - ... 188 057 -1 330 -1 536 2.9 41 620 -3 196 -1 640 8.3 31 654 
     Dec 256 055 -5 276 -4 537 2.6 - - - ... 185 963 -2 094 -1 919 2.6 39 449 -2 171 -1 417 3.6 30 643 
08 Jan 244 286 -11 769 -6 863 -0.3 35 111 35 111 1 027 ... 151 093 -34 870 531 2.0 30 184 -9 265 -5 341 -9.4 27 898 
     Feb 240 462 -3 824 -4 123 0.0 36 169 1 058 -10 ... 148 946 -2 147 -1 376 2.0 28 813 -1 371 -1 319 -8.0 26 534 
     Mar 235 174 -5 288 -3 933 -1.1 37 340 1 171 -369 ... 147 530 -1 415 -1 658 1.5 27 214 -1 599 -906 -12.0 23 090 
     Apr 231 723 -3 451 -5 458 -0.7 36 428 -912 -909 ... 145 511 -2 019 -2 512 1.4 27 622 409 -839 -9.5 22 161 
     May 226 535 -5 187 -5 542 -1.3 35 029 -1 400 -1 590 ... 142 921 -2 590 -2 562 1.0 27 159 -464 -627 -12.0 21 427 
     Jun 215 574 -10 961 -7 355 -2.8 33 849 -1 180 -1 569 ... 137 444 -5 476 -3 950 0.4 24 008 -3 150 -753 -19.1 20 273 
     Jul 208 593 -6 982 -7 186 -2.4 32 589 -1 260 -1 628 ... 135 012 -2 433 -2 798 0.7 22 309 -1 699 -1 354 -19.0 18 683 
     Aug 205 707 -2 886 -7 138 -1.8 32 125 -464 -549 ... 134 723 -289 -711 0.8 21 922 -388 -5 444 -17.6 16 938 
     Sep 198 665 -7 042 -5 892 -3.3 30 927 -1 198 -1 176 ... 131 932 -2 791 -2 863 0.3 19 242 -2 680 -972 -24.7 16 564 
     Oct 185 428 -13 237 -11 680 -5.2 29 165 -1 762 -1 796 ... 126 590 -5 342 -7 323 -0.2 15 756 -3 486 -959 -36.5 13 917 
     Nov 180 835 -4 593 -4 363 -4.6 28 810 -355 -427 ... 124 111 -2 479 -2 854 0.1 14 708 -1 048 -496 -36.5 13 207 
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8.12. SHARE PRICE INDICES AND TURNOVER ON SECURITIES MARKETS. SPAIN AND EURO AREA
Indices, EUR millions and thousands of contracts
           Share price indices                                 Turnover on securities markets
  Financial options   Financial futures 
  General       Dow Jones     Stock market    AIAF   (thousands of   (thousands of
  Madrid  EURO STOXX indices  Book-entry    fixed-   contracts)   contracts)
  Stock    IBEX  government   income
  Exchange     35    debt   market
   Shares   Shares
   Broad     50   Equities    Bonds    Fixed-  and other    Fixed-  and other 
   income   equities    income  equities 
07 1 637.50 14 899.46 419.02 4 344.48 1 670 178 89 600 3 040 244 1 115 708 - 14 161 - 8 722 
08 1 262.61 11 738.25 309.67 3 277.70 1 245 129 79 578 2 178 310 2 403 160 - 19 146 - 7 605 
09 909.46 8 699.12 209.23 2 255.17 420 475 39 705 1 122 480 2 118 370 - 16 226 - 2 952 
P
 Sources: Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia Stock Exchanges (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6); Reuters (columns 3 and4); AIAF (column 8) and Spanish Financial Futures 
 Market (MEFFSA) (columns 9 to 12)
08 Mar 1 439.06 13 269.00 346.99 3 628.06 95 384 5 646 193 445 118 222 ... 1 466 ... 633
     Apr 1 485.01 13 798.30 366.23 3 825.02 116 192 7 223 191 286 160 603 ... 1 544 ... 563
     May 1 460.74 13 600.90 364.68 3 777.85 97 678 5 904 140 822 211 806 ... 799 ... 515
     Jun 1 297.87 12 046.20 321.61 3 352.81 105 483 6 745 142 121 204 624 ... 2 196 ... 649
     Jul 1 276.51 11 881.30 315.84 3 367.82 118 682 7 359 175 967 238 332 ... 1 361 ... 691
     Aug 1 256.93 11 707.30 319.45 3 365.63 67 466 7 081 109 103 173 832 ... 728 ... 557
     Sep 1 175.14 10 987.50 282.61 3 038.20 102 011 6 220 149 233 169 860 ... 1 953 ... 771
     Oct 978.13 9 116.00 237.67 2 591.76 119 483 7 707 190 268 305 089 ... 1 732 ... 765
     Nov 950.75 8 910.60 222.34 2 430.31 73 259 6 525 194 344 293 279 ... 1 979 ... 512
     Dec 975.97 9 195.80 222.81 2 451.48 61 062 5 536 141 215 312 823 ... 2 854 ... 455
09 Jan 898.03 8 450.40 207.09 2 236.98 66 689 6 020 162 791 359 649 ... 2 541 ... 437
     Feb 803.92 7 620.90 184.27 1 976.23 57 487 7 863 194 144 295 515 ... 1 817 ... 443
     Mar 820.67 7 815.00 191.62 2 071.13 60 788 5 780 183 641 343 513 ... 3 820 ... 522
     Apr 935.85 9 038.00 220.27 2 375.34 74 828 7 017 180 362 347 866 ... 2 310 ... 563
     May 975.73 9 424.30 227.48 2 451.24 75 889 7 271 199 822 367 038 ... 1 754 ... 457
     Jun 1 016.66 9 787.80 223.02 2 401.69 84 794 5 753 201 721 404 790 ... 3 984 ... 531
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9.1. INTEREST RATES. EUROSYSTEM AND MONEY MARKET. EURO AREA AND SPAIN
Averages of daily data. Percentages per annum
     Eurosystem monetary policy                                                   Money market
             operations
  Main   Longer      Standing             Euro area: deposits                                    Spain
 refinan-    term     facilities               (Euribor) (a)
 cing ope-  refinan- 
 rations:  cing ope-
  weekly  rations:         Non-transferable deposits      Govermment-securities
 tenders   monthly  Margin-    repos
  tenders    al   Over- 
 lending  Deposit   night  1-month 3-month 6-month  1-year 
 (EONIA)   Over-  1-month 3-month 6-month  1-year   Over- 1-month 3-month  1-year 
  night   night 
07 4.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 3.866 4.09 4.28 4.35 4.45 3.85 4.08 4.27 4.33 4.44 3.78 3.85 3.90 4.11
08 2.50 2.50 3.00 2.00 3.863 4.27 4.63 4.72 4.81 3.85 4.26 4.62 4.66 4.78 3.71 3.74 3.71 3.47
09 1.00 1.00 1.75 0.25 1.076 1.31 1.66 1.81 1.95 1.04 1.39 1.66 1.77 1.94 0.96 0.94 0.93 1.15
 Source: ECB (columns 1 to 8).
   a. To December 1998, synthetic euro area rates have been calculated on the basis of national rates weighted by GDP
08 Mar 4.00 4.44 5.00 3.00 4.091 4.30 4.60 4.59 4.59 4.07 4.28 4.58 4.57 4.58 4.01 3.99 3.94 -
     Apr 4.00 4.55 5.00 3.00 3.987 4.37 4.78 4.80 4.82 3.99 4.33 4.76 4.77 4.76 3.97 3.98 3.98 -
     May 4.00 4.51 5.00 3.00 4.010 4.39 4.86 4.90 4.99 4.00 4.36 4.82 4.85 4.95 3.99 3.98 4.00 -
     Jun 4.00 4.50 5.00 3.00 4.007 4.47 4.94 5.09 5.36 3.99 4.43 4.94 5.02 5.29 3.98 4.08 4.18 -
     Jul 4.25 4.70 5.25 3.25 4.191 4.47 4.96 5.15 5.39 4.17 4.45 4.95 5.05 5.34 4.12 4.25 4.30 -
     Aug 4.25 4.60 5.25 3.25 4.299 4.49 4.97 5.16 5.32 4.27 4.47 4.94 5.09 5.26 4.28 4.31 4.34 4.46
     Sep 4.25 4.36 5.25 3.25 4.273 4.66 5.02 5.22 5.38 4.27 4.60 4.99 5.15 5.30 4.13 4.24 4.25 -
     Oct 3.75 3.75 4.25 3.25 3.820 4.83 5.11 5.18 5.25 3.88 4.82 5.13 5.23 5.28 3.22 3.34 3.29 -
     Nov 3.25 3.25 3.75 2.75 3.150 3.84 4.24 4.30 4.35 3.17 3.93 4.18 4.19 4.42 2.74 2.69 2.49 2.21
     Dec 2.50 2.50 3.00 2.00 2.486 2.99 3.29 3.37 3.45 2.41 3.08 3.33 3.32 3.46 2.22 2.12 1.92 -
09 Jan 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.812 2.14 2.46 2.54 2.62 1.75 2.25 2.37 2.27 2.38 1.60 1.50 1.37 -
     Feb 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.257 1.63 1.94 2.03 2.14 1.27 1.76 1.98 2.05 2.18 1.16 1.13 1.04 1.18
     Mar 1.50 1.50 2.50 0.50 1.062 1.27 1.64 1.78 1.91 1.03 1.33 1.62 1.77 1.89 0.93 0.86 0.91 1.13
     Apr 1.25 1.25 2.25 0.25 0.842 1.01 1.42 1.61 1.77 0.82 1.12 1.47 1.61 1.76 0.73 0.79 0.81 -
     May 1.00 1.00 1.75 0.25 0.782 0.88 1.28 1.48 1.64 0.71 0.96 1.30 1.49 ... 0.67 0.70 0.73 -
     Jun 1.00 1.00 1.75 0.25 0.698 0.91 1.23 1.44 1.61 0.66 0.91 1.26 1.45 1.51 0.66 0.70 0.72 -
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9.2. INTEREST RATES: SPANISH SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM SECURITIES MARKETS
  Sources: Main issuers (column 3); AIAF (columns 4 and 12).
Percentages per annum
          Short-term securities                               Long-term securities
  One-year Treasury  One-year commercial
         bills          paper                         Central Government debt
   Private
  bonds with 
  Marginal  Secondary     Rate  Secondary   Secondary market.   a maturity 
  rate at    market:      at    market:   Book-entry debt.    of over
   issue   outright     issue   outright               Marginal rate at issue    Outright spot   two years 
    spot     spot   purchases between   traded on 
  purchases  purchases    market members    the AIAF 
   between
   market
   members    3-year   5-year   10-year   15-year   30-year     At     At
   bonds   bonds    bonds    bonds    bonds   3-years   10-years
07 4.11 4.07 4.46 4.49 4.00 4.16 4.24 - 4.49 4.13 4.31 4.67
08 3.78 3.71 4.82 4.89 3.93 4.10 4.48 4.92 4.76 3.89 4.36 5.25
09 1.22 1.16 1.99 2.03 2.53 3.14 4.06 4.51 4.90 2.48 4.12 3.58
08 Mar 3.64 3.71 4.62 4.62 - - - - - 3.56 4.12 4.77
     Apr 3.95 3.98 4.74 4.84 3.90 3.96 - - 4.79 3.96 4.31 5.19
     May 4.24 4.18 4.93 5.02 3.99 4.07 - - 4.92 4.16 4.42 5.30
     Jun 4.67 4.55 5.30 5.36 - - 4.84 - - 4.73 4.79 5.81
     Jul 4.46 4.49 5.36 5.33 4.96 4.86 4.76 - - 4.68 4.80 6.42
     Aug 4.38 4.37 5.31 5.31 - - - - - 4.27 4.56 5.59
     Sep 4.34 4.23 5.32 5.44 4.35 - 4.62 4.92 - 4.18 4.57 5.26
     Oct 3.40 3.18 5.17 5.35 - 4.42 - - 5.12 3.60 4.47 5.66
     Nov 2.54 2.40 4.52 4.63 3.41 4.07 3.96 - - 3.21 4.15 5.70
     Dec 2.23 2.09 3.72 3.73 2.96 3.35 - - 4.20 3.07 3.86 3.96
09 Jan 1.45 1.46 2.67 2.78 3.10 3.44 - 4.50 4.85 2.87 4.15 5.00
     Feb 1.30 1.25 2.14 2.24 2.45 3.50 3.84 - 4.96 2.67 4.23 3.30
     Mar 1.30 1.23 1.99 1.99 2.52 3.01 4.22 - 4.96 2.49 4.06 3.37
     Apr 1.27 1.11 1.77 1.82 2.52 3.05 4.08 4.53 - 2.29 4.01 3.20
     May 0.95 0.95 1.74 1.73 2.05 2.88 3.72 - 4.80 2.19 4.05 3.24
     Jun 1.07 0.96 1.65 1.65 - 3.06 4.42 - 4.92 2.34 4.24 3.35
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9.3.  INTEREST RATES ON NEW BUSINESS. CREDIT INSTITUTIONS. (CBE 4/2002)
 Source: BE.
 a. APRC: annual percentage rate of charge. NEDR: narrowly defined effective rate, which is the same as the APRC without including commissions.
 b. Calculated by adding to the NDER rate, which does not include commissions and other expenses, a moving average of such expenses.
 c. The synthetic rates of loans and deposits are obtained as the average of the interest rates on new business weighted by the euro-denominated stocks included in the balance
 sheet for all the instruments of each sector.
Percentages
               Loans (APRC) (a)                       Deposits (NDER) (a)
 Syn-  Households and NPISH      Non-financial  Syn-      Households and NPISH   Non-financial corporations 
 thetic      corporations  thetic
 rate  rate
  (c)   (c)
 Syn-  House  Con-  Syn-  Up to  Over  Syn-  Over-   Time  Repos  Syn-   Over-   Time   Repos 
 thetic  pur-  sump-  thetic  EUR 1  EUR 1  thetic  night  thetic   night 
 rate  chase  tion  rate  million  million  rate  and re-  rate
 and    (b)  deema- 
 other  ble at 
 notice 
07 6.03 6.28 5.53 8.34 5.80 6.32 5.50 2.77 2.72 0.70 4.41 3.72 2.92 1.94 4.42 3.92
08 5.71 6.61 5.83 8.79 4.87 5.91 4.42 2.72 2.79 0.69 4.18 2.20 2.50 1.77 3.47 2.29
09 3.85 4.53 3.36 7.86 3.23 4.62 2.58 1.49 1.58 0.46 2.38 0.64 1.21 0.79 1.77 0.70
07 Oct 5.97 6.27 5.57 8.24 5.68 6.21 5.27 2.68 2.64 0.71 4.31 3.81 2.80 1.82 4.24 3.97
     Nov 6.04 6.35 5.59 8.41 5.74 6.22 5.33 2.69 2.65 0.71 4.29 3.81 2.82 1.87 4.22 4.02
     Dec 6.03 6.28 5.53 8.34 5.80 6.32 5.50 2.77 2.72 0.70 4.41 3.72 2.92 1.94 4.42 3.92
08 Jan 6.00 6.38 5.56 8.64 5.64 6.24 5.23 2.87 2.84 0.72 4.52 3.77 2.98 1.96 4.43 3.94
     Feb 5.98 6.35 5.59 8.49 5.64 6.13 5.23 2.89 2.87 0.74 4.51 3.81 2.96 1.97 4.27 4.02
     Mar 5.95 6.25 5.43 8.55 5.67 6.17 5.28 2.83 2.78 0.76 4.31 3.84 2.99 1.92 4.36 4.04
     Apr 6.01 6.21 5.38 8.54 5.82 6.35 5.42 2.96 2.90 0.77 4.47 3.82 3.13 1.97 4.55 4.02
     May 6.13 6.40 5.55 8.78 5.89 6.45 5.50 2.97 2.92 0.78 4.50 3.84 3.11 1.97 4.51 4.06
     Jun 6.17 6.54 5.72 8.78 5.83 6.50 5.50 3.04 2.99 0.75 4.64 3.88 3.20 2.04 4.59 4.07
     Jul 6.37 6.70 5.94 8.82 6.06 6.64 5.71 3.16 3.11 0.78 4.79 4.04 3.29 2.09 4.71 4.24
     Aug 6.55 7.07 6.18 9.58 6.06 6.67 5.74 3.19 3.14 0.79 4.78 4.08 3.34 2.20 4.65 4.34
     Sep 6.57 7.07 6.21 9.48 6.11 6.70 5.70 3.22 3.21 0.80 4.84 4.07 3.28 2.13 4.71 4.21
     Oct 6.57 7.03 6.21 9.35 6.14 6.97 5.66 3.35 3.35 0.77 5.04 3.34 3.34 2.25 4.67 3.42
     Nov 6.31 7.01 6.18 9.31 5.66 6.56 5.11 3.01 3.06 0.73 4.60 2.72 2.86 2.00 3.98 2.88
     Dec 5.71 6.61 5.83 8.79 4.87 5.91 4.42 2.72 2.79 0.69 4.18 2.20 2.50 1.77 3.47 2.29
09 Jan 5.02 5.95 4.97 8.71 4.17 5.40 3.60 2.25 2.33 0.61 3.47 1.56 1.97 1.39 2.75 1.59
     Feb 4.51 5.28 4.35 7.91 3.80 5.06 3.15 2.01 2.11 0.60 3.12 1.14 1.69 1.27 2.30 1.18
     Mar 4.19 4.86 3.91 7.58 3.59 4.84 2.97 1.77 1.87 0.55 2.76 0.89 1.44 1.01 2.03 0.94
     Apr 3.88 4.65 3.55 7.77 3.18 4.69 2.56 1.58 1.66 0.49 2.46 0.74 1.31 0.87 1.90 0.76
     May 3.85 4.53 3.36 7.86 3.23 4.62 2.58 1.49 1.58 0.46 2.38 0.64 1.21 0.79 1.77 0.70
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9.4 INDICES OF SPANISH COMPETITIVENESS VIS-à-VIS THE EU-27 AND THE EURO AREA
Base 1999 QI = 100
                                        Vis-à-vis the EU-27                Vis-à-vis the euro area
                  Total (a)             Price component   (c)   Based on  Based on  Based on   Based on   Based on 
   Nominal   producer  consumer  total unit  manufactu    export 
  component    prices    prices    labour   ring unit     unit
  Based on   Based on  Based on   Based on      (b)   Based on   Based on  Based on   Based on     costs    labour    values 
  producer   consumer  total unit    export   producer   consumer  total unit    export     costs
   prices    prices    labour     unit   prices    prices   labour     unit     (d)
    costs    values    costs    values
06 106.3 108.5 108.9 102.6 100.0 106.3 108.5 108.9 102.7 106.0 108.6 110.1 118.2 103.9
07 106.5 109.2 110.0 103.9 99.9 106.6 109.3 110.1 104.0 106.3 109.5 111.5 120.2 104.9
08 109.0 111.9 112.0 103.8 101.5 107.4 110.2 110.3 102.3 107.6 110.6 111.9 122.6 104.6
07 Q2 106.5 109.3 109.8 103.9 99.8 106.7 109.5 110.0 104.0 106.4 109.7 111.3 118.6 104.9
Q3 106.3 108.9 110.1 104.4 99.8 106.5 109.1 110.3 104.6 106.2 109.3 111.8 120.3 105.4
Q4 106.9 110.5 110.9 103.6 100.3 106.7 110.3 110.6 103.4 106.5 110.5 112.0 122.1 104.7
08 Q1 108.5 110.8 112.5 103.8 101.0 107.5 109.8 111.4 102.8 107.5 110.0 112.9 124.6 104.8
Q2 109.3 112.2 112.7 103.7 101.4 107.9 110.7 111.2 102.3 108.1 111.0 112.7 125.8 104.7
Q3 109.3 111.7 111.8 104.3 101.3 107.8 110.2 110.3 102.9 108.1 110.6 111.9 123.5 105.3
Q4 108.8 112.9 111.0 103.5 102.3 106.3 110.3 108.5 101.1 106.7 110.8 109.9 116.4 103.7
09 Q1 110.0 112.9 111.6 103.1 103.7 106.1 108.9 107.7 99.5 106.9 109.5 109.2 116.6 103.3
 Source: BE.
 a. Outcome of multiplying nominal and cost/price components. A decline in the index denotes an improvement in the competitiveness of Spanish products.
 b. Geometric mean calculated using a double weighting system based on 1995-1997 (until 1999) and 1999-2001 (since 1999) manufacturing foreign trade figures.
 c. Relationship between the price indices of Spain and of the group.
 d. The index obtained drawing on Manufacturing Labour Costs has been compiled using base year 2000 National Accounts data.
08 Sep 109.1 111.5 ... 103.7 101.5 107.5 109.9 ... 102.2 107.9 110.4 ... ... 104.6
     Oct 108.8 112.0 ... 103.7 101.5 107.2 110.4 ... 102.2 107.6 110.9 ... ... 104.3
     Nov 108.6 112.9 ... 103.6 102.2 106.3 110.4 ... 101.4 106.7 110.9 ... ... 104.0
     Dec 108.9 113.7 ... 103.1 103.3 105.3 110.0 ... 99.8 105.9 110.5 ... ... 102.9
09 Jan 109.9 113.4 ... 103.2 103.7 106.1 109.4 ... 99.5 106.7 109.9 ... ... 103.2
     Feb 110.0 112.5 ... 103.0 103.5 106.3 108.8 ... 99.5 107.0 109.3 ... ... 103.3
     Mar 110.1 112.8 ... 103.2 103.9 106.0 108.6 ... 99.3 106.8 109.1 ... ... 103.4
     Apr 109.9 113.2 ... ... 103.5 106.2 109.4 ... ... 107.1 110.0 ... ... ...
     May 109.6 112.8 ... ... 103.2 106.2 109.2 ... ... 107.1 109.9 ... ... ...
     Jun ... 112.8 ... ... 103.0 ... 109.5 ... ... ... 110.2 ... ... ...
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9.5 INDICES OF SPANISH COMPETITIVENESS VIS-à-VIS THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES
Base 1999 QI = 100
                                       Vis-à-vis developed countries               Vis-à-vis industrialised countries
                        Total (a)          Prices component (c)   Total (a)     Prices component(c) 
   Nominal    Nominal 
   compon-    compon- 
   Based on    Based on   Based on    Based on      ent    Based on   Based on   Based on   Based on    Based on   Based on      ent    Based on   Based on 
   producer    consumer    manufac -     export unit      (b)    producer    consumer    manufac -     export unit    producer   consumer      (b)    producer   consumer 
    prices    prices   turing unit     values     prices     prices   turing unit    values    prices     prices    prices     prices 
  labour costs   labour costs 
      (d)       (d)
06 108.6 110.8 120.8 104.0 101.2 107.4 109.5 119.4 102.8 108.7 111.4 101.6 107.0 109.7
07 110.3 113.0 123.7 106.2 102.3 107.8 110.5 120.9 103.8 110.6 113.9 103.0 107.4 110.6
08 113.0 116.1 128.8 106.0 104.1 108.5 111.5 123.7 101.8 113.4 117.2 105.2 107.7 111.4
07 Q2 110.1 113.0 122.1 106.1 102.2 107.8 110.6 119.5 103.8 110.4 113.9 102.8 107.4 110.8
Q3 110.1 112.7 123.8 106.7 102.3 107.7 110.2 121.0 104.3 110.5 113.6 103.0 107.3 110.3
Q4 111.3 115.0 127.0 106.4 103.1 107.9 111.5 123.1 103.1 111.9 116.1 104.1 107.5 111.5
08 Q1 113.0 115.4 130.4 106.5 103.9 108.7 111.0 125.5 102.5 113.5 116.5 105.0 108.2 111.0
Q2 114.3 117.3 132.9 106.7 104.8 109.0 111.9 126.8 101.8 115.0 118.8 106.2 108.3 111.9
Q3 113.8 116.4 130.2 106.9 104.5 108.8 111.4 124.6 102.2 114.2 117.6 105.7 108.0 111.2
Q4 110.9 115.3 121.8 104.1 103.2 107.4 111.7 118.0 100.8 110.8 115.9 104.0 106.5 111.4
09 Q1 111.5 114.7 123.1 102.9 103.9 107.3 110.4 118.5 99.0 111.2 115.2 104.7 106.2 110.0
 Source: BE.
 a. Outcome of multiplying nominal and cost/price components. A decline in the index denotes an improvement in the competitiveness of Spanish products.
 b. Geometric mean calculated using a double weighting system based on 1995-1997 (until 1999) and 1999-2001 (since 1999) manufacturing foreign trade figures.
 c. Relationship between the price indices of Spain and of the group.
 d. The index obtained drawing on Manufacturing Labour Costs has been compiled using base year 2000 National Accounts data.
08 Sep 112.8 115.6 ... 105.9 104.0 108.5 111.2 ... 101.8 113.1 116.6 105.1 107.6 111.0
     Oct 111.3 114.8 ... 104.7 102.8 108.3 111.7 ... 101.9 111.3 115.5 103.6 107.4 111.5
     Nov 110.4 114.9 ... 103.8 102.7 107.4 111.9 ... 101.1 110.1 115.4 103.4 106.5 111.6
     Dec 111.0 116.2 ... 103.7 104.2 106.6 111.6 ... 99.6 111.0 116.9 105.1 105.6 111.3
09 Jan 111.6 115.3 ... 103.0 104.0 107.2 110.9 ... 99.0 111.3 115.8 104.8 106.2 110.5
     Feb 111.1 114.0 ... 102.5 103.4 107.5 110.2 ... 99.1 110.8 114.4 104.1 106.4 109.9
     Mar 111.8 114.8 ... 103.1 104.3 107.2 110.1 ... 98.9 111.5 115.4 105.1 106.1 109.7
     Apr 111.8 115.5 ... ... 104.1 107.4 110.9 ... ... 111.4 115.9 104.9 106.2 110.5
     May 111.8 115.4 ... ... 104.2 107.3 110.7 ... ... 111.5 115.9 105.1 106.1 110.3
     Jun ... 115.8 ... ... 104.3 ... 111.1 ... ... ... 116.5 105.3 ... 110.7
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